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Abstract 
 
This project is a kind of doingmovingthinking: a close study of iconic American 
dancer/choreographer Deborah Hay’s choreography and practice through my particular dancing 
experience of her solo At Once. The resulting experiential poetics illuminates both the implicit 
critique of an instrumental/rational paradigm and also the ethical implications of the particular 
relationality enacted in Hay’s work. I characterize Hay’s work as a radical communication 
practice, one that moves language through the body in a dynamic torqueing process that both 
gathers toward and unravels from the edges of meaningfulness in a process of perception. I work 
at the interdisciplinary intersection of dance, performance, somatics and cultural studies, and my 
thinking draws substantially on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy and 
language. Aspiring to a balanced integration of moving and writing, of practice and theory, I 
follow a performance studies approach, attempting, as characterized by performance scholar 
Dwight Conquergood: “to live betwixt and between theory and theatricality, paradigms and 
practices, critical reflection and creative accomplishment” (318).  
Through personal daily practice and performance of Hay’s work allied with close 
description, I apply my devised method of emergent choreographic analysis to Hay’s 
choreography and practice. This analysis, conducted from inside the practice of the work, reveals 
how Hay’s complex and distinctly linguistic choreography operates as a constructed situation for 
the practice of perception and that, in performance, this practice moves language through the 
body in a dynamic torqueing process that engenders a unique lived experience of paradoxical 
simultaneity. I coin the term somatic anacrusis to articulate this underlying processual 
phenomenon. Reconsidering the dimension of relationality in Hay’s work, I re-frame somatic 
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anacrusis as a pre-relational pre-disposing, a kind of suspended or “unconsummated 
relationality”. Feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray’s thinking helps illuminate the ethical 
implications of Hay’s work as a practice of perception that opens a new way toward the other. I 
conclude by appropriating Hay’s own rhetorical interrogative strategy “what if…?” What if 
somatic anacrusis offers a possible answer to Irigaray’s call for a new way to approach the other 
that respects fundamental difference and yet allows encounter? 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
But our tradition is not dedicated to the cultivation of sensible perception. We are 
accustomed to living thought as a night of the senses, as a transmission of language and 
its truth, without putting either of these to the test of everyday perception. (Irigaray, To 
Be Two 22) 
 
Since 1970, my practice and resources as a dancer and choreographer have shifted from 
physical to perceptual challenges. (Hay, “Remaining Positionless” 22)  
 
… I wonder how to sustain a relationship between us, between two facts of body and 
language, between two intentions constituting an incarnate relationship which is realized 
by flesh and words. (Irigaray, To Be Two 28) 
 
What if dance is how I practice my relationship with my whole body at once in 
relationship to the space where I am dancing in relationship to each passing moment in 
relationship to my audience? (Hay, At Once 1) 
 
Such a cultivation of perception would modify our loving relationships, whether intimate 
or communal. In fact, there is no rupture between intersubjectivity in the strict sense and 
the intersubjectivity of a collectivity, and the desired changes in the relations between 
man and woman, men and women, form part of a transformation which is helpful to all of 
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our social relationships. (Irigaray, To Be Two 23) 
As the above quotes imply, this dissertation ultimately makes legible American 
postmodern dance artist Deborah Hay’s distinctly linguistic approach to choreography and 
performance practice through feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray’s call for a culture of 
perception and a new relationality. Through practice-based research, phenomenological 
description and my devised method of emergent choreographic analysis I develop an experiential 
poetics of Hay’s choreography and practice that illuminates both the implicit critique of an 
instrumental/rational paradigm and also the ethical implications of a particular relationality that 
are enacted in Hay’s work. I characterize Hay’s work as a radical communication practice1, one 
that moves language through the body in a dynamic torqueing process that both gathers toward 
and unravels from the edges of meaningfulness in a process of perception. Hay’s distinctly 
linguistic choreography and practice generates a counter-twisting force, engendering a lived 
experience of paradoxical simultaneity and sustained suspension of logical coherence for which I 
coin the term somatic anacrusis. I draw out the ethical implications of Hay’s work, ultimately 
understood as a response to Irigaray’s call, by articulating how somatic anacrusis functions as a 
pre-relational pre-disposing that offers a new way to approach the other that respects the 
fundamental irreducibility and dynamic porosity of subjectivity and otherness. What if …? 
This introductory chapter provides the context for my research and outlines the structure 
of the dissertation as a whole. In what follows here, I situate my inquiry within an extended 
critique of modernity and in relation to relevant contemporary debates in the fields of dance and 
performance. I then present my research questions and objectives with respect to Hay’s artistic 
practice, provide the reader with a general sense of her work, and establish the basis of my 
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primary research in her Solo Performance Commissioning Project (Hay, SPCP2). In a chapter 
outline, I provide a brief overview of my experiential approach to research and analysis, 
summarize my main arguments and highlight some of the key theoretical reference points for my 
analysis. After addressing the limitations and delimitations of this study, I position this 
dissertation overall as a textual “adaptation” of Hay’s work, which therefore places it within a 
performative paradigm as a process of “doingmovingthinking” versus within an 
instrumentalizing paradigm as a product of knowledge. I begin by outlining my project and 
situating my dance-specific research within a broader critique of modernity that, in fact, Hay 
explicitly addresses in her own discourse about her work.  
 
Context 
My analysis of Hay’s work – as a radical communication practice – gains traction in the context 
of an extended critique of modernity that considers the force, play and capacity of the body, 
movement and perception in relation to the powers, influences and structures of language and 
socio-cultural prescription. Today we face increasingly complex and concentrated encounters 
with differences and otherness in both live socio-cultural and digital interactions via devices and 
virtual networks. As urban cosmopolitan centres become more densely packed with highly 
diverse populations, and as new technologies, devices and digital media proliferate and challenge 
the human capacity for attention in an attention economy, movement becomes a contemporary 
imperative in order to keep up and perception becomes an essential skill in adapting to change. 
Every day we face a new “global village” and technologies “extend” our senses, perhaps even 
beyond McLuhan’s imaginary. This hyper-futured tone of daily living tends to override an ability 
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to truly acknowledge and appreciate other individuals in their uniqueness. It is so very easy to 
move toward the other as “already known”, to allow oneself to be propelled into a kind of 
functional relationship based on preconceived notions and driven by a means-ends agenda: 
assumptions, needs, expectations and goals bound up in objects, environments and others.  
 I find philosopher Martin Heidegger’s concept of enframing helpful in thinking this 
through. Elaborated in his essay “The Question Concerning Technology”, enframing – I will 
gesture very briefly – is a revealing or calling forth of something that already entails a kind of 
pre-structuring force – Heidegger calls it a “challenging claim” – to order things, to assemble 
them specifically “for use” (19 and 19n17). He defines the essence of technology as the bringing 
forth of something through man’s demand that it stand ready for a purpose. This something that 
comes into being then is not present in itself but only and always already to serve as means to 
another end. It is instrumentalized. And without properly noticing, we live this instrumentalizing 
paradigm, which is quietly determining not only our practical functional interactions but also our 
expressive social, cultural and ecological relations. “We are choreographed up the wazoo in our 
daily lives,” said Hay in January 2009 during a post-show chat following the presentation of her 
group work Up Until Now … commissioned by Christopher House for his company Toronto 
Dance Theatre. With this statement, Hay gestured toward what she considers to be the quotidian 
state of affairs in contemporary western society related to the influences of media, technology 
and socio-cultural programmation of various kinds. Indeed western culture tends to live in a 
hectic, agenda-driven, hyper-productive mode. Somehow we accept an implicit obligation to 
account for the so-called gain, outcome, objective or take-away from any given experience or 
interaction.   
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Though Heidegger’s thought is not germinal to my study, his notion of enframing is 
useful in setting up a basic tension traversing this study between socio-cultural forces and 
structures on the one hand and bodily movements and practices on the other. Certainly this 
thematic pervades critical and cultural theory, having been specifically articulated in many 
different contexts, including among them significant work on bodily techniques (Mauss), 
discipline (Foucault), habits and practices (Bourdieu; de Certeau), aesthetics (Shusterman), and 
dance (Foster, “Dancing Bodies”). I have drawn on the concept of enframing here to illustrate a 
limit situation for the purpose of my study, recognizing that I do so in isolation from Heidegger’s 
thought overall. By contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of primordial contact, or what I refer to 
as primordiality throughout  – “the original bond between the body and world” (Mallin 56) – is 
useful in setting up a theoretical counter-limit to Heidegger’s enframing, one that, in its 
implications of body-world fluidity, opposes the constraining imperatives of instrumental-
rational structuring.  
Here, I use the term “limit” specifically in relation to mathematics in which a limit is the 
value a function approaches as the variables change but at which, importantly, the function never 
properly or fully arrives. It is only possible to come infinitely close to a given limit. This is an 
important point that returns throughout this study and one that I wish to emphasize: it is 
theoretically impossible to arrive at either limit. I’m not positing the body as an unstructured 
primordiality (and in fact, Judith Butler points out that Merleau-Ponty himself considers the body 
“an historical idea” (156)); however, neither am I suggesting that language and socio-cultural 
structures are all there is. My thinking is more along the lines of the pull and play of one within 
the other within the other, and is somewhat analogous to Julia Kristeva’s in her theory of poetic 
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language when she notes that her non-thetic dimension of semiotic bodily pulsations and drives 
can only be theorized from within the thetic, symbolic dimension (24).3 Some readers may be 
wary of my use of terms such as “primordiality”, “pre-reflective”, “pre-relational” and “pre-
disposing”; however, they have critical purpose and relevance in the context of this study, which 
will become clear through my analysis. When I use the term primordiality, it always occurs 
along with a reference to the “impossible”, except when in direct connection to Merleau-Ponty’s 
own use. When I introduce the terms pre-relational and pre-disposing specifically in chapter 6, I 
elaborate their use more fully as “before” that is not before but within. 
Through his commitment to a deeply embodied approach to phenomenology, Merleau-
Ponty’s study of bodily perception and innovative concept of the écart – the bodily capacity to 
always be pulling or spreading away from structured experience (which I take up in more detail 
in chapter 3) – articulates the possibility for change, for creative difference, for malleability and 
corrigibility (Mallin 14). This notion is immensely useful in considering the complex process 
engendered as language and the body interact dynamically in Hay’s work. Therefore, it is to 
Merleau-Ponty that I turn most significantly in this study, both for his decidedly body-centered 
approach to phenomenology, which is particularly aligned with the study of dance, and for some 
key concepts that his philosophy offers, which help me to articulate the lived experience in Hay’s 
work. To be clear, my intent is neither to superimpose Merleau-Ponty’s thought onto Hay’s 
dance, nor to illustrate Merleau-Ponty’s thought in a case study of Hay’s work. Rather than 
pasting theory onto practice or using practice to reinforce theory, my aim is to derive theory 
through practice: to describe my experience of Hay’s work and to think through (the) dancing,4 
bringing the experiences into language by employing useful and available words and ideas that 
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productively lend themselves to the task. In this case, Merleau-Ponty’s ideas and language help 
me to articulate and think through the experiential poetics of Hay’s work – both 
methodologically and conceptually.  
 Having done so, I am then able to return to Irigaray’s call for a practice of perception, in 
order to draw out the ethical implications of Hay’s choreography and practice. Irigaray’s work 
arises in the context of French feminism,5 and was influenced by psychoanalysis, 
phenomenology – she takes up and critiques Merleau-Ponty, among others – poststructuralism 
and Derridean deconstruction (Whtiford). Irigaray’s influences and concerns align to various 
degrees with theorists Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva in particular, insofar as they were each 
concerned in different ways with the role of the body in relation to writing and language. 
Irigaray’s early project was grounded in an acknowledgement and valuation of the sexual 
difference between woman and man, women and men. She argues for a new understanding of 
this sexual difference as a way toward a new ethical relation between two that respects the 
fundamental irreducibility of each – as two – over the historical reduction of the two to an 
abstract, universal one, particularly in/through language and discourse. Her work continually 
develops this project of thinking two, the possibilities of two, and the ethical implications of this 
thinking, always starting from sexual difference and a concern with the subjectivity and 
becoming of woman in a Western phallogocentric order, which she persistently critiques. In 
working with Irigaray here, I take her “thinking two” as a baseline, upon which fundamental 
difference may be considered. In fact, Irigaray’s own writing in “To Conceive Silence” suggests 
this possibility: “The limit of irreducibility would safeguard the singularity of each person: ‘you 
who are not and will never be me or mine’ would remain you as I would remain me, thanks to 
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the work of the negative [silence versus the word], which entails respect for our difference” (To 
Be Two 66). 
 Having briefly highlighted the importance of both Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray for my 
study, I return to Hay, whose work is the focus of my research and who, as my analysis reveals, 
is a theorist in her own right. Hay’s thinking, however, manifests in and through the moving 
body, as dance, though her choreography and practice are distinctly linguistic. Hay is a critically 
acclaimed and internationally renowned choreographer with career beginnings in the 1960s New 
York avant-garde. Over her prolific career as a dancer and choreographer, she has created and 
performed numerous solo and group works that have garnered significant critical acclaim from 
early on. In his 1969 book The Art of Time: Essays on the Avant-Garde theatre critic Michael 
Kirby chose Hay’s Group One (1967) to exemplify the dance of the 1960s avant-garde period, 
devoting a full chapter entitled “Objective Dance” to a discussion of this particular Hay work 
(103). Since that time, Hay has worked consistently in dance, developing her unique approach to 
choreography and movement practice through distinct career phases that have focused alternately 
on solo and large group contexts.6 Hay’s work echoes with the values of the 1960s dance avant-
garde: a tendency toward neutral presentation and a matter-of-fact attitude in performance, the 
equal inclusion of trained dancers and non-trained movers, a refutation of artifice and technical 
virtuosity by embracing pedestrian tasks and activities, the use of scores and game structures as 
compositional strategies to subvert acquired and ingrained habits and patterns, and the blurring 
of art/life boundaries and audience/performer boundaries. Hay’s current approach shares 
common ground with that of other contemporary experimental dance practices generally in that it 
explicitly plays with presence, meaningfulness, habit/spontaneity, relationality and flux/change. 
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Hay’s work prioritizes a commitment to somatic attention, the intelligence of the body, and 
perception, challenges pre-inscribed, embodied techniques and patterns of movement, dance-
specific and otherwise. 
 Hay’s work has garnered her critical acclaim and she has been the recipient of several 
grants and fellowships. She is regularly invited to teach and lecture internationally and she 
maintains contact with the dance studies academy. The roster of artists with whom Hay has 
worked reads as a veritable who’s who of contemporary dance: early training and performance 
with the companies of José Limón, James Waring and Merce Cunningham; a concentrated period 
of participation – as noted above – with Judson Dance Theater and affiliated artists including 
Yvonne Rainer, Trisha Brown, Simone Forti, Steve Paxton, Lucinda Childs; inclusion in Russian 
ballet superstar Mikhail Baryshnikov’s 2000 PASTForward project focussed on the Judson-era 
dance artists, for which he commissioned a new duet from Hay, Single Duet, performed by the 
two of them;7 and the 2008 commission of the group work, If I Sing To You, by the critically 
acclaimed German-based contemporary ballet choreographer and dance innovator William 
Forsythe, followed by subsequent inaugural involvement in his Motion Bank scoring project, 
through which Hay’s score for the solo No Time to Fly (2010) was documented through multiple 
methods and made available online (The Forsythe Company).  
 Attendant to her body of choreographic and performance work, Hay has developed a 
corpus of writing that, as described by scholar Susan Foster, forms a “chronicle of an artist’s 
work” (Foster, “Foreword” xii). This corpus includes three books, multiple published articles, 
documents and transcripts of several lectures and talks, numerous performance scores and libretti, 
and a series of notes on her work accessible via her website. Her lengthy career and her 
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commitment to her practice – through choreography, performance and writing – have established 
Hay as an artist of international repute. Having worked steadily for over 50 years, Hay continues 
to question the practice and performance of dance and to evolve her approach, which uniquely 
deploys language to explore a deeply somatic practice that values bodily perception and 
relational context. Despite her occasional critical comments about the constraining influences, 
agendas and forces in contemporary society, Hay does not present a consistent or overt political 
agenda around her work. In fact she has explicitly deflected such implications (Goldman; 
Burton). Although Hay’s enigmatic work has attracted increased attention in the last ten to 
fifteen years, it remains under-theorized in the dance studies literature. However, her persistent 
engagement in dance movement practice and public performance, and her own writing about 
these experiences, enact implicit critique by performing provocative alternatives with ethical 
implications, as I argue in the chapters that follow.  
Dance’s import for and relevance to political-aesthetic projects of contemporaneity is 
productively addressed by dance/performance scholar André Lepecki in his introduction to the 
anthology DANCE. Lepecki articulates dance’s five main “constitutive qualities: ephemerality 
[that dance leaves no object behind], corporeality [its labour of “embodying otherwise” and 
“proposing improbable subjectivities”], precariousness [related to both its practical-physical play 
with forces and its low social position among the arts], scoring [choreography as a “system of 
command” that disciplines bodies] and performativity [that dance “does” or actualizes what it 
plans to do] as the basis on which “dance appears as an energizing and catalyzing element in 
contemporary art and critical thought” (“Dance as a Practice” 15-16). He identifies two forces in 
the 1980s – the AIDS pandemic as it raised issues of corporeality and mortality and the rise of 
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hip hop (and thus social dancing) in popular social consciousness as a rearticulation of bodies 
and identities – that highlighted dance’s political-aesthetic efficacy in the 1980s. Writing in 
2012, Lepecki concludes:  
The pressing issues of our times may be different: precarization, lawful torture in the 
United States, endless energy wars, fundamentalisms everywhere, ecological catastrophes 
… But the choreo-political questions remains [sic], of identifying what forces and 
apparatuses, non-metaphorically and daily, choreograph subjection, mobilization, 
subjugation and arrest; of figuring out how to move in this contemporaneity; and of 
understanding how, by moving (even if still) one may create a new choreography for the 
social. As long as these questions remain relevant, dance will remain a crucial practice 
and system of critical thought within the aesthetic regime of contemporary art. (“Dance 
as a Practice” 21) 
With humanity facing many complex challenges in these early decades of the twenty-first 
century, it is essential that we find the capacity to open up to possibility, to the unknown, to each 
other in new ways. We are perhaps becoming overly habituated to an instrumental/rational 
modality, which tends to eclipse the possibility for such experiences. How might we shift out of 
this overly premeditated, instrumental modality? How might we enter into an experience of 
openness, the unknown, difference? How might we allow for new possibilities, new encounters, 
new relationalities?  How might we create Lepecki’s proposed “new choreography for the 
social”? I find one possible answer in Hay’s choreography and practice. With its roots in 1960s 
avant-garde, Hay’s work has sustained and developed a critical-poetic impulse, creating a 
complex performance-generating system8 with an embodied ethic at its core. 
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 In chapter 1 of her book Social Works, performance theorist Shannon Jackson reflects on 
the activist or social impulse in twentieth and twenty-first century art, noting the “anti-
authoritarian critique of the 1960s” (23) and the often-asked questions: “‘What happened?’ 
Where is the activism now?’” that imply its loss in the art of subsequent decades (22). She 
presents a more complex consideration of the genealogy of this impulse in art-making: “Rather 
than vilifying or celebrating the espoused values of any particular generation, however, the 
analysis of art-making in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries might best be 
understood as a warning, reaction, compensation, and questioning of changing historical contexts 
that were developing very specific ambivalences toward concepts such as institution, system, or 
governance” (23). Given that Hay’s artistic practice traverses the intervening decades from the 
1960s through to today, Jackson’s lens helps to situate my analysis of Hay’s current work and its 
embodied ethic as implicit, rather than explicit, critique.   
 Where Jackson’s concern in Social Works is to articulate the multiple and interwoven 
aesthetic and political trajectories and mutual “supports” within the “social turn” in 
contemporary art practice (Jackson), artist and writer Walead Beshty takes up the question of 
ethics with respect to social or relational art, asking: “how do ethical relations create aesthetic 
form?” (19). Beshty suggests that “A turn to ethics is a turn to the affirmative question of art, not 
art as negation, allegory or critique, but the description of an art that operates directly upon the 
world it is situated in; it is a definition of art that is not at all premised on representation” (19). In 
turning thus, Beshty returns to the art work, assuming that in the contemporary art context it is 
always already a “social work”, in order to examine the “aesthetics of ethics” (15). By 
identifying an embodied ethic in Hay’s choreography and practice, I raise the possibility of 
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analysing her work for its particular “aesthetics of ethics”. While such an analysis proper 
remains for a future undertaking, Beshty’s proposal frames my project from a different angle: 
refracting my work here as a kind of inverse effort in analysing what could be considered a 
“poetics of (the aesthetics of) ethics” through my practice-based (versus reception-based) 
approach to Hay’s dance.  
 
Hay’s Dances 
Before I outline the analysis presented in the following chapters, it will be helpful for the reader 
to gain some sense of what Hay’s work looks like, generally speaking. It is important to note that 
the textual-visual descriptions of Hay’s dances, to which I now briefly turn, is highly inadequate 
in conveying the impact of their live performance. Nevertheless, I hope that these cues will 
function as a mnemonic for the reader in the journey through my subsequent discussion.  
 Hay’s dances look nothing like conventional pieces of dance choreography per se and are 
likely to leave many audience members wondering whether they are choreography at all. 
Reviews of Hay’s work since the 1990s, of her solo performances and of group performances of 
her dances by others, are consistent in their descriptions, regardless of their positive or critical 
evaluations, and effectively capture the gist of what one might see in a Hay work today. 
Descriptions from writers including Oritz, Russo, Morris, Jowitt, Anderson and Asantewaa 
describe a choreographic vocabulary that sounds more like the confusing (to an outsider) and 
seemingly random activity of young child’s play – jumping from one incomplete possibility to 
the next with no logical flow, clear context or world – than like a cohesive, purposeful and 
mature artistic work.9 
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 In these descriptions of Hay’s work I recognize my own experience performing it and 
seeing it performed by others including Toronto Dance Theatre, Christopher House and Joe 
Moran. The movement ranges from a barely perceptible twitch or sustained, attentive stillness, to 
ordinary pedestrian-like movements, to theatrically exaggerated, raucous or aggressive stomping, 
flailing, gyrating. It can appear awkward and spastic or graceful and fluid, shifting abruptly 
among very distinct tonal qualities and movements, eschewing conventional dance logic, motif, 
phrasing, sequencing, rhythmic order and consistent, recognizable form. Hay and performers of 
her work commonly vocalize, emitting growls, squawks, whistles and gibberish and often sing 
familiar or unfamiliar songs or fragments thereof.  
In his May 2004 Dance Magazine review of Hay’s The Match, a group work performed 
by the Deborah Hay Dance Company, Gus Solomons Jr. provides a typical description of her 
work and hints at the linguistic operations at play: “Her dancers grunt and crawl around on hands 
and knees, gesticulate madly, talk in nonsense language, and twist their faces into grimaces. But 
describing what the dancers do tells nothing of what they’re doing. Hay is a wizard at finding 
cues – word instructions, stories, images – that allow her performers to discover unexpected 
kinetic depths in themselves” (71). As Solomons Jr. notes, the movements themselves are not the 
primary concern in Hay’s work and yet, as I will discuss in chapter 4, they are fundamental to it 
because they underpin the perceptual practice in which the performers are engaged. Importantly 
here, Solomons Jr. also points to the key role words and language play in Hay’s work.  
Where Solomons Jr. identifies some of the underlying concerns in Hay’s work and 
embraces it as compelling, others have equally dismissed it as confounding or ineffective in 
performance. Writes Gay Morris in introduction to her review of Hay’s 2010 presentation at 
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Baryshnikov Arts Center in New York City: “Deborah Hay’s If I Sing to You engendered 
laughter here and there, but I thought it extremely painful” (23). Camille Hardy introduces her 
review of Hay’s 1997 performances of Voila as follows: “Sometimes the idea for a dance is 
much more interesting than the actual experience in the theater” and she goes on to indicate that 
“audiences today expect the material to be as interesting as the motivating concept” (108, both). 
 Hay’s choreography, her process and her own discussion thereof are indeed enigmatic 
and don’t easily map onto received notions of dance. This is not surprising given her background 
as a member of the renegade Judson Dance Theater, whose experiments in dance and movement 
performance fundamentally questioned the art form and recalibrated its trajectory therefrom. 
Throughout her career, Hay has taken the body, perception, attention and relationality as 
fundamental concerns. Her work has received critical acclaim for its distinct approach to and 
manifestation of these dimensions. 
 
Basis of the Research  
My first encounter with Deborah Hay and her work, outside of dance history classes as an 
undergraduate dance student, was at a December 2006 performance of her solo News by 
Christopher House, dance artist and artistic director of the longstanding Canadian contemporary 
dance company Toronto Dance Theatre. Subsequent to this, I saw House perform the solo again 
in June 2008, and then I attended an open rehearsal in January 2009 of Hay’s group work Up 
Until Now, commissioned by House for his company, Toronto Dance Theatre. Following the 
rehearsal, a small group gathered to chat with Hay about her work and writing practice, after 
which a number of us joined Hay for dinner at a nearby restaurant. Other than this short 
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interaction, I made my primary acquaintance with Hay and her work through experiential 
engagement.  
 After witnessing the rehearsal and performance of Up Until Now and hearing Hay speak, 
I was intrigued. Engaged with my own set of questions about presence, attention, the relation 
between movement and language, and performer-audience relationality in contemporary dance 
practice, I recognized in Hay’s work a unique and enigmatic manifestation of these concerns. I 
was also aware that her work is grounded in a decades-long career of committed movement 
practice and choreographic inquiry, and surrounded by a body of her own writing about her 
practice. When I learned of her unique choreographic workshop/residency the Solo Performance 
Commissioning Project (SPCP),10 I instantly knew it would provide an ideal opportunity and 
structure through which to engage my own questions. I applied to the 2009 SPCP and was 
accepted. In August 2009, I travelled to Findhorn, Scotland, to study with Hay as one of twenty 
participants in that year’s SPCP. Over a ten-day intensive workshop, we spent all day every day 
in the studio together learning Hay’s solo score At Once and practicing her specific approach to 
performing. At the end of the ten-day process, each participant signed a contract with Hay 
outlining the rehearsal commitment and parameters under which the solo could be performed. A 
key element in the relationship was a commitment to daily practice, at least 5 days per week, for 
three months prior to the first public performance of the work.11 For the 2009 SPCP, Hay also 
added a new and explicit element to the commitment, requiring the performer to develop an 
adaptation of the solo, thus situating the choreography within the individual artist’s aesthetic. 
During the workshop period, the 2009 group engaged in a lengthy discussion about Hay’s 
intended meaning and specificity of the term “adaptation” with respect to the practice and the 
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work. I will take up this term with respect to my project later in this chapter. The 2009 Solo 
Performance Commissioning Project, the requisite daily practice of Hay’s solo At Once and my 
performances of this work on two evenings in December 2009 formed the basis of this research 
study.  
 In my own research and practice as a dance artist/scholar and movement theorist/educator, 
I am compelled by the complexity of lived experience in dance practice and performance, 
specifically within approaches that tend away from established aesthetics and techniques, set 
choreography, and codified movement forms and phrases, as Hay’s work does.12 As a writer and 
editor, I am also very concerned with the relation between dancing and writing. I ask questions 
like: How can we draw complex, dancing experiences into language without simply reducing 
them to or eclipsing them by a set of analytical concepts? How do we understand and articulate 
the experiential poetics of such work? By poetics I mean the underlying functions or operations 
taking place; by experiential, I mean to address the active embodied experience of these poetics, 
versus analytic observation and reflection thereof. What can we learn from these experiences 
about embodiment, subjectivity, meaning-making, relationality? 
Within this broader scope of inquiry, I undertook a close experiential study of Hay’s 
choreography and practice through her solo At Once, in order to articulate and theorize the 
experience. I focus in this specific study on the following research questions: How can I 
articulate and understand my experience practicing performing Hay’s solo At Once? What is the 
nature of this experience and how is it distinct within contemporary dance practice from 
conventional choreography and dance improvisation? How does Hay’s choreography and 
practice function to engender this experience? What are the implications of Hay’s choreography 
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and practice beyond the dance field per se?  
While I identify this project as a case study because I engage with a single solo by Hay, I 
can ask these broader questions of the work because this is not a solo in the conventional dance 
sense. It is not a discrete creative work substantially different from surrounding works in an 
artist’s oeuvre. Rather, this solo is part of an overlapping series of solos and group works created 
by the artist over the course of approximately 14 years. This series of works explores 
significantly similar choreographic material through scores and linguistic prompts and engages a 
specific performance practice that transcends the individual projects. Through my analysis, I 
develop an understanding not of this specific solo “At Once” but of Hay’s choreography and 
practice through this solo, as one of any number of possible cases through which to study Hay’s 
more overarching approach to dance and performance. Many other performers have experienced 
Hay’s same approach through different works in this series. 
 
Chapter Outline 
As this is first a case study analysis of a relatively under-theorized artist, my work belongs 
primarily within the relatively small scholarly literature on Hay, which I present in chapter 2. 
Therein I consider, in particular, relevant thinking by Susan Leigh Foster, Ann Daly, Lesley 
Satin, John Joseph Dolan, Jim Drobnick and Megan Nicely, among others. This relatively in-
depth review also draws out various themes in the literature, contributing a synthesis that has not 
been articulated elsewhere. 
In order to address my research questions, I developed a multi-method approach to 
experiential research and description drawing from Laban Movement Analysis, phenomenology 
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and auto-ethnography. This is a relatively typical combination of approaches: “Loosely defined, 
embodied research is a blend of phenomenology, anthropology (with its long tradition of field 
studies and participant/observer dynamic), ethnography, and cultural studies” (Albright, 
Engaging Bodies 12). For this study, however, I devised a more specific set of processes and 
procedures that come together in my method of emergent choreographic analysis. In the first part 
of chapter 3, I detail this method, which involves an iterative moving-writing practice that distils 
and reveals key phenomena in the lived dancing experience through somatic awareness and 
several different modes of writing. I also derived my theoretical framework – a triumvirate 
dynamic relation of intentionality/intention, attention and action – first through experience. I 
further define my terms and the shape of this framework in the second part of chapter 3 with 
reference to various movement improvisation, dance and somatics theorists. Phenomenological 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s “ontology of situations” (Mallin 7) and his important 
conceptualization of lived experience through intentionality and the écart underpins my thinking.  
In chapters 4 and 5, I deploy my method of emergent choreographic analysis and present 
a reflective and then a descriptive analysis respectively. In my reflective analysis of Hay’s 
choreography and practice itself presented in chapter 4, I first address Hay’s distinctive use of 
language and then work through an analysis of her choreography and practice, pointing out 
resonances between my work and that of others in the literature on Hay. Through the theoretical 
framework of intentionality/intention, attention and action and with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s 
situational ontology, I show how Hay’s work can be understood as a constructed situation in 
which her distinctly linguistic choreography and practice functions as a destructuring structure. 
Through linguistic torques and semantic strategies, Hay’s destructuring structure operates on 
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processes of intentionality/intention, attention and action in ways that push the performer away 
from processes of structuring and meaningfulness, throwing the performer into a necessary 
practice of perception and toward an impossible glance at primordiality.  
In chapter 5, I present a descriptive analysis of my experience practicing performing 
Hay’s work, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s language to illuminate the phenomena of my 
experience. It is here that I then articulate the experiential concept of somatic anacrusis that the 
work engenders. In order to distinguish this concept, I reference similar conceptualizations by 
several dance improvisation, somatic and movement theorists including Ann Cooper Albright, 
Nancy Stark Smith, Kent De Spain, Hubert Godard and Erin Manning. Clarifying somatic 
anacrusis with respect to related concepts allows me to show how Hay’s work is neither 
improvisation, nor choreography in the conventional sense, and therefore how her work is 
arguably at the cutting edge of choreography.  
In chapter 6, I address the unique relationality generated by Hay’s work. Many scholars 
and writers have commented on this very important distinguishing aspect of her dances. I will go 
further, however, and propose that in Hay’s most recent choreography and practice, she actually 
comes to question relationality per se, enacting a participatory-performative suspension thereof, 
in the processual experience of somatic anacrusis. In the context of certain debates in 
performance and dance studies around training, performance, presence, repetition and 
representation via Richard Schechner, Mark Franko, André Lepecki and Laurence Louppe, 
among others, I understand Hay’s practicing performing as a “training” in “doing” and thereby 
re-articulate somatic anacrusis as a pre-relational pre-disposing. With reference to the debate on 
relational aesthetics in contemporary art via Nicolas Bourriaud and Claire Bishop, I consider 
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Hay’s work to be presumptively relational; however, the dimension of relationality in her work is 
“unconsummated”. In practicing performing Hay’s work, the performer practices a destructuring 
structure that pushes away from structuring and meaningfulness, incites a practice of perception 
that moves impossibly toward primordiality, and enacts an unconsummated relationality that 
does not seek to orient, stabilize or impose but instead remains fundamentally mobile and 
porous.  
Finally then, in this chapter I return to Irigaray’s work to illuminate the implicit critique 
and embodied ethic in Hay’s work. I ask: what if Hay’s choreography and practice could offer an 
answer to Irigaray’s call? What if practicing performing somatic anacrusis could open a new way 
toward the other through perception that, through the destructuring function, respects both 
subjectivity and otherness as fundamentally irreducible yet mutable and contingent, mobile and 
changeable, and therefore always new and unknown. What if we moved into encounter, into 
proximity with the other through this process of pre-relational pre-disposing? 
 
Thinking (through) Dancing  
 
…embodied research (to my mind, at least) requires that one engage seriously with the 
ambiguity that results from trying to conceptualize bodily experiences that can be quite 
elusive. It requires patience with the partiality of physical knowing, as well as a curiosity 
about how theoretical paradigms will shift in the midst of that bodily experience. 
(Albright, Engaging Bodies 12) 
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I write at the intersection of dance, performance, somatics and cultural studies, and, 
broadly speaking, I take a practice-as-research approach to this work. My aims in this project are 
the following: first, to bring my dancing experience into language in a manner that allows it a 
presence alongside theoretical discourse as a way of knowing in its own right; second, to 
understand something of the poetics of Hay’s dance practice and, by extension, why it has been 
received as both enigmatic and compelling, both for audiences and for a roster of international 
performers of significant calibre; third – in accomplishing the first two aims – to contribute a 
unique case study and new perspectives on Hay’s work to the scholarly literature on this 
significant but under-theorized artist; and finally, in expanding the context in which we consider 
Hay’s work, to enhance the appreciation and understanding of her work and certain other 
contemporary dance/performance practices more generally, on the part of both performers and 
audiences.  
My research contributes to the small scholarly literature on Hay, providing a close and in-
depth experiential study of Hay’s solo choreography and practice, articulating a poetics of her 
distinctly linguistic choreography and its unique relationality, and considering the implications 
thereof in a broader context. My work also contributes generally to practice-as-research methods 
for the experiential study of dance practice and choreography through my devised method of 
emergent choreographic analysis. This approach seeks to understand the workings of 
choreography from within the performer’s experience, through an iterative process of moving 
and writing.13 In combination with this method, I offer a theoretical framework, based on the 
triumvirate dynamic relation of intention, attention and action, for analyzing the relation between 
the performer’s experience and the choreography in experimental dance practice. My articulation 
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and conceptualization of what is happening in and through Hay’s work prompts reconsideration 
of the relationship between movement and language through the intermediary of the (dancing) 
body. It also provides a lens through which to differently illuminate and refract other 
experimental contemporary dance and performance practices that are similarly working with 
choreographic functions and through perceptive practices. The concept of somatic anacrusis, 
which I develop through this research, allows a reflection – through dance – on the role of the 
body and perception in fostering openness to difference and more ethical communicative 
relations with others.  
My particular expertise in undertaking this project, I submit, lies in my training and 
experience as a dance artist, movement analyst and writer. Through my own experience as an 
interpreter for others and creator/performer of solo work, as a faculty member teaching 
studio/studies courses in the Dance Department at York University and as Certified Laban 
Movement Analyst, I have been engaged in questioning movement experience “from the inside”, 
seeking to better understand and strive to articulate the lived, fluid multidimensionality of such 
somatic experiences, specifically in performance. My performance experiences range over a 
twenty-year career from the prescribed, highly technical and athletic, to theatrical and character-
based (dance-theatre), to more experimental modalities, involving extended vocalization, 
improvisation and somatically informed practices. In parallel with my interpretive career arc, I 
have also created and performed a number of self-solos deriving from improvisational modalities 
and often including extended vocalization. My teaching, primarily in the dance department at 
York University, is based in a somatic approach and is informed by the diversity of my 
professional experience. Through my practice, I have been spiralling ever more deeply into 
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embodied inquiry, always turning on and returning to a similar set of questions about dance 
performance experience. I have found myself most engaged, generally, by work that embraces 
somatic and/or improvisational paradigms.  
 
Dancing and Writing Alongside Hay 
Given my background in dance, somatic practice and writing, and my declared interest in and 
pursuit of work that derives from improvisatory and somatic modes, it becomes clear that my 
interests are quite aligned with the world of Hay’s practice. In fact I sought out an opportunity to 
study with Hay because of these aligned interests. However, I would describe my initial position 
with respect to Hay’s work as that of a sympathetic skeptic. I had only seen two of her works 
performed live and had only heard she and Christopher House speak about the practice in a 
January 2009 interview with choreographer and dance writer Carol Anderson. Hay’s language 
was very enigmatic and seemed purposefully cryptic and obscure. I admit I was critical of this 
relatively impenetrable discourse and the way it both mysticized and obfuscated the work. I was 
also critical of the structure of the Solo Performance Commissioning Project, which seemed from 
one perspective to be very much a strategic format through which to generate resources and 
disseminate work. However, I was also curious because there was something about the work in 
performance that captured my interest and was unique from the majority of dance and 
performance work I had seen. So, from this skeptical standpoint, I proceeded to undertake this 
study, perhaps in part to determine whether I could find substantive ground.  
Though it sits within an interdisciplinary context and speaks back to larger debates noted 
above, this experiential case study analysis necessarily imposes a tight focus and therefore this 
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document leaves many avenues for future exploration and consideration. My primary intent was 
to study Hay’s work through practice in order to develop a theoretical understanding of Hay’s 
work. This decidedly experiential approach foregrounds my lived experience of her 
choreography and practice, and values the “thinking” that occurs in dancing, in choreography. 
Tacking back and forth between moving and writing, I strove to write from inside the experience 
as directly as possible during my primary research and avoiding, to the extent I could, from being 
influenced by Hay’s own or other writers’ language or perspectives. Video recordings exist of 
both of my performances from December 2009 and I also have audio recordings of the post-
performance discussions with the audience on each evening. I have not watched my 
performances nor listened to these interviews to date so as to limit my writing to experience 
versus observation. Furthermore, it is important to note that in the chronology of my research, it 
was only after both the experiential and descriptive phases of my research that I engaged more 
specifically with the existing discourse on her work.  
This bracketing aligns with a phenomenological approach to research, which I pursue 
through the work of Merleau-Ponty. As an effort that is provisional at best, it aims to bring 
bodily, lived experience to the foreground during engagement with the phenomenon, over 
cognitive reflective and analytical processes. Nevertheless, though I attempted to proceed 
through experiential practice and phenomenological description first, I acknowledge that of 
course I’m informed by discourses and theory and by my past experiences, tacit knowledge and 
disciplinary movement training. However, my approach was purposeful – to study a bodily 
practice as closely as possible through bodily practice. My analysis, deriving primarily from 
phenomenological description of my own experience – versus the received language of the 
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choreographer or others who have written about her work – provides an alternative perspective 
on Hay’s choreography and practice. As much as possible, I have attempted to return to my own 
first-person experiential writing as the primary source for my thinking – my “thinking (through) 
dancing”.  
As noted above, Hay maintains a writing practice that has accompanied her creating and 
performing activity since at least the 1970s. Author of three books and numerous articles, Hay 
has developed a textual field around her work that offers a certain level of insight into her 
concerns and practice, from the first-person experiential and reflective perspective of a practicing 
artist. She has been at times explicitly concerned with developing a language through which to 
communicate her practice. In 1982, she wrote about her then-current project The Grand Dance: 
“The Grand Dance represents the rebirth of my choreographic career in terms of fashioning a 
language to support my aesthetic” (Hay, “The Grand Dance” 40). Her articles and books seem to 
be part of this effort. Two of her three books actually interweave various textual voices, 
including experiential description, choreographic or performance directives, and reflective, 
sometimes autobiographical, material. Hay also writes scores or libretti for her dances – often 
after a first performance of a work – that derive from close experiential writing alongside 
practice and in turn become the “score” for that work, used in subsequent remounts of the 
particular dance.14  
In certain ways, this dissertation project has paralleled Hay’s own writing practice. I too 
have written closely alongside practice, developing experiential writing that traces the residues 
and echoes of the dancing experience. I too aim to interweave experiential and reflective writing 
throughout this dissertation as a way to move toward communicating the substance of the 
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dancing experience in Hay’s work. I too am concerned with illuminating the practice itself in 
order to develop shared understanding of its specificity and potential. Particularly in light of 
these parallels, it is important for me to re-state that I am writing as one individual practitioner 
about my experience of Hay’s approach to choreography and practice through a single solo work 
by Hay and my perspectives are therefore limited as such. While I have conducted eleven 
interviews with other practitioners from the same SPCP that I attended, these interviews have not 
been transcribed or referenced and do not figure in this particular project. Here, I am specifically 
working through first-person experience toward phenomenological description in order to 
discern an experiential poetics of Hay’s practice and consider its potentially broader socio-
cultural implications.  
I will note here that I coin a number of neologisms in my analysis in order to more 
effectively articulate lived experiences of paradoxical simultaneity that are difficult to render in 
given language. Throughout my discussion, these neologisms also function secondarily as 
performatives that emphasize the somatic experiential dimension of my work and sustain a 
connection to the dancing process at its core. I use these terms judiciously and in the spirit of the 
French feminist school of écriture feminine, feminine writing – a term and theory coined by 
Hélène Cixous in her critique of Western metaphysics and the symbolic economy: “to describe 
that which has been erased through the privileging of the (masculine/speech [and here also 
mind]) one over the (feminine/writing [and here also body]) other” (Alphonso 254). 
As may be apparent to readers familiar with Jacques Derrida’s paradigm-shifting 
theory/method of deconstruction, this study resonates with his influences and ideas while not 
directly taking them up – save in chapter 6, in which I briefly address the impact of his thought 
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on the development of performance studies. Of course this could be said of many studies, as 
Derrida himself demonstrated, wherein appear the traces of various influences that have not been 
explicitly included. Certainly French feminism owes a debt to Derrida’s complex move in 
deconstructing inherited binary thinking and the implicit hierarchies embedded within. Irigaray’s 
critiques of Western phallogocentrism developed in part via Derrida’s insights, as indicated 
above. Further, as noted, Derrida’s thinking has had important significance for performance 
studies.  
Some of what might be read as Derridean resonances in this study more likely arise first 
through Hay’s own movement “theorizing” which takes priority here and in which some might 
find certain “deconstructive” semblances, and second, through my use of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, 
which, as several writers have suggested anticipate Derrida’s in certain ways (Grosz 38; Moran 
432; Reynolds; Franko, “Mimique” 212n29). For these writers, Merleau-Ponty’s effort to move 
beyond the dualism of mind/body in his work and the way that he presents the intertwining of 
body-subject and world, in which the aspects are necessarily co-constituted but never directly 
coincident, foreshadow Derrida’s own challenges to a binary system of thought.  
Also in my description and discussion of Hay’s work to come, readers familiar with 
Buddhism may note resonances between Hay’s approach, my discussion thereof and Buddhist 
philosophical ideas. This is no surprise. Hay’s work has been influenced by Zen Buddhist ideas 
particularly through her association with the 1960s avant-garde and explorations of various 
Eastern philosophies, particularly through the influence of John Cage (Banes, Terpsichore). 
Megan Nicely’s study of Hay’s solo Art and Life (2010), which I discuss in chapter 2, 
productively explores this angle. I have chosen to work with Merleau-Ponty’s thought for three 
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main reasons: 1) because his phenomenology usefully addresses and navigates the challenging 
body/mind dualism – and is particularly relevant for dance research; 2) because his language and 
ideas productively assist me in articulating the experience of dancing Hay’s work; and 3) 
because, in drawing Hay’s work into dialogue with Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray (whose thinking, 
as Elizabeth Grosz has elaborated, was also influenced by Merleau-Ponty (39)), I am able to 
extend this close study of a dance practice through a much broader cultural discourse. 
 
Practicing, Performing, Writing: Iteration, Adaptation, Perpetuation 
Not only has this dissertation paralleled Hay’s own writing practice specifically, it also parallels 
the creative and performance process of adaptation that she expects of those who acquire her 
dances for their own repertoire, as I did. I consider this document itself to be an adaptation of the 
solo At Once insofar as it involves iteration of the work through practicing, performing and 
writing. In positioning my dissertation in this way, I hope to pre-emptively address objections 
that this study instrumentalizes Hay’s work in service to theory. This is important to me for two 
reasons: because I am wary when dance practices are too readily used to explicate or exemplify 
pre-existing theory or when they are taken de facto as critique, rather than being respected and 
approached as “theory” in their own right; and because there is yet a hierarchy in dance and 
dance studies that places “dancing” below “thinking about dancing” and which I believe must 
continue to be challenged. 
 Below I consider the way that Hay’s work is iterative at many levels, and I specifically 
address the way that a performer of her work develops an adaptation through iterative process. I 
note that for Hay, this adaptation derives from the performer’s fidelity to the iterative daily 
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practice. Then I consider an alternate definition of adaptation offered by postmodern theorist 
Linda Hutcheon. With these two ideas of adaptation in hand, I understand my dissertation 
research as an iterative process of daily practicing, performing and writing, and position this 
document itself as an adaptation of Hay’s solo At Once. 
 As I’ve discussed above, writing about her practice is an important outlet for Hay’s 
pedagogical impulse, an impulse that is generally evident from her ongoing interest in sharing 
her practice with others in workshop contexts throughout her career. This drive to share her work 
– and to perpetuate her ideas broadly – is fulfilled to a degree by the distribution of her articles 
and books, and the availability of various notes and scores on her website. It is realized 
exponentially, however, in the SPCP structure. Via this structure, which I have explained above, 
Hay has generated a global network of individuals who iterate and perpetuate her work and ideas 
internationally – through practice and performance, and sometimes also through writing.15 (That 
she requires participants’ funds to be generated from their communities extends this network and 
roots it at the local level.) SPCP participants mount both solo and group shows of Hay’s work, 
and regularly engage other artists as collaborators on their own performances of the solos. Artists 
who encounter her work locally via another performer, may become participants in the SPCP, as 
did I; and the network grows, iterating and perpetuating Hay’s work.  
 Iteration, then, is a fractal thematic in the practicing, performing and writing of Hay’s 
work, appearing at many levels and in many contexts, from the interweaving of her solo and 
group processes, to her re-circulating of choreographic elements from previous works in new 
ones, to the very specific kind of iteration that she requires of her SPCP participants in their 
commitment to daily practice. Part of the explicit commitment of the performer is to develop a 
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personal adaptation of the work through this daily process of practicing the score, tools and 
questions regularly and consistently. Hay’s solos are to be developed and presented by SPCP 
participants as adaptations, credited with choreography by Deborah Hay and adaptation by the 
individual.  
 An adaptation, for Hay, must include fidelity to the practice, which is what in effect 
produces the adaptation, as the individual performer negotiates the complexity of her 
choreography and manifests a specific rendering of the work:  
The performer who adapts one of my solo works calls into action 3 parallel roles: the 
dancer, choreographer, and the executant. Executant means ‘putting into effect the exact 
demands’ which underlie the practice of performance of my movement material. Each 
dancer must be a conscious executant. At the same time the virtues of ‘fidelity and 
sympathy’ with my choreographic preferences has to be felt. I run a risk every time my 
dances are performed because a competent practice of the work depends on the 
unforeseeable and imponderable factors that make up the performer’s virtues of fidelity, 
sympathy, and streaming perceptual challenges. Every adaptation includes the execution 
of the specific, non-specific, yet easily discernible material within the written dance score 
that I provide. No matter how detailed or broad the language, between the written score 
and the performance are hidden elements that cannot be defined because my ‘verbal 
dialectic’ is deliberately powerless to define the performer’s movement dialectic. (“More 
About the Adaptation”) 
In my practicing performing, I strove for fidelity and sympathy with Hay’s work. I attempted to 
be a conscious executant, while embracing what I understand to be the roles of dancer and 
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choreographer16 within the work as well, in terms of developing an adaptation. Hay’s 
instructions to participants at the SPCP allowed for a range of creative developments, including 
the addition of music, collaborators, costume and set. She was willing to accept the omission of 
parts of the score, but not the addition of anything new. My performances of At Once included a 
simple costume and two set elements (a tree and the crumbling remains of a brick wall), and 
involved a minimal change to one section of the score (where Hay used the setting of a mall in 
her text, I adapted this to the setting of a city). In my performances then, I held an autonomous 
contextual responsibility for the framing of the choreographic material, which I was under 
obligation to perform according to the “exact demands” of the practice. For Hay, this constitutes 
an adaptation of her work, realized through iterative daily practice. 
 In the book A Theory of Adaptation, Linda Hutcheon offers her own definition of 
adaptation:  
In short, adaptation can be described as the following: An acknowledged transposition of 
a recognizable other work or works; A creative and interpretive act of 
appropriating/salvaging; An extended intertextual engagement with the adapted work. 
Therefore, an adaptation is a derivation that is not derivative – a work that is second 
without being secondary. It is its own palimpsestic thing. (8)  
It is interesting to consider Hutcheon’s notion of adaptation alongside Hay’s and specifically 
with respect to the contractual requirement for three months’ of daily practice prior to the 
individual’s first performance of the work. For Hay:  
Three months is not an estimate. It is based on my experience with new material. In order 
to recognize all the ways I hold onto ideas, images, suppositions, beliefs, the ways my 
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body attaches to what I think the material ‘is’, or should feel like, or look, I need to be 
alone in a studio, noticing the infinitely momentary feedback that arises from my daily 
performance of a reliable sequence of movement directions, influenced by the immediacy 
arising from the same questions day after day after day. (Hay, “How do I recognize my 
choreography?”)  
It is important to note that daily practice does not entail “rehearsal” or “repetition” in advance of 
and preparation for a finished and final presentation. Daily practice, for Hay, is performing –
practicing performing.17 The individual is to perform the work in its entirety; sections are not to 
be practiced discretely, in isolation from the whole. For Hay, this daily iteration of the work is 
central to the process of developing an adaptation. Further, per Hutcheon, each day’s iterative 
practice can be construed as yet another adaptation of the work.18  
 Where Hay emphasizes the importance of fidelity, Hutcheon problematizes this notion in 
the process of adaptation, allowing for much more freedom in the process by noting that 
“adaptation is an act of appropriating or salvaging, and this is always a double process of 
interpreting and then creating something new” (20). In light of Hutcheon’s points here about the 
process of “interpreting and then creating something new”, we can consider this dissertation 
project – and specifically my description and analysis in chapters 4 and 5 – as yet another 
adaptation of Hay’s work, a new contextual framing of the choreography and practice, arrived at 
through an iterative process of practicing and writing. In chapters 4 and 5, I focus specifically on 
my experiences within the work itself, as I embrace the choreography and practice performing it. 
Therein, I draw from both my experiential journal entries – which trace in writing my daily 
practice of the score in its self-same sequence – and from extrapolated phenomenological 
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descriptions of experiences in the work that I developed from the journal entries. Each piece of 
writing in itself can be considered, per Hutcheson, to be an adaptation – as can this dissertation 
as a whole.  
 Working directly with Hutcheon’s definition of adaptation, we can understand this 
dissertation as 1) “an acknowledged transposition of a recognizable work”: my 
phenomenological descriptions are of Hay’s practice and choreography of At Once; 2) “a 
creative and interpretive act of appropriating/salvaging”: my writing in the dissertation draws 
from Hay’s work and proposes my own thoughts and ideas in extension from it, with inevitable 
choices made about what to include and focus on; and 3) “an extended intertextual engagement 
with the adapted work”: my process for this writing included three months of daily practice and 
two formal performances, all of which I wrote about on a daily basis; four months of time spent 
in exclusive transcription of those daily writings; a process of review and selection from those 
daily writings; a second phase of writing extrapolations from the selections; and an “extended 
intertextual” period of analysis and interpretation in writing this document, in which I also 
reference the discursive texts surrounding Hay and her work.  
 As noted above, in Hay’s definition of adaptation, maintaining fidelity to the practice is 
essential. However, in writing a dissertation Hay’s mandate poses a challenge because in writing 
a theoretical analysis I am working reflectively in another medium. Hutcheon’s definition, 
however, liberates me from Hay’s requirement of fidelity in writing this dissertation, allowing 
for the process of “interpretation and the creation of something new”. Thus rather than being a 
standard critical analysis of an object of study, and independent therefrom, conducted from a 
more aloof and ostensibly objective theoretical standpoint, I position this document as an 
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adaptation – a descriptive analysis of a lived experience, dependent thereon, conducted from an 
engaged, participatory and subjective experiential standpoint that retains ties to the lived 
phenomenon itself: “a derivation that is not derivative”, “a work that is second without being 
secondary”. As Hutcheon would say, this document “is its own palimpsestic thing”, which 
participates in the iterating and intertextual field of Hay’s work and adaptations thereof – 
perpetuating through processes of practicing, performing and writing.  
 
Return to/of the Avant-Garde 
During the 1960s avant-garde period, choreographers and performers of the Judson Dance 
Theater community, of which Hay was a part, undertook a serious questioning of then 
conventional dance practice and performance, pushing boundaries, overturning assumptions and 
developing innovative and interdisciplinary approaches to choreography and performance.19 In 
more recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in artists of the Judson Dance Theater20 
– many of whom have continued to practice, create and perform – as new generations of dance 
creators and performers re-engage with fundamental questions around their art and practice: 
What is dance? What is movement? What is performance? How is the audience-performer 
relation imagined, constituted? The resurgence of interest in the Judson-era artists was likely 
bolstered by Mikhail Baryshnikov’s interest in this group and the large, high-profile 
PASTForward tour of his White Oak Dance Project in 2000, which included remounts and new 
works by a number of Judson-era choreographers, including Hay, and which followed twenty 
years after Perron’s Bennington College Judson Project.21 Framed from within a contemporary 
cultural moment, these questions nonetheless resonate with the avant-garde ethos of the 1960s, 
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tied as they are not only to issues of aesthetics but also to issues of relationality, politics and 
ethics.  
Hay was among those at the heart of this experimental group and, as I will discuss in the 
following chapters, she has continued to question the art and practice of dance over subsequent 
decades of her career. Hay has become an internationally renowned and critically acclaimed 
figure in contemporary dance and performance practice and her work remains relevant today. 
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature on Hay 
 
Hay has cultivated this body, discovered and rediscovered it over many years of dancing. 
In training to make and perform dances, she attends to the body’s changeability. She 
explores the ramifications of multiple, distinctive metaphorical framings of physicality. 
Body, in turn, has offered a kind of dialogue – probing, assessing, reacting, and 
instigating in response to Hay’s various queries. Close and consistent attentiveness to this 
dialogue forms the basis of Hay’s regimen for learning to dance and also generates the 
motional matter from which her dances are made. For Hay, choreography emerges from 
her ongoing reflections about bodiliness. (Foster, “Foreword” ix) 
 
For Hay, dance is a way of knowing, one that our culture obstinately ignores. It’s her job 
to tease out what the body knows, and dancing is the ‘trick’ she deploys to do so. (Daly, 
“Horse Rider” 46) 
 
INTRODUCTION TO HAY 
Because of Hay’s status as a relatively lesser-known member of the Judson Dance Theater and 
the New York avant-garde, who has come to significant international critical acclaim since the 
turn of the millennium, I will here introduce the reader to Hay’s career and influences in brief 
before outlining the relevant literature on her work to which my research contributes. As noted in 
the previous chapter, Hay has remained active as a performer and choreographer since the 1960s, 
moving through several distinct phases throughout her creative career. Hay began her career 
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working in New York City briefly as a dancer with James Waring’s and Merce Cunningham’s 
companies. She then participated in the formation of Judson Dance Theater – influenced 
significantly by the creative and philosophical thinking of John Cage, composition teacher 
Robert Dunn and the 1960s avant-garde’s artistic embrace of ideas from Zen Buddhism. In 1970 
Hay moved to Mad Brook Farm in Vermont. There she lived and worked with a group of artists 
and developed her work Ten Circle Dances, a fully participatory group dance practice grounded 
in Tai Chi–based principles of breath and flow and using simple whole body gestures and basic 
travelling steps. In 1976, Hay moved to Austin, Texas, where she continues to live and work. 
During her next period of self-solo creation, Hay began to explore speaking during performance, 
while still building her work around principles of breath, flow, presence and attentiveness 
deriving from Eastern spiritual influences of Zen and Tai Chi. In the late 1970s, Hay began 
working with groups once again in a process she referred to as The Grand Dance (Hay, “The 
Grand Dance” 40). From 1980 through 1996, Hay conducted fifteen annual large-group 
workshops with trained and untrained performers – which took place over several months of 
daily practice and culminated in group performances.22 In these workshops, Hay led groups in 
her particular approach to movement practice – which she later called “playing awake”,23 a 
specific and committed practice of paying attention to one’s moving body in the context of the 
group and the surrounding space. In 1997, Hay created the solo Voilà, and began turning her 
attention to a new set of questions around the documentation and transmission of her dances 
(Daly, “Horse Rider” 53). In 1998, Hay created yet another group structure within which to 
continue her choreographic and performance explorations and launched the Solo Performance 
Commissioning Project (SPCP), ultimately a group workshop context for the practice of solo 
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performance. The SPCP continued annually through 2013, and during this time, Hay developed 
an international reputation and her work attracted the interest of some of the world’s leading 
choreographers and dancers. She has been commissioned to create group works for major 
contemporary dance companies and has become sought after as a teacher and speaker. In the 
previous chapter, I addressed Hay’s writing and publications, which are central to her work as an 
artist. 
Hay’s work has remained relevant and over time she has continued to receive critical 
acclaim for her experimental approach to dance practice and creation. As dance scholar Ann 
Daly noted in 1992, among her 1960s contemporaries (Daly references David Gordon, Twyla 
Tharp and Trisha Brown), Hay remains distinctly committed to an “antitechnical aesthetic” 
(“The Play of Dance” 36). Daly continues:  
Hay is still interested in the aesthetics of the lived – rather than the mastered – body. She 
still exists (both literally – in Austin, Texas – as well as metaphorically) at the margins of 
the art, refusing to buy into the conventional standards of beauty that have reentered the 
field in the last decade. She simply has eliminated that kind of hierarchy from her 
vocabulary. (“The Play of Dance” 36)  
In 1999, Daly reiterates her point, identifying Hay as the only Judson-era choreographer besides 
Douglas Dunn, who is still active and committed to the experimental ethos (“Horse Rider” 45). 
While one might argue that others of that era have continued to explore and experiment, Hay’s 
consistent commitment year over year to her dance/movement practice and her ever-growing 
public profile certainly distinguish her. As “artist-philosopher” (Daly, “Horse Rider” 45), Hay 
takes movement practice and performance as her materials and has developed, over her career, a 
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refined approach to choreography that yokes language and sensory perception in a complex 
choreography that “thinks” through lived experience and relationality. 
Hay’s solo performance and group choreography have been addressed by numerous 
dance writers and critics in the mainstream and dance-specific media over the course of her 
career. She and her work have been the subject of at least two documentaries (Bromberg; 
Edmunds). A number of dance practitioners and scholars have engaged directly with Hay’s work 
in written form, publishing interview transcripts, reflective essays, and scholarly analyses, and 
Hay’s work is also examined in individual chapters in several doctoral dissertations. Though 
primarily taken up in dance and performance studies contexts, Hay’s work has also been 
addressed in relation to movement/body therapy and community arts practice.  
In addition, Hay and her work are referenced in many texts focussing more broadly on 
the 1960s avant-garde and specifically on Judson Dance Theater. Sally Banes, pre-eminent dance 
scholar of the 1960s avant-garde and the Judson-era, has published several books treating these 
historical moments.24 Dance critic and writer Deborah Jowitt also discusses Hay’s work in the 
context of 1960s dance in her historical text Time and the Dancing Image. References to and 
descriptions of Hay’s practice and her early work appear in these texts and others (Livet; 
McDonagh) and have been relied upon by authors of other articles about her. Hay’s 1966 work 
Solo is described in Deborah Garwood’s essay “The Future of an Idea”, which discusses the 
reconsideration by curator Catherine Morris of the original art event 9 evenings: art, theatre and 
engineering, mounted in New York in 1966 by Billy Kluver (a Bell Labs engineer) and visual 
artist Robert Rauschenberg and on which Hay’s work appeared. Hay’s work Group One is 
discussed at length in Michael Kirby’s 1969 text The Art of Time: Essays on the Avant-Garde 
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and is addressed briefly by Rosalind E. Krauss in her book The Originality of the Avant-Garde 
and Other Modernist Myths. 
Hay established several fundamental commitments early in her career that have persisted 
and continue to underpin her practice today: 1) daily movement practice 2) participatory 
engagement and relationality (i.e. a concern with affecting the experience of others through 
dancing, be they participants or audiences), 3) iterative processes shifting from solo to group and 
back to solo work, and from practice to writing to practice 4) explorations with non-trained and 
trained movers, and 5) the development of a language around her practice, and around the 
documentation, transmission and public dissemination of her works and ideas. These 
commitments have been variously addressed by those who have written about Hay and her work, 
and I will touch upon them in the following review of key contributions to the discourse on Hay.   
 
MAJOR ANALYSES OF HAY’S WORK 
In the relatively small scholarly literature on Hay, a number of key analyses are relevant to 
consider here. They form the bulk of the scholarly engagement with Hay to date and my work 
resonates with aspects of each, including: a general agreement on the core characteristics of 
Hay’s choreography and practice as noted above, the application by some theorists of feminist 
and phenomenological lenses to her work and, in certain cases a consideration of different 
possible ethical dimensions involved in Hay’s approach to dance creation and performance. Each 
of the contributions outlined below addresses a different phase in Hay’s career, and looks at her 
work from a specific angle and in a distinct context. Most of these studies take Hay’s work as 
one example among several to illustrate a larger argument, and certainly in various ways each 
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reveals the broader socio-cultural and theoretical context and concerns of its time. While my 
work shares some common ground with these prior studies, it is distinct in being an in-depth case 
study engaging Hay’s work first in itself as a movement practice through experiential research. 
To further distinguish between my work and these earlier analyses, my interest is not in what 
Hay’s practice offers or presents to an audience, but instead in how her practice functions, 
experientially. Finally, rather than taking Hay’s work as a means to illustrate a larger argument 
or theoretical position imposed from outside the work, my research seeks to reveal the implicit 
critique and theory that Hay’s work enacts, working with various theoretical texts to articulate 
and understand Hay’s own embodied “thought”. 
 Two important notes of explanation to the reader: First, this review of the literature on 
Hay, while not exhaustive, is quite comprehensive and detailed. The first section outlines the 
major analyses relevant to my study, and the second section considers various themes and 
critiques in the literature on Hay. To my knowledge no such synthesis exists and, insofar as 
Hay’s work has been under-theorized in the dance studies literature, this review in itself makes a 
contribution to the field in which my work also participates. Furthermore, this review serves in 
part to establish context and credibility for Hay as a lesser-known member of the Judson Dance 
Theater and yet one of the few who has sustained a career in dance since those early experiments 
in the 1960s.  
 Second, while this review is conventionally placed at the beginning of my dissertation, I 
remind the reader that my methodological approach began with embodied practice and 
phenomenological description in order to engage first with the dancing itself as a kind of 
knowledge, and to limit the influences of both Hay’s own and others’ discourses in the first 
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investigatory phase of my process. Clearly, a complete bracketing of prior knowledge and 
experience is impossible. I definitely acknowledge that Hay’s own language informs my 
experience as I studied directly with her in learning the solo in the first place. However, in 
proceeding first through experiential practice and then engaging with the literature by and about 
Hay, my writing is less influenced by the discourse than if I had taken the opposite approach. I 
was certainly aware of the generally limited scholarly engagement with Hay’s work; however, 
only after I completed writing and transcribing my journal material did I properly address the 
contributions outlined here. Thus, I was I able to address the convergences and divergences 
between these and my own analyses.  
One of the first significant scholarly considerations of Hay’s work occurs in Susan Leigh 
Foster’s 1986 study Reading Dancing: Bodies and Subjects in Contemporary American Dance, 
which looks at Hay’s work from primarily the 1970s and early 1980s – some solo performance 
by Hay and some of her group work with other dancers. In this text, Foster elevates Hay in the 
context of three other historically significant choreographers – George Balanchine, Martha 
Graham and Merce Cunningham – categorizing each artist’s approach as exemplary of a certain 
modality of choreography and thereby developing a structuralist analysis of dancing. Foster 
studies the work through textual and visual material, and where possible as an observer of live 
rehearsal and performance and through interviews. Foster’s text portrays Hay as a rigorous and 
articulate choreographer/director with a clear and unique vision and approach to dance and dance 
making and argues that Hay’s somatic approach emblematizes Foster’s choreographic modality 
of “resembling”. Of particular note, in this text Foster discusses Hay’s “technique” of cellular 
consciousness at length: a practice of attending to and experiencing the body not as an 
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undifferentiated entity but rather as the multiplicity and possibility of “the ever-changing 
cumulative performance of seventy-five trillion semi-independent cells” as Foster later described 
it in her introduction to Hay’s third book (“Foreword” xii). This “technique” has remained 
central to Hay’s work throughout her career, though the surrounding practice has become more 
complex and enigmatic. It is this complex practice – as a practice – in which I am interested as 
opposed to the structural features of Hay’s choreographic approach overall, which Foster has 
examined here. 
 Ten years after Foster’s work, John Joseph Dolan’s 1996 dissertation, Reconfiguring the 
Socio-Somatic Horizons of the Subject: The Physiognomic Dimensions of Perception and 
Meaning in Twentieth-Century Theatre and Dance, considers Hay’s work within a single chapter 
as one of two examples of a somatically-based theatrical practice that can be understood to 
function as a resistant response to the instrumentalizing forces of late capitalism. Referencing his 
participation in a number of Hay’s large-group workshops starting in 1985, Dolan nonetheless 
focusses his analysis on his spectator experience of the original 1991 group performance of 
Hay’s Lamb, Lamb ….  Through a robust and lengthy description of the performance experience, 
he highlights a number of key reflections that illustrate and support his previous discussion of 
Hay’s practice including: 1) the experience of disorientation that arose as a result of the 
performers’ active looking at the audience and his related subsequent experience of feeling 
unmoored and then entering into an easeful experience of what he describes as a “pre-personal”, 
“pre-symbolic” state of fluid awareness (207); 2) the ways in which Hay’s structural/processual 
constraints and use of language (209) function to disrupt the possibility for the performers to fall 
into conventional movement patterns and gestures, urging instead their openness to the non-
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rational and embodiment of unfamiliar or otherwise culturally dismissed movements in a process 
of becoming (207); and 3) the challenge for both performers and audience members in engaging 
with this “continual displacement and suspension of those narrative and technical guidelines that 
have traditionally structured the meaningfulness of movement and its role in presencing” (208). 
 Dolan’s analysis of Hay’s work corroborates that of other theorists and my own insofar as 
it draws out many of the same key values and concerns that characterize her work. Further, his 
discussion of Hay’s earlier large group work to explicitly exemplify a kind of resistant somatic 
practice supports my own recognition of Hay’s more recent solo work in a similar light; however, 
our projects differ, of course, in theoretical context, methodological approach and focus, and 
each takes up distinct instances of Hay’s work, separated by about twenty years. Dolan 
ultimately argues that Hay’s work is ahistorical. He suggests that in presenting only the non-
rational, her work hides the fact that it needs the rational in order to exist. Further, he argues that 
her work is only partially effective as a resistant practice because it does not foreground that 
potential resistance to prevailing instrumental modes by presenting these prevailing modes 
within it. He also notes Hay’s apparently contradictory position with respect to language, 
implying her turn against the rational and the linguistic, and yet her reliance on it as a problem 
because it suggests a naivété and denial of historical situatedness and the real and ongoing 
struggles about body, nature, class, race, gender, etc., and therefore of the “social-cultural 
conditions of possibility for her particular aesthetic (or anti-aesthetic) orientation” (212). These 
are valid concerns. However, I would argue that the uncanniness and disorientation that Dolan 
describes points to the complexity and depth of the work’s work, in its – and the performers’ – 
dialogic dance with sedimented cultural conventions and assumptions. In light of the turn to 
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performance as a concept and organizing principle for cultural analysis (Davis 1) in the years 
since Dolan was writing, and in fact its conceptual effects on culture generally, I would argue 
that Hay’s work participates effectively in this modality – enacting, rather than representing, its 
concerns. 
 Distinct from Dolan’s socio-cultural analysis, Lesley Satin’s 1997 dissertation on 
feminist autobiography in dance/performance treats Hay’s work in a chapter-length case study 
(which I reference through its subsequent revised publication as a discrete article in 1999) 
arguing that Hay’s practice is autobiographical in the sense that throughout her career she has 
consistently been engaged in practicing and performing “metaphors of self” (182)25 or “self as a 
process re-formed in every present moment” (182). In the 1999 article, dancer and scholar Satin 
provides a sustained feminist analysis of Hay’s work, writing from observations of Hay 
performances – most specifically Hay’s solo Lamb at the Altar, derived from the prior large-
group work Lamb, Lamb, Lamb … treated by Dolan above – texts by and about Hay and related 
topics, and from an interview with Hay in 1996. Noting Hay’s eclectic and abruptly shifting 
movement vocabulary; use of sound and spoken word; strategic manipulation of time; volition or 
agency as a performer in the act of decision-making; and intentional embrace of and play with 
visibility/invisibility, seeing and being seen (with the attendant layers of attention, intimacy, 
pleasure and erotism); Satin makes links between Hay’s practice and aspects of feminist and film 
theory with respect to the gaze and objectification.26 Satin suggests that, through her 
performance and choreographic strategies, by returning the gaze and disrupting viewer 
appropriation of herself as dancer, as woman, as “body”, Hay sets up the possibility for 
presencing the self-in-process as flux and change.27 In consolidating her autobiographical 
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argument, Satin quotes Hay from her book Lamb at the Altar: “All I can be at any moment is all 
of myself. If myself is more than fifty trillion cells in radical transformation every moment, I am 
off the hook of being any one entity. I am flux in a corporeal body. Responsibility to a singular 
identity is a misconception” (qtd. in Satin 203). This is where quoting Hay in support of Hay can 
become tricky, because Hay is articulating herself in an intuitive manner that is not necessarily 
free from contradiction and circularity. I read Hay’s description above as indicative of an 
experience of becoming in a very protean sense, and therefore find the word “myself” to be 
contradictory because it suggests a kind of stable cohesion of identity that is counter to the 
protean experience of flux and change. As such, I would refute the argument that Hay’s work is 
autobiographical, in the sense of a “graphy-writing of the bio-life of the auto-self”. Hay is not 
working on the “self” nor even on the dissolution or letting go of self per se, but on the 
experience of flux between these limits – an experience that I describe and discuss in my own 
experiential, versus observational, analysis, which also draws on feminist theory though different 
texts, and with the intent to illuminate rather than explain. 
Turning from Hay’s dance to Hay’s discourse, performance scholar Jim Drobnick 
specifically considers Hay’s distinct use of language in his 2006 essay that draws on personal 
experience in Hay’s 1988 large-group workshop28 and significantly on a review of thirty years of 
literature and documentation, including Hay’s archival and personal material (47). In his essay, 
Drobnick provides a cross-referenced glossary of twenty-seven of Hay’s terms/phrases and 
synthesizes the key understandings at work therein.29 Based on his research, Drobnick argues 
that Hay’s embrace of language is decidedly purposeful and intentional, and was so from early 
on. As expressed in her own words writing in 1982 at the culmination of her Grand Dance 
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process, she stated her aim for the next phase of her career: “The Grand Dance represents the 
rebirth of my choreographic career in terms of fashioning a language to support my aesthetic” 
(Hay, “Grand Dance” 40). Drobnick opens his text, twenty-four years later, with the following 
corroborating statement: “Over the course of a forty-year career, choreographer/performance 
artist Deborah Hay has created an elaborate and distinctive language to articulate an aesthetic 
philosophy, to communicate with performers and to serve as a pedagogical tool” (43).  
The significance of Drobnick’s work lies in his placing substantial weight on and 
providing detailed articulation of Hay’s linguistic processes in her movement/performance 
practice. He notes the ways in which Hay’s use of language functions to defamiliarize and 
destabilize, to sustain a generative and indeterminate experiential state, which he suggests has 
personal and social ramifications because the defamiliarization of body and discourse implicates 
identity (46). It is the poetics and potential implications of this experiential state that I aim to 
articulate through my work. Drobnick participated in one of Hay’s large-group workshops and 
his understanding clearly derives in part from his experience in the workshop; nevertheless, the 
substantial balance of his source material is textual and, furthermore, draws to a large degree on 
Hay’s own writing and explanations, often quoting Hay directly from interviews and from her 
own writing. His perspective is overarching and covers a thirty-year period. By contrast, my case 
study practice-based research derives distinctly from phenomenological description of my own 
experience versus the received language of the choreographer or others who have written about 
her work – so far as that is provisionally possible, as I have noted earlier. Where Drobnick’s 
focus is on developing a glossary of terms, my focus here is on analyzing the performative 
function or effect of Hay’s language in the specific choreographic operation – and stands in 
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complementary relationship to Drobnick’s excellent explanation of Hay’s use of language in her 
practice.  As Drobnick emphasizes: “Words in her lexicon bear an unmistakable performative 
element; rather than conveying information, expressing a point of view or operating as a form of 
notation or description, Hay’s language serves as a provocation for self-reflection, causing 
creative disturbances in the minds and bodies of performers and, by extension, audiences” (47). 
Writing primarily in a journalistic context, dance scholar Ann Daly nevertheless brings 
her intellectual perspectives to bear in a series of reviews, essays and interviews with Hay, 
compiled in her book Critical Gestures. Daly’s writing provides insights into Hay’s work from 
the 1990s. In this collected material, Daly offers keen descriptions of some of Hay’s works from 
the period and develops helpful analyses of Hay’s practice and performance. Three pieces of 
writing are particularly significant. The first two primarily address the values of presence and 
relationality in Hay’s work. The last provides insights into the developing importance of the 
performance libretto or score in Hay’s work from this point forward. In her 1990 review of 
Hay’s trilogy The Man Who Grew Common in Wisdom, Daly brings up the significance for Hay 
of presence in performance with respect to a quality of attention, and how this can activate 
performer-audience relationality. Daly also acknowledges the instinct, on the part of an audience 
member, to identify Hay’s dance as improvisational, though Daly here – and Hay, elsewhere30 – 
declare firmly that it is not.  
In her introduction to the performance libretto for Hay’s solo work Lamb at the Altar, 
published in TDR: The Journal of Performance Studies in 1992, Daly captures the core relational 
intent in Hay’s work and goes on to explain how this concern with relationality manifests 
through the large group workshop context and links this to other strategies Hay has employed in 
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her performing career: “dissolving the boundaries between performer and spectator: by using her 
home as a performance space, by raising the lights in the theater, by speaking to the audience 
before a performance, and by directly looking at her spectators while performing” (“The Play” 
38). In a 1997 interview with Hay, published in PAJ: A Journal of Performance and Art in 1999, 
Daly engages Hay in a discussion around the developing role of the libretto in her practice, with 
respect to the creative process for her 1997 solo Voilà. Prior to this, Hay had written scores for 
some of her dances; however at this point in her career, the process of writing libretti for her 
dances became a fundamental aspect of her choreographic practice and came to inform the 
explicit process of documenting and transmitting her dances, which in fact she began doing 
before her 1997 solo Voilà.31 The developing relationship in Hay’s work between choreography, 
writing and transmission prompted a new trajectory in her career, leading to the inception of the 
SPCP project. Where Daly’s descriptive analyses derive from observation and interviews, my 
work explores these concerns from an experiential standpoint. Daly’s discussion with Hay about 
the role of the libretto or score in Hay’s work informs my analysis of the score as one element in 
Hay’s complex choreography, deriving from the very distinct use of language in her practice. 
 In contrast to Daly’s short journalistic contributions, Megan Vineta Nicely’s 2012 
dissertation Choreography from the Outside: Dance Experiments in Thinking, Perception, and 
Language after 1960 offers a chapter-length analysis of Hay’s solo practice – entitled 
“Catastrophic Acts of Perception”, a phrase taken directly from Hay – based on her personal 
experience in Hay’s 2010 SPCP for the Hay solo Art and Life (2010), one year after my 
participation. I consider this study in slightly more depth than the previous ones because it is a 
much more current study, and engages with Hay’s solo practice partly from an experiential 
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perspective as does mine. Nicely draws on her own SPCP experience, several other workshops 
and attendance as an audience member at a performance of Hay’s group work If I Sing to You, 
writings by and about Hay, as well as an interview with Hay conducted during her study in 
Findhorn, to ground her discussion of Hay’s practice and process, which serves as one of three 
examples that illustrate her theoretical argument about choreography as “future writing”. Nicely 
makes a case that certain choreographers’ works – that of Americans Trisha Brown and Deborah 
Hay, and the Japanese choreographer Akira Kassai – draw us back from the quotidian lived 
experience of self and open us onto a pre-personal experience and state of consciousness linked 
specifically with somatic awareness/attention, and through which different kinds of knowledge 
and perspectives on the world can arise. As such, Nicely characterizes these choreographic 
practices and processes as “future writing” because, in leading us, they are understood to be in 
advance of us in time. Nicely situates her discussion in the context of affect theory, drawing on 
the work of Deleuze (and Guattari), Brian Massumi, Elizabeth Grosz, Erin Manning and others.  
 Nicely breaks her discussion into four main parts. First she addresses Hay’s practice itself 
and the ways in which Hay’s approach to choreography is a kind of counter-choreography,32 a 
critique of Western concert dance that asks Western-trained dancers to actively let go of and 
subvert their prior training, to engage in Hay’s “catastrophic acts of perception”. In the second 
part, through the use of phenomenologist Yasuo Yuasa’s thought, Nicely forwards a conception 
of Hay’s practice as a kind of “somatic negation”, drawing directly from Yuasa’s notion of 
“without-thinking”, which is his third mode of thinking (thinking and not-thinking being the first 
two). In the third part, Nicely focusses on the role of visuality in Hay’s work. Through a 
phenomenological lens using Japanese phenomenologist and Zen practitioner Nishida, she 
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develops a discussion of the ways in which Hay’s approach to vision and seeing disrupt the 
constitution of subjectivity. It is here that, as I noted in my introductory chapter, Nicely’s study 
thinks through aspects of Hay’s work through a Buddhist philosophical lens. In her fourth and 
final section, Nicely addresses the apparently environmental themes of the specific solo she 
learned from Hay, Art/Life.  In conclusion, Nicely proposes that Hay’s work is about changing 
habits of thought and action to more potentially ethical ones that will better prepare us to respond 
to the crises of our times.  
 My work parallels Nicely’s insofar as we both treat Hay’s practice and performing 
through personal experience as trained dancers and our descriptions and interpretations of 
experiences in Hay’s work resonate, quite closely at times. I too take a phenomenological 
approach to my study and articulate the way in which Hay’s work disrupts engrained social and 
cultural habits, and shifts me out of quotidian modes of being and relating. I too consider that 
Hay’s work engenders a different kind of relationality that has potentially ethical implications. 
However, particularly in light of these similarities, it is important to understand the distinctions 
between Nicely’s and my work. I develop my argument through a different method, writing 
much more closely to the lived experience, and I derive my concept of somatic anacrusis through 
this process of experiential writing. Nicely uses Yasuo Yuasa’s concept of somatic negation or 
“without-thinking” to understand aspects of Hay’s approach, specifically Hay’s cellular body and 
use of questions (Nicely 149). My concept of somatic anacrusis addresses the holistic experience 
of practicing performing Hay’s work, and not just certain aspects such as Hay’s cellular body 
and questions. Further, Yuasa’s concept, understood via Nicely, does not adequately articulate 
my experience within Hay’s work, which involves a more dynamic, tensional quality. 
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Nevertheless, though derived independently from one another through experiential research, 
these two conceptualizations of Hay’s work reinforce our similar understanding of the unique 
operations of Hay’s choreography. Where Nicely’s project aims to draw theory and practice 
together in a reflective discussion of Hay’s work as one among several case studies illuminating 
her broader theory of choreography as future writing, by contrast my project approaches Hay’s 
work in itself in order first to describe the lived experience, and then to analyze how it functions 
and elucidate what is happening therein. I aim to draw theory from practice, beginning with 
experience in Hay’s work, and striving to retain ties to the somatic in my analysis in order to 
understand the embodied “thinking” that is occurring within the practice of Hay’s work – giving 
weight to this way of knowing, and the phenomenological descriptions thereof as knowledge in 
its own right.  
 
THEMES AND CRITIQUES 
In addition to the more robust analyses I have just discussed, a number of other writers address 
Hay’s work directly in discrete articles, including early Hay collaborator and musician Bill 
Jeffers, feminist scholar Judy Burns, performance scholar Danielle Goldman and, in a review of 
Hay’s book My Body, the Buddhist, performance theorist André Lepecki. Taking each in turn 
allows me to address several important themes and critiques in the literature on Hay. 
 
Hay’s Spirituality 
In her early book on American dance artists of the 1960s and 1970s, Terpsichore in Sneakers: 
Post-Modern Dance, dance scholar Sally Banes devotes a chapter to Hay entitled “Deborah Hay: 
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The Cosmic Dance”, which commences with the statement: “Deborah Hay’s choreography 
during the 1960s and ’70s has evolved from theatrical to social to almost sacred dancing” 
(Terpsichore 113). In this overview of Hay’s early career and influences, Banes articulates the 
prevailing concerns of Hay’s early work already discussed above. She also particularly notes the 
influences of Tai Chi Chuan on Hay’s developing practice – including the concepts of “letting 
go”, of flux and of paradox that have undoubtedly persisted in Hay’s work. Banes notes, 
however, that even at this early stage these influences were only that: Hay’s “group practice 
diverges from Tai Chi” and her “dances break from Tai Chi Chuan in the range of their dynamics” 
(Terpsichore 119-121, all). Hay was not undertaking a spiritual practice per se but drawing on 
these and many other influences in her artistic explorations. 
 Bill Jeffers’ article “Leaving the House (Deborah Hay)”, published in The Drama Review 
in 1979, provides a unique interpretive perspective on Hay’s work of this early period. As a 
participant playing music in performance with Hay, Jeffers obviously had “insider” knowledge 
about Hay’s intentions for her performances, and his descriptions and interpretations reveal the 
language and discourses of the time, an almost naïve belief in the possibility of universal 
experience and a lack of criticality around individual differences. Nonetheless his writing, which 
is peppered with quotes from Hay herself, reveals many salient values and principles that her 
work then embraced and that continue to resonate, though differently, in her current practice. 
Jeffers comments extensively on the ritualistic and spiritual dimensions of Hay’s work, 
articulating what she does as a kind of meditation that involves a practice of emptying so that the 
dance can enter her. This concept of emptying resonates with ideas from Zen Buddhism, which 
as Satin, Dolan, Nicely and others have noted, influenced Hay’s early development, partly 
	  55	  
through John Cage’s and others’ influence on her 1960s artistic cohort. Jeffers describes the 
specific preparation of the performing space and the inclusion of elements of nature, and 
everyday objects, imbued with a sense of sacredness through their selection and placement. He 
notes the influence of her Tai Chi practice, describing the sustained and sometimes dreamlike 
quality of her movement and the fact that it never seems to arrive at a resolution. Jeffers 
articulates his understanding of how Hay’s dances function, through perception and listening, 
that the dances arise through Hay’s and the audience’s simultaneous perception and listening: 
“The movements themselves aren’t important. It’s the space around them, the perception of them, 
both by Deborah and the audience, that gives them life, illuminates them. Imagination is real. 
The perception is the dance. For everyone. Which is the same as saying that the creative act 
going on here is the perceiving of the dance” (84).  
 While Jeffers’ article is important for its description and interpretation of Hay’s work 
from this period and the way it articulates key principles of perception and listening that have 
remained consistent throughout her career, it is also a key to understanding the spiritual 
discourse that over time has pervaded Hay’s work and discussions thereof. A language of 
spirituality pervades the literature on Hay and is important to critically consider, though an in-
depth analysis is not the focus, nor within the scope, of this study. Numerous journalistic reviews 
and scholarly articles touch on this aspect repeatedly throughout different phases of Hay’s career, 
over the course of which it seems Hay has distanced herself somewhat from her more 
wholehearted initial embrace of Eastern spiritual influences. From her practice of Tai Chi and 
embrace of principles of Zen Buddhism, which are well documented; to her various descriptions 
of her practice as “movement meditation” and “performance meditation”; to the ritualistic, even 
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worshipful, character of her daily movement practice, especially with its reverence for the 
“whole body as teacher”, Hay seems to have actively embraced and then, perhaps more aptly, 
productively appropriated this discourse. In early talks she gave, upon her arrival in Austin, on 
her Ten Circle Dances and first few solo performances, Hay quotes various spiritual teachers 
including Ram Dass and Pir Vilayat Khan (“Dance Talks” 18-19). Her second two book titles 
also stand as examples of spiritual references: Lamb at the Altar: The Story of a Dance and My 
Body, the Buddhist.  
 In her current practice, the term meditation is not so common to describe her practice, 
which she articulates more often as “practicing performing”.33 Hay’s apparent shift away from a 
more overt spiritual discourse may be in part because of the difficulty this discourse posed to her 
work being critically accepted on the artistic circuit. Satin has noted the challenge of addressing 
the spiritual dimension and dispenses with it quickly in her text, commenting: “Spiritual 
experience, a slippery site for scholarship, is sanded down by Hay’s humor and by her earthy, 
sensual, and quite secular presence, on- and offstage” (Satin 183). If we take this description as 
evidence of Hay’s embodied ambivalence on the subject, in a 1997 interview with Ann Daly we 
find Hay’s explicit articulation thereof. Here, Hay responds to Daly’s line of questioning about 
the apparent spiritual layer in Hay’s work: “What does [prayer] mean to me? How do I relate to 
this, as a cynic, without much religious background, and who has no relationship to prayer at all 
in a conscious way?” (qtd. in Daly, “Horse Rider” 47). Hay responds a little further on: “This is 
crucial. In dance I do not divide the body into physical, spiritual, mental, emotional, 
psychological parts. I am adamant about this. The whole body is perceiver of everything 
imagined, created, invented, not imagined, guessed, faked” (qtd. in Daly, “Horse Rider” 47).  
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 Drobnick’s perspective, discussed above, also addresses the influence of Eastern ideas on 
Hay’s work, while framing a more methodological rather than spiritual application: “Hay 
reengineers these ancient, spiritual techniques to the contemporary practice of performance, 
while maintaining their efficacy in transforming the mind and body” (47). The significance of 
this quote to my discussion lies in Drobnick’s reference to “the contemporary practice of 
performance”. Indeed Hay’s work must be understood and contextualized by the fact that it is 
presented as live dance performance. Hay situates herself and her work circulates within this 
disciplinary economy – of not-for-profit artistic creation; theatrical performance; local, national 
and international dissemination through presentation, touring, commissions, etc. – and the 
performer of her work purposefully presents a dance performance before an audience, invoking 
the context and specific social agreements of this type of theatrical event, which substantively 
distinguishes Hay’s work from spiritual practices per se. Nicely’s work, also discussed above, 
develops a strong thesis around the role of “East as Method” (144) in Hay’s work, recognizing 
the way that Hay “extends [Buddhist notions] into artistic practice” (155). From my discussion 
here, it becomes clear that scholars have wrestled with the spiritual thread in Hay’s work, in 
order to address the artistic impact thereof. Hay herself remains ambiguous on the subject. In the 
introduction to My Body, the Buddhist, Hay’s ambivalence and yet explicit appropriation of the 
discourse of spirituality becomes apparent, with the focus remaining on her conviction of the 
body’s innate and unique capacity for knowledge:  
It would have been antithetical to my process of inquiry to research Buddhist 
theory in order to substantiate my thesis. Long ago I stopped sitting at a desk, surrounded 
by books, gathering information. My research happens in the experiential realm dancing 
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– standing on my two feet and moving, listening, seeing. I do not think people are going 
to be reading this text in order to learn about Buddhism. 
 
I am not a practicing Buddhist. Nor am I a practiced poet, librettist, or archivist. 
The literary forms used in this book are liberties I have taken in order to unravel the 
coding between movement and perception. The libretto, poem, score, short story, were 
co-opted by a flag-bearer in pursuit of the study, transmission, and intelligence born in 
the dancing body. I will try anything to help bring some attention to the truth born here. 
 
My Body, The Buddhist describes innate skills and basic wisdom that bodies 
possess but which remain untranslated because as a culture we tend to hide in our clothes. 
Unrecognized is the altar that rises with us in the morning and leads us to rest at night. 
The book’s intent is to open some trapped doors that prevent awareness of the body’s 
daringly ordinary perspicacity. (Hay, My Body, the Buddhist xxv) 
  
 With respect to my own research, which strives first to analyze and articulate Hay’s 
practice through my own first-person experience, I will make two points here. First, it is essential 
to acknowledge and accept the foundational influence of certain, primarily Eastern practices and 
principles on the development of Hay’s aesthetic, just as these ideas have informed so many 
artists, particularly within the 1960s avant-garde. Second, and more complex, is that while Hay’s 
discourse and approach itself refer to and bear resemblances to these Eastern practices, Hay’s 
work is not explicitly spiritual in intent;34 rather, in my view, a kind of secular relationality is a 
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fundamental value. These two points further support my choice of theorists in this study and to 
use material other than Buddhist philosophy as a lens through which to consider Hay’s work. 
 Jeffers makes an important point that helpfully situates Hay’s work in the realm of 
performance and distinguishes it from spiritual practice per se, while also supporting my point 
above about the fundamental importance for Hay of relationality. It is significant to remember 
that Jeffers was writing in 1979, about Hay’s work of that period, which she did describe as 
meditation, as I have noted above. In a discussion by Jeffers of how visual and movement 
descriptions of Hay’s performance do not accurately capture what is really going on, Jeffers 
writes:  
It’s like trying to describe meditation with a discourse about the look on the meditator’s 
face. What it’s all about is someplace else. I know that for Deborah, her dance, but 
especially her solo performance, is meditation. It is meditation but with one significant 
difference from traditional forms: Hers includes a desire to communicate something, 
thereby making it performance as well. (Jeffers 84)  
Hay corroborates:  
I feel like, without exception, people respond to the presence of a being who is in the 
moment. It is such a gift. Whether in performance or on the street or in the house. It’s a 
gift of life. It is true communication, understanding. The main reason for performing is to 
provide that experience for myself and the audience. It is the one common language 
which is, without exception, clear. (Hay in Jeffers 84) 
The point is to understand that Hay’s fundamental intent is to communicate, not with the divine 
but with others, the audience, present in the moment.  
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 I venture that the discourse of spirituality pervades Hay’s and others’ discussion of her 
work not because the work is spiritual per se but largely because this language is known and 
shared by a wide public,35 and it offers a way to approximately articulate the somato-sensory 
experiences to which Hay’s work gives rise – both for participants and for audiences.36 In my 
research study, I work through phenomenological description of the experience and do not 
further address this spiritual framing.  
 
Hay’s Feminism 
Judy Burns takes a feminist approach to Hay’s solo trilogy The Man Who Grew Common in 
Wisdom in her 1990 review. Burns discusses the trilogy in the context of then-current feminist 
theory (particularly concerned with visuality and the spectatorial gaze), noting two particular 
ways in which Hay’s work subverts the gaze: 1) via Hay’s inner/outer focus and inviting being 
seen while also seeing; and 2) via Hay’s clown-like costuming which subverts the sensuous 
female figure/identity that Burns notes was more actively embraced in earlier Hay work (Burns). 
For Burns, throughout the performance Hay sustains a dynamic subject position with respect to 
the audience. Writes Burns:  
Through non-linear choreography, subtle costuming, and a highly refined, simultaneous 
inner and outer focus, Hay attempted to eliminate factors which would arrest the viewer’s 
gaze and get in the way of the audience fully sharing the experience of Hay’s movement. 
She appeared to be trying not to create visual, kinesthetic or dynamic images with her 
movement; as a matter of fact, she seemed to relentlessly strip away anything which 
might contribute to image-making. (Burns 169-170) 
	  61	  
 For her part, Satin’s writing (discussed above) more broadly illuminates various aspects 
of Hay’s career through the lens of feminism. Satin points, as does Burns, to Hay’s early solo 
performances in which she embraced a lush sensuality, presenting a conventional notion of 
beauty and woman’s body through the use of soft, draping costumes; and, through her use of 
mythological and archetypal female images and performance settings, aligning woman, body and 
nature in a manner that could easily be understood as presenting an essentialist perspective. 
However, Satin implies that this would be an oversimplification, noting both Hay’s formalist 
concerns and her active “assertive (as well as inviting) stance toward the spectator” (191n13).  
 Like Burns, Satin remarks on Hay’s prioritizing the intention and experience of visibility 
and being seen by the audience as essential to the premise of Hay’s work, to foreground/perform 
the experience of the whole person/self. In Satin’s view: “‘Inviting being seen’ is at once the 
most generous and most provocative of the movement meditations that guide her dance practice” 
(187). Satin draws on her interview with Hay in 1996 to highlight Hay’s own reflections on the 
experience of being a woman performer. Though Hay dismisses an intellectual feminist intent in 
her approach to performing, she does acknowledge the complexities therein: “Early on in my 
performing career, when I would stand in front of men, I would … be inviting being seen, and 
doing [things that were] as gross or as ugly as I could get…. [T]here were a lot of men who 
would not lift their eyes to look at me. They did not want to see a woman looking like I was 
looking. [T]here was some confrontation going on here – it was so awakening to me” (qtd. in 
Satin 198).  
 It is primarily Hay’s specific and active approach to visuality that gives rise to these 
particular feminist analyses of her performance, and which is also a key aspect of other analyses 
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less explicitly feminist, including Nicely above and Goldman below. All these scholars are 
touching differently on the unique relationality engendered by Hay’s work. Insofar as this 
activation of reciprocity subverts the possibility for any fixed subject or object position on the 
part of the performer and on the part of the audience members, it speaks to the way in which 
Daly has described Hay’s work – in an implicit reference to feminist discourse – as a 
“performance of becoming” (“Review” 35). Based on Hay’s comment to Satin, it would seem 
that Hay recognizes the effect of her approach to visuality in her work but that she did not and 
does not proceed with the intent to provoke, challenge or subvert from a feminist standpoint, 
hence Hay’s “feminism” – as I have titled this section, in quotes. 
 
Hay’s Politics and Ethics  
There are those who think Hay’s work is entirely ahistorical and sealed inside a bubble of inquiry 
into “pure aesthetics” and there are others who think Hay’s work enacts a politic, even mounting 
a critique of major socio-cultural issues and debates. As I have discussed above, Dolan mounts a 
significant critique of Hay’s work in suggesting that it is ahistorical and does not adequately take 
account of very real political struggles in the world. By contrast, in a 2007 article in TDR: The 
Drama Review, Danielle Goldman also addresses the socio-political resonances of Hay’s work. 
Goldman weaves a descriptive and interpretive text about Hay’s group work O, O, tying it into 
her experience in a weeklong workshop with Hay, photographs of the performance, an interview 
with Hay and an excerpt from the score for O, O. Goldman’s text provides a robust perspective 
on this work and Hay’s practice. In the text, Goldman acknowledges the political resonances in 
this particular work with the US “war on terror”: in the Twin-Tower emblazoned visors (crossed 
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out and overwritten with O, O in marker) provided to shield the audience’s eyes from the 
performance lighting; in the raw vocal lament repeated by different dancers; and in the closing 
image in which the dancers walk away from a single still female with a black scarf wrapped over 
her head like a veil.  
 In her article, Goldman questions the ethical dimension of Hay’s approach to visuality 
that involves the performer taking an active approach to receiving the gaze in “invit[ing] being 
seen” and at the same time taking an active approach to seeing by “view[ing] others as the 
subject of one’s experience rather than the object” (“O, O” 165). Goldman is concerned with the 
implied generosity and trust involved in Hay’s proposals related to visuality and questions what 
it might mean to engage in this practice in situations that are not as safe and communal as the 
rehearsal studio, for example. Goldman writes: “Resistant to a visual reduction of the body, 
while still committed to being seen, Hay’s performance practice is indeed filled with political 
implications” (“O, O” 160). Focussing on considerations of visuality, aurality and objecthood, 
and the inherent power dynamics involved in being the subject – as Hay asks – rather than the 
object of another’s gaze (Goldman, “O, O” 165), Goldman’s essay raises ethical questions about 
Hay’s work from both the perspective of an audience member and from the perspective of a 
participant, and about the relationality between them.  
 In light of the 2012 controversy about Hay’s Blues work at New York’s MoMA in 2012, 
these points certainly resonate. The 2012 presentation of Blues involved two distinct groups of 
dancers – the blue whites and the blue blacks – that were defined based on gender and skin 
colour, segregated in performance, and each given a distinct practice – essentially blue whites: 
calm unified presence and blue blacks: energetic individualized mobility (Wasik).37 For some, 
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audiences and performers, these dynamics established a distinctly racist hierarchy in 
performance, which – by performer in the work Kathy Wasik’s account at least – was dismissed 
by Hay as being entirely absent in the work (Wasik). Blues has been critiqued for being naively 
racist on the one hand (Gonzalez) and, on the other, Hay has been described as being a 
provocateur) for enacting critique of this kind of hierarchy through dance in such a high profile 
institution (Ask Homeland Security).  
 Blues is not the subject of this research; however, because the ethical dimension of Hay’s 
work is of interest to me with respect to Hay’s articulated concern with relationality, this incident 
is important to acknowledge. Over time, as I have discussed throughout this chapter, many 
writers and observers of Hay’s work have commented on its unique effect on the performer-
audience relation, in part through the distinct quality of presence and attention that her work 
engenders in performers, and in part in the way that it disrupts sense-making processes and 
tendencies. As I have indicated above, Dolan has suggested that Hay’s dances work on and shift 
the performer/audience relation in a way that at least partially challenges the lived status quo, 
and Nicely too – through her engagement with Hay’s work in relation to Zen Buddhist thought – 
suggests that there is a compassionate aspect to Hay’s practice in its relational openness and aim 
to not fix onto anything (Nicely 154). Similarly to her dismissive response to Satin’s questions of 
explicit feminist intent in her work noted above, Hay stands aside from the ethical/moral debate 
in her discussion with Goldman, saying: “I’m going to be honest. I’m doing this for the most 
selfish reasons on earth. I’m not going in with any kind of morality” (qtd. in Goldman, “O, O” 
162). That an artist could create work with political implications and yet not be reflectively 
aware of those implications is possible; however, that a work itself carries such implications 
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cannot necessarily be denied by the artist. We are all working and responding from and with 
partial – and differing – perspectives. Further, that an artist as committed and reflective as Hay 
should simply not be aware of these implications seems implausible. That she should choose to 
sidestep or refuse to comment on such questions with respect to her work seems entirely 
probable – fundamentally Hay’s practice operates through paradox, challenging the very 
possibility of fixed perspective. Moreover, if Hay’s work has a politic, it is enacted in her 
performance, not articulated in her discourse. Through my study of Hay’s solo choreography and 
my experience therein, I aim to address how her work functions, and as such how this contributes 
to its unique relationality. I will return to the topic of relationality in Hay’s work and the ethical 
implications thereof in chapter 6. 
 
Hay’s Self-Mythologizing 
Hay’s side-stepping around political and ethical questions about her work, seem all the more 
strategic when considered in light of her commitment to writing, which seeks to document and 
transmit her practice and work. In his 2002 review of Hay’s My Body, the Buddhist, André 
Lepecki describes the book as a travelogue of sorts, and situates it in a genealogy of texts written 
by dancers/choreographers from Thoinot Arbeau through Isadora Duncan, Martha Graham, 
Doris Humphrey, Rudolf Laban, Merce Cunningham and Bill T. Jones, among others. Lepecki 
suggests that Western theatrical dance is tied inextricably to writing:  
What can be provisionally argued is that writings by choreographers provide us with a 
different form of choreography’s substance: that of always reflecting and refracting 
forces that shape behavioral and ideological structures of subjectivation and subjection. 
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More radically, one could propose that Western theatrical dance only discovers its 
conditions of possibility once it claims writing as privileged partner, once it pairs writing 
with Western dance’s other two foundational ‘substances’: the body (as estranged matter 
of continuous re-articulation and refinement), and movement (as autonomous aesthetic 
category and ontological imperative). (“My Body” 165)  
This proposal aptly describes what Hay has indicated in her own words to Ann Daly about the 
role of writing in her choreographic practice and how it expands her understanding and 
experience of her practice and her choreography: “I learned about other dimensions of the dance 
that I did not know were there until I wrote them down” (qtd. in Daly, “Horse Rider” 52). If for 
Hay, choreography’s substance is an exploration of perception of self and other, and of 
relationality, then her writing differently explores and articulates these concerns. Certainly, the 
ideas and experiences noted in My Body, the Buddhist circulate and re-circulate through Hay’s 
body in movement practice, and through others’ bodies in Hay’s movement practice.  
 With respect to Hay’s commitment to writing and publishing, her exemplary skill in 
articulating her process and experiences provides interesting perspectives and insights into her 
work. In parallel to her choreographic and performance work, the books and articles she has 
published also accumulate in a self-generated archive that documents her artistic career. 
Powerful as linguistic articulations of an ephemeral and experiential practice, and participating 
as they do in the economy of texts, they strongly support her reputation and stature as an artist. 
Would she be as known, acknowledged and revered if she had not produced these texts in 
complement to her performance and teaching work? As Elizabeth Aldrich, Library of Congress 
Curator of Dance, asked in an address to the assembled members of the Dance Critics 
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Association at their 2007 New York conference: “When is it appropriate to question the public 
record?” (Andrews).  In this questing for “truth”, Aldrich was referring to the contemporary 
commodification of reputation and the power appropriated by artists, through self-generated 
writing and publishing, to shape their own mythologies, as opposed to becoming the subjects of 
histories written about them. The power of the written word has not been overlooked by 
choreographers and movement artists. One need only cast an eye back in time, as Lepecki has 
done above, to identify Isadora Duncan for example, one of modern dance’s pioneers, as an 
articulate individual for whom the written and published text served immensely in disseminating 
her views and solidifying her reputation. Hay’s writing can be seen in this light, and indeed 
likely functions in this way to some degree. Self-serving as it might seem, historically speaking it 
must be noted that, generally, women have less frequently been taken up as the subjects of 
written histories and therefore, in order to become part of the public record, they have arguably 
had to take the initiative and generate their own documentation.38 What might be called self-
mythologizing from one side of the mouth could equally be called self-preservation from the 
other.   
 
Hay and Community Practice 
Though primarily taken up in dance and performance studies contexts, Hay’s work has also been 
addressed in relation to community arts practice and movement/body therapy. Chapter 13 from 
Hay’s book My Body, The Buddhist appears in Petra Kuppers and Gwen Robertson’s anthology 
The Community Performance Reader, although in Hay’s contributor biography therein it is made 
clear that Hay “does not work in community performance contexts, but her ways of thinking 
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about movement have influenced practitioners in many countries” (Kuppers and Robertson xiii). 
Despite this statement, insofar as her work has long involved untrained participants from the 
interested general public, she can easily be considered an early proponent of community arts 
practice as it has come to be conceived today. Hay has been advocating through her inherently 
relational workshop practices and solo and group performances since the late 1960s – when she 
first began working with untrained participants – for an increased awareness and understanding 
of the body and movement practice. Arguably, Hay’s work has always existed at the intersection 
between art and community, and a more comprehensive consideration of her work in this light 
would likely contribute to the lively discussions at the heart of Shannon Jackson’s book Social 
Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics, in which she gestures: “… one way of 
characterizing the “performative turn” in art practice is to foreground its fundamental interest in 
the nature of sociality” (2). 
 
Hay and Therapy/Healing 
Just as her work has been connected to the field of community performance, Hay’s practice has 
also connected her to the field of dance therapy. In 2000, during her tour of PASTForward with 
Mikhail Baryshnikov, Hay was invited to deliver the Marian Chace Foundation Annual Lecture 
for the American Dance Therapy Association. Her text, which draws on and includes excerpts of 
her writing from elsewhere (including My Body, The Buddhist) is published in the American 
Journal of Dance Therapy. In her opening comments, Hay notes: “I am aware that my work over 
the last 30 years has had a therapeutic counterpart for many people who have studied with me, 
including myself, yet the site for my studies has been as a practicing performer and 
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choreographer and not as a practicing therapist” (“Woof” 8-9).39  
 The fact that art and creative process have been explicitly developed as therapeutic 
treatments – such as in dance/movement therapy for example – weaves these practices closely. 
What distinguishes performance from therapy, in my view, is both the specific relationality 
involved in each and the intent of the practice. In therapy, the relationship between therapist and 
client focuses on the client’s personal experience and process, with the therapist as guide and 
witness. The intent is toward wellness, to heal. In performance, the relationship between 
creator/performer/s and audience focuses on aesthetic experience. The intent is toward 
communication – of some kind. Though healing might be an attendant effect of performance for 
performer or audience, it is not the primary purpose of the effort or encounter, as it is in therapy. 
Certainly there is more to this discussion than I can address here. What I wish to acknowledge is 
simply the proximity of Hay’s work to therapeutic practice while making the necessary 
distinction between therapy and performance, thereby maintaining an understanding of her work 
explicitly as performance in the context of my specific study. 
 
CONCLUSION 
From the above discussion, we come to understand how Hay’s influences have their roots in the 
rich and radical artistic experience of the 1960s avant-garde and that her work of that time 
embodied – in fact, according to Kirby epitomized – the aesthetic concerns of the period. Judson 
Dance Theater dance-makers, including Hay, rejected the values of the dance modernists, of 
elitism in art, of conventional technique and virtuosity and of dramatic theatricality of the kind 
well-known in the dance work of Martha Graham and José Limón, for example. Instead they 
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actively blurred art/life boundaries, artistic disciplinary boundaries, and audience/performer 
boundaries, embracing pedestrian tasks and activities, as well as sports, as material for dance and 
including new music, visual art and sculpture, film and other electronic technologies in their 
works. A tendency toward neutral presentation and a matter-of-fact attitude in performance, 
along with the equal inclusion of trained dancers and non-trained movers points up the intent to 
go against artifice and technical virtuosity.40 The use of scores and game structures functioned as 
compositional strategies to subvert acquired and ingrained habits and patterns. Dance writer 
Deborah Jowitt notes that the Judson artists were “casting dancer as decision-maker, intent on 
solving a particular problem … a wily, alert individual, perhaps athletic, perhaps not” (317). 
Hay’s work has remained anchored by these concerns throughout her career, over the course of 
which she has brought various aspects to the foreground during distinct phases of artistic 
exploration.  
 Hay has continued to embrace aspects of Eastern spiritual practices, specifically from Tai 
Chi and Zen Buddhism, and these influences have undoubtedly informed the ways in which she 
understands art and life as contiguous, two sides of the same coin. In “Excerpts from Talks Made 
during my first, second, and third Solo Dance Performances, 1976-77”, Hay said the following, 
which has been quoted by others elsewhere: “So the dance is my being here in this space, totally, 
and preparation for this performance is my entire life and nothing more, or less” (“Dance Talks” 
21). If this sounds as though it could be stated by any dance artist – or any performing artist for 
that matter – I think Hay’s persistent exploration of this statement is how perhaps she is putting 
the whole of dance in question through her work and that this is what attracts so many people 
these days. She is indeed getting at something that is true for all performers (or all dancers): there 
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is knowledge inside this experience but it is hard to pin down. Pinning it down – to the degree 
that is possible – is what I’m trying to do in attempting to show how Hay’s work functions. 
 For years Hay preferred to work with untrained movers, only returning to work 
exclusively with professional dancers and performers in the last fifteen or so years. According to 
dance scholar Danielle Goldman, it was during her time with JDT that Hay, “began to 
experiment with what would become a lasting fascination: challenging distinctions between 
trained and untrained dancers” (“O, O” 160). Hay has been at times quite adamant about using 
pedestrian, prosaic movement in her dances, and has only loosely held onto disciplinary identity 
as a dancer/choreographer. Hay writes in her 1988 article “Remaining Positionless”: “In The 
Man Who Grew Common In Wisdom (1987), I return to choreography but remove all movement 
that could not be created by a traffic cop from Duluth. It is deliberately prosaic. The 
choreography is similarly reduced, stripped of everything unusual” (“Remaining Positionless” 
22-23). She has embraced spoken word, extended vocalizations and singing throughout her 
career, and has worked collaboratively with musicians/composers at times, though the range of 
disciplines included in her work was arguably greatest in the 1960s when she used film and 
electronic technologies in, for example, Group One and Solo, both noted above. 
As discussed above, Hay has developed a very specific and rigorous discourse/use of 
language around her practice and performance that underpins the unique constraints of her 
choreography and practice – an approach that is rooted in the scores, tasks and games of the 
Judson-era – to simultaneously inhibit and release both patterned and so-called spontaneous 
behaviour. So-called because arguably what one thinks of as spontaneous, movement that might 
arise in an improvised context for example, is not necessarily so and is, rather, always already 
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shaped by cultural forces. I hope to show how Hay’s practice aims to actively unravel, arrest, 
irritate and rebuke such encultured spontaneity.  
An exploration of the dimension of relationality continues to pervade Hay’s work. She 
has continued to prefer intimate performance settings in which she can be in close proximity to 
her audience-cum-participants. She has also performed in her home, inviting audiences into her 
living room, laid out with a table of food, candles and cushions on the floor. She has repeatedly 
created working structures that blur the distinction between audience and participant, bringing a 
group of people together for a period of regular daily movement practice in the early Ten Circle 
Dances, and in both the large-group workshop format and in the Solo Performance 
Commissioning Project structure. In chapter 6, I return to a deeper consideration of the 
dimension of relationality in Hay’s practice. 
Hay has continued to practice and perform herself and is sought-after as a master teacher. 
Nicely addresses the way in which Hay’s approach to teaching is informed by Eastern practices 
and is influencing the trajectory of contemporary dance training itself today, noting that Asian 
pedagogies tend not to rely on image/form-based transmission (146). Nor does Hay, who almost 
never demonstrates movements themselves. Instead, Hay works from proposals and what ifs, 
deflecting the decisions and movement manifestations thereof, to the dancer/choreographer. As 
Nicely phrases it: “Hay similarly moves the questions she has asked her own body to those 
bodies studying with her, thus transmitting her practice as a kind of writing by which dancers re-
write themselves and their dance training. In this way, Hay is also affecting the field of 
contemporary dance training itself” (Nicely 146), a point also supported by Bojana Bauer in her 
essay “When Train(ing) Derails” (Bauer). 
	  73	  
The literature discussed in this chapter forms a matrix of discourse around Hay’s work. 
Each analysis I have discussed travels a specific vector through Hay’s choreography and practice, 
connecting specific nodes and intersecting with other vectors, providing various oblique 
perspectives on the work. By considering various themes and critiques in the literature on Hay – 
i.e. spirituality, feminism, politics, therapy – I have addressed some of the contextual frames 
through which her work has been and may yet be productively and critically considered. 
Touching on these discussions acknowledges the many overlapping discourses triggered by 
Hay’s work, while also allowing me to further circumscribe my own perspectives and concerns 
in this study. My own study travels a new vector through Hay’s work, intersecting with other 
vectors at some previously articulated nodes and yet contributing a differently inflected angle in 
the accumulating matrix of writing on Hay. 
Foster’s study establishes Hay as a significant choreographic voice and offers an 
articulation and analysis of Hay’s early explorations of breath, flow and the development of her 
practice of cellular consciousness. Dolan provides insights into the practice and the performance 
Hay developed through her large group workshops with untrained performers. His critique, that 
the political aspect of Hay’s work is only partially and ineffectively realized, in fact grounds an 
understanding of the way in which Hay’s work does not represent – or even present – but rather 
enacts its politics. Dolan was writing in the mid 1990s, before the so-called performative turn in 
cultural theory, a turn that now facilitates the contemporary understanding of Hay’s politics that I 
arrive at in my conclusion. Satin’s feminist analysis of Hay’s work foregrounds many of the key 
characteristics of Hay’s practice and performance, reinforcing some identified earlier by Foster 
that recur through the literature, and that appear in my own study, which is more 
	  74	  
phenomenological in approach but takes a feminist turn in conclusion. Drobnick’s substantial 
analysis of Hay’s lexicon establishes the base for my own consideration of Hay’s distinct use of 
language in her approach to choreography. In turn, Daly develops Hay’s approach to writing and 
articulates Hay’s reflective understanding of its role in the transmission of her choreography, 
which informed the SPCP structure. In considering Hay’s work through her own solo practice 
and performance, Nicely’s study resonates with mine most closely, as she addresses her own 
experience within the work and thinks it through in relation to various phenomenological texts. 
Our studies complement each other, and yet diverge in their main objectives: Nicely’s primarily 
to support her thesis about choreography as future writing; mine primarily to develop a poetics of 
Hay’s choreography and practice in itself.  
Taken together, the literature on Hay discussed above reveals many of the primary 
concerns in her work – presence, meaningfulness, habit/spontaneity, relationality, 
flux/change. Rooted in 1960s avant-garde experimentalism in dance, Hay’s work continues to 
explore these dimensions of lived experience, all of which can be understood to revolve around 
questions of intention, attention and action. I will use these three dimensions of lived experience 
to organize my case study analysis of Hay’s choreography and practice for the solo At Once in 
the chapters that follow. My research seeks to articulate and understand the unique operation of 
these processes in Hay’s work through a decidedly experiential approach that aims to draw 
theory from and through practice. In the following chapter, I outline the method by which I 
proceeded, and the theoretical framework that organizes my findings.
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Chapter 3: Method and Theoretical Framework 
 
METHOD: APPROACHES, STRATEGIES, PROCESS 
Dancers’ words on the body remain virtually unknown, and virtually unheard, for they 
rarely correspond with the different discourses of which the body is the object. (Louppe, 
“Singular Moving Geographies” 12) 
 
Because improvisation exists for the improviser as a movement-based somatic state, the 
challenge to each participant, and therefore the core of significance for this kind of 
research, resides in the real-time translation of experience into language, and the 
acknowledgment that such a translation can only approximate what is felt. In other words, 
what we can know or surmise about improvisational experiences must be based on a kind 
of echo that survives the constant disappearance of the improvisational “now”: the 
language of the individual reports. (De Spain 28-29) 
 
As a textual practice, however, improvisation is very slippery. It also fits uneasily with 
certain kinds of academic discourses. I have found it difficult to find the right frame, the 
right tone with which to theorize about improvisation. Clearly it takes a leap of faith to 
articulate the nuances of a state of physical and metaphysical flux. It is delicate work, and 
there is the omnipresent fear of bruising the form of improvisation, pinning it down to 
static meanings, dissecting it for the sake of epistemological stability. But the alternatives 
are equally deadly; by keeping improvisational work outside of current intellectual 
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discussions, we limit its influence. Sure, my experience of improvisation will change as I 
write about it, but then again, my experience of writing and thinking will also change as I 
engage with my embodied knowledge from an intellectual perspective. (Albright, Taken 
by Surprise 260-261) 
 
Introduction: Researching Somatic Experience 
As the above quotes by theorists of movement and improvisational dance suggest, writing about 
the experience of dancing is a challenging task and one that doesn’t fit easily into discursive 
frameworks and yet, there is much to be said about such experiences, and knowledge to be 
gleaned. In this introduction, I outline several perspectives and approaches to embodied research 
and culminate with a brief summary of my multi-method approach.  
 In his essay “Embodiment and Cultural Phenomenology”, cultural anthropologist Thomas 
Csordas articulates the need for a paradigm of embodiment in ethnographic research in 
complement to the more established paradigm of textuality, proposing that we should be able to 
study culture and self through embodiment just as we study these topics through texts.41 He 
draws on phenomenological thought, and specifically Maurice Merleau-Ponty, to establish the 
construct that while “semiotics gives us textuality to understand representation, phenomenology 
gives us embodiment in order to understand being-in-the-world” (147). With reference also to 
Heidegger, Csordas articulates the perspective that language can disclose experience inasmuch as 
it can represent or even constitute it, supporting his case for the study of culture and self through 
embodiment, in complement to textuality. In considering research through the paradigm of 
embodiment, Csordas raises several significant methodological issues. First, he asks whether 
	  77	  
such research would necessarily involve a specific method or kind of data, to which he answers 
no: “There is no special kind of data or special method for eliciting such data, but a 
methodological attitude that demands attention to bodiliness even in purely verbal data such as 
written text or oral interview” (148). The second issue involves the question of how the 
researcher engages the data: “whether it is sufficient to attend to the body or whether one must in 
addition attend with the body, now understood as a tool for research” (149).  In affirmative 
answer to the second, Csordas quotes historian Morris Berman who, Csordas notes, advocates for 
an experiential engagement of the historian’s bodiliness in research and writing: “‘History gets 
written with the mind holding the pen. What would it look like, what would it read like, if it got 
written with the body holding the pen?’” (Berman qtd. in Csordas 149).42  
 I find Csordas’ presentation compelling insofar as it thinks through and articulates the 
possibility for a unique contribution to research through a paradigm of embodiment. However, 
contrary to Csordas, I would argue that indeed specific skills and training are required – perhaps 
increasingly so, the more specific and complex the bodily experiential phenomenon under 
consideration – not only to develop a deeply nuanced attention to bodily movement patterns and 
a facility in disclosing them through language, but also to cultivate awareness and understanding 
of one’s own bodily habits and patterns in conducting first-person somatic research. It is far too 
easy to fall into generalized cultural or aesthetically specific assumptions about body movement 
and meaning that rest at the level of “body language” (Daly, “Movement Analysis” 44). By 
“body language” I mean the level at which movements and gestures already “stand for” or 
represent socio-culturally established meanings. While it is not possible to transcend one’s own 
experience and therefore somatically generated experiential knowledge is inherently situated,43 a 
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necessary critical reflexivity is required when studying with and through one’s own somatic 
experience, in order to adequately address the complexity and individual differences therein. 
 Many dance scholars approach their research from a more general somatic standpoint, 
drawing on extensive personal dance experience and the ability to reflect on nuances of 
movement experience, and using poetically descriptive writing to bring movement experiences 
into contact with a variety of cultural and theoretical discourses. Ethnographic and auto-
ethnographic methods are frequently deployed in dance studies, particularly since the field of 
dance studies developed early on under strong influence from anthropology and has since 
developed its own ethnographic methods and strategies specific to dance ethnographic projects 
(Sklar, “Reprise”; Davida). Laban Movement Analysis (LMA) has been used as a method and 
tool for movement observation and description in a variety of dance studies and in other fields 
including psychology and communications. (Brennan; Daly, “Movement Analysis”). Daly writes 
that: “One of the fundamental strengths of LMA is its ability to deal with the processual aspects 
of performance” (“Movement Analysis” 45).  
 Descriptive and more specific phenomenologically descriptive methods have also been 
deployed and critically re-examined in the study of dance because of the obvious need to 
articulate movement experience in research studies. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s 1966 The 
Phenomenology of Dance (recently re-issued in 2015) and Sondra Horton Fraleigh’s 1987 Dance 
and the Lived Body: A Descriptive Aesthetics represent early and committed phenomenological 
approaches to dance art. Over her prolific career, dance scholar Ann Cooper Albright has often 
deployed first-person somatic approaches to research that value movement knowledge, 
“posit[ing her] dancing body as a research tool or guide” (Albright, Engaging Bodies 182). In 
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various projects, she has sought to build theory from this knowledge through descriptive, 
phenomenological and critical-theoretical writing. She models this work, and in fact she 
implicitly answers Berman’s question quoted above in, for example, her rewriting the history of 
Loie Fuller’s dancing through a first-person somatic research approach that generates new and 
important insights about Fuller’s early twentieth-century performance practice (Albright, 
“Matters of Tact”). Albright’s work is specific and rigorous, and she succeeds at foregrounding 
somatic experience and knowledge in her writing. In this study, I aim to foreground somatic 
experience and movement knowledge, using specific description to build theory that maintains 
intimate ties to the movement knowledge from which it arises.  
 My aim aligns generally with Fraleigh’s phenomenological approach: “Phenomenology 
depends on immediate experience, but includes more. It hopes to arrive at meaning, perspectives 
on the phenomena of experience (dance in this case) which can be communicated” (Fraleigh, “A 
Vulnerable Glance” 135). More specifically, I follow Albright, who, in reflecting in 2011 on her 
research and writing for her 1997 book Choreographing Difference: The Body and Identity in 
Contemporary Dance, writes: “I wanted to give the experience of dancing its own intellectual 
credibility” (Engaging Bodies 10). I hope to avoid an overly personal auto-ethnographic 
narrative, while allowing my first-person somatic experience to enable me to illuminate and 
inflect Hay’s choreography and practice through certain theoretical discourses. My goal is to 
develop a descriptive understanding of the somatic experiences in Hay’s choreography and 
practice and to discern the somatic function, or experiential poetics, of Hay’s choreography and 
practice in a manner that could be corroborated by others who engage in her work. 
  Situated within the broadly defined field of practice-as-research, I have derived a multi-
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method approach to my research that begins with embodiment and draws on various tools and 
strategies to address these objectives. This approach plays across multiple fields, grounded first 
in dance practice and then most specifically in my somatic training in Laban Movement Analysis 
(LMA), and embracing auto-ethnographic and phenomenological strategies. Beginning with 
practice and performance, and writing alongside through close somatic awareness, I employ an 
iterative writing strategy to develop first-order auto-ethnographic journaling and 
phenomenological descriptions of experience from which I then extrapolate second-order 
phenomenological descriptions of significant experiences in a “double-distillation” process that 
provides material for my analysis. I aimed to write as close to the dancing experience as possible, 
both in time and in sensory-perceptual awareness.  
 In this close-writing practice, the dancing experience is still “with me” as I write, 
enlivening my flesh and bubbling just beneath (and through) my skin. It stays with me a while 
after I stop moving, like the light and free bounce that remains in my step after the giggle from a 
moment of humour has passed; or like the fizz and crackle that courses through my body from a 
surge of adrenalin following a near miss with a car while riding my bike; or the expansive tingle 
that spreads through my flesh in the aftermath of a warm embrace. Such moments erupt from or 
through the generally smooth flow of quotidian experience in which somatic experience may 
only register as a consistent hum. In such ruptures, one’s somatic being is jolted to attention and 
registers awareness of our implicit and proximal bodily relation with the world for a time. As 
phenomenologist Drew Leder has remarked, our bodies draw our attention through hunger or 
pain for example (40). However, through dance and somatic practice, for example, one can 
develop the skill of noticing and thereby register finer details of change in bodily experience as it 
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passes. My aim was to trace – longhand – such somatic residues and echoes of my dancing 
experience in Hay’s work in its fluid multidimensionality and texture, and to then extrapolate 
from first-order to second-order descriptions so that we can come to know this dancing 
experience in some appreciable manner and thus consider it analytically in the context of 
discourse.  
 The Winter 2011 theme issue of Dance Research Journal offers several critical re-
appraisals of phenomenological approaches to dance (Franko, “Editor’s Note”; Ness; Pakes).44 
Sally Ann Ness’s article, in particular, examines the implications for dance studies of following 
(or having followed) the Foucauldian turn away from phenomenology based on Foucault’s 
critique of phenomenology’s finite subject. Navigating a fine balance between the contributions 
of both phenomenological embodied and Foucauldian discursive approaches to the critical 
analysis of dance, Ness acknowledges that dance studies might do well not to throw the baby out 
with the bath water so to speak. Dance specialists might indeed reject the finite 
phenomenological subject that Foucault rejected while yet recuperating the phenomenologically 
oriented approach to researching embodied, subjective experience. Ness suggests “an entirely 
different kind of analytics might have to be conceptualized – one that entertained the possibility 
of ahistorical, originary analytical movements – an emergent analytics specific to a significatory 
realm brought into being in the performance of dance itself” (27).   
As a series of nested, palimpsestic texts, the descriptive extrapolations I’ve developed 
retain linkages through keywords and phrases to their first-order descriptions, which, through 
cursive bodily writing, retain linkages to the somatic experiences “enlivening my flesh” as I have 
just discussed. Using these nested texts, my choreographic analysis emerges from the embodied 
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experience of the dance and responds to Ness’ provocative prompt for an emergent analytics. 
And, how else to research lived movement experience? Certainly, as Albright points out in one 
of the quotes that open this chapter above, the experience might change in the process of writing 
about it and my descriptions are definitely first-person renderings. This may be inevitable in any 
such attempt. However, the alternatives are deadly indeed, as Albright points out. Without such 
attempts, these dance-specific phenomena would, for all intents and purposes, be dead to 
discourse. Through my work I hope to enliven these phenomena in my text, and at the same time 
contribute to enlivening the discourse around Hay’s choreography and practice.  
It is in light of these challenges and objectives that I employ a multi-method approach to 
my research on Hay, drawing on strategies and techniques of auto-ethnography and 
phenomenology, along with Laban Movement Analysis, which provides me with a distinctly 
movement- and somatically-oriented method and expertise. Before I continue, I remind the 
reader once again of the chronology of my research phases in which I engaged first through 
practice and descriptive writing, and only then to analysis in context of various literatures. Below 
I articulate my approach in detail and address the strategies I used in my research, in order to 
establish a clear foundation for, and acknowledge the limitations of, my analysis and discussion 
to come. 
 
Laban Movement Analysis as Method 
Because it largely underpins my somatic experiential approach to this research, I will now 
provide a brief overview of Laban Movement Analysis (LMA) for those unfamiliar with it, and 
then articulate the specific way in which I deploy it in this study.45 (For a more fulsome 
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discussion of Laban Movement Analysis see Bartenieff, Bradley, Brennan, Daly, Hackney, 
Maletic, and Newlove and Dalby).  Laban Movement Analysis (LMA) can be understood as both 
an analytic framework for the observation and description of movement and as a method or 
process – a “way” – to orient toward and notice the somatic and processual dimensions of 
movement experience. As an embodied research method, LMA offers a relatively reliable 
structure and language for the description and analysis of movement46 that is applied by Certified 
Movement Analysts (CMAs) across many different fields including cultural performance (dance, 
theatre, music, etc.), anthropology, physical therapy, psychology, corporate leadership and 
management (both coaching and assessment), communication (LMA has been used in mediation 
and conflict resolution, for example), and in animation and the development of motion capture 
and artificial intelligence technologies (Laban/Bartenieff Institute of Movement Studies).  
 While LMA is applied across a broad spectrum of movement contexts as noted above, it 
has been subjected to the scrutiny of cultural critique.47 The LMA framework or system itself 
certainly bears traces of its genealogy and the historical context of its founder/creator, having 
been developed over the first half of the twentieth century by Bratislavan-born Rudolf Laban, a 
dancer/choreographer and movement theorist working with other progressive artists of the time 
in Germany, Austria and Switzerland – particularly in the Ascona artists colony – in the early to 
mid-twentieth century. It has also to this day absorbed influences and biases of its proponents 
and their primarily Euro-centric socio-culturally informed thinking. It has been shaped and is 
continually being (re-)shaped by historical and socio-cultural forces. In using LMA in my study, 
I acknowledge its inherent biases and limitations, while embracing its efficacy for my work. The 
strengths of LMA as a method, for my study, are in its emphases on a) open somatic awareness 
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to subtle changes in personal movement experience, b) processes and practices for bringing 
movement experience into language, and c) self-reflexivity and critical awareness of personal 
and disciplinary movement patterns and habits in the process of observation and analysis. 
 As a framework, LMA provides a symbolic code for shared communication and functions 
as a specialized language of movement, not entirely dissimilar from the linguistic codes of other 
movement practices like ballet or tai chi, for example. The difference is that LMA aims to 
describe movement and movement experience at a more phenomenal, rather than aesthetic or 
discipline-specific level. Its purpose is not necessarily to describe, teach or share a specific way 
of moving but to analyze and describe any human movement in itself – with respect to use of the 
body, space, dynamic quality, shaping and relationship. Laban and his proponents developed a 
specific vocabulary and symbol system to describe and notate the modes, dimensions and 
characteristics of change in movement. As a “way”, LMA provides an intersubjective approach 
to movement study through nuanced somatic awareness and a process of embodied “listening” – 
a kind of open, kinaesthetic “tuning in/attuning” to bodily dynamics. This embodied experience 
is then articulated first in whatever language lends itself usefully to the task, and ultimately 
through LMA’s specific framework and vocabulary. Through experiential learning involving 
extensive movement exploration the researcher/analyst attends to the subtle shifts and flows of 
the body, learning to recognize personal movement preferences and to discern distinguishing 
aspects of physical practices generally, in order to develop self-reflexivity and critical 
perspective in the process of movement observation through somatic awareness.  
LMA involves perceiving “felt” or experienced movement, in oneself and in others, 
through kinaesthetic attunement.48 I would liken the subtlety and keenness of LMA’s approach to 
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somatic awareness – both of self and other – to that of a scuba diver freely floating along the 
edge of a coral reef and openly attending to and then describing as much of the movement 
therein as possible, from the minutest shifts of the tiniest and most unfamiliar aspects and entities 
to the nudibranchs and floating fingers of sea anemones to the wavering coral stalks, sunlit 
particles and passing bubbles in the almost-imperceptible tidal pull of the ocean in its micro-
immensity. This process can also be likened to the work of a sommelier or perfumer in attending 
to and learning to distinguish subtle shifts and nuances in taste or scent and being able to 
describe these distinctions in language. LMA develops the skills involved in first being able to 
distinguish sensory-perceptive subtlety and then in being able to bring this detail into language in 
order to identify and communicate it to others. As I have noted earlier, in the hum of daily life 
more intense somatic experiences erupt through our bodies and ignite our somatic awareness, 
drawing us into our bodies and away from a more quotidian “semi-somatic” state in which we 
are thinking about and interpreting the world and others. By contrast, this deeper bodily focus is 
the state of somatic awareness in which I conduct my research; however, the experiences I am 
processing occur at a much more micro level and don’t necessarily “erupt” but more aptly “hide” 
beneath or inside the more macro-level experiences. The process of articulating this experience 
requires sustained and detailed attention to somatic experience; access to a range of linguistic 
tools and vocabulary; and an awareness of the different registers at which descriptive writing 
may occur in order to open to, and hone in on, the experience itself.  
Here, I wish to emphasize the distinction between the process of noticing and the process 
of reflection and articulation. In the process of noticing, the intent is toward movement 
experience generally, to maintain as wide a field of somatic awareness and as little expectation or 
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preconceived notion of what might develop as possible. Despite having access to and facility 
with LMA’s framework and language, I am not “looking for” or “applying” LMA’s pre-defined 
movement features or aspects while in experiential process. Rather, I aim to notice and register, 
to the degree possible, the dynamic, blurry and complex tones of somatic states and shifts in my 
movement and then to develop apt descriptive language for these experiences as soon afterwards 
as possible. Although one could then ultimately translate this material into the LMA framework 
and vocabulary, I do not undertake such a specific translation here. In my research here, the 
LMA framework and language must necessarily be set aside, first, in order to engage somatic 
awareness sensitively to the nuance of experiential change and second, in order to communicate 
my analysis within a broader field of study. Using the LMA-specific vocabulary immediately 
thematizes the experience through a pre-established framework and would constrain the process 
of noticing that I am aiming for in my research, while restricting access to my analysis to those 
familiar with the LMA framework. 
Certainly, somatic awareness is cultivated to varying degrees in most physical practice; 
however, that awareness is often intentionally shaped by and specific to the aesthetic values, 
goals, objectives, techniques and language of the given practice. Because the aim of LMA is to 
describe any and all movement, there is a greater degree of openness in its approach to somatic 
awareness. LMA as I deploy it in this study – as a “way” – is closely aligned with a 
phenomenological approach to descriptions of lived experience.49  
In summary then, I use LMA as a way – rather than as an analytic framework – to attend 
to and perceive the subtle flow and flux of my dancing experience in Hay’s work. My LMA 
training provides me with strategies that support the process of noticing and generating language 
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to describe the nuances of movement experience. To reiterate, while LMA has an established 
framework and vocabulary for movement description and analysis, my descriptions do not rely 
on this vocabulary per se. Rather, I strive to describe my somatic experience as immediately and 
precisely as possible, rather than articulating it according to the pre-defined LMA framework. 
With my descriptions, I aim for evocation of experience, not analysis. As noted, inserting the 
LMA vocabulary into the middle of this process would inherently thematize the experience and 
create a further reflective distance between the experience and the descriptions, a distance that I 
aim to minimize. My subsequent analysis of these descriptions proceeds likewise not through 
LMA but through a keyword coding and second-order description process that arises from the 
first-order descriptions and that I will discuss further below. 
 
Auto-Ethnographic and Phenomenological Strategies 
In identifying auto-ethnographic strategies in my research, I acknowledge that movement and 
body-based or somatic research cannot be separated from considerations of subjectivity and self. 
My work is auto-ethnographic insofar as it is a kind of writing of the self, in which I strive to 
make sense of my experience through self-observation and reflection, while also making sense of 
the artistic practice itself and drawing further connections between my experience of the practice 
and broader social and cultural concerns. As my research begins in personal practice and works 
through the act of writing and reflection on my experience, I make explicit here the point that my 
work is inherently perspectival and situated. I accept that this research and discursive text is in 
part performative of self – myself. As performance scholar John Freeman notes:  
The body and the self are also centre stage in research. If ethnography, broken into its 
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two constituent elements, is ethno: people and graphy: writing (hence autograph) . . . a 
trying to make sense of cultural groupings, then autoethnography is a trying to make 
sense of our activity of trying to make sense. It is an innately heuristic and performative 
activity, wherein one’s learning to learn becomes as important as one’s understanding of 
subject. The subject of the research may in fact be the subject of self; or, with more than 
a(nother) nod to Goffman, the self-as-subject. (15) 
My research aligns with autoethnography’s embrace of the inherently subjective nature of 
research, particularly in the realms of artistic practice and performance. As Freeman argues, 
autoethnography offers a productive and generative method to study new practices: 
In its implicit acknowledgement that all observation is participant observation – because 
all observation is participatory and involving – and through its increased commitment to 
the use of the first-person pronoun in ways that locate the researcher/performer as the 
subject/object of the work, autoethnography has emerged as one of the very few 
postmodern conceits with something genuine to say about the ways in which art and 
research are moving forward into practices that are new and germane. (8-9) 
Where my work differs from auto-ethnography is in the fact that in my overall study, I do not 
develop a narrative thread, nor an autobiographical account per se, save at the meta level in 
presenting the process I undertook in conducting this research. While I use writing to make sense 
of experience and I consider my daily journal entries to be in one way “micro-narratives” of my 
daily movement practice, functioning to tell me about my experience after the fact in the way 
that field notes function for an ethnographer, I am not generating a story or account of my 
experience working with Hay per se. Rather I am studying the somatic processes at play in Hay’s 
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choreography and practice through my embodied experience thereof. Distinct from narrative then, 
my work is phenomenological insofar as I develop close descriptions of the phenomena of this 
somatic experience in order to understand how Hay’s choreography and practice function and 
thereby to develop a poetics of Hay’s work.  
In writing about autoethnography, Freeman notes “…the intrinsically subjective nature of 
observation, analysis and recall, allowing for the fact that stories are never merely told by the 
teller. Rather, they are invented and created, fashioned and made… ” (17). This awareness also 
resonates with the phenomenological observations of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with respect to our 
limited and perspectival access to lived experience and the implications of this for our resulting 
attempts at description. In his discussion of horizon, (which I will address in the theory section 
below), Merleau-Ponty reminds us that even though the horizon comprises the full spectrum of 
perspectives, they are not all concretized in our present situation. As such, he writes: “I have still 
only a harmonious and indefinite set of views of the object, but not the object in its plenitude. In 
the same way, although my present draws into itself time past and time to come, it possesses 
them only in intention, and even if, for example, the consciousness of my past which I now have 
seems to me to cover exactly the past as it was, the past which I claim to recapture is not the real 
past, but my past as I now see it, perhaps after altering it” (Phenomenology of Perception 80). 
This horizonal synthesis “is no more than a presumptive synthesis, operating with certainty and 
precision only in the immediate vicinity of the object” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception 80). 
Two methodological points arise, therefore, that are important for my study. First, our 
familiarity with or understanding of an object is only ever partial and perspectival; and, second, 
	  90	  
once removed from the object, the accuracy of our familiarity and understanding necessarily 
morphs and erodes. We can perhaps understand this as the inherent shaping of lived experience 
that occurs in time if we accept that we are always fluidly situated and that in any given present, 
the perspectives encompassed in our horizonal synthesis are shifted/shifting. These points are 
important for my study methodologically, because I am striving to articulate the lived experience 
of a particular dance practice during the very experience of which it is not possible to develop 
descriptions.50 
It is helpful here to consider Samuel Mallin’s articulation of the issue in his study of 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought:  
The only way that I can ‘know’ a situation and have it fully available to myself is by 
actually being in it when it occurs. It is possible to describe it with the aid of memory and 
imagination, but only by putting myself back into the situation as it concretely existed. 
Such a description must always remain vague and indefinite (even more so than its 
description at the time of its actual occurrence). One finds the more cognitive or thematic 
one makes it, the more its ‘mood,’ ‘feel,’ or ‘atmosphere’ disappears. (14)  
Mallin’s point emphasizes that the closest description of experience is the one that is developed 
at the time of its actual occurrence and that is not overly thematized.51 However, if that is not 
possible, then Mallin’s comment suggests that descriptions – albeit more vague and 
indeterminate – can be developed by returning to the situation through memory and imagination, 
with an effort made to minimize thematization. Considering this possibility for describing lived 
situations helps me to clarify how my process is both autoethnographic and phenomenological. I 
will return to a discussion of descriptive writing, specifically, at the end of this section.  
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In this study, I was not able to develop descriptions while in the actual situation of the 
dancing practice. Nonetheless, my effort is toward developing close descriptions of my lived 
experience in Hay’s practice – and I do so, after the fact, with the aid of memory and imagination.  
My journal entries can be seen as micro-narratives in some way, telling the story of my 
experience in its immediate aftermath. Since the thematization of experience is inherent to the 
process of narrating the experience, as in autoethnography, these journal-entry–micro-narratives, 
align with autoethnography; however, as they include close descriptions of lived experience they 
also align with phenomenology. My second-order descriptions, developed through extrapolation 
from the journal entries through keyword coding, are likewise aligned with both 
autoethnographic and phenomenological approaches. They are developed through a keyword 
coding process after both the actual experience and first-order journaling; therefore, per Mallin, 
they are subject to potential thematization and, as such, they could tend toward autoethnographic 
narrativization. However, because these second-order descriptions rely on cues and clues from 
my first-order journal entries, which serve to resituate me in proximity to the experience and re-
awaken body memory, these second-order extrapolated descriptions function as 
phenomenological descriptions of experience that come as close as possible, given the 
circumstances of the situation under consideration: personal lived dancing experience.  
 
My Process 
Having discussed some of the grounding for my multi-method approach to this study, I will now 
articulate the research process itself and the way in which I deployed these methods. 
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As I articulated in my Introduction, I participated in a ten-day dance residency in Findhorn, 
Scotland, during which time, along with twenty other movers, I commissioned and learned 
Deborah Hay’s choreographic score for the solo At Once along with her approach to practicing 
performing. In my overall inquiry, I strove to approach the research phenomenologically, that is 
with as little discursive “noise” as possible around the practice and Hay’s specific approach. In 
discussing my method here, I reiterate that I did not engage with the literature by and about Hay, 
nor significant relevant movement theory until after I completed my daily experiential and 
writing practice, and my initial transcription process. Below, I explain my approach to this 
research in more detail, in order to establish the basis for and limits of the claims I will make. 
Following the residency process in Scotland,52 I returned to my home in Toronto, Canada, 
and, after a weekend of rest, I commenced the minimum three-month period of daily practice 
(five days per week) required by the contract I signed with Hay. This period culminated in two 
performances of the solo in December 2009 to an audience of approximately 20 each evening. 
Each performance was followed by a post-show discussion with the audience.53  
My daily practice occurred in the early morning, for the first month outside in a field near 
my home and subsequently in a large dance studio. I practiced the solo five days each week, 
though my two off days were not consistently the same. On a handful of occasions, I practiced in 
very odd spaces, including a hotel room and a horseback-riding ring; and on one occasion I 
practiced via visualization rather than physical movement. My physical practice sessions tended 
to last between 30 and 90 minutes, depending on the location and whether or not I engaged in a 
warm-up prior to running the score. By running the score I mean a fully engaged, embodied 
practice of the performance. Running the score itself ranged from 20 to 40 minutes on average. 
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Per Hay’s counsel, given during the workshop process in Scotland, I always practiced the score 
from beginning to end without interruption and never worked on any section of it outside a 
complete run of the work. Save for the first month when I practiced outside, I would usually 
conduct a preparatory warm-up, integrating a period of breathing and centering, vocal sounding 
and limbering movement to ready myself for my practice of the score. Sometimes, after warming 
up and before running the score, I would engage in a free movement practice focussing simply 
on Hay’s various tools and questions (like we sometimes did during the Scotland residency) as a 
way of further orienting and tuning myself to the work. Normally, I would run the score once per 
session. 
Immediately following my physical practice, I would either return home from the field or 
retreat to the lobby of the studio building and engage in a (hand-written) journalling process. 
This writing is a tracing back over the bodily residues and echoes of my movement experience in 
practicing performing the dance. I use the word tracing because indeed I went back over the 
experience through a sheet of paper. Through this paper, my experience was slightly obscured – I 
have addressed above the inherent effect of the translation process – and yet as I wrote longhand, 
I can almost say that some of my embodied experiences flowed through my pen onto the page. I 
wrote on 63 of my total 71 practice days. I practiced for approximately 10 extra days over the 
required 3 months in order to continue regular practice through to my formal performances, after 
which I also wrote, generating a total of 65 journal entries. The duration of my writing sessions 
matched that of my studio sessions, usually lasting from 30 to 90 minutes. The entries range in 
length from a few lines to over 2000 words on several occasions, with an average length of about 
1200 words.  
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My daily journal entries function like auto-ethnographic field notes. At one level, as I 
have discussed, they are “micro-narratives” of my daily practice sessions, a chronological telling 
of my lived experience. At another level, they include deeper phenomenological descriptions of 
the nuances of my somatic experiences within the practice in its immediate aftermath. Drawing 
on ethnographic practices, I strove to describe and record as much detail as possible about my 
daily, embodied experiences in practicing performing the choreography. I generally wrote myself 
through the choreography in parallel with my just-past physical embodiment of it. As I wrote, I 
could still sense and perceive the somatic residues and echoes of the embodied movement 
experience in my relatively stationary body. I strove to write this experience, aiming to bring to 
language my multidimensional, multilayered experience navigating the choreography anew each 
day. My writing zooms deeply into experience at times as I encounter and relive a particularly 
resonant experience and work to unfold its detail and nuance in language. At other times, my 
writing inevitably veers off the score as I attempt to capture the tangent lines of thought that 
would often arise. Despite veering off the score in such moments, I maintained a discipline of 
returning to the score to finish out my parallel writing process on most occasions in order to 
maintain consistency in my approach to the daily writing process over the course of the research 
period. 
During the three-month period of practice I never returned to read my notes from 
previous days. In doing so, my aim was to limit a reflective/analytical engagement with the work 
as much as possible. This effort also enabled me to maintain fidelity to Hay’s work insofar as it 
seeks to subvert the conventional approach to dance practice that focusses on rehearsal and 
refinement through repetition. Limiting reflective/analytical engagement, to the degree possible, 
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also helped to stave off my performer’s instinct to evaluate my practice sessions, and the 
attendant desire to strive for repetition of a previous experience internally judged to be “good” in 
some way. Purposefully leaving aside my previous days’ writing helped me to sustain my focus 
on the daily lived experience, and supported my phenomenological attempt to bracket reflective 
and analytical processes that could over-determine the experience.  
Subsequent to my primary experiential research, I transcribed all my journal entries from 
their first-order original longhand to computer. This provided me with the opportunity for an 
initial reflection on this material. In the process, I began to note descriptions of recurring 
experiences of the score, questions and tools of the practice and of my self, other, space and time, 
along with various other somatic phenomena arising in my experiential practice. During the 
transcription process, I developed a list of keywords and phrases from these recurring 
descriptions that effectively identified or captured particular experiences. I then searched for 
occurrences of these keywords and phrases, determined those with highest frequency throughout 
the material, and distilled the most substantive and relevant ones into a short list.54 Using this 
distillation, I developed extrapolated descriptions of these key somatic experiences. In 
developing the extrapolations, I wrote in reference to a collection of the most resonant first-order 
descriptions of the given experience, which I gathered through keyword searching and reread at 
length. As I have noted, at this point the auto-ethnographic, “micro-narrative” aspect of the 
journal entries served as a recall mechanism – providing date, location and other cognitive, 
affective and sensory-perceptive cues for the lived experience under consideration – while the 
evocative, poetic flow of these most immediate first-order long-hand descriptions aroused 
somatic – or what is sometimes called “body” – memory, rekindling, to the degree possible, the 
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sensory-perceptive state of the original experience. Rereading in close sequence a series of first-
order descriptions of a recurring experience prepared me for the writing of second-order 
extrapolated descriptions. In a process that I consider a kind of qualitative “double distillation”,55 
the second-order extrapolated descriptions provide concentrated and clarified articulations of the 
key somatic experiences in the work. It is from these double-distilled descriptions that I then 
undertook my reflective analysis of the choreography and practice. 
My process here can be effectively considered in relation to two different methods 
employed by dance practitioner/researchers concerned with articulating somatic experience. In 
an attempt to get as close as possible to the lived experience, my first-order descriptive process 
compares with Kent De Spain’s strategy for reporting on improvisational practice. My second-
order extrapolations function somewhat like Anne Cazemajou’s approach to participant 
interviews about movement experience.  
Improviser and researcher Kent De Spain undertook experiential research in 
improvisation with the goal of articulating and analyzing the experiences of movement 
improvisers. In order to get as close as possible to the lived experience of improvisation, he 
devised a method of real-time reporting in which several accomplished improvisers, including 
himself, practiced alone in a studio and were prompted by variably timed pre-recordings to 
“report now”. In response, they were instructed to simply describe what they were doing and 
another recording device captured their responses. De Spain then collected these responses and 
analyzed them for language-use and various common experiences these reports revealed. While 
De Spain acknowledges the fact that any interference in the experience (i.e. the requirement to 
“report now” and speak) would necessarily change the lived experience (28), improvisational 
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practice lends itself to such a strategy in its inherently un-pre-structured format. In improvisation, 
the recordings become just another variable in the experience. In Hay’s work, the score, 
questions and tools comprise a choreography, the requisite fidelity to which would be 
compromised with a strategy like De Spain’s. My approach to first-order description through 
journaling immediately after my practice represents my attempt to get as close as possible to the 
experience without impinging on the experience itself through the requirement to report during 
the practice. 
In the process of moving from insider dancer in a training situation to outsider 
researcher/analyst of that same training situation, scholar Anne Cazemajou refers to a specific 
interview technique of accompaniment developed by Pierre Vermersch that she employed in her 
research. Vermersch has developed a method, psycho-phenomenology, involving first-person 
reporting on lived experience. Using Vermersch’s technique, Cazemajou generated responses 
about somatic experience from participants in a dance practice in which she also participated. 
Writes Cazemajou: “This technique focuses on ‘explicitation’ and allows the subjective bodily 
experience of the interviewee to be made explicit through its rendering in speech” (23). She 
further articulates how she worked with her interviewees in generating description of their 
previously lived experience:  
When I was sure that we had found a specific moment and that he or she was reliving it, 
revealing what Pierre Vermersch calls an “embodied posture of speech” – the main signs 
being a faraway look, a slowing down of the delivery and the use of the present tense – I 
started asking questions that brought the student to describe this moment: ‘What are you 
doing now?’ ‘What are you doing when…?’…. (24)  
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Cazemajou explains:  
Through this activity of ‘reflectiveness’ (réfléchissement), the technique of 
accompaniment devised by Vermersch helps the interviewer bring the verbalizations back 
to the action, and from there, back to the very place of the experience. In this activity of 
making something conscious – as opposed to the ‘reflexive activity’ which is a 
conceptual activity – the interviewer and the interviewee subordinate their cognitive 
activity to a silent open posture, which allows what is not yet conscious, and which exists 
only in a pre-reflexive, ‘ante-predicative’ manner (before it has been expressed in words), 
to emerge. This technique creates the conditions to help the interviewee reappropriate his 
or her experience and to enable sense to be made of what really happened. (24) 
My double-distilled extrapolations can be understood as a kind of “auto-explicitation” in 
which my first-order descriptions function as a prompt or accompaniment to assist me in reliving 
the experience in order to bring it to language in a reflective, versus reflexive, manner.56 The 
difference of course between my work and both De Spain’s and Cazemajou’s is in the fact that 
both De Spain and Cazemajou were primarily interviewing co-participants in a dance experience 
(though they both included reflections on their own experiences in their studies as well), whereas 
I worked auto-ethnographically. While I have already indicated that I conducted interviews with 
co-participants on my SPCP program, I have not engaged with that material in this study in order 
to keep my project within scope. Because part of my project was to develop close descriptions of 
the phenomena of my dancing experience as material for analysis, I focused exclusively on my 
own extensive set of writings and devised a process of working with them. The 65 journal entries 
I generated over the course of my three-month practice form the basis of my inquiry wherein, 
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though I remain the sole source, I am not the subject/object of my research, which in fact strives 
for an understanding of the poetics of Hay’s choreography and practice through these first-hand 
experience. My series of first-order and second-order writings provides a substantial set of 
experiential descriptions upon which to develop my analysis.  
 
SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES OF MY INQUIRY 
As I have stated earlier, my goal is to articulate an experiential poetics of Hay’s solo 
choreography and practice that can and should ultimately be challenged and/or corroborated by 
other practitioners of her work. However, that is beyond the scope of this study and must remain 
for a future project, in which material from the eleven interviews I conducted with other 
practitioners on the same SPCP program would provide an excellent base. Above, I have 
articulated the various methods and strategies informing my research, and I have identified some 
of the significant issues and limits to embodied research of this kind. Below I address some 
additional considerations and raise two further points with respect to daily practice and 
descriptive writing.  
Though I am working through first-person somatic experience, I do not consider my 
phenomenological observations to be subjective but to be intersubjective. Experiencing Hay’s 
work is not an entirely private affair but, as a public performance practice, is one in which others 
– performers and audience members – can and do participate. Through non-specialized 
descriptive language, my goal is to elucidate and communicate my observations and analysis 
broadly. My findings participate in an intersubjective field of shared experiences and published 
material related to Hay’s work. In my literature review, I have outlined some connecting threads 
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and I will draw some further connections between my analysis and that of others who have 
practiced and written about their distinct experiences in Hay’s work, which complement my own 
study. 
While I continue to articulate this project as a case study, I explained earlier how the solo 
At Once is not a discrete creative work but part of a series of works created over 14 years that 
explores similar choreographic material through scores and linguistic prompts and that 
significantly engages a specific performance practice that transcends the individual projects. 
Thus my analysis is not exclusive to this unique solo per se but transcends it and applies to Hay’s 
choreography and practice in any number of possible cases, “situations”, or works within the 
series. This point further supports the intersubjectivity of my research insofar as many other 
performers have experienced Hay’s same approach through different works or “situations”. 
With respect to my method of emergent choreographic analysis, while it relies to some 
degree on my expertise as a movement analyst; my professional experience as a writer and 
movement educator; and my longstanding commitment to and practice of experiential 
description, the procedures involved are available to others. As is clear from multiple movement 
education contexts and the plethora of approaches using imagery to facilitate motor learning,57 
somatic awareness can be learned and developed, and experiential description can also be 
practiced and refined. In my first- and third-year dance technique classes at York University, I 
frequently ask students to verbally describe their movement experiences and to write experiential 
reflections thereof. At the beginning of term, my requests are often met with stunned silence; 
however, with coaching, prompting and examples, they develop their awareness and capacity to 
do so. As a result, an intersubjective field of shared experiences develops that allows for more 
	  101	  
nuanced communication, and the ability to compare, contrast, deepen and share embodied 
knowledge. The potential exists to further extrapolate in such situations from non-specialized 
language into the language of LMA in order to increase precision and inter-reader reliability. In a 
future project involving the interview materials I have referred to above, this additional 
procedure could be productively explored. 
This study, limited as it is, values embodied knowing and brings the dancing experience 
to the forefront, providing an example of how both dancers (in this case me) and choreographers 
(in this case Hay) are indeed “thinking” through movement in practice and performance. My 
method of emergent choreographic analysis would benefit from further application in different 
choreographer’s works, which would undoubtedly yield new insights into the potential and 
limitations of the approach, while also revealing aspects of the choreographic “thinking” of other 
experimental dance and movement artists.  
Two further points arise here to be considered: the first being the repetition of the specific 
lived experience or situation daily over three months with the aim of minimal to no active or 
determined analytical reflection; and the second being the approach to descriptive writing during 
the first order journaling and extrapolated descriptive processes. 
 
On Daily Repetition A-New58 
As noted earlier, the contract with Hay required a daily practice of the score for a minimum of 
five days per week over the course of three months prior to the first public performance. What I 
wish to note regarding the repetition daily over three months is the fact that, while I could not 
write in the “immediate vicinity” of the object (the dancing experience), and while there was 
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necessarily a familiarization with the score and practice over time, I strove to approach each 
daily practice a-new to the extent possible. My strategies for this included efforts not to meditate 
on or discuss the daily experience following the first-order descriptive writing process each day, 
not to reread first-order descriptions until their transcription, which was begun well after the 
entire three-month practice and journalling period concluded, and to rigorously practice 
accordingly to Hay’s direction. She specifically articulated that one should not seek to compare 
daily practices with past daily practices, nor to strive to repeat certain remembered previous 
experiences in the work. Both of these reflective activities are common in a typical dance 
rehearsal context in which one is generally striving to hone, refine and deeply embody one’s 
precise physical and interpretive execution of a work, aiming for a certain level of “repeatability” 
in performance.  
 My point here is simply that in my study, by repeating the same practice daily it indeed 
became familiar, and yet because of the unique practice itself and my specific approach to it, the 
goal and result of this repetition was decidedly not to perfect a specific technical, interpretive or 
representative performance; rather, in very brief the goal of the repetition is to practice entering 
into a dynamic process of not-knowing. In my concluding chapter, I address this question of 
repetition in more detail. Acknowledging and living – indeed embracing – the paradoxical 
tension that persists throughout the dance experience itself and my study of it, I submit that this 
“repetition a-new” provides me with a fair and robust set of first-order descriptions from which I 
extrapolate phenomenological descriptions of recurring aspects of the dancing experience. I 
accept that my descriptions are inherently perspectival, that per Merleau-Ponty they are 
“presumptive syntheses” (Phenomenology of Perception 80), and yet this approach provided an 
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articulation of the personal lived experience of dancing practice that facilitated my subsequent 
analysis. 
 
On Descriptive Writing 
My experience both writing and reading dance descriptions has shown me that there are different 
registers at which to write about experience and these registers offer different perspectives on 
and reveal different layers of the experience.59 Having become aware of at least three different 
registers in my own writing, I mean here to make them explicit in order to further specify my 
approach to descriptive writing in this study and thereby to also clarify how this writing 
underpins my subsequent analysis. The third register, being furthest from the lived experience, is 
one of received description, a kind of writing of experience that essentially parrots received ways 
of articulating an experience, using words, phrases, devices and concepts that have been used 
before to describe the given experience. In this kind of writing, I would include my using Hay’s 
own or other writers’ language to describe her work,60 something I strive not to do, unless I am 
comparing my independent description of her practice to her own in order to make a point. The 
second register, closer to lived experience, is one of creative description, a kind of writing 
experience in which language may first develop from a seed of experience, but very quickly 
begins to play on itself in an imaginative linguistic chain, like in poetry. The first register, and 
the one I strive for in both my journal descriptions and in my extrapolations, is one in which the 
writing retains as close as possible a tie to the somatic experience under consideration, returning 
to its pre-reflective source and echo in the body, rather than relying on the line of the writing 
itself, or to pre-established discourse. 
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In my descriptions, therefore, I write with the intent to describe my bodily, lived 
experience. I do not strive to generate poetic description of the kind that I might in creative or 
imaginative writing practice. Rather, I aim to articulate what, in dance parlance, is often called 
“body memory”. By this, I mean aspects of pre-reflective experience – perceptions, affective 
tones, physicalities – whose imprint, residue or trace remains available to awareness in the 
manner of a vibration or echo in the body.61 I find that these trace vibrations and echoes provide 
a kind of filamentous connection back to the lived experience itself in its immediate aftermath. 
Attending to these traces and following their filaments in written language with pen in hand 
maintains a tangible analog connectivity to the body and allows me to travel back inside the lived 
experience to a degree.  
This discussion of my descriptive writing experience connects to the way that Merleau-
Ponty considers the relation between the cognitive-linguistic and pre-reflective capacities. 
According to Mallin’s discussion of Merleau-Ponty on the topic, we understand that the 
cognitive-linguistic capacity is necessarily “parasitic” (170) on the pre-reflective capacities, 
meaning that it relies on and is fed by the pre-reflective capacities. Mallin points to a passage in 
The Visible and the Invisible: “the “pure” ideality [the cognitive structure] already streams forth 
along the articulations of the aesthesiological body [noncognitive structures], along the contours 
of the sensible things, and, however new it is, it slips through ways it has not traced, transfigures 
horizons it did not open” (Merleau-Ponty qtd. in Mallin 170, insertions by Mallin). This quote 
usefully reflects the notion I’ve discussed above of language’s filamentous connections to bodily 
experience, while also acknowledging the way that the cognitive-linguistic capacity can also 
“slip” into different registers. Further describing this connectivity between the body and 
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language in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty writes of the transfiguration of flesh 
into language: “It is though the visibility that animates the sensible world were to emigrate, not 
outside of every body, but into another less heavy, more transparent body, as though it were to 
change flesh, abandoning the flesh of the body for that of language, and thereby would be 
emancipated but not freed from every condition” (Visible and Invisible 153). Important for my 
purposes is the notion that visibility emigrates into language but is not entirely freed from certain 
bodily conditions, that is, language retains connections to bodiliness therein. Here, visibility 
refers to the node of reversibility between seeing and being seen, a notion that holds for all the 
senses. Merleau-Ponty also refers to touch and tangibility, for example. As such, we could say 
“sensibility” here instead of visibility, and effectively expand the reference beyond the visible to 
include all the senses. 
In writing descriptions with the aim to articulate pre-reflective experience, I aim for a 
kind of “honesty” or “integrity” in which the writing strives to retain the connections noted 
above. This commitment to integrity in descriptive writing helps me to clarify the difference 
between the transfiguration of bodily experience into language (which is my aim in this study) 
and descriptive writing at the second and third registers noted earlier, in which cognitive-
linguistic capacities begin to rely and feed on themselves. In the second register, I experience an 
awareness of my cognitive-linguistic capacity hankering to play on itself, and leading me “astray” 
into creative imaginative writing. As Mallin notes, cognition can “[perform] the same operations 
on the structures of every other region and … even on its own (171n2). In this case, the text itself 
seems to take the lead; language and the ideas themselves become the subject of my writing, 
thereby directing the development of subsequent lines. This is the process of thematizing that I 
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have discussed earlier. When I notice this starting to occur, I prompt myself to reset or re-orient 
to my bodily experience and the somatic, lived phenomena under consideration because this 
experience is my primary concern in this study. Because I am aware of the multiple registers at 
which my writing can develop, I can guide my process to focus as closely as possible on the 
somatic experience. As discussed above, my LMA training helps me with this. 
A key point must be made here, however, with respect to the writing process and poetic 
language specifically. While I make every effort to pursue “honest” description, my writing 
necessarily relies on existing vocabularies, devices and languages that are accessible to me. This 
reliance is distinct from my experience of second register writing described above in which 
language plays on itself. In the latter, there is a separation and shift away from the somatic 
experience to the writing itself whereas in the former, attention to bodily experience is sustained 
and I draw on whatever language sources, tools and modes available to me and relevant to the 
experience in order to articulate it, including useful language from other situations and realms of 
experience, referential experience, metaphor, etc., to illuminate and articulate the experience. 
Thus poetic language emerges while always maintaining the commitment to remain as close as 
possible to the nucleus of the pre-reflective experience through the filamentous connections of 
bodily residues.62 The descriptive writing that I strive to develop in this study, at the first register 
of writing I’ve discussed above, functions in a way like Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of 
spoken word: “The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its meaning in the same 
way as the gesture contains it. This is what makes communication possible” (Phenomenology of 
Perception 213).  
We can understand the difference between first register and third register writing also 
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through Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between “authentic speech” and “inauthentic speech”. 
Inauthentic speech, as discussed by Mallin, uses already acquired linguistic structures to express 
meanings that are already known and sedimented” (184). Authentic speech, on the other hand, 
“uses given meanings to capture an intention that transcends them, while at the same time it 
“‘fixes’ these sedimented structures and ‘recasts them all’ by using them in a new context” 
(Mallin and Merleau-Ponty qtd. in Mallin 185).  I aim for something close to “authentic 
speech”63 in my descriptions of my experience in Hay’s work, seeking to take hold of this 
somatic experience through language while also bending language to this effort. At times, I find I 
must inflect, “recast” or combine terms and vocabulary in order to articulate the distinct somatic 
experiences that Hay’s choreography and practice generate. These very specific – but non-
specialized – descriptions form the basis of my analysis of the poetics of her work.  
 
CONCLUSION TO METHOD 
It will be helpful here to recall my positioning of this dissertation as an adaptation insofar as each 
subsequent rendering of the choreography – from my daily practice to daily journal entries to 
transcriptions to extrapolations – belongs to a series of adaptations of Hay’s work. What we read 
here is necessarily a creative interpretation64 no matter how faithful I have tried to be to the lived 
experience. This inevitability is explicitly embraced by Hay in setting up the individual solo 
commissions as adaptations in the first place. Further, as noted earlier, Hay engages in an 
iterative practice of moving and writing such that each informs the other in an ongoing 
generative process. My work here, in some ways then, parallels hers. In striving for fidelity to the 
experience while accepting the inevitability of adaptation, in striving for phenomenological 
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description while accepting the necessary use of existing language and frameworks, I foreground 
the inherent and inescapable tensions in this work while remaining committed to the value of the 
process.  
Obviously this research is a single step in a potentially larger project that would involve 
parsing interviews with other practitioners and determining similarities and differences in 
experiences, as De Spain and Cazemajou did. I expect it would be possible to complete a similar 
analysis of other participants’ verbal descriptions and discover possible underlying 
commonalities; however, it is also important to acknowledge here that I’m not presuming 
universality of experience or shared meaning per se, but rather I am working through 
phenomenological description to reveal my experience of Hay’s work in order to develop an 
understanding of the poetics of her choreography and practice. Based on informal conversation 
during the Scotland residency and my interviews with co-participants, I believe there may indeed 
be common phenomena experienced by others in the specific practice of Hay’s work, hence my 
effort here to develop intersubjective phenomenological descriptions and analysis. Certainly the 
small scholarly literature about Hay’s work suggests this to be the case, as we have seen in my 
review of writing by Dolan, Drobnick, Satin, Daly and Nicely, for example, which I will draw on 
in subsequent chapters to support my discussion.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
The unknown is precisely that and more. It is that which was previously unimaginable, 
that which we could not have thought of doing next. Improvisation presses us to extend 
into, expand beyond, extricate ourselves from that which was known. It encourages us or 
even forces us to be ‘taken by surprise’. Yet we could never accomplish this encounter 
with the unknown without engaging the known. (Foster, “Improvising Body, Improvising 
Mind” 4)   
 
… surely, all bodily articulation is mindful. Each body segment’s sweep across space, 
whether direct or meandering, is thought-filled. Each corporeal modulation in effort 
thinks; each swelling into tension thinks; each erratic burst or undulation in energy thinks. 
Each accented phrasing or accelerating torque or momentary stillness is an instance of 
thought. (Foster, “Improvising Body, Improvising Mind” 6-7) 
 
Every external perception is immediately synonymous with a certain perception of my 
body, just as every perception of my body is made explicit in the language of external 
perception. If, then, as we have seen to be the case, the body is not a transparent object, 
and is not presented to us in virtue of the law of its constitution, as the circle is to the 
geometer, if it is an expressive unity which we can learn to know only by actively taking 
it up, this structure will be passed on to the sensible world. The theory of the body 
schema is, implicitly, a theory of perception. We have relearned to feel our body; we 
have found underneath the objective and detached knowledge of the body that other 
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knowledge which we have of it in virtue of its always being with us and of the fact that 
we are our body. In the same way we shall need to reawaken our experience of the world 
as it appears to us in so far as we are in the world through our body, and in so far as we 
perceive the world with our body. But by thus remaking contact with the body and with 
the world, we shall also rediscover ourself, since, perceiving as we do with our body, the 
body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception. (Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception 239) 
 
Introduction 
In this section, I will outline the theoretical framework that gives shape to my analysis. In 
articulating an experiential poetics of Hay’s dance practice, I mobilize a phenomenologically 
based framework, substantially informed by discourse on improvised dance and movement 
theory, and underpinned by the philosophical thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This 
framework – a triumvirate, dynamic relation of intentionality/intention, attention and action – 
provides a lens through which to understand Hay’s work both in relation to and, importantly, 
distinct from other dance practices characterized by non-prescribed movement, improvisation 
generally. At the broadest level, my work engages with the phenomenological philosophy of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In particular his concepts of the situation and the écart provide a strong 
theoretical framework for my analysis of the concept of somatic anacrusis in Hay’s practice as a 
dynamic suspension of processes of meaning-making. Because of his focus on the foundational 
role of body movement in the constitution of lived experience, Merleau-Ponty’s thinking is 
appropriate and supportive in this discussion of Hay’s dance practice. Further, Merleau-Ponty’s 
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articulation of the primacy of perception becomes relevant to my analysis of Hay’s practice. She 
herself describes her work as a “practice of perception” and directs performers to engage in this 
practice. I aim to clarify this activity and its central role in the effect of her work. While at the 
outset we cannot assume a de facto alignment between Hay’s understanding of perception and 
Merleau-Ponty’s, his philosophy becomes a useful tool in thinking through and articulating my 
experiences of Hay’s work and in showing how it can indeed be understood as a constructed 
situation for the practice of perception. 
 
Improvisational Dance Practice as Comparative Context 
In order to provide some theoretical context for my consideration of Hay’s work, I draw from a 
related field of movement research in which her work can be and has been loosely associated,65 
that of movement improvisation. I must make clear here that Hay refuses the term improvisation 
to describe her work,66 and I concur for reasons that will become clear through my analysis. 
Simply stated, Hay’s work is choreography. I situate Hay’s practice in relation to improvisation 
by defining Hay’s dance practice as a non-prescribed-movement practice because the actual 
movements, style, forms, sequences and physical-technical vocabulary to be performed are not 
provided in advance by the choreographer (in this case Hay); rather, they develop in the moment 
of the performance through the mover’s engagement in the practice.67 As such, improvisational 
dance, which can also be understood as a non-prescribed-movement practice, provides a 
comparative context in which to consider and discuss Hay’s work. The ways in which dance 
scholars and movement theorists analyze improvisational practices offer some useful concepts 
and language for my discussion. 
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Improvisation in dance practice is a contested term with perhaps as many meanings as 
there are practitioners. Inquiry into dance improvisation has been taken up by dance scholars, 
choreographers and practitioners themselves who consider its role, meaning, impact and 
implication within a range of dance practices and across disciplinary and everyday life 
boundaries.68 From discussions of this activity, we can distill a common thread that understands 
improvisation as spontaneous composition. Considerations of improvisation typically address the 
dichotomy or dialectic (depending on the writer) between freedom and constraint, or agency and 
structure, emphasizing the potential and possibilities for varying relations between these paired 
terms as inherent to an understanding of the concept and practice.  
As dance scholar Danielle Goldman notes in her book on the topic: “Improvisation is 
generally described as a spontaneous mode of creation that takes place without the aid of a 
manuscript or score. According to this view, performance and composition occur simultaneously 
– on the spot – through a practice that values surprise, innovation, and the vicissitudes of process 
rather than the fixed glory of a finished product” (I Want to be Ready 5). Goldman’s project in 
her book, however, is to problematize the idea of freedom she sees pervading the literature on 
dance improvisation. She intends to go “against the grain of most written accounts of improvised 
dance to suggest that improvisation does not reflect or exemplify the understanding of freedom 
as a desired endpoint devoid of constraint. On the contrary, it actively resists it” (Goldman, I 
Want to be Ready 3). Goldman, following Foucault, proposes improvised dance as a practice of 
freedom that involves ongoing negotiation of constraint and that this is improvisation’s “most 
significant power as a full-bodied critical engagement with the world, characterized by both 
flexibility and perpetual readiness” (I Want to be Ready 5).  
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Considering improvisation as a negotiation between freedom and constraint enables an 
understanding of this practice across a spectrum of dance forms, characterized by relative 
degrees of freedom from prescription or constraint: at one end we would find very open 
improvisational work, and at the other, very set choreographic work. In his introduction to Taken 
By Surprise: A Dance Improvisation Reader, co-editor Richard Gere acknowledges this spectrum, 
evident in the topics across the collection of essays under this title, when he notes that you can 
see improvisation: 
… in the release technique class when a dancer feels her way toward mastery of the 
morning’s phrase and then extends and embellishes it in her own way … in the flamenco 
studio when a battery of footwork takes on a new life, a variation in rhythm, or a double-
time flurry … in the theater in the expression of the professional performer who lingers 
an extra second in a choreographed one-legged balance and is forced to catch up the lost 
time by squeezing the next few steps into a nanosecond. (Gere xvi)  
Placing Hay’s work on this spectrum proves challenging: insofar as it involves non-prescribed-
movement, it falls closer to the “open improvisational” end;69 yet, insofar as it involves a tightly 
specified score and practice, it falls closer to the “set choreographic” end. Though I use 
improvisational dance practice as a comparative context for Hay’s work, my discussion will 
show how her work is ultimately distinct. 
As I have already noted, improvisation is often described as “composing in the moment” 
and this helps make a provisional distinction with Hay’s work, which does not call for such 
“composing in the moment” per se; it is already composed – choreographed – by Hay through 
the score and specification of its practice. Moreover, whereas one can point to the purposeful 
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performative expressivity or intentionally communicative meaningfulness of a given 
improvisation (even if abstract, or non-rational, or “pointless noodling”, or self-indulgent), in 
Hay’s work one can arguably only point to its purposeful performative function or operation, not 
its expressivity or meaningfulness per se. These distinctions are challenging both to appreciate in 
witnessing Hay’s work from an audience standpoint and also to experience through practicing 
Hay’s work from a performer’s standpoint. In this study, I am attempting to think through and 
articulate the latter, which requires some additional terms of reference. 
 
Intention, Attention, Action 
Considering Gere’s examples above, such improvisational situations require a high level of 
engagement and responsiveness – what Goldman, quoted above, calls “flexibility and perpetual 
readiness” and what we might recognize and identify both in performance and in daily life as 
presence.70 In the improvisational dance performance context, these general qualities underpin 
the performer’s ability to make decisions and render movement in-the-moment. Recognizing 
these underlying qualities points in the direction of the additional terms of reference required for 
my discussion. As indicated by Goldman’s and my different word choices above, in writing 
about improvisational and (non-improvisational) dance practice, scholars and practitioners use 
various terms to identify and express the underlying qualities that engender the particular 
experience or state of presence such work manifests. The terms “intention” or “intentionality”, 
“attention” or “attentionality” and action, often arise in the effort to articulate aspects of 
movement experience.  
For example, in dance improviser and researcher Kent De Spain’s analysis he describes 
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improvisation as an “attentional practice” (37), a process of paying attention to experience and 
using multiple sources drawn therefrom to generate and compose movement. De Spain also takes 
up intentionality as a major category in his analysis and articulates three different approaches to 
intentionality (with respect to movement, the physical body, and elements of artistic form) (33). 
For De Spain, the intentionality in improvisational practice is directly related to the process of 
sourcing and composing movement, the project of – the intent toward – making something, be 
that a “dance”, meaning, or sense of some kind.  
In Laban Movement Analysis, the terms intention, attention and action are also used to 
articulate distinct stages of bodily experience in the process of movement, be that a simple 
gesture or a full-bodied, energetic displacement in space. Building on his study with Rudolf 
Laban, Warren Lamb’s book Body Code, with Elizabeth Watson, offers a three-stage action 
process involving – in their terms and order of progression – attention, intention and 
commitment: “Our movement can be understood as a constant interplay of attention, intention 
and commitment, overlapping at many different levels and over varying time spans” (Lamb and 
Watson 136). For Lamb and Watson, attention characterizes a state of heightened awareness or 
focus, intention characterizes a specific gathering or organizing of the body, and commitment 
characterizes the shift from preparation to action, the crossing of the threshold into functional or 
expressive movement. In an interview between dance theorist Laurence Louppe and movement 
theorist Hubert Godard, they establish the notion, taken from Michel Bernard, of the dancer’s 
body as a “corporeity” (Louppe, “Singular Moving Geographies” 13), emphasizing the dancer’s 
accumulated history in movement as one of experiences, intensities, situations, rather than that of 
a topology (geometric and spatialized structural relations). In seeking to identify an existing 
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discourse through which to address this idea, they dismiss the bio-medical discourse and indicate 
phenomenology as a possibility. Louppe explains: “… the problematic of dance brings into play 
a body of continuous functionality; the dancer can only work from a body-vector, which does not 
define itself in terms of its structure, but in terms of the ways in which it organises intensity and, 
as we’ll see, intentionality” (“Singular Moving Geographies” 13). In thinking through dance as a 
way of organizing intensity and intentionality, their discussion leads them to consider how this 
organizing comes about, what comes before the movement, and how intentionality arises.  
Despite the recurring appearance of these terms in relation to movement experience, their 
usage is not necessarily consistent or specific. Common ground can be found at the general level 
of understanding: intent, intention or intentionality generally describe an orientation toward an 
objective, goal or a particular type or “figure” of experience; attention generally describes a state 
of heightened awareness and focus on either the external world or the mover’s bodily landscape 
within; action generally describes the movement itself – a functional or expressive gesture, 
which could be sound-based, or a whole body reconfiguration/displacement in space and time, 
for example. My analysis of Hay’s practice, however, requires more specific definitions of these 
terms and a clearer articulation of the way they inter-relate in a larger theoretical framework 
concerned with the process of bodily, lived experience.  
 
A Phenomenological Framework for Movement Research: Merleau-Ponty and Laban  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty provides a theory of the lived body that seeks to overcome Cartesian 
body-mind and subject-object dualism, focusing on the experience of being-in-the-world as one 
of fundamental intertwining of bodysubject and world in situations, a term that I will define 
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further below. Merleau-Ponty argues that consciousness is necessarily and inherently “bodily” 
and always already woven with the world, our environment. The fact that from birth our bodies 
are fundamentally or primordially open to the world through perception means, for Merleau-
Ponty, that we are always already in the world, or “thrown”. We are always intertwined in 
situations, such that our experiences of self and world are in a way co-constitutive. According to 
Merleau-Ponty, we have different modes or regions of subjectivity through which we experience 
the world – cognitive, affective, motor-practical and perceptual, the last of which is, for him, the 
most fundamental and upon which the others articulate themselves. It is to a study of perception 
that he devotes his most substantial effort in his Phenomenology of Perception. His other key 
work for my purposes is The Visible and the Invisible, in which his significant essay “The 
Chiasm – The Intertwining” further articulates our ultimate woven-ness with the world.71  
I have previously discussed Laban’s work in support of my approach to experiential 
research and description of movement experience. Further to that, Rudolf Laban’s movement 
theory – as it has evolved in the theory and method of Laban Movement Analysis today – also 
informs my theoretical framework insofar as he too was concerned with processes of intention, 
attention and action, in the much more applied movement and dance context. Dance and 
movement scholar Vera Maletic has completed a comparative analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s and 
Laban’s theories, and finds alignment along a number of principles, most importantly in both 
thinkers’ efforts – in the same cultural moment of the early to mid-twentieth century – to counter 
a prevailing body-mind dualism by reconsidering our inherent bodily relation with the world and 
others. It is not clear whether Laban had direct knowledge of Merleau-Ponty’s work; however, 
they were approximate contemporaries working in the early to mid-twentieth century (Laban in 
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Germany and surrounding areas and then England, Merleau-Ponty in France) and therefore likely 
encountering similar currents of thought, art and practice. In her lengthy examination of Laban’s 
movement theories in her book Body, Space, Expression, Maletic points out the general cultural 
impact of the challenge to Cartesian dualism mounted by phenomenological philosophers in the 
1920s and 1930s such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. She notes that, “Laban’s awareness of the 
clash of classical and contemporary views of movement, space and time is apparent in his 
writings”, continuing with a quote from Laban’s Choreutics in which he writes: “the 
conventional idea of space as a phenomenon which can be separated from time and force and 
from expression, is completely erroneous,” continuing that “movement is the life of space. Dead 
space does not exist, for there is neither space without movement, nor movement without space” 
(Maletic and Laban qtd. in Maletic 163, all). 
Laban’s movement theory is not a rigorous philosophy per se; however, it does imply an 
intuitive grounding in an existential phenomenological framework that aligns in certain ways 
with Merleau-Ponty’s thought. In an Appendix to her main text, Maletic conducts a correlation 
of Laban’s movement theory to selected aspects of several key phenomenologists including 
Ervin Straus, F. J. J. Buytendijk and Merleau-Ponty. As she notes, “Common to all four authors 
is the conviction that one has to seek the ground of all knowledge in experience” (190). In 
drawing connections between Laban and Merleau-Ponty, she focusses specifically on the latter’s 
notions of the lived body, motility and intentionality, as well as his articulation of spatiality. 
Maletic correlates Merleau-Ponty’s lived body with Laban’s notion of gesture. In Laban’s 
description of the power of gesture, Maletic finds common ground with Merleau-Ponty’s lived 
body insofar as each notion articulates the way in which subjectivity and world are 
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fundamentally implicated with each other and interwoven through perceptual processes. For 
Laban, gesture belongs both to subjectivity and world: “One perceives this whole interwoven 
complex [of man and world] as I, as a thing, as a phenomenon. The stirring or excitation of the I 
is timed by the densities which we experience as matter, body, the touchable. The unifying basis 
is the eternally changing power of gesture” (Laban qtd. in Maletic 191). Maletic notes that for 
Laban “it is the unified sense or the dance sense which perceives the gestures of the environment” 
(Maletic 191). In a very clear quote drawn from Laban’s Die Welt des Tänzers, Maletic connects 
Laban’s theory to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy: “Laban maintains that ‘only movement can be 
perception, experience, consciousness’” (Maletic and Laban qtd. in Maletic 191). She also points 
to the parallel in the notions of lived body and gesture that, for each respective thinker, situate 
one in space and time: 
‘In so far as I have a body through which I act in the world,’ writes Merleau-Ponty, ‘space 
and time are not, for me, a collection of adjacent points …. The space and time which I 
inhabit are always in their different ways indeterminate horizons which contain other 
points of view. The synthesis of both time and space is a task that always has to be 
performed afresh.’” In Laban’s view, “space and time structures, as well as time and 
energy phenomena, are for the dancer concrete unities, which are constantly renewed 
through the power of gesture.’ “Dancer,” in this context, refers to a person alert to the 
world, self and others. (Merleau-Ponty and Laban qtd. in Maletic 191-192) 
Through Maletic’s analysis we can start to understand the ways in which Laban’s 
movement theory resonates with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy. While 
Maletic’s analysis provides useful insights, a much more detailed comparative analysis of the 
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two bodies of thought would, I believe, further yield both some quite complementary and also 
distinct articulations. However, such a project is beyond the purview of this dissertation. It is 
sufficient for my purposes here to point out these correlations in order to emphasize the 
complementarity of Merleau-Ponty’s and Laban’s thought with respect to my research. In this 
study, my dance training provides the somatic-practical background for my work, LMA provides 
the somatic-theoretical background and some key concepts for my thinking, and Merleau-Ponty 
provides the philosophical-theoretical lens for my analysis. 
Before I continue with a discussion of some of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas as relevant to my 
work, it is important to acknowledge that phenomenology – and Merleau-Ponty specifically – 
has its critics. This distinction, between phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty, in fact provides an 
effective pivot for this brief discussion insofar as the two are not one and the same, by any 
estimation. Phenomenology is an umbrella term for an approach to philosophy inaugurated by 
Husserl’s call to return “to the things themselves”, which is commonly understood to have 
redirected the focus of philosophical inquiry from rationalism and idealism to lived experience. 
Merleau-Ponty is one of many philosophers to take up this phenomenological proposal, which he 
did in a way quite unique from others in the general field, including Heidegger, Sartre and 
Levinas, among others. According to Dermot Moran: “Merleau-Ponty … has made the most 
original and enduring contribution to post-Husserlian phenomenology in France, through his 
attempts to offer a radical description of the primary experiences of embodied human existence” 
(391). My point here is simply that critiques of phenomenology, generally, do not necessarily 
constitute critiques of Merleau-Ponty’s thought specifically, which in itself does not maintain 
absolute consistency through time (Moran; Grosz) and which continues to hold relevance for 
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fields as diverse as philosophy of mind, psychotherapy, somatic practices and new research in 
cognition (Moran 433). 
 And in dance. In the Winter 2011 special issue of DRJ (Dance Research Journal), which 
reconsiders the value of phenomenology for dance studies, Mark Franko provides an 
introduction that usefully summarizes the major critiques of phenomenology that arose through 
post-structuralist and deconstructive thought:  
phenomenology’s first-person perspective was accused of placing a unitary subject at the 
center of all perception and possible description; cognition studies have located the brain 
rather than the body at the core of aesthetic reception; and innovations in new media and 
digital performance have destabilized the primacy of the lived body itself in dance 
performance… and last but not least, the accusation that phenomenology is a humanism 
purveying universalizing values. (“Editor’s Note” 2)  
In opposition to this problematic naïveté of the ahistorical, subject-centered approach of 
phenomenology, during the 1980s dance studies embraced and benefited from the influences of 
Foucault’s “analyses of power, history, and the vicissitudes of subjectivity” and his ideas around 
“discipline, inscription, and control” (Franko, “Editor’s Note” 2-3). In light of these critiques, the 
journal issue features a collection of essays reconsidering the relative value of phenomenology 
for dance studies. 
 In her particularly insightful essay, which I have quoted from earlier, Sally Ann Ness 
undertakes a detailed examination of Foucault’s turn from phenomenology, focussing on his 
rejection of the “finite, organismically individual, labouring, speaking human subject” and 
specifically an “observing subject” (22). She then asks what the consequences are for dance 
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studies in embracing a Foucauldian approach to analysis. While valuing the ways in which dance 
and choreographic analysis benefit from considerations of historical and temporal context, power 
dynamics, political engagement and the history of ideas that come with a Foucauldian approach, 
she suggests that:  
To follow Foucault’s lead, in this regard, is to forego analyses that would give priority to 
the identification of that which is definitively emergent or categorically ahistorical in 
choreographic performance. It would preempt analyses that seek to orient to the immanent 
and the manifesting, as well as the virtual relations of dance – not only as they bear on 
histories of the present, but as they might make critically conceivable possible futures of 
the present as well. (Ness 22) 
Via her discussion of Foucault, Ness’ article provides an effective articulation of the major 
critiques of a phenomenological approach, while strongly emphasizing the potential it holds, 
specifically for dance studies’ “greatest analytical and critical faculties – its capacity to attune 
articulately to the generative, structuring significance of bodily motility” (Ness 28).  My study 
embraces a phenomenological approach to dance that, I hope, enables a consideration of this 
generative bodily motility for the way that it is “thinking” in the midst of dynamic socio-cultural 
relations and forces and the way that this “thinking” inflects understandings of those relations 
and forces.  
 With respect to the complexity and nuance of Merleau-Ponty’s work, the ways that it 
developed and shifted over the course of his writings, and the fact that one of his major 
contributions, The Visible and the Invisible, was left unfinished at his untimely death, it is 
beyond the scope of this study to provide a robust critical analysis. As feminist scholar Elizabeth 
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Grosz has noted: “I cannot presume that easy, ready-made judgments are possible with the 
writings of as subtle a thinker as Merleau-Ponty” (38). Insofar as Merleau-Ponty’s work 
generally belongs to phenomenological philosophy, the critiques noted above apply, though 
somewhat provisionally. While it shares broadly in the phenomenological approach, Merleau-
Ponty’s thought is a distinct strand that proceeds through a uniquely bodily approach, and it has 
further been argued to have foreshadowed various post-structural and deconstructionist 
conceptualizations. Critics have noted the ways in which, in his effort to rethink the dualism of 
body-mind and by extension other binaries such as subject-object and self-other, Merleau-
Ponty’s thinking foreshadowed Derrida’s deconstruction (Grosz 38; Moran 432; Reynolds; 
Franko, “Mimique” 212n29). As Grosz writes:  
Rather than valorize one or the other side of a dichotomous pair of terms and affirm their 
fundamental unity or oneness in some kind of global or local wholism (which necessarily 
implies a reduction of one term to the other) or accept the bifurcation and mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive status of binarized terms, Merleau-Ponty, in ways that strikingly 
anticipate Derrida’s supplementary or deconstructive readings of binary polarization, 
refuses the very terrain and founding presuppositions of dualisms. His work is a 
resumption or reclamation of the space in between binary pairs. (38) 
In her essay, Grosz examines Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, in particular his notion of the “flesh” and 
related vocabulary, from a feminist perspective, seeking to address whether his work 
“participates in phallocentric presumptions” (38), by appropriating metaphors of femininity to 
ground an implicitly masculinist theoretical system or whether his work is potentially useful for 
feminist purposes. Grosz notes that one of the most significant feminist critiques – even by those 
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feminists who embrace his work generally – is that of Merleau-Ponty’s “avoidance of the 
question of sexual difference” (46) in terms of his thinking about the embodied human (read, 
masculine) experience. Grosz specifically takes up Irigaray’s critical reading of Merleau-Ponty 
in The Ethics of Sexual Difference, noting similarities and differences in their ideas and 
summarizing Irigaray’s critique: “that, in keeping with her analysis of a selective history of 
philosophy … Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical paradigm owes an unacknowledged debt, indeed its 
conceptual foundations, to femininity and maternity – a debt whose symptoms reside in the kind 
of language of pregnancy he continually invokes to articulate the emergence of that torsion 
within the flesh that constitutes and unites the seer and the visible” (Grosz 52). Grosz concludes 
by acknowledging a general phallocentrism in Merleau-Ponty’s work while also recognizing 
several key contributions that may be useful for feminism, including: his challenging of binary 
oppositions and his notion of the flesh as an intertwining of subject and world that “founds a new 
ontology that supercedes … [the given] … ‘hierarchy of being’” (54).  
Susan Kozel has also considered Irigaray’s critique of Merleau-Ponty in The Ethics of 
Sexual Difference and her strategy of mimesis in this (and other of her critiques of Western 
philosophers). Kozel’s major argument is in showing how Irigaray’s strategy of mimesis falls 
short in this instance, when considered against Irigaray’s own philosophical efforts to theorize 
and enact difference rather than subsume one in another. However, Kozel also offers some 
recuperative comments regarding Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. She concludes that:  
Irigaray’s reduction of [Merleau-Ponty] to little more than yet another male philosopher 
prioritizing a devouring and enclosing faculty of vision is an excessive caricature. He 
charted a philosophical path away from the dogmas of rationalism and empiricism and, in 
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his later work, from the consciousness-body divide that dominates most thought, be it 
scientific, aesthetic, or philosophical. (Kozel 126) 
 The above discussion provides an outline of some of the major critiques of both 
phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty’s work, while also pointing out some of the ways in which 
they may yet be useful and generative in dance studies and in feminist theory. In this dance-
specific study, I embrace a phenomenological approach generally, draw on certain aspects of 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought specifically, and align my arguments within a frame influenced by 
certain of Irgaray’s texts. (A brief note here that inasmuch as she critiqued phenomenology and 
its key thinkers (Merleau-Ponty among others), Irigaray was also significantly influenced by 
them.) I proceed, now, in light of these critiques and bolstered by the recuperative readings noted 
above that find value and relevance in these ideas specific to my particular project. I will now 
address the key ideas from Merleau-Ponty that inform my theoretical framework for the analysis 
of Hay’s choreography and practice.  
A brief reminder to the reader that I use the term primordial below in direct reference to its 
use by Merleau-Ponty. I understand that it and other related terms implying an unstructured 
origin outside a given context or situation have been problematized in post-structuralist and post-
modern critiques, not least by Derrida through deconstruction and his claim that “‘There is 
nothing outside the text’” (Derrida qtd. in Royle 62). As I have noted above, however, various 
scholars have identified resonances between Merleau-Ponty’s thought and Derrida’s, and Royle 
suggests that this oft-cited claim by Derrida has been a source of misunderstanding: “In truth, 
Derrida has always been preoccupied (in the strongest senses of that word) by what precedes or 
exceeds language. Sometimes he calls it ‘force’, as in the early essay ‘Force and Signification’ 
	  126	  
(1963) where he writes: ‘Force is the other of language without which language would not be 
what it is’.” (Royle and Derrida qtd. in Royle 62). As I have noted earlier, the reader may find 
resonances in the following discussion and analysis of Hay’s work with these Derridean ideas via 
my use of Merleau-Ponty. If indeed these ideas and the connection between Merleau-Ponty and 
Derrida might be usefully inflected by my study of Hay’s work here, it must remain for a future 
analysis. For my purposes here, Merleau-Ponty helps me to specify the concepts of 
intentionality/intention, attention and action in the context of embodied experience. 
 
Primordial Contact and Perception  
For Merleau-Ponty, “there is a primordial level which describes the original bond between the 
body and world” (Mallin 56). This primordial level or primordial contact describes the 
bodysubject’s original thrownness through the body’s given or innate general capacities or 
openings on the world. Mallin outlines four specific ways (or regions) through which, according 
to Merleau-Ponty, we engage the world – “subjectivity’s primordially given capacities” (24):  
Merleau-Ponty divides the ways we can relate ourselves to the world into the perceptual, 
the cognitive, the affective, and the practical, and we can note that any situation contains 
all of these to varying degrees. Cognitively, in every situation we may, for example, recite 
rules to ourselves, make inferences and judgments, or merely rely on linguistic 
categorizations. There is always a core of perceptual awareness of ourselves, others, and 
the natural world. Affectively, there may be emotional tensions, moods, attitudes, 
concerns, or desires. Of course, situations are essentially practical, but, besides their 
containing capacities and dispositions, there is an accompanying bodily or motor 
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involvement (which is found in physical behavior or perhaps gestural or verbal action). 
(15) 
Through these primordially given capacities then, we are always already in-the-world, and this is 
how I understand and use the phrase “being-in-the-world”. Through our primordially given 
capacities, we begin to acquire structures of experience, which are like experiential convergences 
of being-in-the-world that are first acquired in a given situation and then applied to new 
situations, thereby organizing and interpreting experience. Mallin notes that one or the other of 
our primordially given capacities can become temporarily central but all are generally present in 
every situation (15).72 However, according to Merleau-Ponty, it is through perception first that 
we begin to acquire structures of experience: the logic of the second-order affective, practical 
and cognitive (or cognitive-linguistic) structures derives from first-order perceptual structures. 
As Merleau-Ponty writes in The Visible and the Invisible, “Perception as an encounter with 
natural things is at the foreground of our research, not as a simple sensorial function that would 
explain the others but as the archetype of the originating encounter, imitated and renewed in the 
encounter with the past, the imaginary, the idea” (Visible and Invisible 158). As Mallin 
articulates it:  
Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of perception … holds, first, that perception gives 
us the clearest case of our relationship to Being; secondly, that all other types of objects 
have a natural nucleus in or must be based on this perceptual relationship; and, thirdly, 
that all the regions … necessarily interact in such a way that they “borrow” or “imitate” 
the logic of the most primordial region, perception. (31) 
Considering perceptual structures as establishing a first-order “logic” does not preclude the 
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possibility that in lived experience capacities other than perception might lead or motivate 
perception because, as stated above, they are all generally present in situations; this first-order 
characterization proposes only that perception gives us the most proximate relation to primordial 
contact. This discussion of primordial contact and perception will become relevant in my 
analysis of Hay’s choreography and practice as a practice of perception through which 
primordiality might be impossibly glimpsed. 
 
Intertwining and Flesh 
Merleau-Ponty articulates the way in which, through perception first, we are woven – bodily –
with the world: “I delve into the thickness of the world by perceptual experience” 
(Phenomenology of Perception 237). This woven-ness occurs through the body’s potential to be 
both sentient – that is, actively perceiving through the senses – and also sensible – that is, able to 
be perceived. We know this most significantly because we can experience this within ourselves: 
we can both see and be seen, touch and be touched, hear and be heard through our own 
perceptual capacities. Perception, thus, as a bodily capacity, gives us the fundamental ability to 
be at once outwardly and inwardly oriented. The processes of perception can in a way be 
understood and experienced as a kind of turning “inside-out” or “outside-in”, reversible, a term 
that I use here descriptively but that is also used by Merleau-Ponty in his discussion of 
perception. As Merleau-Ponty writes: “External perception and the perception of one’s own body 
vary in conjunction because they are two facets of one and the same act” (Phenomenology of 
Perception 237). 
In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty further articulates his thinking on 
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perception, which leads him to develop his notion or principle of “flesh”. Merleau-Ponty 
develops this principle by considering the relation between seer and seen, toucher and touched, 
establishing their inherent reversibility and woven-ness. In working toward this notion, he asks, 
“Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the world is flesh?” 
(Visible and Invisible 138). Considering the phenomenological experience of vision and touch as 
involving both the sensible (objective) and sentient (phenomenal) body he notes: “My body as a 
visible thing is contained within the full spectacle. But my seeing body subtends this visible body, 
and all the visibles with it. There is a reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other” 
(Visible and Invisible 138). This intertwining renders “a Visibility, a Tangible in itself, which 
belong properly neither to the body qua fact nor to the world qua fact” (Merleau-Ponty, Visible 
and Invisible 139) and from this understanding he develops his notion of the flesh. He describes 
the flesh as a “strange adhesion” (Visible and Invisible 139), as a “coiling over of the visible 
upon the seeing body” (Visible and Invisible 146), as a “fold” (Visible and Invisible 146) and as 
the “formative medium of the object and the subject” (Visible and Invisible 147). These ideas 
become important to my analysis of Hay’s choreography – as a practice of perception. My 
experiential descriptions, specifically of Hay’s tools – which, in my analysis, comprise the third 
aspect of her choreography – reveal phenomenological experiences of perceptual reversibility 
and intertwining along with experiences of fundamental disorientation that elide distinctions 
between subject (self) and object (world). Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the intertwining and the 
flesh helpfully illuminate my experience in Hay’s work. 
In this discussion, Merleau-Ponty makes two more important points that bear on my 
analysis. First, he indicates the way in which our perceptive capacities are not closed in upon 
	  130	  
themselves but are “gaping open” (Visible and Invisible 147), the lacuna at their core a necessary 
counterpoint to, an anticipation of, the seeing of a visible, the touching of a tangible that then co-
constitutes a fragment of being from the flesh. Second, he also points out that the experience of 
reversibility he has established in principle, is only “always imminent and never realized in fact” 
(Visible and Invisible 147). It is a limit situation that is never reached precisely because my body 
is both sensible and sentient but cannot be absolutely coincidentally so. Merleau-Ponty notes: 
this is not a failure. For if these experiences never exactly overlap, if they slip away at the 
very moment they are about to rejoin, if there is always a ‘shift,’ a ‘spread,’ between 
them, this is precisely because my two hands are part of the same body, because it moves 
itself in the world, because I hear myself both from within and from without. I experience 
– and as often as I wish – the transition and the metamorphosis of the one experience into 
the other, and it is only as though the hinge between them, solid, unshakeable, remained 
irremediably hidden from me. (Visible and Invisible 149) 
These two points, about the perceptual lacuna as an anticipation, and the imminent but 
experientially unrealizable instance of reversibility, bear on my analysis in helping me to 
articulate my experience in Hay’s work as an experience of somatic anacrusis, a continual 
movement of turning back toward the impossible limit experience of lived suspension of this 
anticipatory lacuna that arises through the experiential reversals and foldings-back engendered 
through the linguistic torques of Hay’s choreographic score, questions and tools. 
 
Intentionality 
Intentionality73 is a key concept from Merleau-Ponty that is important for my study. It is best 
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understood as a quality or movement of towardness generated through the openness that inheres 
in the given capacities articulated above. Primordial openness creates a kind of draw like the 
absence of air creates a vacuum force that pulls together bodysubject and world. Intentionality is 
essential to situations; it creates them and we can never be outside of one. Intentionality could 
alternately be described as a kind of continuous driving to engage, a magnetic pull or attraction 
between bodysubject and world, that is always already occurring in fundamental situatedness as: 
“the intentional threads linking [the body] to its surrounding” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 
of Perception 38, insertion mine). Intentionality generally can be understood as that which 
organizes or orients the flux of lived experience in(to) tensions, pulls, polarities. Intentionality as 
a kind of inherent force of engagement contributes to the experiential distinction of subjectivity 
and objectivity. In its directedness-toward, it incites a process of differentiation between 
bodysubject and world and is of primary importance in developing an understanding of how 




For Merleau-Ponty, attention as a process of articulation and specification is fundamental to the 
acquisition of structures (Mallin 70). In attending, we are able to focus on and distinguish levels 
of detail in a given situation and thereby acquire new structures – convergences – for future 
situations. Merleau-Ponty distinguishes both originating attention, that first process by which an 
articulation or specification is made in a field or from a general horizon and which is a “creative 
structuring”; whereas, secondary attention involves the “actualization of already sedimented 
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structures” (Mallin 70, both). Writes Merleau-Ponty: “Thus attention is … the active constitution 
of a new object which makes explicit and articulate what was until then presented as no more 
than an indeterminate horizon” (Phenomenology of Perception 35). For my purposes, it is useful 
to understand attention as a process that configures and then refigures experiences, objects and 
world through the distinguishing process of attending in a given situation. According to Merleau-
Ponty: “To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to bring about a 
new articulation of them by taking them as figures. They are preformed only as horizons, they 
constitute in reality new regions in the total world (Phenomenology of Perception 35). This 
notion of attention as a process of configuring and refiguring will bear on my analysis of Hay’s 
work with respect to the way in which I find her use of questions choreographs attention. 
 
Motility or Action 
For Merleau-Ponty, our capacity for movement – including full body movement, gestures and 
the movement of our senses (i.e. vision) – underlies and makes possible our structuring of 
experience in situations through intentionality and attention. In short, we must move in order to 
perceive, and this is how he comes to express “motility as basic intentionality. Consciousness is 
in the first place not a matter of ‘I think’ but of ‘I can’” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception 159). Mallin helpfully addresses the relationship between motility and perception 
noting their “close interconnection” and the way that “perceptual structures will be shown … to 
be motor intentions, and, hence, to have an intrinsic connection to the body’s capacities for gross 
or wide-ranging motor behaviour” (45). Because I have above discussed the way in which, for 
Merleau-Ponty, perception “gives us the clearest case of our relationship to Being” (Mallin 31) 
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and is the first order of structures of experience, it becomes important here to address how it is, 
then, that motility is yet thought to “underpin” perception. This can be understood generally, by 
noting the distinction in the above quote between motor intentionality and perceptual structures. 
Intentionality, as noted above, describes our body’s inherent openness on/tending toward world, 
and world toward body. We have intentionality – or basic connectedness in/to the world – 
through these capacities, which intertwine and cross-weave, with motility being a necessary and 
founding aspect. Structures, by distinction, are acquired body-world convergences that further 
organize and interpret experience. To grossly oversimplify, for my purposes it is sufficient to 
understand that while we are in the world through intentionality, including motility (our practical 
capacity) and perception, we establish structures of experience first through perception.  
 It is helpful to note that later in his text, Mallin discusses the concept of global motility, a 
fluctuation between a general abduction of the body and a general adduction of the body 
(abduction being a movement away from centre and adduction being a movement toward 
centre): “global motility is describable at any one time as a particular balance or organization of 
all the body’s standard motor capabilities” (163), or what Merleau-Ponty calls a “rhythm of 
existence” (Merleau-Ponty qtd. in Mallin 163).74 Global motility and motor intentionality 
concern me here because they effectively articulate aspects of my experience in Hay’s work that 
I refer to as “action”. With the term action, I mean to address the spectrum of body activity that 
rides on and extends from this underlying, given, global motility or articulation between body 
and world: from the most cellular pulsing of blood and breath, through the movement of the 
organs – including the senses – through sound- and movement-based gesture to whole body 
activity. I have chosen the term “action” because it allows me to be both more specific and to 
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address more possibility than the term “movement” per se, which, in a dance context, has 
specific connotations of fluidity and purposefully manifested gesture. With the term action, I can 
thereby include micro-actions of the inner body, sound-based gesture and more reflective 
purposeful action – while also remaining distinct from Merleau-Ponty’s term “motility”, which is 
specifically tied to his philosophy and refers to our bodily capacity for rather than actualized 
movement. Simply stated, by “action” I mean all kinds of actualized involuntary and voluntary 
bodily physical change. 
 
Situations, Structures, Horizon and Écart 
For Merleau-Ponty, the bodysubject’s given capacities open to and engage the world as the 
world opens to and engages the bodysubject’s capacities – by way of intentionality. These 
mutual engagements are not discrete and occurring in advance of a relation or in linear sequence 
but are simultaneously constitutive of the relation as much as they are constitutive of both 
bodysubject and world. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms:  
Human existence will force us to revise our usual notion of necessity and contingency, 
because it is the transformation of contingency into necessity by the act of taking in hand. 
All that we are, we are on the basis of a de facto situation which we appropriate to 
ourselves and which we ceaselessly transform by a sort of escape which is never an 
unconditioned freedom. (Phenomenology of Perception 198)  
Situatedness is given, yet as we hear in the quote above, it is dynamic, not fixed. As Mallin 
articulates, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is grounded in an ontology of situations (9). A 
situation is a kind of originating contact in which so-called bodysubject and world become 
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through fundamental intentionality. For Merleau-Ponty subjectivity is primordially open toward 
possibility, available and ready, seeking engagement in way, or motivated, and objectivity or 
world is also primordially open, available in its multifaceted fullness and ambiguity, provoking 
engagement: Mallin writes that “… the subjective and objective aspects of a situation cannot be 
isolated, […] they interweave and are dialectically interconnected” (14). I am using the term 
engagement to describe a situation, which I understand as the fitting together or articulation of 
this primordialness, an articulation which simultaneously makes apparent or crystallizes a 
particular subjectivity and objectivity, while also registering the ambiguous and inexhaustible 
possibilities therein.75 Per Mallin, “we can say that situations are modes of being-in-the-world or 
are expressions of our global existence” (16, italics mine) and “structures…must be 
comprehended as states or modes of subjectivity” (18, italics mine).  
We can therefore understand the relationship between situations and structures: situations 
describe a more fundamental process of body-world engagement; whereas, structures describe a 
more specific process of organizing and interpreting that engagement, which builds a particular 
subjectivity and objectivity. Upon a foundation of general thrown structures deriving from our 
primordially given capacities, convergences of the key features of actual given situations 
sediment in our being from the time of our originating contact, and more specific structures are 
acquired through lived experience. These structures become sedimented in subjectivity, and are 
general and repeatable such that they can be called up in and readily crystallize, or particularize, 
subsequent engagements. The collection or “matrix”76 of interconnected sedimented structures 
forms a “schema” (Mallin 16) that manifests lived experience as such, organized and interpreted 
– or “meaningful” in a very broad sense of the term.  
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For Merleau-Ponty, the flux of lived experience includes all spatial and all temporal 
perspectives, encompassed in his notion of horizon. In our situatedness, or being-in-the-world, 
situations give us certain spatial (front, back, side, etc.) and temporal (present, past, future) 
perspectives through which we understand the co-existence of other perspectives for other beings 
(objects and people). Therefore, these other perspectives inhere within our perspective such that 
our situatedness (being-in-the-world) encompasses the full horizon of all these possible 
perspectives, even though they are not immediately concretized in our present situation. 
Merleau-Ponty writes: “Each present permanently underpins a point of time which calls for 
recognition from all others, so that the object is seen at all times as it is seen from all directions 
and by the same means, namely the structure imposed by a horizon” (Phenomenology of 
Perception 80). This quote helps me begin to develop a different understanding of time and 
space. To oversimplify in order to summarize, I begin to see the possibility that time can be 
understood not as “passing” or “now and then” but as an ongoing, thick and vibrating “nowness”. 
Likewise, space can be understood not as ‘three-dimensionality” per se or “here and there” but as 
a dynamic, dense and spongy “hereness”. I will return to these ideas when I consider my 
experiences of space and time in Hay’s work. 
That Merleau-Ponty proposes situations as the fundamental basis for experience suggests 
that there is no possibility for experience “outside” of a situation. However, as I noted above, 
situations are dynamic, not fixed; it is important to understand that for Merleau-Ponty, situations 
are always ambiguous, indeterminate and corrigible (Mallin 14). While the intentional aspect of 
a situation is concretized for the bodysubject, it is never grasped in its entirety. In the same 
manner as otherness stretches away and is never fully graspable, so too is subjectivity the 
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stretching away of possibilities from the concretized intentionality of the situation. The active 
gatheringdispersing77 polarity – or dehiscence – established through this concretization of the 
intentional aspect and simultaneous stretching away, as bodysubject and world engage in 
situations, is articulated by Merleau-Ponty as écart. As Mallin writes: “In his last notes, Merleau-
Ponty states that the ‘there is’ is merely the separation (écart) from the ‘something’ … and can 
ultimately be understood as the general separation of figure from ground” (63). I will return to 
this notion of écart and the way that the movement of dehiscence generates a figure-ground 
separation in considering how Hay’s choreography and practice performs figure-ground reversals 
in lived experience. 
 
CONCLUSION TO THEORY 
To summarize then, my theoretical framework is informed by Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
of situations, specifically through the concepts and terms outlined here. To be clear, I do not 
attempt to embrace and account for the entirety of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. I use these concepts 
and terms to articulate my lived experience in Hay’s choreography and practice, and to develop 
an understanding of its poetics. Merleau-Ponty gives me a way to understand and think through 
embodied being-in-the-world as always-already situated, yet ambiguous, experience. Through 
various modes of intentionality, we are open to and tending toward the world as it is tending 
toward us, in a filamentous connectedness based on primordial contact and to which perception 
gives us the most proximate relation. We grasp-and-are-grasped-by the world within situations 
fundamentally through motility – or, in my terms, action – which is implicit to the mutual 
grasping process. Through our various modes of intentionality, attention draws figures from the 
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horizon of experience and our lived experience becomes organized, structured. Structures might 
be thought of as repeatable convergences that form figures and patterns from the flux of lived 
experience. These patterns – structures – sediment into what Merleau-Ponty articulates as a 
bodily schema through which lived experience is organized and interpreted and by which we 
thus navigate the intersubjective realm of bodysubject-world. However, from these convergences, 
lived experience also diverges, pulls or stretches away in a movement of dehiscence – Merleau-
Ponty’s écart – that renders ambiguous, contingent and malleable both structures and also 
situations. From the first concretized situation, structures organize our lived experience and 
because of their inherent ambiguity and malleability, these structures morph and new structures 
are acquired as we live more and more complex experiences. Each new level, or structuring, is 
acquired through differentiation and therefore presupposes the previous level. The point here is 
to understand the concept of levels building on one another – sedimenting. As such, we 
understand that always embedded in a situation there is the potential primordial level or 
primordial contact, that originary openness inherent in our primordially given capacities, of 
which perception is fundamental. As noted by Mallin: “Merleau-Ponty insists that our senses are 
in direct contact or actually merge with otherness, to the extent that Being ‘runs through them’ 
(25).  
In the following analysis, I consider Hay’s choreography and practice through this 
phenomenologically informed framework. Through first- and second-order experiential 
descriptions based on personal experience, I develop my analysis in which I consider Hay’s solo 
choreography and practice as a constructed situation in which the score, questions and tools 
function as a destructuring structure. Through the triumvirate dynamic relation of 
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intentionality/intention, attention and action I describe the poetics of this practice – as perceptual 
process. I then articulate the specific experiences of self-world, body-space and movement-time 
that the work’s poetics engender and that lead me to understand the practice as a practice of 
somatic anacrusis. Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of horizon and écart come to bear on my 
discussion of practicing performing Hay’s work and enable me to articulate the experiential 
concept of somatic anacrusis that I argue lends her work its distinct aesthetic identity, enigmatic 
audience reception and unique attraction to contemporary performers across the globe.  
I am arguing that Hay’s practicing performing constructs a situation in which, through a 
destructuring structure that thrusts the performer into a fundamental process of perception, we 
may approach limit experiences of the originating encounter (situation), or primordial contact, 
which presents the possibility for “creative structuring” rather than the “actualization of already 
sedimented structures” (Mallin 70). I am specific in saying that we “may approach” in the sense 
of approaching a mathematical limit. It is not possible to, in fact, achieve or sustain such an 
experience. According to Merleau-Ponty, we are always already situated, thrown, we cannot be-
in-the-world otherwise. However, in the movement of dehiscence – the écart – in the stretching 
away from the intentional aspect of a concretized situation, in which the horizon of lived 
experience includes all possibilities and perspectives, it becomes impossibly possible to approach, 
draw near, and perhaps catch a glance of primordiality. In this way, I will argue, Hay’s 
choreography and practice offers a new way to approach the world and others relatively 
unencumbered by already sedimented structures and open to the horizon of other and others’ 
possibilities and perspectives.  
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As a more creative and open approach, would this not be a more ethical and ultimately 
loving approach? What if…?78 
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Chapter 4: Hay’s Choreography and Practice: A Constructed Situation for the Practice of 
Perception 
 
Contrary to totalizing theories that argue that the body is unknowable outside language, 
Hay posits the body as dialectical with language, that is, as an influence upon language as 
much as it is influenced by language. Such an ideosomatic understanding of the 
interrelatedness of the psyche and physique recognizes that the body inherently exceeds 
the capacity of language to describe it, while it simultaneously inspires new forms of 
eloquence. (Drobnick 45) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I develop an understanding of Hay’s choreography and practice, specifically 
through my experience in her solo At Once (2009). As I have mentioned previously, this solo is 
not a conventionally discrete creative work but one in a series of related works that spans 14 
years, over which time Hay developed a particular way of working that is exemplified in any 
number of individual works from the series. At Once provides a case study for the analysis of her 
approach to choreography and practice that transcends the single work. I argue that Hay’s 
distinctly linguistic choreography establishes a constructed situation, in which the braided 
aspects of her choreography and practice function as a destructuring structure for the practice of 
perception. Repeatedly throughout her own writing, Hay herself, identifies perception as a key to 
her work; however, she uses the term broadly in varying contexts, as seen in the quote below. 
My aim in this chapter is to articulate how her choreography functions as a practice of perception, 
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through my own experience and emergent choreographic analysis. According to Hay: 
Since 1970, my practice and resources as a dancer and choreographer have shifted from 
physical to perceptual challenges. I perceive the doing of movement as rhetorical. Every 
dancer has just so much physical prowess, so much personal experience shaping his/her 
movement vocabulary. However, if one imaginatively endows every cell in one’s body 
with an individual intelligence for movement and perception, the experience of 
movement increases exponentially. Performance becomes a continuum of multiple 
cellular experiences unfolding simultaneously. One can only be at the feet of one’s body 
as a teacher – not the teacher instructing the body how to dance! The lessons learned here 
are as untranslatable as they are blunt. The wisdom of my body, when it is invested with 
individuated cellular perception, is hilariously profound. What I am doing when I am 
dancing is directing my attention to the validity of these tiny intelligences and reflecting 
that information back to the world. This is what I call the performance of dancing. It is an 
on-going manifestation of mystery. It is the unknown brought to light for an instant. For 
myself and the audience. (“Remaining Positionless” 22) 
Despite her variable use of the term perception above, this quote provides several useful insights 
into Hay’s work, including, as I’ve already mentioned, her interest in perception. Here, we also 
encounter her notion of cellular awareness or what she sometimes calls cellular consciousness, 
described as early as 1986 in Susan Leigh Foster’s analysis of Hay’s early work. This belief in 
the wisdom or intelligence of the body – “as teacher” – aligns with the perspective taken in 
somatic practice and indicates Hay’s long-time commitment to this approach, which is not 
universal to post-modern or contemporary dance practice per se, though it has become more 
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prevalent in the last decade.79 Hay’s description of “the doing of movement as rhetorical” in the 
above quote further inflects an understanding of her work, allowing us to consider and question 
the way in which her work might operate rhetorically to persuade, or to influence the thought or 
conduct of an audience. (I address this last point in chapter 6 with respect to the ethical 
dimension in Hay’s practice.) Finally, that Hay understands her dance to be bringing the 
unknown “to light for an instant” also suggests that she is clear about what she intends her work 
to be doing. Here I develop an understanding of how her work foregrounds and activates 
perception, brings the unknown to light for an instant and ultimately functions as an embodied 
rhetoric.  
 My analysis is underpinned by concepts outlined in the previous chapter based on 
Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. Overall, I consider Hay’s choreography and practice to be a situation, 
which is purposefully built through language, and as such I take it to be a constructed situation. 
Within this constructed situation, I address the ways in which Hay’s language, as embodied in 
performance practice, operates on the performer’s intention, attention and action such that Hay’s 
constructed situation functions as a destructuring structure. This desctructuring function in effect 
upheaves and excavates sedimented layers of acquired and habituated structures in a process that 
ultimately pitches the performer into a necessary practice of perception and toward the 
impossible possibility of a glance at primordiality, a term I use in Merleau-Ponty’s sense.  
 I begin by understanding Hay’s choreography as a distinctly linguistic, braided function 
of three strands – a written score, a series of questions and a collection of tools. I then work 
through each aspect of Hay’s choreographic braid, paying particular attention to her use of 
language and articulating through experiential description how Hay’s linguistic torques and 
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semantic/syntactic strategies operate distinctly on and for the performer within her work. I 
continue to develop my thinking through Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of situations, and I organize 
my analysis of Hay’s work around the processes of intention, attention and action, which I have 
articulated in the previous chapter.  
Through my analysis, I reveal the primary operation of each aspect of Hay’s 
choreographic braid, establishing that the score choreographs my intention, the questions 
choreograph my attention and the verbal tools choreograph my action. Although my analysis 
identifies the primary operations of each aspect of Hay’s choreographic braid, it is important to 
emphasize that Hay’s choreography functions only and necessarily as a braid – that is, with all 
three strands crossing and weaving together to work as a whole. No single strand functions 
alone; each supports and complements the operations of the others. This distinguishes Hay’s 
work from other contemporary dance and movement choreographers who use scores by 
themselves to structure performances. Here I analyze only the primary – but not exclusive – 
functions of each strand. Through my analysis, I discuss how Hay’s distinct use of language 
choreographs the performer’s intention, attention and action by simultaneously engaging and 
deflecting these processes, thereby perpetually destabilizing the performer and ultimately 
thrusting her into a necessary, fundamental practice of perception. I conclude by summarizing 
my analysis of Hay’s solo performance work as a linguistically constructed situation in which the 
braided choreography of score, questions and tools function together as a destructuring structure 
for the practice of perception. I argue that in practicing performing Hay’s choreography, the 
performer surfs along the edges of meaningfulness/meaninglessness  – impossibly glancing the 
unfolded open of primordiality. 
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HAY’S CHOREOGRAPHY: A LINGUISTIC BRAID OF SCORE, QUESTIONS AND 
TOOLS 
To develop an understanding of Hay’s work as a constructed situation for the practice of 
perception requires an understanding of the elements that comprise Hay’s choreography, since it 
is significantly not aligned with the conventional understanding of choreography as prescribed or 
designed movement per se. As Drobnick indicates in the quote that opens this chapter, Hay’s 
choreography is distinctly linguistic. Hay defines her choreography in the following way:  
What I mean by my choreography includes the transmission from me to the dancer, of the 
same series of questions I ask myself when I am performing a particular movement 
sequence that ministers shape to a dance. I will not talk about my movement choices here, 
except to say that as an aspect of my choreography they fall almost exclusively into three 
categories: 1) impossible to realize, 2) embarrassing to “do”, or, idiotic to contemplate, 3) 
maddeningly simple. These movement directions are not unlike my questions that are 1) 
unanswerable, 2) impossible to truly comprehend, and, at the same time, 3) poignantly 
immediate. (“How do I recognize my choreography”) 
Here, Hay describes her choreography as made up of two aspects: movement directions and 
questions. Hay gives her so-called movement directions via a prose libretto – a text-based score, 
which may include a few cursory sketches or simple diagrams of spatial pathways – rather than 
via physical demonstration.80 I say so-called because, as she indicates here and as I will elaborate 
in this chapter, these text-based movement directions provide very little information about actual 
physical or gestural activity that might be considered dance movement per se. Hay’s questions, 
also based in language, are transmitted to the dancer primarily via spoken word, though some do 
	  146	  
appear written in the score. Thus we have two linguistically constructed aspects of Hay’s 
choreography: score and questions. In addition to the above-noted text-based score and series of 
questions, I also address what I consider to be a distinct third aspect to Hay’s choreography, 
comprising a collection of verbal tools that coach the performer in the process of rendering the 
choreography as such. Therefore, in my analysis, I consider Hay’s choreography a three-stranded 
braid of score, questions and tools, in effect, a linguistically constructed situation. 
 Hay’s work, of course, is rooted in the movement explorations involving scoring, games 
and tasks that figured prominently in the work of 1960s Judson-era cohort of avant-garde 
dancemakers of which Hay was a part. As I have noted in chapter 2, these artists were 
fundamentally questioning the materials and methods of dance and dancemaking. With roots in 
this 1960s post-modern81 turn in dance, Hay’s work has sustained and developed this impulse, 
creating a complex performance-generating system that pulls and pushes the fabric of 
meaningfulness, propelling or inviting the performer to glance at  – and perhaps just beyond – its 
fraying edges. It is this operation that I aim to analyze in this chapter. 
 
ON HAY’S USE OF LANGUAGE 
As I have indicated, Hay has long maintained a writing practice alongside her dancing and 
develops scores or libretti of her dances in an iterative process of moving and writing in which 
each activity informs the other in their respective development.82 She has published, relatively 
extensively for a dance artist, on her own practice in journal articles and in several books. 
Several writers have noted that Hay has, or has had “[an] ambivalence about language … [a] 
fascination verging on distrust” (Drobnick 43). Dolan too notes that Hay’s use of koan-like 
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language implies a “distrust of the linguistic dimensions of our being-in-the-world” (214). It is 
perhaps this ambivalence or distrust that has led her to develop ways of working with and 
querying language through the body in a productively tensile manner. The questions and verbal 
tools that Hay uses have been developed over years and years of focused effort as she worked 
out ways to communicate and share her practice with others.83  
As noted in my discussion of the literature by and about Hay in Chapter 2, performance 
scholar Jim Drobnick has undertaken an analysis of Hay’s deliberate and performative use of 
language that resonates with my own analysis. Writes Drobnick:  
In Hay’s usage, seemingly common terms … bear intentionally deflected 
meanings that seek to direct the actions of the performers without 
overdetermining the outcome, instruct while stimulating creative thought, and 
critically challenge physical and mental habits that diminish the potential of the 
body. The discourse that Hay provides is deceptively simple and oftentimes 
paradoxical, yet it effectively opens up possibilities for experiments in selfhood 
and performance. (43) 
In my own encounter with Hay’s language and through personal practice of Hay’s work, I have 
found similar experiences to those Drobnick notes above. Through this and the following chapter, 
I will use my own case study practice and phenomenological descriptions thereof to discuss and 
analyze Hay’s linguistic choreography through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of 
situations and the triumvirate dynamic relation of intention, attention and action that I have 
established in the previous chapter. To reiterate a point about my method, the reader will recall 
that I approached my study through practice and phenomenological writing prior to engaging 
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with the literature on Hay. Throughout my analysis, I make connections to the literature in order 
to point out where other discussions resonate with and corroborate my own. My primary focus in 
this chapter is on revealing how Hay’s language functions in performance, first through direct 
engagement in and “close reading of” the practice. Hay’s dexterity with language will become 
evident through my analysis of the score, questions and tools. I analyze how, through linguistic 
torques and semantic/syntactic strategies, these linguistic strands operate experientially in Hay’s 
work on processes of intention, attention and action, functioning as a destructuring structure for 
the practice of perception. 
 
EMERGENT CHOREOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF HAY’S AT ONCE 
The following emergent choreographic analysis is structured in three major sections, 
corresponding to the three distinct strands of Hay’s choreography and their primary linguistic 
form: 1) The Score: Choreographing Intentionality/Intention through Ambiguous Assertions, 2) 
The Questions: Choreographing Attention through Rhetorical Interrogatives, and 3) The Tools: 
Choreographing Action through Enigmatic Imperatives. In each of the three sections, I develop 
my analysis in two subsections: a) function of the specific linguistic strand, and b) discussion and 
analysis of experience. I begin, however, with an overall introduction to the work so that the 
reader has a sense of the three strands as part of a whole before I consider each in turn. 
The score for At Once is an eleven-page double-spaced text document, provided in hard 
copy to participants on day one of the SPCP residency. The participants also received several 
revised versions of the score during the week-long process and subsequently via email over a 
few months following the residency. The cover page of the hard copy document includes a list of 
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the names of the participants who commissioned this score. The specific version of the score that 
I refer to in this study was distributed by Hay via email after the residency and is dated 
September 2009. It opens with the following credit: “text, choreography, and direction Deborah 
Hay” (Hay, At Once 1).  
 Immediately following this on the first page are four multi-level question sets (Hay’s 
header indicates that there are three when in fact there are four major sets presented): 
Three [sic] questions for the dancer  
What if the question “What if where I am is what I need?,” is not about what I 
need but an opportunity to remember the question “What if where I am is what I 
need?”  
 
What if dance is how I practice my relationship with my whole body at 
once in relationship to the space where I am dancing in relationship to each 
passing moment in relationship to my audience? What if the depth of this question 
is on the surface? 
  
What if my choice to surrender the pattern, and it is just a pattern, of 
facing a single direction or fixing on a singularly coherent idea, feeling, or object, 
when I am dancing – is a way of remembering to see where I am in order to 
surrender where I am?  
 
What if how I see while I am dancing is a means by which movement 
	  150	  
arises without looking for it? (Hay, At Once 1) 
In my analysis, these four questions belong to the broader series of questions that I consider as 
the second of the three strands of Hay’s braided choreography. In the text document, directly 
following the questions are three notes or “reminders”: 
3 reminders for the practice of At Once 
Remove your sequencing from the sequence of movement directions. 
Remove hesitation and reconsideration. 
A word or short phrase in purple ink is a warning to steer clear of any creative 
impulses or habitual behavior in regard to the language used; replacing those 
impulses by instantly assuming the cellular intelligence of the body. (Hay, At 
Once 2) 
These three reminders quoted above belong to the larger collection of what I refer to as verbal 
tools that Hay offers to performers in the practice of the work. In my analysis, the tools comprise 
the third strand of Hay’s choreography.  
 The four questions and three reminders (tools) I refer to above, which actually appear 
written within the score itself, are representative of the broader series of questions and collection 
of tools that Hay offers to performers in the process of learning her work. Through the learning 
process, Hay verbally volleys questions and tools to the performer during group and individual 
practice, sometimes abbreviating the phrasing or offering an adapted version of a question or tool. 
Taken together at the outset of this document, which includes the text-based score proper, these 
questions and reminders provide some insight into the philosophical and rhetorical tone of 
inquiry that characterizes Hay’s specific practice. 
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 After the questions and reminders, a poem appears on page three of the score that suggests 
a multidimensional, affective realm that perhaps this dance could evoke. While this poem may 
gesture toward a field of meaningfulness in which to situate the work, its inclusion is enigmatic 
in relation to the whole of the practice in which meaningfulness is fundamentally questioned. I 
am not concerned here with developing possible or potential interpretations of the dance, nor 
therefore of this poem as a discrete substantive entity. My focus is on the experience of the 
practice in which this poem, as part of the score, plays a role addressed below. Following the 
poem, the choreographic directions start on page three in black font with various notes 
interspersed in blue font. (As indicated by Hay in the quote above, a handful of words appear 
throughout in purple. Where I quote from the score in the following sections, I insert indications 
of font colour where relevant.) Choreographic directions take the form of single sentences or 
short paragraphs. While a few directions are relatively concrete and specific and include very 
simple and direct movement activity, spatial pathways or temporal guidelines, most are more 
abstract, sometimes poetic and don’t necessarily suggest movement at all. Earlier I have referred 
to Hay’s own characterization of her choreography in a longer quote, from which I here repeat 
her qualification of her movement choices as: “1) impossible to realize, 2) embarrassing to “do”, 
or, idiotic to contemplate, 3) maddeningly simple” (“How do I recognize my choreography”). 
Often, a choreographic direction is followed by one or more individual notes, guiding and 
reminding the performer to maintain fidelity to the practice, which includes practicing the 
questions and tools.  
 In an article from 1988, Hay commented on how she worked with set movement in 
reference to her more conventionally choreographed 1984 work The Well: “I use the prescribed 
	  152	  
movement like a child uses monkeybars. The form catapults me into the unknown. I return to it, 
secure in its support, but my attention is focused on what I am really after – returning again and 
again to what is not graspable” (“Remaining Positionless” 22-23). This quote refers to 
“prescribed movement”, which is how Hay was working at the time. In At Once, there is 
essentially no prescribed movement, but there is still choreography84 and in my experience it 
functions as Hay has described: as a guide or support for an exploration of the unknown. The 
following quote is drawn from my first-order journal entries, and refracts my experience of the 
choreography overall:  
November 3, 2009 
So if I need the score, then why do I also feel like it constrains me from full 
immersion – or is that the point? The score demands my [focus, and] draws me 
away from falling in. [My use of the phrase falling in refers to the experience in 
which I lose my focus on the score, questions and tools, and indulge in the 
experience of moving, enjoying and playing with the images or metaphors that 
arise from my movement or a narrative thread that evolves. Falling in, as such, is 
counter to Hay’s practice and leads to resolved, graspable, solidified 
meaningfulness.] But I’m also working to be as close to that edge as possible – so 
I’m not “fallen in” but I’m also not removed. Somehow the score, questions and 
tools combined restrain and enable me in ways to navigate the precarious edge. If 
I fall in – then I lose the relation with my environment, audience, space, time, and 
become subject of my own experience. And perhaps object to the audience? If I 
navigate the edge, then I invite a sustained relation-with and the intersubjective 
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potential opens. When I feel this, I feel the proximity of the world and the 
thickness of space and the presence/passing of time. A kind of awareness in which 
they are more revealed in themselves rather than being background to my 
foreground – or life, society, culture, the everyday layers and layers of sediment 
through which we wade or perhaps on the surface of which we step busily.  
In the above journal quote, the experience of the choreography starts to become apparent insofar 
as it compels and constrains the performer. The multidimensional focus required to embrace all 
three linguistic aspects at once in the practice of the work is part of the challenge and function of 
the choreography. In lived experience, the score, questions and tools function together in a 
linguistic matrix of assertions (statements), interrogatives (questions) and imperatives (tools or 
directives) respectively, through which the performer moves. It is only in reflective analysis that 
these aspects may be discerned as three discrete strands of Hay’s choreographic braid by their 
linguistic form (assertive, interrogative, imperative) and by their function (choreographing 
intention, attention and action). I will now address each aspect and its primary function in the 
following sections and subsections. 
 
THE SCORE: CHOREOGRAPHING INTENTIONALITY/INTENTION THROUGH 
AMBIGUOUS ASSERTIONS 
In Hay’s work, the score operates in a very specific way as one of three aspects of the whole of 
her braided choreography and practice. If we take the understanding of intentionality established 
in the previous chapter using Merleau-Ponty, as the quality of towardness, the mutual tending 
toward of body-subject and world, of grasping together in situations, then we can begin to 
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understand the role of the score in Hay’s work, which is one aspect of the destructuring structure 
effected by her choreography and practice. It is important here to make a distinction between the 
terms intentionality and intention. For my purposes, I will use intentionality, via Merleau-Ponty, 
to articulate the connectedness arising through our given capacities between body-subject and 
world in situations, a situation being a general term for any instance of being-in-the-world. I will 
use the combined term intentionality/intention to both relate back to Merleau-Ponty’s use and to 
articulate a more specific orientation (connectedness) between myself as performing body-subject 
and the world of Hay’s choreography and practice, in a constructed situation, with the term 
constructed here denoting the more specific and distinctly linguistic theatrical dance 
performance instance of being-in-the-world. This distinction in terms preserves the theoretical 
frame I have articulated through Merleau-Ponty that subtends my analysis while allowing for a 
more specific consideration of the particular connectedness – intention – between myself-as-
dancer and the choreography-as-dance in this specific experience.  
In clarifying these terms here, I retain the meaning of intentionality, via Merleau-Ponty, 
as a fundamental open adhering of body-subject and world, and establish my use of the related 
term intentionality/intention that derives from the first and yet arises through a more specific 
context. Understanding intentionality/intention as a layered form of fundamental intentionality 
maps onto Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of the sedimentation of structures of experience 
insofar as intention, as I’m defining it here, arises in a more sedimented context in which 
structures of experience have accumulated for myself as dancer (body-subject) in theatrical 
performance situations (world/s). Intentionality/intention, then, is a more particular form of 
fundamental intentionality. In short, for my purposes intentionality is to situation what 
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intentionality/intention is to constructed situation. And, it is in the constructed situation of Hay’s 
choreography and practice that I experience the score operating on my intentionality/intention, 
that particular towardness arising between myself – as the dancer – and Hay’s work – as the 
dance. 
 
Function of the Score: Choreographing Intentionality/Intention 
The score functions on several levels to choreograph my intentionality/intention. As the 
directions for my performance of a dance, at the outset the score and I move toward each other, 
linking together by inherent “intentional threads” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
83) and informed by previous lived experiences of dancer-dance situations that have sedimented 
as structures in my body schema. As I am open to and tending toward this lived experience as a 
bodysubject through fundamental intentionality via my given capacities – cognitive, affective, 
motor-practical and perceptual – and specifically so through intention as an experienced dance 
performer, the score draws, attracts or engages me, just as I am open to be drawn, attracted or 
engaged. The score, as a text, draws my cognitive (cognitive-linguistic) capacity and further 
engages this aspect of my intentionality/intention through its complex language. The opening 
poem specifically draws my affective capacity, engaging this aspect of my 
intentionality/intention, which perpetuates throughout the score with references to the affective 
dimension of joy/sorrow. The fact of the “dance” itself as something generally realized as a 
movement-based event draws my motor-practical capacity, and the few explicit movement cues 
with spatial and temporal directions throughout the score further engage this aspect of my 
intentionality/intention. References throughout the score to the practice of perception particularly 
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in relation to space and time, along with the questions and tools (to be discussed more 
specifically in dedicated sections below), draw my perceptual capacity, which, as I will elaborate 
later, is engaged in Hay’s practice as a primary intentionality/intention upon which the 
performance relies. 
Thus, in the ways described above, Hay’s score choreographs my intentionality/intention 
and precipitates a mutual grasping of dancer and dance, bodysubject and world. However, 
through Hay’s distinct and deliberate use of linguistic torques and semantic/syntactic strategies 
illuminated in the examples below, my intentionality/intention is choreographed uniquely from 
my experiences in other dances and from other daily, lived experiences generally. Generally, 
through intentionality and a particular grasping or fitting together of bodysubject and world, 
subjectivity and otherness (identities and objects) precipitate in situations, structures are thus 
acquired and sedimented, and subsequent meaningful interpretations and interactions can occur. 
In Hay’s work, as I will discuss below, through her ambiguous assertions the complex linguistic 
operations of the score subvert the process of intentionality/intention, of mutual grasping, 
undermining the tendency toward precipitation of identities and objects, subjectivity and 
otherness, and perpetually throwing the performer back into flux and away from the possibility 
for meaningful organization of bodysubject and world. Intentionality/intention is necessarily 
engaged and yet simultaneously deflected, folded back on itself, by the language of the score. 
Like a sock turned inside out is still a sock, intention, turned inside out, is still intention; however, 
what appears is the “other side” of it – not the intentional object but the écart, the spreading 
away of subjectivity and otherness. We can never be in the world without intentionality, 
according to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. We are always already engaged, or “in-the-world”. 
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Hay’s work embraces this, working with these inherent processes of connectedness and 
precipitation and using language to perform deliberate operations that attempt to perpetually 
suspend those very processes. As intentionality/intention draws dancer/bodysubject and 
dance/world toward an intentional focal or meeting point, Hay’s score choreographs these 
processes into an experience rather of the écart, or spreading away.  
 
Discussion and Analysis of the Score: A Well-Worn Path 
In this section, I present several examples and quotes from my journals that reveal the ways in 
which the score functions to choreograph my intentionality/intention.85 My aim is to show how 
Hay’s score simultaneously engages and deflects it through linguistic torques and 
semantic/syntactic strategies such that the performer experiences a suspension of processes of 
intention, moving not toward meaningfulness and the intentional object, but instead into the 
écart or spreading away that I have articulated in the previous chapter via Merleau-Ponty. As one 
of three distinct linguistic aspects of Hay’s braided choreography, I consider the text of the score 
in linguistic terms as a series of choreographically ambiguous assertions, declarative statements 
that assert themselves as a dance.  
My experience of the score is of an increasingly well-worn path, the specific 
choreographic directions marking the progression of the experience like blazes on a trail, 
beckoning me forward, leading me through the forest of the experience. The detail in the 
language and the specificity of the cues proposed in the score challenge me in their 
simultaneously concrete declarations and ambiguous abstractions: they are, metaphorically 
speaking, the rocks, roots, inclines and textures along the trail, giving me boundaries, however 
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porous, and direction, however meandering. The choreographic directions, as linguistic 
assertions, engage me in this specific performance context.86 They are the “what” of the dance in 
a way, and initially engage my intention. The specificity of the choreographic assertions propels 
me through the experience, preventing me from becoming lost in free play – what is sometimes 
called “noodling” in vernacular improvisational dance parlance – or stuck in a physical loop, 
repetition or other movement or imagistic exploration, which may also occur in improvisational 
work.87 The score demands my commitment, restraining me from indulging in or falling into 
particularly pleasurable, meaningful, or otherwise attractive/engaging movement experiences 
that might arise during the performance practice and that might otherwise be elaborated in 
improvisational work. The score is always nudging me back to the path. Each time I practice the 
dance, I retread the path, deepening its contour in the overall landscape, negotiating its 
particularities, noticing familiar landmarks and always being surprised by new details, 
perspectives and navigations that vary in degree from minor to major, each time. The score, as 
well-worn path, functions as a guide through an experience that is infinitely rich and complex, 
and allows me to explore it anew each time without becoming lost along the way. As a part of 
the constructed situation of Hay’s choreography, it productively constrains my process or 
journey and always leads me onward. Hay instructed us to always practice the score in its 
entirety, never to practice sections in isolation from the whole. This instruction is key to the way 
in which the score choreographs my intention, drawing me in and propelling me through the 
constructed situation of Hay’s work, as I describe in this journal quote from my practice: 
November 27, 2009 
There’s a tumbling quality to my experience in the score that I don’t feel in free 
	  159	  
practice. [Free practice is how I describe working with the tools and questions 
outside of practicing the score. Though Hay instructed us to always practice the 
score in its entirety, not extracting sections for specific rehearsal, we did engage 
with the questions and tools in themselves during the SPCP and I continued doing 
this at times during my three-month practice]. I had a long free practice today 
and felt a shift partway through where I really connected to the world – my visual 
field – and was able to really listen to time, see/feel space but this becomes dull in 
the score to a degree, because the score is so strong – or my connection to it is so 
strong – there’s a magnetic power to this connection that acts like a force 
propelling me onward and I feel like the questions have the opposite potential – to 
be a kind of brake against this. 
In this entry, I describe the score as a “force” and as “having a magnetic power”. These 
descriptions inform my analysis of the score’s function with respect to intentionality/intention, 
insofar as the score grasps me, as much as I grasp it. The score, as text for a dance, opens toward 
me – as performer – providing me with a context, with a baseline of initial 
intentionality/intention. In some ways, it doesn’t matter what I do, so long as I do something 
rather than nothing, and so long as change occurs, that there is a beginning, a middle and an end 
to this experience. The score is an important part of how Hay’s work is choreography, is dance, 
is performance, rather than simply a kind of meditation or therapeutic practice.88 Because the 
score asserts a dance, it engages my intentionality/intention as a performer. There is a mutual 
fitting together of myself the performer and this score as a dance.89 However, Hay’s linguistic 
torques and semantic/syntactic strategies render the choreographic assertions both ambiguous 
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and unrealizable. As such, while engaging my intentionality/intention, the score simultaneously 
deflects it.  
 I consider the opening poem and subsequent references to it through the score as the first of 
four examples that I consider here for the ways that they simultaneously engage and deflect my 
intentionality/intention. Three simple stanzas commence with the similar phrases “Joy and 
sorrow in the audience…, Joy and sorrow in movement…, Joy and sorrow in history…” (Hay At 
Once 2). During the residency/workshop, we spent very little time with this aspect of the score 
and Hay did not provide any direct explanation of the poetic text. As part of the overall 
document, however, it informs the performer and bears various oblique relationships to specific 
movement directions that occur later; for example, the direction to stream joy and sorrow across 
one’s face, near the beginning of the piece: 
My body is still while joy and sorrow wash across my face like a stream of 
instances. A full smile or frown is never fulfilled. When not streaming, my face 
may briefly return to normalcy, or it may sustain a single reflection of joy/sorrow 
for longer moments.  
 
[blue font] Note: I am not limited to my personal experience of joy and 
sorrow. It is a tremendous relief to know that it is in and about the audience, the 
theater, through history, time, and space. 
 
[blue font] Note: As I perform, I try to remove my tendency to embody the 
poetic language I use to describe the movement material. (Hay, At Once 4-5) 
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This particular choreographic assertion directs the performer to both enact this affective 
streaming and at the same time, according to the second sentence, to avoid fully enacting either 
one of the affective qualities noted. Though indeed the third sentence of the assertion indicates 
that sustaining a longer moment of joy/sorrow is acceptable, importantly the fact that here Hay 
yokes “joy/sorrow” with a forward slash, and does not specify “joy or sorrow” or “joy and 
sorrow”, directs the performer away from specificity and toward an experience of fluid 
ambiguity. Further on, another note indicates: “[blue font] Note: I understand that joy and sorrow 
are always present in the world, in the audience, in my body. I do not have to instigate it [sic]” 
(Hay, At Once 6). This note inflects the entire set of cues throughout the score related to the 
joy/sorrow affect, explicitly dissociating the performer’s deliberate pre-determined affective 
intent (or instigation) from the existence, experience and physical actions of streaming joy and 
sorrow, implying that this ambiguous affect might simply flicker across the performer’s face like 
a breeze rippling the surface of a pond, arising in and from the world rather than in or from the 
performer.90 Thus through a series of linguistic torques, this choreographic assertion engages and 
deflects the performer’s intentionality/intention, inciting precipitation toward affective 
movement meaningfulness and simultaneously subverting its intentional realization.  
Lesley Satin has noted a similar dissociation between affect and physical action in 
writing about an earlier Hay solo, Lamb at the Altar, performed by Hay:  
Sinking to plié, curving her torso forward, she continues to slide her hands down 
her legs and feet. And then she sobs exaggeratedly; the sound is bereft but the act 
is isolated, the sobbing unattached to any visible cause. It is as though all Hay is is 
standing and sobbing. Then she switches to the next unit: snaps off the sobbing 
	  162	  
and dances off, alternately prancing and pausing. (Satin 188) 
Here, Satin is addressing the way in which Hay’s work comprised movement “units” (189) that 
“bypassed the codes of movement and movement organization that [ballet and modern dance] 
systems assumed” (191). In Satin’s description we can recognize the engaging and deflecting of 
intentionality/intention that I have discussed as resulting from the choreographically ambiguous 
assertions in Hay’s score.91 
Throughout the score for At Once, the performer is challenged by similar choreographic 
assertions that, by simultaneously engaging and deflecting intentionality/intention, require the 
performer to practice Hay’s “cellular intelligence”92 in which movement and the body’s fluid 
responsiveness are prioritized over the tendency or desire to fix, register, recognize and express 
affective (or any other kind of) meaningfulness. Meaningfulness per se is precipitated and 
actively subverted by Hay’s linguistic torques and semantic/syntactic strategies, as I will 
continue to discuss. 
 My second example is one of the most concrete movement directions in the entire score 
and comes second in the sequence. This choreographic assertion exemplifies the way Hay gives 
practical physical information throughout the score, which comes – albeit rarely – as basic 
information of one or two kinds: general movement of the whole body or gesture with a body 
part, accompanied by either a spatial direction for where or temporal guide for when to enact the 
given direction: 
The moment the light returns I step onto the stage walking in a stride and 
style not mine; as foreign as a foreign accent, recognizable but odd. The path is a 
singular broad curve that ends in a slightly accelerated little curl that leaves me 
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facing the portal through which I stepped onto the stage. 
 
[blue font] Note: Nothing about my performance ends at the end of the 
curl. (Hay, At Once 3) 
Though the choreographic assertion provides direct and explicit movement, the fact that an 
individual’s walk is inherently personally specific and easily recognizable to those who are 
familiar, even from a distance, makes this choreographic choice highly significant. As a 
seemingly straightforward assertion on the surface, this direction is nevertheless complex in 
asking the performer to immediately acknowledge and relinquish her fundamental movement 
signature and begin to shift away from pre-established, personal identity – and yet Hay is not 
specific about the alternate stride save that it is “not mine”. “As foreign as a foreign accent”, the 
stride may be “recognizable but odd”. Again here, ambiguity comes to the fore: in this walk there 
is something familiar and at the same time something unfamiliar or unknown. By subverting 
personal habit and the desire to identify through her choreographic assertion, Hay directs the 
performer to enact identity as fluid and shifting. As a performer of this choreographic cue, I am 
somehow me and yet not me, and not specifically anyone else (a character, for example). Upon 
reflection, this line in the score recalls the experience of learning to speak a second language as 
an adult and the way that I experienced my sense of identity, personality and habits of expression 
shift and transform as I took on a new language, in a process of becoming other. Once again, 
through Hay’s linguistic torques and semantic/syntactic strategies, intentionality/intention is 
engaged and deflected by this ambiguous assertion. 
 In contrast to the above relatively concrete physical direction, my third example is of a 
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more abstract direction and multiple notes that come later in the score. In this example, the 
choreographic assertion provides no concrete movement information; however, the text does 
provide several parameters to constrain the performer in its enactment: 
Complexity arises. I play havoc with how I perceive time and space rather 
than creating complex body movement. Clearing the dance of complexity is as 
abstruse, yet here I am, the two occurrences weaving back and forth several times. 
The duration of the two directions is choreographically challenging for the 
performer.   
 
[blue font] Note: The movement is not difficult just because I use the 
words complexity, havoc, abstruse, choreographically challenging. And clearing 
the dance of complexity does not necessarily require flowing movement. 
 
[blue font] Note: If I can manage my perception of time and space to 
inform my body then I do not have to think about what movement to do next. What 
I mean by my perception of time is that it is passing. And what I mean by my 
perception of space is that I include it in my dancing so that I am not seduced by 
the intelligence, past experiences, patterns, limitations, and/or sensuality of my 
moving body. (Hay, At Once 9) 
As if it hasn’t already arisen for the performer of Hay’s work, here the score explicitly presents a 
new level of challenge. How, possibly, does one dance this choreographic assertion? 
Fundamentally here, the score choreographs intention: as dance this choreographic assertion 
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engages the performer’s intention; in its abstraction, as not-dance, this choreographic assertion 
deflects the performer’s intention. Hay’s linguistic torques and semantic/syntactic strategies here 
thwart the mutual fitting together of performer and choreography (body-subject and world). Each 
subsequent sentence in this choreographic assertion participates in a multilayered linguistic 
torque that turns the previous sentence on its head, deflecting processes of 
intentionality/intention as they engage them anew. The sentence about “clearing the dance of 
complexity” compounds the challenge of this choreographic assertion, in which the two 
ostensibly contrasting occurrences of complexity and its clearing oscillate. The temporality of 
this oscillation is not obvious. Hay’s indication that “the duration of these occurrences is 
choreographically challenging for the performer” actively deflects the performer’s 
intentionality/intention away from habitual rhythmic, arrhythmic, sequential or otherwise pre-
established structures or patterns of danced time. As Satin has noted: “Hay’s work is detached 
from phrasing in the traditional sense, and the spectator’s sense of timing is not moored to the 
temporal framework of the movements’ arrangement” (189-190). In her first note, Hay’s 
language deflects the performer’s intentionality/intention away from creating complex, or for 
that matter flowing, movement. In her second note, she deflects the performer’s 
intentionality/intention away from pre-existing patterns and structures of experience that might 
arise through the movement.  
Further, because complexity “arises”, I don’t activate it; as a performer I am thrust into 
the experience. At the same time, because “I play”, I actively enter into a kind of high-speed 
parrying with my perceptions of time and space, whatever they might be. Hay’s language 
generates ambiguity and fluidity. I am intentional and yet not because space and time are 
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somehow the protagonists here and I am responding through my perceptions thereof. I am 
moving and yet not creating movement: it arises through my perceptions of space and time. And 
it is through this direct and flurried confrontation with perceptions of time and space that my 
intentionality/intention is deflected, inhibiting me from falling into habits, patterns and 
tendencies that might surface in my body. In this example, once again, the linguistic torques and 
semantic/syntactic strategies in Hay’s score function to simultaneously engage and deflect 
intentionality/intention.  
A fourth example of a choreographic cue from the score suggests a more concrete 
imaginary setting but again gives no indication of how, physically, to perform it, while also 
counselling the performer to avoid doing something specific, to avoid “making” something 
appear or occur:  
I perform market, a contemporary market, [purple font] a mall. Without 
creating [purple font] a mall I notice it wherever I am.  
 
[blue font] Note: I attend to my perception of space and time in order to 
distract myself from predetermining the outcome of this choreographed language. 
It is an effort to refrain from creating [purple font] a mall. [blue font] Instead 
copious instances of [purple font] a mall [blue font] appear and disappear. (Hay, 
At Once 9-10) 
In the note itself, which appears in blue in the actual score, the term “a mall” appears in purple. 
The purple font is an explicit reference to the third of the three reminders on page two of the 
score (which I have discussed above) and reminds the performer to avoid enacting “creative 
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impulses” or capitulating to “habitual behavior” that may be prompted by the language used. 
Instead, according to the reminder, the performer should “[replace] those impulses by instantly 
assuming the cellular intelligence of the body” (Hay, At Once 2, all). 
In yet another of Hay’s linguistic torques, here again the performer is faced with a 
challenge. Whether a market/mall (or a city93), Hay’s language evokes a familiar setting, 
undoubtedly familiar in some way to the performer through acquired structures of experience. 
Immediately then, the score engages intentionality/intention, these structures are activated and 
the performer’s tendency is to call upon these structures to project and in some way perform, 
present or represent this setting. However, Hay’s explicit warning to avoid this tendency jolts the 
performer back from this acquired structure and performing technique. Through the phrases 
“notice it wherever I am”, and “copious instances … appear and disappear”, the score deflects 
the performer’s intentionality/intention. Like in the other examples discussed above, this 
deflecting of intentionality/intention pushes the performer back from the precipitation and 
structuring of subjectivity and objectivity acquired through previously lived experiences of 
market/mall and toward an experience of the fluid ambiguity and stretching away of subjectivity 
and otherness in which any instance could belong (or not) to market/mall (or city). 
From this discussion of the score, its linguistic complexity becomes apparent. The above 
examples provide some insight into the character and tone of the text, which comprises a 
sequence of similar short choreographic assertions followed by various notes. The score’s text is 
variously enigmatic, obscure, poetic and nonsensical throughout. Sometimes it appears clear and 
direct on the surface; however, as can be seen in these examples, there is almost always a 
linguistic torque or semantic/syntactic strategy – word choice, word order or juxtaposition of 
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ideas – that interrupts easy understanding and confounds its enactment by engaging and 
deflecting intentionality/intention. Reading it, as we did aloud on several occasions during the 
SPCP, leaves one with the feeling that potential meanings are just out of reach. There is a quality 
to the experience of slipping and sliding, of jumping from ice floe to ice floe, of tumbling 
through, as my earlier journal quote indicates. The text itself explicitly and deliberately resists 
any attempt at a cohesive or metaphorical/poetic understanding. In Hay’s mixing of the poetic 
and prosaic, in her linguistic torques and semantic/syntactic strategies, in comments and notes 
following choreographic assertions, the text – as a score for a dance – continually undermines 
our impulse to structure and organize, to understand. It constantly catches us just before we 
solidify a meaning, flipping and turning the language and setting potential meanings back into 
motion and flux. In order to dance the score, a leap of faith is required; faith that somehow my 
body will understand how this text becomes a dance. The text of the score asserts itself as a 
dance, to be moved; it is a proposal to be enacted through embodied performance – and it is but 
one of three distinct linguistic strands in Hay’s choreographic braid. 
 
THE QUESTIONS: CHOREOGRAPHING ATTENTION THROUGH RHETORICAL 
INTERROGATIVES 
In my analysis, Hay’s questions comprise a second distinct strand of her choreography. Here too, 
Hay’s use of language is specific and performative, in the sense that these questions “do 
something”94 when embodied by the performer in the practice of Hay’s choreography. In the text 
document, as discussed above, Hay includes four questions for the dancer. These four questions 
come from among a larger malleable set that Hay offers in the practice of her work.  
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For the benefit of the reader, I reiterate the four questions from the score here, in order to 
move my discussion forward: 
Three [sic] questions for the dancer 
What if the question “What if where I am is what I need?,” is not about what I 
need but an opportunity to remember the question “What if where I am is what I 
need?”  
 
What if dance is how I practice my relationship with my whole body at 
once in relationship to the space where I am dancing in relationship to each 
passing moment in relationship to my audience? What if the depth of this question 
is on the surface? 
  
What if my choice to surrender the pattern, and it is just a pattern, of 
facing a single direction or fixing on a singularly coherent idea, feeling, or object, 
when I am dancing – is a way of remembering to see where I am in order to 
surrender where I am?  
 
What if how I see while I am dancing is a means by which movement 
arises without looking for it? (Hay, At Once 1) 
These questions are offered in the score as a way to set up the overall practice of the work and 
were often repeated by Hay during the residency period, usually during an opening discussion 
before the day’s practice, or during brief reflections and discussions of group or individual 
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practice. As such, they form a kind of subtext to the score itself that runs along beneath it during 
practice and comes to the fore at various moments as another kind of support and guide that 
helps the performer maintain fidelity to the choreography and practice. Without them, practicing 
performing the score could quite easily transform through repetition and familiarity into an 
improvisational exploration or a semi-structured sequence of relatively repeatable movements. In 
these latter possibilities, pre-established forms or specific movement content begin to structure 
and organize the experience into more readily graspable meaningfulness, which runs counter to 
Hay’s work. (I discuss Hay’s work in relation to conventional choreography and improvisation in 
more detail in chapter 5.) 
Hay’s questions, as they are now primarily crafted, were developed initially as 
“performance meditations”,95 single enigmatic phrases around which she focused her movement 
practice over long periods, and which formed the core of solo works or group workshop and 
performance events. As noted earlier, a collection of these phrases appears in the back matter of 
Hay’s book My Body, the Buddhist, under the heading “Performance Practices” (My Body, the 
Buddhist 103). Of the phrases listed there, most commence with the construction “I imagine …” 
while some of the later ones commence with the rhetorical interrogative “What if …?”. In her 
more recent work, Hay seems to have moved away from calling these phrases “meditations” or 
“performance meditations” and has specifically embraced the linguistic strategy of the rhetorical 
interrogative “What if …?” to set up these somatic inquiries.  
 
Function of the Questions: Choreographing Attention  
In Hay’s work, the questions operate in a very specific way as the second aspect of her braided 
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choreography and practice. If we take the definition of attention established according to 
Merleau-Ponty in the previous chapter, we understand attention as a process of articulation and 
specification (Mallin 70) in which figures and forms are discerned, drawn out and made explicit 
as figures from a ground, or from what Merleau-Ponty describes as a horizon. This process of 
attention is what gives us “things”, patterns and connections that become structures with and 
through which we can act and interact. If we think of intentionality as an inherent and implicit 
process of orienting, then attention is the process of distinguishing specific forms and 
interrelationships among them from a given perspective and orientation. In Hay’s work, the 
questions choreograph my attention; however, rather than drawing forth figures, forms and 
objects from the horizon of possibility, Hay’s questions simultaneously engage and deflect this 
process. Figures, forms and objects recede into the horizon of possibility. In always returning to 
the rhetorical interrogative, Hay’s questions veer away from answers, away from specific, 
distinguishable and identifiable entities and toward a fluctuating and infinite spectrum of 
possibility. Hay’s “what if …” questions initiate processes of attention but her interrogative 
syntactics refuse the figuring of form, per se; they activate somatic processes but subvert the 
figuring of body, per se. By way of illustration, consider the digital processes by which a blurry 
image can be further resolved so that the features and details can be more clearly discerned. By 
contrast, Hay’s work choreographs my attention away from such resolution, in the opposite 
direction toward increased blurriness and indistinguishability or flux, toward the question qua 
question. 
As I have discussed above, what have in the past been referred to as Hay’s performance 
meditations are now framed by Hay most frequently as “what if’s…” and it is these questions to 
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which I attribute the operation of choreographing attention in Hay’s work. Hay herself 
acknowledges the importance of the practice of attention, writing: “The maintenance of attention 
is the work that I do” (“Remaining Positionless” 23). Speaking from experience, it most certainly 
is work to sustain or perpetually return to an open, generative, percolating state of attention and 
resist the natural tendency to determine, articulate and specify. In Hay’s work, the questions 
choreograph my attention engagingdeflecting it toward the horizon. Like in the between state of 
figure-ground reversal of the image of two faces or a vase in which neither figure manifests, Hay 
choreographs attention toward a fluctuating field of possibility that could become anything, but 
which is in that moment, nothing specific.  
 
Discussion and Analysis of the Questions: Play in the Body, The Body in Play 
In this section, I present several quotes that illuminate the ways in which Hay’s questions 
function to choreograph my attention. In my discussion, I aim to show how Hay’s questions 
simultaneously engage and deflect attention through linguistic torques and semantic/syntactic 
strategies such that the performer experiences a suspension of processes of attention, moving not 
toward discerning figure and ground, but instead toward an experience of the horizon of all 
possibility that I have articulated in the previous chapter via Merleau-Ponty. As the second of 
three distinct linguistic aspects of Hay’s braided choreography, I consider the questions in 
linguistic terms as rhetorical interrogatives, questions posed for the sake of the questioning itself 
and not to generate answers. As Hay herself has written: “The question stimulates the body’s 
curiosity and responsiveness. The dancer is thus decentralized and continuously repositioned in 
relation to time, space, and other” (“Performance as Practice”).  
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Hay’s questions generally take two related forms. The first is the general form of the 
“What if …” as in the four questions from the opening of the score quoted above and others from 
the more malleable set she offers in practice. The second is a subcategory also in the form of 
“what if …” but specifically including reference to “the cellular body” or “every cell in my 
body”, for example: “What if every cell in my body could perceive time passing?” The following 
quotes from my journal reveal aspects of my experience of the questions with respect to the 
process of attention. Here I describe their effect, particularly with respect to a) their capacity to 
catalyze an open attention to possibility and b) their role in subverting processes of figuring and 
forming.  
Sept. 13, 2009 
I found more freedom and movement in the song/dance and jazz crossing – not 
improv though because I was in the questions – perceiving – and I felt my 
curiosity piqued, possibilities open and more variety arise. 
 
Nov. 4, 2009 
In free practice … I actually started though just in the question: “What if dance is 
how I practice relationship …” from the score. I worked to stay with this question 
for a bit and began to really notice when I crossed the “line”, fell over the edge 
into following my body/improvising. It sort of feels like forgetting and it also feels 
easier and less attentive.  
 
Nov. 4, 2009 
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 “What if where I am is what I need?”  
 
Not about what I need but about remembering the question itself. When I work 
with this – I arrive here/now in presence/present and with a sense of calm, 
patience and attention. Also, I feel evaluation/judgment slough away as the 
possibility of the question rises up in me. This is a powerful experience … 
Hay’s enigmatic completion of her questions with phrases that syntactically fold back 
onto the opening “what if…” construction is key to their function in her work. By folding back I 
mean to describe the way in which the endings of the questions, or the secondary questions 
embedded therein, tend to strategically undermine the meaningful direction of the initial phrase. 
The questions effectively lead away from answers and redirect the reader/performer back into the 
open realm of the interrogative, suspending one in the rhetorical “what if …”. Take the first 
question of the series included above, which is explicit in redirecting the reader/performer back 
toward the “what if…” and back into the question per se: “What if the question “What if where I 
am is what I need?,” is not about what I need but an opportunity to remember the question 
“What if where I am is what I need?” (Hay, At Once 1). 
Questions of the second type that include reference to the cellular body, by virtue of their 
construction not only fold back on the “what if …” itself but also fold back on the body itself, 
putting it into play, and into question. By asking the performer to consider the body as a 
gathering of trillions of independent cells, Hay provokes a reconsideration of the conventional 
understanding of the body itself as a singular entity.96 These secondary questions amplify the 
function of the question in choreographing attention in Hay’s work. First, they engage an inner-
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directed attention toward the experience of the body that is immediately deflected from the more 
stable body-as-entity to the more mobile multiplicity of trillions of cells. Then they engage an 
outer-directed attention toward the experience, for example, of time, immediately deflecting 
attention from the more stable concept of time to the more mobile and multiple notion of time 
passing. The following extrapolated description of my experience of the questions in Hay’s work 
further illuminates how they function to stimulate play in the body and put the body itself in play 
– in question: 
This question  – What if every cell in my body could perceive time passing? – draws my 
perceptual attention to an experience of my body as a dynamic fluid versus a solid mass. 
My physical/sensory awareness becomes kinaesthetically open to the potential?/actual? 
perceptual experience of the micro fluctuations and constant liquid motion of my body as 
a configuration or gathering-together of trillions of tiny rippling, oozing, pulsing, flowing 
cells. Posing this question to my body catalyzes/prompts/stimulates an actual experience 
of physical release of inherent, patterned tendencies to hold or fix my physical stance, or 
aspects thereof, and draws my attention to perceptions of flux, mobility and constant 
micro-level dynamism within my body.97 As this perceptual shift/experience washes 
through my body, I experience an opening of my sensory perception to the full three-
dimensional space around me, engendering a more equal multi-directional, holistic 
bodily awareness of my surroundings/environment and a simultaneous resonance or 
reverberation of my actual physical/sensory presence in/situatedness in/relationship 
with/my environment/the world.  
This frisson of awareness I describe above is similar to the buzzing bodily vibration one may 
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experience when one hears a quiet, but unusual and unrecognized sound in the dark of one’s own 
home in the night. The key connection between my experience of the questions in Hay’s work 
and this quotidian example is that in both, there is a confrontation of sorts with the unknown, the 
unrecognized, the uncategorized. In such an experience, one’s somatic attention becomes 
heightened; the event draws forth the body’s perceptual processes and catalyzes imagination’s 
generation of possibilities: “What if …?” The difference is that in the quotidian experience, we 
would typically seek an answer and probably not easily return to sleep without a resolution. In 
Hay’s work, the tendency to seek and arrive at answers and resolutions is actively thwarted. In 
my experience in Hay’s work, the questions provoke or awaken play in the body; however, in 
their folding back, the questions also put the body itself into play. As a performer, I am not body 
as entity but body becoming flux. 
Thus, Hay’s linguistic torques and semantic/syntactic strategies choreograph the 
questions in her work specifically to effect an inner-outer engagingdeflecting of the process of 
attention, ultimately pushing the performer away from figuring, forming and structuring either 
body or environment and rather toward the horizon of possibility. As a question so inclines us, 
we start to go toward the answer, and as we begin rolling down the question, its very 
interrogative character tips upward and around, and we roll back into the “what if…? of the 
“what if …?. Tip a question mark on its side. Leap across the abyss from the point to the stem 
and begin to move along into the deep curve, which travels back up and around in reverse, to 
where the interrogative suspension gathers and thickens, ready to drip back down onto the deep 
curve. Repeat. Now imagine being in motion everywhere on this figure at once. At Once. This is 
the impossible processual figure of the embodied experience of “What if…? It is the question per 
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se that is the key because it functions to simultaneously engage and deflect attention. The 
question “What if …?’, spoken easily and lightly, is a textual gesture that in its porous proposal 
resists objective stasis, seeking not to state or confirm, but to engender openness and play. 
Indeed, in a linguistic torque that epitomizes the engagingdeflecting of attention, one of Hay’s 
secondary questions (from the main four quoted above) asks: “What if the depth of this question 
is on the surface?” (At Once 1). 
In several instances in Drobnick’s analysis, he connects various terms in Hay’s lexicon, 
including definitions of Performance Meditation, Play and Cellular Consciousness, to the activity 
of attention. In his definition of “Performance Meditation”, he explains that such phrases or 
“affirmations” help to focus the performer’s mind, providing each dance with a central 
“imaginative task or space” (53). In this definition Drobnick notes, quoting Hay, that: “The 
meditations serve as generative sources of inspiration one keeps returning to throughout the 
performance – they are ‘perfect little attention devices’” (Drobnick and Hay qtd. in Drobnick 53).  
In his definition of Hay’s use of the term “Attention” itself, he writes: “Attention is an 
exceptional state of being because it noticeably stands out from the ordinary tendency to live 
distractedly and habitually” (48). Hay used to employ a single meditation for a single 
performance or work or year of practice.98 Having multiple questions, as in the case of At Once 
serves the same purpose to focus the performer’s mind; however, in providing more options for 
the performer to work with Hay multiplies the effect of the “what if …” – the question qua 
question – in engagingdeflecting the process of attention.  
Drobnick also defines the term “Play”, which he cross references to the term Performance 
Meditation. According to Drobnick, play encompasses “[g]ames and imaginative exercises –
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 what Hay calls ‘what ifs’ … techniques for engaging performers totally in mind and body” (53). 
Drobnick’s point not only aligns Hay’s ‘what ifs’ with play, it also resonates with my point about 
the way in which Hay’s questions choreograph attention, “engaging performers totally” and 
deflecting attention to the horizon of possibility rather than discerning a specific figure from a 
ground. He goes on to note that “playing asks performers to forget themselves … which carries 
the risk of looking ridiculous” (53), which prompts him to make the connection to child’s play 
and point out the quality of serious and compelling engagement witnessed therein. In linking 
these terms and connecting them to the realm of imagination, Drobnick’s work usefully 
corroborates my analysis. Indeed, Hay’s “What if …?” is like saying “Let’s pretend…”. The 
rhetorical interrogative “what if …?” in itself invokes the space of play in which the horizon of 
generative possibilities percolates but from which none are yet formed or specified. In Hay’s 
work, I am not playing “something”. In fact, for Hay, we are simply “playing awake” (Hay, 
“Letters” 70). 
Hay has indicated in talks and workshops that her questions should be said lightly, 
somewhat with a sense of humour. I recall her saying this during the SPCP with an impish, wry 
smile and a twinkle in her eyes.99 Hay often embodies a sense of play and lightheartedness in her 
work and interactions, generally. Rather than simply a personality characteristic, I think this is a 
key aspect to Hay’s work in cultivating a quality of ludic openness that resists sedimentation, 
solidification and stasis and rather supports mobility, laterality and flux.100 In her article 
“Remaining Positionless”, Hay writes about her interest in games and play, making the 
connection to the way that games and play demand (or as I argue, choreograph) attention: “These 
are the tools of my dance making – games with rules I love playing. Games that include a 
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propensity for imagination and change. Games that demand my attention or the dance vanishes” 
(“Remaining Positionless” 23). This playfulness also links to the Zen influence in her practice 
insofar as Zen koans are like riddles and cannot be approached directly, nor are they necessarily 
resolvable.101 Hay’s book My Body, the Buddhist includes chapters entitled: “my body is bored 
by answers” and “my body enjoys jokes, riddles, and games”. Hay is most certainly not 
interested in resolution. In commenting to the audience attending an open rehearsal of her work 
Up Until Now… on Toronto Dance Theatre, she said something to the effect of, and I paraphrase: 
“I love watching a work in which nothing happens but is happening all the time” (Open 
Rehearsal). 
 
THE TOOLS: CHOREOGRAPHING ACTION THROUGH ENIGMATIC 
IMPERATIVES 
The third aspect of Hay’s choreographic braid comprises a set of verbal tools or directions for the 
performer, to be enacted in the practice of the choreography. The tools use more direct and 
specific language than either the score or the questions insofar as they are mandates for the 
performer, most often given as imperatives; however, they too bear evidence of Hay’s distinct 
linguistic torques that transform them into enigmatic imperatives. In the score, several such tools 
are listed in the opening and I reiterate them here for the reader: 
3 reminders for the practice of At Once 
Remove your sequencing from the sequence of movement directions. 
Remove hesitation and reconsideration. 
A word or short phrase in purple ink is a warning to steer clear of any creative 
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impulses or habitual behavior in regard to the language used; replacing those 
impulses by instantly assuming the cellular intelligence of the body. (Hay, At 
Once 2) 
The third reminder here is somewhat unique and is more akin to the notes provided throughout 
the score, rather than one of the verbal tools as I’m articulating them. Nonetheless, this third 
reminder could be rephrased in the imperative as: “steer clear of any creative impulses or 
habitual behaviour in regard to the language used” and would then more closely belong to the set 
of verbal tools under consideration here. 
Other than these three reminders in the score, the verbal tools are primarily provided by 
Hay in person during the residency process, spoken in an ad hoc manner generally during 
practice sessions. As Hay observes, responds to and coaches the performer in the practice, these 
imperatives come at the performer seemingly randomly and can be somewhat jarring, though the 
performer is expected to maintain focus and continue the practice. This jarring effect – which 
feels like the interruptive experience of having the hiccups – is purposeful as Hay offers these 
tools to jog the performer out of what she perceives as a habit or pattern that is developing in a 
particular performer’s run of the score, or to shift the performer away from possibly or actually 
falling into improvisation or the development of thematic movement material, narrative or 
character.102 As a result of having heard these tools repeatedly delivered by Hay during my own 
and others’ performance practices during the residency process, the phrases have become an 
embodied third strand in the performance practice, along with the score and the questions. In this 
way, they could be considered a kind of habit in themselves; however, as I will discuss, in their 
linguistic construction and challenging demands, the language of the tools – like the score and 
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questions – operates to subvert their easy implementation. As tools to thwart organizing 
processes and pattern formation – embodied as interruptive hiccups – in themselves they resist 
habituation.  
 
Function of the Tools: Choreographing Action 
Hay’s tools operate in a very specific way as the third and final aspect of her braided 
choreography and practice, to, in effect, choreograph the concrete action of the dance. Distinct 
from the score, which catalyzes the intentional context, and distinct from the questions, which 
focus the performer’s attention, as imperatives, the tools specifically direct the performer’s 
action which, as I will discuss, is not danced action but rather perceptual action. 
 The movement precipitated by Hay’s tools is not meaningful movement per se, 
encompassing some purpose – such as taking up a fork to eat – or expression – such as spreading 
and then enclosing one’s arms to share an embrace. Nor is it even the abstracted movement –
movement for movement’s sake – that we might find in set or improvised dance, for, in these 
cases, there is still meaningfulness within an abstracted expression or purpose: this movement is 
conceived and understood as “form” and/or “content”. The tools in Hay’s practice generate 
movement that is neither “form” nor “content” per se. Rather, the tools function to incite the 
basic movement of change – from cellular pulsing and fluctuations of breath through to gross 
motor movement. This movement is of the order of Merleau-Ponty’s “global motility”, which as 
I have discussed earlier is described by Mallin as a fluctuation between a general abduction and 
adduction of the body (movements away and toward the centre of the body) (163). In Hay’s 
work, as I will discuss, the general imperative to “fire” into motion and the simple directions of 
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turning, shifting, and even of inviting and noticing can be understood as instances of bodily 
expansion (abduction) and contraction (adduction). For example, using a camera aperture as a 
metaphor, one can understand inviting as a kind of global opening or dilating of the body; 
whereas, in contrast, noticing can be understood as a kind of global closing or constricting of the 
body.103 This global motility, or general expansion and contraction of the body is described by 
Merleau-Ponty as a “rhythm of existence” (Merleau-Ponty qtd. in Mallin 163). Thus this 
movement can be understood as the movement of existence. I have earlier identified the term 
“action” to encompass this range of possibility in order to distinguish from Merleau-Ponty’s 
“global motility” and to capture the possibility of all involuntary and voluntary movements 
beyond what we conventionally understand as dance movement. 
 Hay’s tools choreograph the performer into this action and thereby into the perceptual 
processes that are fundamentally enabled by the basic movement of change. Hay’s enigmatic 
imperatives continually direct and redirect the performer simultaneously both toward her bodily 
experience and through her body toward the environment. Although the language of the tools 
may or may not reference perception directly, embodying the tools – in random and rapid 
sequence – activates perceptual processes. I am specific here in articulating perceptual processes 
versus perceptual structures because the random and rapid sequencing of the tools along with the 
requirement to perform the score and practice the questions, undermines the possibility for 
organizing or structuring of the experience to occur. This processual experience is further 
emphasized by the tools’ linguistic constructions, which, as I will show through a pairing of 
examples below, propel the performer into perceptual oscillation through the experiences of 
reversibility that the tools effect. The performer is choreographed into the experience of seeing 
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and being seen (visibility), touching and being touched (tangibility), “hearing” and “being heard” 
(audibility).  
 Without prescribing or designing movement per se, Hay’s tools direct the performer into 
action and yet away from attaching to, defining or thematizing any particular movement 
experience, propelling the performer instead in the throes of perceptual processes. Further, Hay’s 
imperatives constantly shift the performer’s perceptual modes (visibility, tangibility, audibility) 
and perceptual directions (toward the body or toward the environment; inner/outer) in what 
Merleau-Ponty discusses in his essay “The Intertwining – The Chiasm” as intertwinings and 
reversibilities (Visible and Invisible 130-155). As Merleau-Ponty articulates: “There is a double 
and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and of the tangible in the visible” (Visible and 
Invisible 134). Through the following analysis of a selection of Hay’s tools, I establish how 
Hay’s tools choreograph the performer’s action: away from “danced (theatrical) movement” per 
se, away from purposeful, expressive, meaningful gesture, and away from the tendency to fall 
into physical habits or patterns of movement or performance that may be ingrained from 
previous years of dance training or general enculturation. My discussion highlights the 
interrelatedness and crossing over of perceptual processes – the body as both sentient and 
sensible. In choreographing the performer’s action away from meaningful danced movement, 
Hay’s tools choreograph the performer toward fundamental motility and, in perpetuating 
experiences of perceptual reversibility, into the process and practice of perception.  
  
Discussion and Analysis of the Tools: Perceiving is Moving, Moving is Perceiving 
Hay’s verbal tools and directions function within the choreography as cues that tune up and 
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activate perceptual processes. These cues, phrases and directions may seem enigmatic to readers 
who do not have familiarity or experience with dance or somatic practices and indeed they are, 
even for those who do. Hay doesn’t typically explain what these phrases mean or how to use 
them. They are tools to be embodied in practice, which is where their function is realized. During 
the SPCP, Hay’s emphasis was on the lived experience of the work in which the tools were 
embodied and enacted, not reflected upon. Based on what she was seeing in the performance, 
Hay would call out various directions during group and solo practice as reminders. In her doing 
so, we participants were able to sometimes discern the effect of a tool when a performer 
responded to it.  
 As a result of hearing Hay speak these tools over and over during the residency process, 
her voice came to be “memorized” in my body as part of the practice. In my experience, 
practicing alone after the workshop period, far from Scotland and far from Hay, I would 
consistently “hear” her voice reminding me of various tools as I worked. Sometimes they would 
flow together or arise in combinations. Most often I did not experience them as linguistic phrases 
but as actions in my body. They would “surface” at different moments in a way almost in 
response to what I needed to remind myself of in any given experience – like embodied 
“reminders”, which is how she introduces the three examples provided in the opening pages of 
the score. The tools cannot be thought about per se during practice. As noted, these imperatives 
are actions that must be lived. I have only come to analysis after the three-month process of 
practicing and writing, and period of journal transcription and extrapolated description. As the 
following journal entry reveals, my body understood their meanings experientially: 
Sept. 11, 2009 
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The ready-fire-aim tool is helpful but also problematic if it becomes a conscious 
directive rather than an embodied ‘coach’ to keep present with/to the moments 
that arise and always ready to surrender the ‘previous’ moment. 
The key is to understand that these directions are offered ‘to the body’ with implicit confidence 
in the body’s own capacity to respond, to apprehend rather than comprehend. According to the 
Gage Canadian Dictionary, these terms are distinguished as follows: comprehend means to “take 
complete hold of the meaning of something and understand it fully and perfectly”; whereas, 
apprehend means to “take hold of a fact or idea but without necessarily seeing its relationships or 
implications” (“apprehend” and “comprehend”).104 I use this terminology because it helpfully 
describes the way we can “take hold” of these tools with our bodies as tools for use – in action – 
in an immediate and non-reflective manner as compared with the way we might “take hold” of 
them more reflectively, considering and analyzing their meanings and relations. To illustrate, in a 
cursory manner, I suggest the reader recall the moment when one’s alarm clock rings, prompting 
one from a deep sleep in a darkened bedroom. Typically, one can very rapidly find and turn off 
the alarm, without looking and almost before actually waking. The sound of the alarm can be 
likened to Hay’s directions and the body’s response, to both the alarm and Hay’s directions, is a 
somatic one.105 
 Hay’s extensive collection of tools challenges the performer’s capacity to sustain a 
multidimensional awareness of them all throughout the duration of the practice, while also 
managing to practice the score and the questions, ultimately in the presence of an audience. 
Throughout the following descriptions and discussion, I will elaborate how Hay’s cues activate 
perception, and engender experiences of reciprocity, reversibility and intertwining. For my 
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purposes here, I have selected a small set of examples from the larger and somewhat shifting 
collection of tools that I experienced as part of Hay’s practice during the SPCP process and that 
have been acknowledged variously in others’ writing about Hay’s work (i.e. Drobnick; Satin; 
Nicely). I have chosen these phrases specifically to exemplify the larger collection of tools as a 
distinct aspect of Hay’s choreography and to enable me to articulate their function overall. In 
practice, the collection includes tools that can be considered alternate phrasings of others, which 
are connected to a root purpose or activity in Hay’s work. I have listed the chosen examples in 
pairs along three perceptual dimensions to demonstrate how various tools function in 
complementary relation to activate both interoception and exteroception, the former referring to 




a. “Invite being seen” 
b. “Refresh your visual field” (“Turn your fucking head”) 
 
2. Tangibility 
a. “Notice the feedback from your body” 
b. “Be a barometer of space” (“(I) need the lab”) 
 
3. Audibility 
a. “Ready-fire-aim” (“Move and Call it X” and “Step Up to the Moment”) 
	  187	  
b. “Dis-attach” (“Remove my Sequencing from the Sequence” and “Here-and-
Gone”) 
 
1. Visibility  
The first set of tools from the above list, “Invite being seen” and “Refresh your visual field”, 
explicitly address visibility.106 I use the term visibility in reference to Merleau-Ponty’s usage, by 
which he refers to the given capacity of vision that renders visibles in the world and thereby 
renders us visible as well. Below, I briefly address this reversibility with respect to this pair of 
Hay’s tools. In my experience of Hay’s tools, the former imperative situates the performer as a 
recipient of vision from the external world. Rather than a passive recipient, a position that has 
been considered in accounts of the audience-performer relation and with respect to gaze theory, 
the performer here is active, as the implied subject of the verb “invite”. The latter imperative 
situates the performer as an active agent of vision and one who is directed to use her own 
capacity to shift and move in order to alter the scope of her own vision. Hay has at times stated 
this in the more frank phrase, “Turn your fucking head”, which gets quickly and directly to the 
point and provides the performer with a very clear action. In this pair of tools, by explicitly 
addressing perception – in this case vision – in an imperative linguistic construction, Hay directs 
the performer’s action. Importantly, the action is not “danced movement” per se. The simple 
motion of change prompted by Hay’s tools activates perceptual processes. Here, “invite” can be 
understood to involve a simple turning or opening (bodily in some way) toward the implied 
“seer”, just as refreshing the visual field can be accomplished through a simple turning or 
shifting of one’s head. This fundamental movement of change – the action of perception – 
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becomes the movement of the dance. 
In this set of tools, revolving around vision, we also encounter and can begin to 
understand a certain reversibility insofar as the performer and the audience/world (be that the 
presence of an actual human audience or simply the presence of the external world, objects and 
entities therein) can be understood as one-inside-the-other, linked through vision and the visible. 
The performer is a visible in the world, inviting being seen, and the world is also visible “in the 
performer”, in and through the performer’s visual field. As Merleau-Ponty writes: “…there is an 
immediate equivalence between the orientation of the visual field of awareness and the 
awareness of one’s own body as the potentiality of that field” (Phenomenology of Perception 
239). This is but one example of a set of tools that activates experiences of perceptual 
reversibility in Hay’s work. I will address my experience of this particular reversibility of I-
world in the next chapter. 
 
2. Tangibility 
I connect the second set of tools  “Notice the feedback from your body” and “Be a barometer of 
space” along the perceptual dimension of touch insofar as they both imply the registration – 
loosely speaking – of qualities of volume, density, pressure, tension, texture and temperature, for 
example.107 The first imperative directs the performer toward her own body and asks the 
performer to tune in to somatic experience, indicating – through the use of the verb “notice” as in 
the use of the verb “invite” above – that the performer once again be active in this process. The 
second imperative in this pair situates the performer in relation to the surrounding space and 
through the term “barometer” (which measures changes in atmospheric pressure in meteorology) 
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directs the performer to register the qualities and characteristics thereof. In this tool, space is 
conceived of in a tangible sense as having pressure, or “force”. As imperatives, these tools direct 
the performer’s action but once again they do not define danced movement. In this case without 
the word “turn”, there is even less actual movement information provided per se. However, 
through the imperative construction Hay’s verbs imply the movement of change, thereby 
activating perceptual processes.  
 Here again a reversibility becomes apparent insofar as “the body” and “space” can be 
understood to be one-inside-the-other, and linked through touch and the tangible. “The body” is 
in space, registering the changing densities and textures thereof, while space is also in “the body”, 
made apparent through somatic pressures, tensions and textures within. This particular 




The final pair of tools I will discuss in order to exemplify the function of the tools in Hay’s work 
include: “Ready-fire-aim” and “Dis-attach”.108 Where the first two sets of tools quite readily 
align along a perceptual dimension, these tools do not as obviously connect to one. However, I 
connect this pair of tools to the perceptual dimension of audibility by recognizing the way that 
duration, sequence and rhythm commonly manifest through sound (as a marking or punctuating 
of time) – both in the world, for example in music, and in the body, for example in the lub-dub of 
our heartbeat. Insofar as “ready-fire-aim”– through it’s more common word order of ready-aim-
fire – implies the preparatory sequence and sound of a gunshot, it indeed suggests audibility. 
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Further, my experience of this and the related tools “Step up to the moment”, “Here and Gone” 
and “Remove my sequencing from the sequence” activate an awareness of duration, sequence 
and rhythm generally. The former imperative, “Ready-fire-aim”, prompts the performer into 
action in a spontaneous manner. Like a runner at a race waiting for the starter pistol to fire her 
into action, the performer is also in an amplified attentive state of readying; however, Hay’s 
linguistic switch of order directs the performer to “jump the gun”, to simply fire into action 
before aiming. In my pairing of tools here, “Dis-attach” directs the performer to release the 
action, implying a kind of silence – or the action of listening – in opposition to the sounding of 
“ready-fire-aim”. “Ready-fire-aim” launches the performer into relatively spontaneous, un-pre-
meditated action – like a reflex – subverting the process of aiming, assessing and choosing that 
would usually precede decisive action. Hay sometimes uses the phrase “Move and call it X” as a 
related tool to similarly catalyze this process.109 The latter imperative to “Dis-attach” functions in 
a similar but opposing manner to subvert any reflective processing that might commence in the 
aftermath of a movement, directing the performer to release any tendencies to identify, assess 
and evaluate that might commence with respect to the manifested movement. As Hay otherwise 
puts it: “Here-and-gone”. As imperatives, once again these tools direct the performer’s action but 
they do not define danced movement. Through the imperative construction Hay’s tools catalyze 
action through the bodily movement of change, thereby again activating perceptual processes. 
 In this set of tools also, there is a reversibility at play insofar as rhythm and sequencing 
can also be understood to be one-inside-the-other, linked through sound and the audible. “Ready-
fire-aim” directs the performer to spontaneously sound out movement with the body, which is 
audible to the body. “Dis-
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to the also audible silence of the “after-before”. In the former, there is a process of listening for 
and hearing the sound of movement erupting and in the latter there is a process of listening for 
and hearing the silence of the dissipation of the movement. This particular reciprocity, which 
relates movement and time, will also be addressed through descriptions in the next chapter. 
 As the above analysis articulates, Hay’s tools work in specific ways to shift the performer 
away from “danced movement” per se, away from decisive/identifiable “acts of dance” and 
instead toward the fundamental movement of change and “acts of perception”. The experience is 
disorienting for the performer accustomed to either conventional choreography or 
improvisational modalities, and arguably also for the audience. As Dolan has noted from his 
experience as an audience member watching a performance of Hay’s work Lamb, Lamb, Lamb, 
Lamb …: “They [the performers] were looking at us, the audience in a naïve and unforced 
attitude of re-cognition […] To me it felt like dropping into an abyss where the very act of 
spectatorship, of watching and identifying with the proceedings, was effortlessly being called 
into question […] at one point I had the feeling, utterly terrifying and enchanting, that I was 
onstage and the performers were the audience members” (206).  
 In the score itself, as a note to a choreographic cue, Hay writes of this move away from 
dance movement and toward perceptual process:  
[blue font] Note: My choice to perform this material requires catastrophic acts of 
perception. I associate catastrophic with images of great loss. Catastrophe, in this 
sense, refers to the magnitude of former behavior that I need to dis-attach from in 
order to permit myself to enact these choreographic directions. It is loss of 
tremendous proportion. (Hay, At Once 5) 
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Nicely’s analysis also becomes helpful here in corroborating my analysis of the tools. In her 
discussion of Hay’s “catastrophic acts of perception” (which is the title of the Hay chapter in her 
dissertation), Nicely writes: “These acts of perception are catastrophic in that such reorientation 
is at great risk to what has been learned” (127). Later she notes some of the acts that must be 
relinquished by the dancer:  
certain modes of orienting, sequencing movement, performing in ways that project and/or 
achieve certain kinds of sensations and feedback, and “checking out” to just ride 
movement pathways rather then [sic] attending to them. Many of these elements compose 
a professional dancer, and to then be asked to release these seems almost insurmountable. 
It is to risk our lives as dancers, (Nicely 131) 
(Nicely’s use of the phrase “checking out” here recalls my earlier description of the experience 
of “falling in” and the navigation of “the edge”.)  
 Rather than providing the dancer with acts of movement, Hay choreographs the 
performer into acts of perception. Nicely notes that “[t]he acts of perception are sensorial … 
movement arises by attending to the situation as it unfolds” (127). This quote effectively 
captures my experience of the tools overall, by which I am constantly propelled into action – 
which I have defined as the fundamental movement of bodily change with respect to Merleau-
Ponty’s global motility discussed in the previous chapter. It does not matter what movement and 
I needn’t and shouldn’t seek reflective understanding of its possible meaningfulness. It is 
sufficient that I move, that change occurs, in order to continually activate perceptual processes 
and subvert tendencies to arrest the flux in order to orient, define, organize and interpret the 
experience. In my discussion of the questions (what ifs…) I referenced Hay’s phrase “playing 
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awake”. The title of Hay’s 1991 large group workshop, the phrase arises in an earlier published 
text by Hay entitled “Playing Awake: Letters to my Daughter”. There, Hay writes: “Tricks help 
me short-circuit negative or outmoded patterns of thought and/or action. Tricks wake me up to 
‘playing awake.’ The only hard part is remembering to play” (“Playing Awake” 75).  
 To reiterate, according to Merleau-Ponty, movement – change – is necessary in order to 
perceive: motility enables perception and perception begets the first order structuring of 
experience. By engendering experiences of perceptual reversibility – of continually prompting 
shifts from experiences of seeing to experiences of being seen, from experiences of touching to 
experiences of “being touched”, from experiences of sounding to experiences of listening – 
Hay’s tools choreograph the performer into the thickness of visibility, tangibility, audibility, in-
between these experiences. Hay’s tools choreograph the performer’s action; as imperatives they 
propel the performer into movement; however, by virtue of their enigmatic linguistic 
construction, the tools deflect the performer from “danced movement” per se. Instead, the tools 
foreground and choreograph the action of perceiving, activating perceptual processes rather than 
establishing perceptual structures per se. Rather than acts of dance, the tools precipitate acts of 
perception, Hay’s “catastrophic acts of perception”. And, according to Mallin on Merleau-Ponty, 
“perception gives us the clearest case of our relationship to Being” (31). 
In the following passage, Merleau-Ponty’s description of the flesh resonates with my 
experience of the tools in Hay’s work: 
It is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the 
touching body, which is attested in particular when the body sees itself, touches itself 
seeing and touching the things, such that, simultaneously, as tangible it descends among 
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them, as touching it dominates them all and draws this relationship and even this double 
relationship from itself, by dehiscence or fission of its own mass. This concentration of 
the visibles about one of them, or this bursting forth of the mass of the body toward the 
things, which makes a vibration of my skin become the sleek and the rough, makes me 
follow with my eyes the movements and contours of the things themselves, this magical 
relation, this pact between them and me according to which I lend them my body in order 
that they inscribe upon it and give me their resemblance, this fold, this central cavity of 
the visible which is my vision, these two mirror arrangements of the seeing and the 
visible, the touching and the touched, form a close-bound system that I count on …. 
(Visible and Invisible 146) 
The resonance I wish to draw out specifically is that of the double experience of seeing/being 
seen, touching/being touched – the experience through the body of being both sentient and 
sensible – as a simultaneous dehiscence or splitting and folding back over that arises in/through 
perceptual processes. This reversibility, this experience of turning inside out, occurs in my 
practicing Hay’s work in which the boundaries between what I understand as myself and the 
world blur to the point that I experience myself as world and I experience world as me – a 
contiguous tissue, the flesh. And through this experience of the flesh via the desctructuring 
structure of Hay’s choreography and practice, historically sedimented meaningfulness is 





CONCLUSION: HAY’S CHOREOGRAPHY AS THE CONSTRUCTED SITUATION OF 
A DESTRUCTURING STRUCTURE FOR THE PRACTICE OF PERCEPTION 
In a short article by Hay, she writes about one of her earlier solo dances The Other Side of O 
(1998), in which she includes a piece of text from her program notes describing a gesture that 
effectively articulates her consistent line of danced inquiry: “Touch the tip of one index finger to 
the other. Do the same with your thumbs. With these fingertips connected, open the space 
between them to form an O. Now separate your hands. What remains is the other side of O. This 
absence of boundary is the choreographed site for The Other Side of O” (“What if now is?” 34). 
It also effectively envisions and articulates the engagingdeflecting processes that I have 
articulated are at play in Hay’s work through her distinct use of language to choreograph dance. 
In this chapter, I have presented an analysis of Hay’s choreography for the solo At Once. 
I began by summarizing my theoretical framework informed by Merleau-Ponty, outlining the 
way that lived experience occurs in situations and articulating my triumvirate dynamic relation 
of the key processes of intentionality/intention, attention and action that underpin the wovenness 
of body-subject and world. I then provided an introduction to Hay’s choreography, and outlined 
my approach, which considers it a distinctly linguistic braid of three strands: the score, questions 
and tools. The majority of the chapter was then dedicated to an emergent choreographic analysis 
of Hay’s solo At Once, based on my experience practicing performing the work.   
I discussed the way in which the three strands of her choreographic braid construct a 
situation that, through its distinct and specific use of language, operates on processes of 
intentionality/intention, attention and action. In my discussion of the score, I have articulated 
how through ambiguous assertions it effectively choreographs intentionality/intention by 
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engagingdeflecting it from precipitations of subjectivity and objectivity toward the écart or 
spreading away of otherness. My analysis of the questions – the “what ifs…” – has shown how 
their construction as rhetorical interrogatives inherently blurs the figure they initially seem to 
articulate – often the body as an entity – ultimately choreographing attention by subverting the 
tendency to articulate figure and ground and precipitating a kind of hovering at the horizon of 
possibility. Finally, in discussing Hay’s tools, I have presented the way in which they function as 
imperatives to action, choreographing the performer not into danced movement per se but rather 
propelling her into the fundamental movement of change and reversibility of perceptual 
processes.  
While these aspects of Hay’s choreography operate distinctly in the work, they 
necessarily weave together as a braid to form Hay’s choreography as a whole. Each aspect has its 
primary function and yet they layer and overlap in a non-hierarchical plait to form the 
choreography. In their interweaving they retain their primary function and yet support and 
enhance the functions of the other aspects. A more fine-grained analysis could potentially tease 
out secondary and tertiary operations within each aspect of the choreographic braid. However, 
for my purposes, it is sufficient to understand the primary functions of the score, questions and 
tools, and the general manner in which they work together to create Hay’s specific choreography, 
which proposes a complex and multidimensional linguistic-somatic challenge to the performer 
and ultimately thrusts her into a necessary practice of perception that is nonetheless impossible to 
sustain, as I will discuss in chapter 5.  
From my emergent choreographic analysis of Hay’s score, questions and tools, we can 
begin to understand Hay’s choreography as a linguistically constructed situation which functions 
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as a desctructuring structure for the practice of perception. Based on my outline of Merleau-
Ponty’s articulation of situations and structures in the previous chapter, we recall that a situation 
can be understood as a fundamental body-world engagement, a certain kind of global or general 
context in which body and world fit together through fundamental intentionality. According to 
Merleau-Ponty, we are always and necessarily situated; importantly, however, situations are 
dynamic and ambiguous. While situations manifest a given fitting-together, they also contain 
within them the écart or stretching away from that fitting-together, as well as the horizon of all 
possibility. Within situations, through processes of attention our lived experience is organized 
into various structures of experience that are layered or sedimented in one’s body schema. These 
structures are then called upon in new or different situations, in order to organize and interpret 
them, and to thus enable meaningful action within the context or situation. 
We can now see how Hay’s choreography can be understood as a constructed situation. 
First, a theatrical dance choreography and performance context is in itself a situation in which 
intentionality/intention draws performer, dance, and audience together; attention articulates and 
discerns specificity, calling up previously sedimented structures of experience to “make sense” 
of the situation and thus enable meaningful interpretation and interaction. In this case, however, 
Hay’s choreography is a specifically constructed situation in which performer, dance and, 
ultimately, audience are presumptively drawn together through intentionality/intention but are 
then in a way “pushed apart” or “turned inside-out” by the linguistic operations of the 
choreography itself, which enacts not conventional danced movement per se but a practice of 
perception. In a way, Hay uses the theatrical dance performance context as a set-up or foil to 
enable the practice of perception. Thus Hay’s choreography is a constructed situation. The 
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theatrical situation in effect isolates and protects the core of the work, the practice of perception, 
and at the same time makes it possible to practice. If one were to engage in this practice in public 
without the performance context, one might not only appear to be “insane”, one might also 
experience a sense of “insanity” for lack of a frame, context to hold the practice.110 Engaging in 
the practice in private without the performance context would potentially render it more of a 
therapeutic or meditative undertaking.111  
Through her very specific use of language in the score, questions and tools Hay 
effectively constructs a situation – her choreography – that uses language against itself in a way, 
to effect a destructuring operation that functions to undermine our habit- and pattern-forming 
processes, continually engagingdeflecting intentionality/intention from precipitations of 
subjectivity and otherness and into the écart, drawing our attention away from figure-ground 
specificity toward the horizon of possibility, and pivoting us through bodily-perceptual 
oscillations and reversals into a practice of perception – which according to Merleau-Ponty gives 
us our closest relation to Being. 
It is the turning inside out noted above, engendered by the linguistically constructed 
situation that leads me to say that Hay’s choreography functions as a destructuring structure. In 
its specific and distinct composition as a linguistic braid of score, questions and tools, the 
choreography works as a kind of structure; however, in choreographing intentionality/intention, 
attention and action away from articulation and meaningfulness, and rather toward flux and 
ambiguity, the choreography works as a destructuring structure. It thwarts and subverts the 
calling up and application of pre-established structures of experience sedimented in the body 
schema by choreographing intentionality/intention, attention and action away from specificity, 
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figure-ground differentiation and danced movement per se. This destructuring structure has at its 
ultimate core a practice of perception, which is enabled through the choreographic function and 
which reveals, in performance practice, an inherently proximate, ambiguous and fluid body-
world experience. Through the continual oscillations and reversals engendered by the score, 
questions and tools, the performer is choreographed through the sedimented layers of the body 
schema and into a kind of suspension of structuring that approaches a primordial limit, 
potentially allowing the impossible, a furtive and sidelong glance – in the word glance’s double 
sense of both seeing and/or touching – at primordiality.112  
When people use the word “presence” in discussions of Hay’s work, I think that it is this 
quality or character that they seek to describe. In the following quote, Merleau-Ponty expresses 
the way that movement is consciousness, movement is the way that we come to realize and know 
both body and world:   
Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of the body. A 
movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it 
into its ‘world’, and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow 
oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any 
representation. Motility, then, is not, as it were, a handmaid of consciousness, 
transporting the body to that point in space of which we have formed a representation 
beforehand. (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 160-161) 
Based on my analysis, this term “presence” in descriptions of Hay’s work can now be understood 
to express these instances of lived, fluid proximity of body-world, in which movement reveals 
itself as Merleau-Ponty’s consciousness, in a practice of perception. This is what arguably marks 
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and distinguishes Hay’s work in the context of contemporary theatrical dance practice and 
performance,113 and it is what I describe and analyze from the inside of the experience in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Moving, Beyond Meaningfulness: Practicing Performing Somatic Anacrusis  
 
I recognize my choreography when I see a dancer’s self-regulated transcendence of 
his/her choreographed body within in [sic] a movement sequence that distinguishes one 
dance from another. (Hay, “How do I recognize my choreography?”) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
What happens when I commit to the regular practice of Hay’s distinctly linguistic 
choreography for the solo At Once? What is the nature of my experience inside the practice of 
perception that her choreography engenders?  
 In this chapter I establish the experiential concept of somatic anacrusis through 
descriptive analysis of my experience practicing performing Hay’s work, distinguish it from 
several related concepts in the dance improvisation and somatics literatures, and discuss Hay’s 
work – as choreography – in relation to an understanding of both conventional choreography and 
improvisation. I proceed, through experiential description, to articulate several key experiences 
that consistently arise through my regular engagement with the choreography and practice. 
Working from first-order journal entries developed during my four-month daily practice both 
performing and writing about Hay’s solo At Once, along with extrapolated descriptions of key 
experiences in her work that I developed subsequent to my primary research, I discuss how they 
reveal distinct and constantly shifting experiences of I-world, body-space and movement-time. I 
draw on language from Merleau-Ponty to support my discussion, not as an attempt to work 
through his philosophy per se or to directly analyze these specific and contrasting experiences 
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through his work, but to help illuminate them as they arise through Hay’s practice and to 
emphasize the way that these experiences align with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
articulations of bodily perceptive experience. Via my discussion, I arrive at three key somatic 
phenomena underlying these experiences, all of which are characterized by a unique felt sense of 
paradoxical simultaneity. Yoking these three somatic phenomena together, I develop the 
experiential concept of somatic anacrusis, which I then further articulate with reference to 
concepts from the dance improvisation and somatics literatures. This process of clarifying the 
experiential concept of somatic anacrusis allows me to distinguish Hay’s work from both 
improvisation and set choreography and to show how her practice moves “beyond 
improvisation” and toward the “cutting edge of choreography”.114  
In the previous chapter, I presented a reflective analysis of Hay’s choreography as a 
constructed situation in which the linguistic torques and semantic/syntactic strategies within the 
score, questions and tools function on processes of intentionality/intention, attention and action, 
operating as a destructuring structure for the practice of perception. Hay’s choreography 
effectively engagesdeflects115 intentionality/intention, attention and action, in ways that 
continually subvert tendencies to stabilize, organize, and interpret meaningfulness. The 
choreography throws me into an experiential flux in which, through the practice of perception, I 
move the world’s and my fundamental contingency – and potentially, impossibly, glance 
primordiality. 
Here, I present a descriptive analysis of my experiences practicing performing Hay’s 
choreography. As I have indicated in discussing my method, part of my effort in this study is to 
bring this lived movement experience into language and therefore I quote directly from my 
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journal entries and include extensive extrapolated descriptions throughout the following pages. 
As indicated above, I follow my own descriptions of experience with passages from Merleau-
Ponty that reflect back on and illuminate them in a kind of dialogic citation strategy. Through 
this approach, I hope the reader will begin to see how the theory already lives within the 
experience. Nevertheless, I take an inherent risk in quoting directly from journal entries and in 
including extensive extrapolated descriptions. As I have discussed at greater length in my 
method section, in these experiential descriptions my aim is to use whatever language available 
to draw out the phenomena and as such, words arise and recur in ambiguous and sometimes 
contradictory ways. In my journal entries and extrapolated descriptions, I quite liberally use 
words that come to have more specific and defined meanings as terms in my analysis. These 
descriptions are tied to the experience and are first and second order efforts at describing and 
articulating the experience as it happened. It would be counterproductive to critique the use of 
terms in these descriptions because that would impose on them and prevent them from retaining 
their proximate tie to the bodily experience. Therefore I ask the reader to remember this caveat 
with respect to the various descriptive voices herein, which are denoted by italics. 
 
Theoretical Recapitulation 
In my introductory chapter, I presented several concepts and ideas from the dance improvisation 
and somatics literature that resonate with the experiences of flux and engagingdeflecting 
processes I’ve discussed that arise in Hay’s work. I summarize them here in preface to my 
descriptive analysis of practicing performing Hay’s choreography in order to guide the reader 
through my development of the experiential concept of somatic anacrusis. I will develop their 
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relevance to my work in more detail later in the chapter.  
Dance improviser and scholar Ann Cooper Albright develops upon veteran dance 
improviser Nancy Stark Smith’s notion of the “gap” as a state through which an improviser 
passes that involves a suspension of reference points and an experience of freefall that Stark 
Smith describes as “breaking … a pattern of behaviour” and “from which more directions are 
possible than anywhere else” (Smith qtd. in Albright, “Dwelling” 258, both). Albright suggests 
that this experience points to an “existential openness” or “space in which to change our habitual 
responses” (“Dwelling” 259). Importantly, implicit in both Smith and Albright’s perspectives, 
this experience is always on the way to somewhere: into a direction from among Smith’s 
possible directions, or in Albright’s words, “what could happen out ‘there’” (“Dwelling” 260).  
Improviser and researcher Kent De Spain articulates the ways that, in improvisational 
practice – an “attentional practice” (37) as he defines it – the mover pays attention to experience 
and draws sources therefrom with which to compose movement. He discusses different 
approaches to intentionality116 – toward movement, the physical body and/or elements of artistic 
form – that, through attention, draw the performer toward figures of experience and sense-
making. De Spain also gestures toward “something ineffable”, a “beyond” (36-37), that 
sometimes arises in improvisational experience and that for him lies outside linguistic 
articulation. He provisionally references the language of spirituality to reach at this experience, 
as have Hay and others in discussing Hay’s work.117  
Movement researcher Hubert Godard, in conversation with dance scholar Laurence 
Louppe, defines the concept of “gestural anacrusis”, by which he identifies a spacetime of pre-
movement, before the gesture as such, as an anacrusis, and describes it as a “low pressure trough” 
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and later as “a value… of hesitation, a certain suspension of being, body and thought” (Godard 
qtd. in Louppe 17). In Godard’s inquiry about what comes before movement/gesture, he is 
concerned nonetheless with understanding how the poetics of gesture, of movement, arises. 
While Godard’s gestural anacrusis and my concept of somatic anacrusis share a term, I 
distinguish the concepts from each other by their differing relationships to meaningfulness. I will 
clarify this further in my analysis below.  
Finally, movement philosopher Erin Manning also thinks through the question of what 
happens before movement in the process of querying the relationality and connectedness of 
partnered improvisation in tango dance. She establishes a cycle of phases that occur in the 
experience of moving together: “preacceleration–relation–interval–intensification–actualization–
extension–displacement–preacceleration” (25) in which she articulates preeacceleration as “the 
breath that releases speech, the gathering-toward that leaps our bodies into a future unknowable” 
(25).  
Together, these articulations offer multiple, related perspectives on the processual 
experience of moving toward danced meaningfulness – the expressive, communicative aspect of 
dancing. Their relevance to my work lies in their respective references to and characterizations 
of the experience of what happens before the realization of meaningfulness as such. Following 
the descriptive analysis of my experience in Hay’s work below, I will return to these 
theorizations further. Before I begin, I remind the reader of my positioning of this dissertation – 
in the introductory chapter – as an “adaptation” and propose that the following descriptive 




I enter the work. The choreography invites a shift from fixity to flux: “I enter in a stride not my 
own”.118 I let go my movement signature, my recognizable and familiar identity and morph 
slightly sideways. The choreography loosens my reflective grip on the world; I relinquish the 
stabilizing fixing, objective function. Activating perceptual processes, the work compels my 
bodily dimension to unfold, to surface, to come into contact with the world. I enter a mode of 
open listening through this somatic unfolding, flowing toward the world, listening, attending and 
noticing, not knowing, not seeking. The choreography engenders a letting go, which is not 
complete surrender or release but a transitive, dynamic, fluid experience. Like the reciprocating 
movement of breath, world and I move together in heterogeneous forceflows, currents and eddies 
of movement, tidal in their microimmensity. Movement is everywhere.  
 The following descriptive analysis of practicing performing comprises three sections that 
address significant recurring dimensions of the experience and reveal the somatic phenomena 
underlying them. The three dimensions and their underlying phenomena are: I-world: 
absencingpresencing, body-space: yieldingexpanding, and movement-time: thresholding. These 
dimensions became apparent via the shortlist of keywords I generated as part of my method in 
working with my first-order journal entries. The underlying somatic phenomena come to light 
through the descriptive analysis that follows. What I aim to show is that by practicing performing 
the destructuring structure of Hay’s choreography – which excavates through sedimented 
structures of experience and undermines the structuring process per se – I necessarily enact the 
practice of perception opened up by the operations of her choreography and thereby move into a 
more proximate experience of being-in-the-world. This more proximate, less structured and 
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therefore more primordial, experience is revealed only in and by the tension generated through 
Hay’s linguistically constructed situation and destructuring structure in which the performer is 
suspended. The pushing, pulling, torqueing and reversing effected by the linguistic choreography 
engagesdeflects processes of intentionality/intention, attention and action and continually inhibits 
any kind of resolution or arrival in meaningfulness per se, engendering an experience of dynamic 
bodily suspension that I describe as somatic anacrusis. Primordial contact, per se, as a sustained 
experience is impossible but through Hay’s choreography, which subverts and undermines the 
insistent and inherent tendency toward structuring and meaningfulness, a glance (at this “before” 
of meaningfulness) is, perhaps?, possible (only through Hay’s kaleidoscopic-linguistic lens of 
“after”). This is a paradox – the paradox – of Hay’s choreography – and also of my effort in this 
dissertation, to bring to language something that inherently resists that possibility. 
 
Experiences of I-World: “absencingpresencing” 
In the practice of Hay’s choreography – as score, questions and tools – I experience what I 
describe as a distinction between the experience of an “autonomous I” or “I am”, involving a 
stable and fixed sense of both myself and world, and the experience of a more “fluid I”, a 
dynamic sense of myself and the world that is multiple (cellular), protean, heterogeneous and 
mutable. I have already touched on this I-world experience as a perceptual reversibility in my 
discussion in the previous chapter of the pair of Hay’s tools related to vision. It is in practicing 
performing the choreography as a whole – through the effect of the destructuring structure and 
the practice of perception – that the underlying phenomenon is revealed more fully. Here is an 
excerpt from a journal entry describing these experiences: 
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Sept. 25, 2009 
When I’m in the “I am” … then I sense a vacuum surrounding me … Nothing really 
touches me – bodily. Everything is somehow remote, unrelated to me. Yet in [other] 
moments … I felt proximity, relationship, as though a dam released and space rushed 
toward me with force – the world came close, touched my skin, pushed against my mass 
like another being in an embrace – or like my dog does, nestling into the contours of my 
lap, fitting to me as I also fit to him and there is a mutuality – a meeting – bodily that we 
share. This is how I felt in that moment – it was but a fraction of a second, but it was 
clearly different – more tactile …  
From my various first-order descriptions of these experiences in journal entries, I developed the 
following extrapolated description that characterizes these distinct experiences of I-world. 
In my experience of what I am calling the “autonomous I”, I feel small and contained, 
drawn back into myself and discrete from the world, separated out from and unconnected or 
unrelated to my surroundings. I describe this as an experience of remoteness, dryness. My skin is 
a closed, tight boundary that keeps me in and keeps the world out. I am hermetically sealed 
inside, “shrink-wrapped”. Between the world and me is a void, emptiness, like the airlessness 
and gravity-less-ness of deep space, wherein there are no energies or bodies. I can see the world 
and hear the world, touch objects in the world and sometimes smell the world but it is far away, 
held at a distance, on the other side of an impermeable boundary. While this boundary is elastic 
and malleable, in the sense that I can move within it and interact with the world, “we” – the 
world and I – do not “touch”. I experience no sensual connection, by which I mean that I do not 
receive my experiences in and through my “body”. Rather, my experiences seem to come to my 
	  209	  
awareness through my “mind”. They have a quality of abstraction to them, versus a quality of 
concreteness. I am indeed aware but in a manner that is outwardly directed. I, in this 
autonomous sense, point my awareness into the world and this pointing is closed, definite and 
linear. I might describe it as two-dimensional, lacking an experience of three-dimensional 
volume. This is a functional or habitual mode of being that relies on what I already know. I 
proceed in the world based on pre-conceived expectations. I interact from and through already 
learned and assumed experiences, roles, rules and codes, structures and strictures that I 
experience as already forming and holding and stabilizing me. In this experience, I understand 
myself as “objective-subject”, an entity that ostensibly maintains a regular and consistent form, 
signature or identity regardless of the possible dynamics of its surroundings. In this experience, I 
am “self-aware” in a kind of inward-closing, defining manner; the form of my self-awareness 
here is circular (not spherical) because of the two-dimensional quality of the experience. 
In my experience of what I am calling the “fluid I”, I do not feel contained by the 
boundaries of my physical body; I flow outward toward the world, connect to it and am part of it. 
I do not experience a complete dissolution or formlessness of self in this experience but an 
easing and releasing in contrast to the sense of relative stability and stasis in the “autonomous 
I”. I experience my skin as both porous and filamentous (referring to the antennae-like hairs on 
my skin), at once opening inward and furling outward. My body boundary blurs, inviting the 
experiential possibility for exchange with my surroundings. Osmosis. I experience a subtle tactile 
pressure on the surface of my body and become tangibly aware of the currents of air flowing 
around me, the intensities and flickerings of light. In this experience, I apprehend my 
materiality: that I am made of the same “stuff” as the world. My surroundings seem to transform 
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from distant, abstracted “ideas” or “things”, to concrete physical presences. My bodily 
awareness of these presences shifts my attention and I begin to perceive the aliveness of the 
world, densities, tones, textures and motions, temporalities and spatialities. What I mean by this 
is that I receive or apprehend the bodily imprints or registrations not of recognizable and named 
things like “building”, “trees”, “grass”, “studio floor”, or “window” but rather the bodily 
imprint or registration of a gestalt of qualities such as enduringsolidupwardthrustingangle (of 
peaked roof) or randomrhythmicflutteringbouncing (of leafy branch) or 
flatexpansiveambergrainywoodedwarmth (of surface on which I stand or roll).119 These 
experiences imprint me as I also imprint them in the sense that I become aware of the invisible 
vibration and resonance of my actions in the world. At times I make sound, percussive or vocal, 
which accentuates this experience of vibratory resonance. We are moving together and I 
experience myself as continuous with the world, affecting it as it affects me. It is this sense of 
continuity or flowing-with that incites me to describe this as an experience of fluid “I”. I 
experience ongoing fluidity and malleability in my sense of self, a contingency and 
responsiveness to the world and a sense of myself as a dynamic composite of expressions and 
experiences, imprints and registrations, both outwardly directed and inwardly gathered. In this 
experience, I am an open “subjective subject”, an inter-subject. The form of my self-awareness 
here is multiply spirallic, turning inward to turn outward and turning outward to turn inward. 
It is essential to understand that neither of these distinct experiences of “I” are stable or 
absolute in the practicing. Borrowing the concept of limits from mathematics for a moment (in 
which a limit is an infinite point to which I can only ever approach but at which I can never 
arrive), I understand the concept of an absolute fixed sense of self as one limit and the concept of 
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a fully dissolved or perhaps better, evaporated, sense of self as another limit. My lived 
experience can approach but never arrive at these limits, which are infinite extremes. In a sense, 
the “fluid I” that I experience in moments in the work is a self that is liquid. At different 
moments, this experience of self takes on varying degrees of viscosity – weighted, dense and 
rolling like mercury; sticky, thick and slow like molasses; trickling and light like clear stream 
water; or looser yet and lighter like vinegar – yet it is always a mobile, responsive and dynamic, 
multidimensional experience. I remain grounded in my dynamic material body, which 
simultaneously turns in on itself and extends beyond itself, spiralling, enfolding, unfolding. 
 In practicing performing, Hay’s choreographic destructuring structure incites a shift from 
my relatively closed, habitual and stable “autonomous I” to a more open, protean and dynamic 
“fluid I”. As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the opening sentences of the score implies 
and precipitates this shift, immediately asking me to relinquish my established, regular identity 
and shift toward something other “in a stride and style not mine” (Hay, At Once 4). Letting go 
my fixed and set sense of self – as “autonomous I” – and with it the associated functional, 
habitual modes and patterns that enable me to operate effectively and meaningfully in the object 
world – means letting go of the relatively stable and perspectival relations I have with things and 
my environment. “Dis-attach”, Hay says. The process of letting go involves entering an 
experience of relative free fall or vertigo in which I can no longer count on my usual supports, 
expectations and understandings nor on the bracing effect (literally, holding up or holding apart) 
of perspective and separation from things. Everything is moving, swirling, shifting, blurring; 
and, becoming “fluid I”, I join the flux. Normally familiar, discrete entities are no longer 
identifiable as such. I enter the unknown.  
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In this newness, and in order to navigate this choreography, my bodily senses heighten 
instinctively, rising to the occasion. “Notice the feedback from my body”, says Hay. Perception 
becomes my guide. I “feel” my way through. At the same time, the world, as I know it in my 
daily life, shifts as well. The familiar world that I count on and within which I function recedes 
and an unfamiliar flux surges forth in which I see anew. As “fluid I”, through bodily perception, 
the world and I come into proximity, embrace and begin to move together. This is a new kind of 
“support”, a kind of contact duet with the world.120   
My description here calls to mind that offered by Merleau-Ponty in the chapter 
“Experience and Objective Thought” in Phenomenology of Perception in which he addresses 
“the problem of the body” and the way that objective thought eclipses experience in the act of 
positing an object even though, in his analysis, the process begins in bodily perception.  
I detach myself from my experience and pass to the idea. Like the object, the idea 
purports to be the same for everybody, valid in all times and places, and the individuation 
of an object in an objective point of time and space finally appears as the expression of a 
universal positing power. I am no longer concerned with my body, nor with time, nor 
with the world, as I experience them in antepredicative knowledge, in the inner 
communion that I have with them. I now refer to my body only as an idea, to the universe 
as idea, to the idea of space and the idea of time. Thus ‘objective’ thought (in 
Kierkegaard’s sense) is formed – being that of common sense and of science – which 
finally causes us to lose contact with perceptual experience, of which it is nevertheless 
the outcome and the natural sequel … the absolute positing of a single object is the death 
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of consciousness, since it congeals the whole of existence, as a crystal placed in a 
solution suddenly crystallizes it. (Phenomenology of Perception 82) 
Here Merleau-Ponty’s text captures the sense of separation (“I detach myself from my 
experience”) in the “autonomous I” and by contrast, the sense of contingency (“inner 
communion”) in my experience of the “fluid I”.  
In a later passage in the section “The Theory of the Body is Already a Theory of 
Perception”, he treats this distinction again, this time with emphasis on bodily perception: 
We have relearned to feel our body; we have found underneath the objective and 
detached knowledge of the body that other knowledge which I have of it in virtue of its 
always being with us and of the fact that we are our body. In the same way we shall need 
to reawaken our experience of the world as it appears to us in so far as we are in the 
world through our body, and in so far as we perceive the world with our body. But by 
thus remaking contact with the body and with the world, we shall also rediscover ourself, 
since, perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self and, as it were, the 
subject of perception. (Phenomenology of Perception 239) 
Here, Merleau-Ponty provides language that supports my description of the “fluid I” and the way 
that I experience my bodily senses “rising to the occasion” (“remaking contact with the body and 
with the world”), while also making a connection that considers “our body” as our “self”. My use 
of the “I” in my descriptions above is a simple or vernacular use of the term that implies a 
general experience of personal subjectivity.121 
In my practicing Hay’s work, I move simultaneously from and toward both these senses 
of I-world while crystallizing neither. There is only flux. By engagingdeflecting 
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intentionality/intention, attention and action as I have discussed in the previous chapter, the 
choreography engenders this fluid ambiguity. The experience is not a linear oscillation between 
one and the other but instead an active paradoxical simultaneity. I can sustain neither of the two 
experiences of I-world described above while inside the work. I cannot sustain the “autonomous 
I” because the choreography (as destructuring structure) demands that I let it go, while at the 
same time I acknowledge that as a contemporary western subject – and as a dancer/performer in 
the constructed situation of practicing performing Hay’s work – I proceed from this 
“autonomous I”: I intend toward the choreography as a dance that I will perform. The 
“autonomous I” is simultaneously present and absent throughout the practice, as is the “fluid I”. 
The choreography consistently thrusts me into an experience of the “fluid I”; however, my 
quotidian sense of self and perspective on the object world, the habits and patterns that subtend 
my regular daily experience and the meta-experience of doing the choreography (including the 
insistent habit of evaluating my experience against deep-seated dancerly criteria and against my 
previous day’s practice – both of which Hay explicitly directs against) erupt and tend to 
crystallize the “autonomous I”, returning me to my prevailing mode of objective relation with the 
world. Thus, in doing the work, I experience a paradoxical simultaneity in which “autonomous I” 
and “fluid I” are both present and absent. I experience both and neither at once.  
I can best characterize this as an experience of absencingpresencing. I use this yoked 
term because the verbs “absencing” and “presencing” aptly describe my lived experience of the 
“not-thereness” and “thereness” of these distinct senses of self while also describing that same 
quality in my awareness of the world as it shifts in relative relation to these senses of self, its 
relative “thereness” in relation to the “fluid I” and “not-thereness” in relation to the “autonomous 
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I”. Further, the explicit yoking of the words reflects the paradoxical simultaneity in this 
experience, in which these I-world processes of absencing and presencing occur at the same time. 
 
Experiences of Body-Space: “yieldingexpanding” 
I will now move on to describe my experiences of the dimension of body-space in Hay’s work, 
in which I experience my body as space and the surrounding space as a thickness co-extensive 
with my body. I have already addressed the body-space experience as a perceptual reversibility 
in my discussion in chapter 4 of the pair of Hay’s tools related to touch. Here, the underlying 
phenomenon is more fully revealed in practicing performing the choreography. Here are two 
excerpts from journal entries that reveal my experience of this dimension: 
Sept. 10, 2009 
 I felt a moment of clear questioning in this section – perceiving space – barometer of 
space – and this stood out from the rest of the experience. I felt kind of like my body 
shrunk and my awareness of space grew bigger – so I was smaller but my attentional 
kinesphere was enlarged and the actual space around me came clearer and became 
thicker – tactile almost. I also felt my curiosity tune up and my movement changed – 
intention-wise, it seemed to not come from me as much as in almost-response to the space. 
 
Oct. 7, 2009 
I think I understand my experience of space being/becoming thick as the experience 
arising from my cellular body perceiving space, which in reciprocity gives me to myself 
as space.  
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From these and other first order descriptions of similar experiences in journal entries, I 
developed the following extrapolated descriptions that characterize these distinct experiences of 
body-space. 
In my practice of this work, a distinct shift occurs in my experience of space. Hay 
sometimes offers the verbal tool “Be a barometer of space” and this linguistically suggests an 
ability to sense space and reveal its dynamics through the body. This experience of space is 
distinct from the conventional understanding of space in dance, which refers to the “use of space” 
via location, direction, pathway and level. 
As I embrace Hay’s tools “refresh your visual field” and “all that I can and cannot see”, 
the space around me manifests a depth of field of which I am not normally aware. I perceive 
proximity and distance and the thickness therein. Space becomes dense and tangible, a kind of 
element or force field within which I move. When I do, whether with a finger motion or a full-
bodied action, I experience my impact on space, displacing it, pushing it away and feeling it flow 
around me like water. Its texture is inconsistent; I encounter deep currents of concentrated 
density that open onto more shallow, diluted pools. This perceiving of space locates me 
specifically in and as space. As space takes on depth and dimension, so do objects in my 
environment, thereby reciprocally activating my perception of my own depth and dimensionality 
– my body as space. I become as aware of the curves, angles, inclines and slopes of forms in my 
environment as I do of my own bodily form. My perception of depth and dimension also carries a 
heightened awareness of surface. I experience the specific elongatedshallowdroppingawaycurve 
of my forearm from wrist to elbow, for example, which leads me into noticing the space between 
my elbow and the floor below, my experience of the force of gravity making space’s bouyancy 
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apparent to me as lift beneath my arm. I also notice the flatlinearshootingout directionality of the 
floorboards themselves and the vast expanse they define and reveal. The far wall of the studio is 
miles away.  
This experience of space contrasts my everyday experience of space, which is in a way a 
“non-experience” of space and, rather, a nominal-functional experience of things. In this 
functional mode, I do not perceive space as dense and tangible. I see primarily objects and 
others, not the space between, as though through a kind of filmic membrane or overlay that is 
suspended between the world and me. In this experience, objects and others remain dormant 
within their pre-defined and already-known sheaths, behind this filmic overlay. By this I mean 
that I recognize them only as I have come to know them before, by their marks of identity, not by 
their tangible, voluminous and contoured presence. Familiar and available, they are fixed, stable 
and simply there in their established “identities”. There is a flattening, equalizing function to 
this filmic overlay that distances the world from me and renders things in two dimensions. I see 
beyond things in their material presence to their purpose or function for me. In a way, I’m 
engaged in a constant process of critical evaluation. If I judge that they have such a purpose in a 
given circumstance, they become important and become part of my functional experience as I 
take them up and use them toward accomplishing something. Otherwise, they do not stand out 
from the flatness, with depth and dimension in themselves. If they don’t have a purpose or 
function for me, then they recede into the flat and equalized realm beyond me.  
As with my discussion of experiences of I-world above, here again I describe two 
contrasting experiences of space: the latter prevailing in my everyday functional experience and 
the former arising in my experience while practicing Hay’s choreography. As I also noted above, 
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these two experiences are limit experiences and are not absolute.  
In practicing Hay’s choreography, I shift from a flattened, cartographical experience of 
space to a voluminous, dynamic one. One of Hay’s typical questions incites this shift: “What if 
every cell in my body could perceive space?” As I practice this within the choreography, my 
attentional aperture dilates to take in more detail at the level of my cells insofar as this is possible. 
I notice micro perceptions on the surface of my skin, for example, that register the shifting air 
currents in the environment and my attentional aperture instantly dilates further, opening up a 
tactile122 perception of my surroundings. I move in and therefore touch space, its thickness, 
which begins to include my awareness of all volumes, both those “uncontained” open spaces and 
those “contained” as objects. Those “contained” objects rise in my awareness as variably 
weighted concentrations of volume, space, and I experience these weighted, concentrated 
volumes as though they are inside my body as I, too, am a weighted concentration of volume; I 
too am space. As “barometer” of space, I move body-space and register its dynamics. 
 At the same time, I am still a dancer doing a dance and Hay’s score continually pulls me 
back to the cartographical perspective with directions such as: “Note: I strongly maintain the role 
of the choreographer overseeing the particularity of the path I travel – making spatial choices 
without becoming too artistic” (Hay, At Once 7). Within my experience of this direction, I shift 
to a “lived” bird’s eye view of the space and objectively visualize the locations and paths I’ve 
defined in my dancing area. This is a reflective act that pulls the rug out from under my 
voluminous body-space experience. As cartographer – Hay’s choreographer in the above phrase 
– I return to being a body moving in space, mapping its topography. 
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 Again, I turn to Merleau-Ponty, who provides useful language that illuminates these 
experiences. In a section on “The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility”, he writes:  
By considering the body in movement, we can see better how it inhabits space (and, 
moreover, time) because movement is not limited to submitting passively to space and 
time, it actively assumes them, it takes them up in their basic significance which is 
obscured in the commonplaceness of established situations. (Phenomenology of 
Perception 117) 
Here, Merleau-Ponty’s phrase suggests a distinct difference between the experience of the body’s 
actively taking up or inhabiting space and the commonplace experience in which this activity is 
“obscured”, which resonates with my description above. Further on, in a section on “The 
Synthesis of One’s Own Body”, he offers the following in which, again, Merleau-Ponty 
distinguishes objective space and a more “primitive spatiality” of which the body is co-
extensive: “Experience discloses beneath objective space, in which the body eventually finds its 
place, a primitive spatiality of which experience is merely the outer covering and which merges 
with the body’s very being. To be a body, is to be tied to a certain world, as we have seen; our 
body is not primarily in space: it is of it” (Phenomenology of Perception 171). 
Like in my experience of I-world, in my practicing Hay’s work, the engagingdeflecting 
operation of the choreographic destructuring structure demands that I move simultaneously from 
and toward both these senses of body-space while crystallizing neither. Again, there is only flux.  
In Hay’s choreography, I am required to attend to my objective body in objective space in 
order to manage my locations, pathways and levels in the dancing area. Space, in these moments, 
seems to yield in my awareness to the placements and trajectories of my body, which expands to 
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become a magnified opaque object in this experience, a game piece I purposefully manipulate. 
At the same time, however, I am directed by the choreography to perceive space through my 
cellular body and in this experience, my body yields its magnified objective opacity, opening up 
dynamic perception at the surface of my skin and within the volume of my body. This bodily 
space expands, meeting and merging with the space surrounding me in a tangible swelling and 
subsiding body-space, like a water-filled jellyfish in the roiling ocean, barely bounded by a 
membrane. Just as I experience my skin as surface membrane containing relatively concentrated 
volume of my body, so do I experience other objects as “concentrated volumes” contained by 
surface membranes – other jellyfish. In Hay’s choreography, I must somehow sustain both of 
these experiences of body-space – cartographical and voluminous – but can in practice sustain 
neither, because each experience pulls at the other’s seams. I am once again suspended in a 
paradoxical simultaneity: my body expands in the cartographical mode while simultaneously 
yielding in the voluminous; space yields in the cartographical while simultaneously expanding in 
the voluminous. Once again, in order to aptly describe this phenomenon, I yoke these terms: 
yieldingexpanding. 
 
Experiences of Movement123-Time: “thresholding” 
From a discussion of I-world to that of body-space, I now move to a discussion of movement-
time in my experience practicing performing Hay’s work. The reader will recall that I addressed 
this dimension in my discussion of Hay’s tools “Ready-fire-aim” and “Dis-attach”, which I 
connected to the perceptual reversibility of listening/sounding. Here, in my descriptions of 
practicing performing, this dimension and its connection to audibility is revealed more fully. 
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Once again I commence with two journal entries and then some extrapolated descriptions before 
developing my discussion. 
Oct. 7, 2009 
So what happens if I just allow myself to perceive time passing – since it already is? The 
fleeting awareness of this involved a softening in my body, a release of tension and a very 
momentary letting go of the constant sense of rush – the pressure that I consistently 
experience in feeling time as finite and limited and the amount of work, tasks, activities 
that I want, need, feel compelled to somehow fit into this finite –in fact somehow even 
shrinking span or possible duration. When I play with perceiving time passing, I feel like 
I stop trying to swim against the current or move opposite to its flow, like turning the 
other way after making a whirlpool in the swimming pool. Acceptance, submission or 
surrender to the flow of time, that I am.  Somehow my work, tasks, activities can no 
longer be separate from time “as finite or shrinking container”. They merge and my 
doing becomes being – they are one and the same. I am here now not separately from my 
action/interaction, but as it – through it. Without action/interaction, I am not. Simple as 
that. Living is time; living is space. 
 
Dec. 17, 2009 
Like trailing my fingers in a stream, with the flow of the water always water, never the 
same water ever. And yet there’s a continuity to my perceiving the water as water despite 
it never being the same water – I am in time, I am time – flowing, passing – always 
time/duration? But never the same time – no fixing just aiming – attending – perceiving 
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its passing, my passing as time. 
Following are my extrapolated descriptions around experiences of time in Hay’s choreography. 
In my practice of this work, different experiences of time arise through somatic 
awareness. Hay often asks the question, “What if every cell in my body could perceive time 
passing?” This linguistically foregrounds a conception of the body as a mass of trillions of cells 
that evokes both the fluidity and heterogeneity of the body and suggests the independent capacity 
of each cell to perceive in itself. This question proposes the potentially immense perceptual 
power of the body, or, as Hay says “the body’s daringly ordinary perspicacity” (Hay, My Body, 
the Buddhist xxv).  
In my experience of the work, I acknowledge that there are (at least) two different types 
of time experiences, (aside from clock time, which is not an experience within the work other 
than when I have to measure how long the dance takes in order to plan for its production in 
theatrical performance). The first is the more commonly understood dancerly experience – or 
use – of time, which relates to tempo, timing and rhythm, marking the measure of “linear” time 
and therefore somewhat related to clock time. The second is a more perceptual experience of 
time as suggested by Hay’s question above. As I enter the work and experience the shift in my 
sense of self from “autonomous I” to “fluid I”, my sense of attention to the world pervades my 
body and I begin to “listen” through every pore, becoming “all ears” as it were. I “listen” not 
to someone speaking but to my body and the world, through my body in the world. As I “listen” 
in this way, I experience a kind of now-ness or attention to present moments in their infinite 
continuity as I move past them or they move past me, as Hay says: “here and gone”. As I 
perceive these moments and their “here and gone-ness” as flow, time becomes a river124 in 
	  223	  
which I swim, sometimes upstream, sometimes downstream and sometimes across – but there is 
always a current. However, as my perceptive awareness deepens, I come to experience a kind of 
ongoing present that is flowing but no longer past me like river water. This experience of time as 
flow becomes concurrent with my experience of myself as flow, the fluid I, my cellular body. With 
this awareness, I suddenly understand myself as time. I am not in time; I am time. And the world 
is time. I am time in that I am time passing. This experience of being time is an experience of 
time coming as much as it is an experience of time passing. I hear Hay: “step up to the moment” 
– for it is arriving and won’t wait for me. “Let it go” for another is coming. If my experience of 
time is the ongoing present that I am, and not a linear sequence of passing moments, and if this 
ongoing present includes within it both “time coming” and “time passing”, then it is a kind of 
pastpresentfuture in which I must engage in both these activities “at once”: steppinguplettinggo, 
steppinguplettinggo. This experience of buoyant fluctuation is very similar to the experience of 
the flow and fluctuation of breathing. Through my experience of time in this very proximate and 
micro-specific way and the perception that both the world and I are time, my awareness begins 
to include a kind of “epic time”. By this I mean a felt sense of the immense and simultaneous 
compressions and expansions of both “pastness” and “futureness” in the ongoing 
present/presence of a tree or building, for example, or – in a shift of scale – the different 
compressions and expansions of these in the ongoing present/presence of a bird or insect. 
Noticing this through my body, I experience a felt sense of the different compressions and 
expansions of time within my own body, my bones, cells, skin, nerve pulses. I become aware of 
the complex ongoing temporal counterpoint withinbetween me and the world. 
This experience contrasts my experience of time in daily life, which is of an abstract ruler 
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to whose measure I must submit. Clock time, calendar time, time marked out in sequence of 
equal portions, exerts a constraining freeze on my experience, locking me into a regularity, an 
imposed tempo. Above, I have described my perception of time as a kind of listening. In the case 
of daily life, what I hear is a monotone buzz or the incessant rush of a cascading waterfall that 
drowns out the ongoing present of experiential time. This incessant white noise stops up my ears 
– all my “bodily” ears – desensitizing me to the buoyant flux of myself and world.125 In my 
experience of time as linear progression, I am standing in the river and time exerts a kind of 
pressure or force on me – sometimes lighter, sometimes stronger. Facing upstream toward the 
future, I must stabilize myself and brace against its flow or be swept away into the past. In this 
experience my movements accentuate or punctuate its flow, creating a rhythm. Returning to the 
sound metaphor, if time in this case is an ongoing sound created bodily by the flow of the breath, 
my movements phrase and affect its flow, like the covering of the holes of a flute, changing tones, 
lengths of tones and rhythms. In a way, then, my movements are “against” time; I am a (partial) 
dam and my movements are the sluice gates that attempt to control time’s flow.126 
Here again I describe two contrasting experiences of time: the latter prevailing in my 
everyday functional experience and the former arising in my experience while practicing Hay’s 
choreography. Again, as with my experiences of I-world and body-space discussed above, these 
two experiences are limit experiences and are not absolute.  
 In practicing Hay’s choreography, I shift from an experience of time as linear progression 
to an experience of time as buoyant fluctuation. In the former, I experience the “tempo” 
(speed/velocity) and “timing” (rhythm/periodicity) of my movements as measuring and marking 
the linear passage of objective time, a force to which I am beholden. In the latter, I experience 
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the movement of my body itself as time, from large travelling movements to small gestures to 
micro shifts in weight and breath. As I practice performing the work, my experience begins with 
time as a force outside myself that is flowing past me as I resist and punctuate it. As I practice 
the choreography, moving into a perceptual mode, I experience my body become “inhabited” by 
time. My living, breathing, moving body is time. And as I come to experience myself as such, I 
experience all things as time. Thus time is both bodily and epic. Whereas my movements first 
mark and measure time’s flow, gradually they become the flow of time itself. In this experience, 
time doesn’t seem to have a past and a future distinct from the present; rather since everything is 
time and I am “now”, all time is gathered in the “now” of existence. This is what I mean when I 
describe the compressions and expansions of time in the ongoing present. My movement is time, 
is time passing. 
That said, in the work I am, as always, a dancer and there is some part of me that 
understands movement as tempo and rhythm; the same goes for Hay the choreographer. In 
addition to notes throughout the score about perceiving time passing, there are instructions that 
draw me back into experiences of time as linear progression – which often involve sound. At one 
point, the score instructs the performer to sing a wordless song: “The song’s duration is 
determined by how much time is required for it to impress itself on my body and the audience’s 
memory.  The phrasing of the song can expand and contract” (Hay, At Once 6). Further on, the 
following direction appears: “I attach rhythmic movement to the song, my dancing obviously 
influenced by my singing” (Hay, At Once 6). With these directions, I am called upon to work 
with measure, tempo and rhythm, my movement becoming an objective accentuation and 
punctuation of the linear progression of time.  
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 Once again, I turn to Merleau-Ponty who here quotes Heidegger, for language that 
illuminates this experience further: “‘The passage of one present to the next is not a thing which 
I conceive, nor do I see it as an onlooker, I effect it; I am already at the impending present as my 
gesture is already at its goal, I am myself time, a time which ‘abides’ and does not ‘flow’ or 
change’ …” (Heidegger qtd. in Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 489). 
 The text here makes a distinction between the conceptual marking of time as a series of 
moments and the experience of being time, both of which I have described above. Merleau-Ponty 
also offers the following description, which reiterates the distinction between an “abiding” 
experience of time and objective time, which resonates with my descriptions above of my 
experiences within Hay’s practice. Writes Merleau-Ponty: “This intuition of time’s permanence 
however, is jeopardized by the action of common sense, which thematizes or objectifies it, which 
is the surest way of losing sight of it” (Phenomenology of Perception 490). 
 In this last quote below, drawn also from Merleau-Ponty, we find reference to acts of 
decision-making or conceptualizing and the way that these acts provide a remedy against time, 
binding and withholding us from the flow and revealing ourselves as entities, rather than as time 
per se. This quote from Merleau-Ponty usefully illuminates my description of the experience of 
movement as a punctuating and marking of time’s flow: 
I am not the initiator of the process of temporalization; I did not choose to come into the 
world, yet once I am born, time flows through me, whatever I do. Nevertheless this 
ceaseless welling up of time is not a simple fact to which I am passively subjected, for I 
can find a remedy against it in itself, as happens in a decision which binds me or in the 
act of establishing a concept. It withholds me from what I was about to become, and at 
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the same time provides me with the means of grasping myself at a distance and 
establishing my own reality as myself. (Phenomenology of Perception 496) 
Like in my experiences of I-world and body-space, in my practicing Hay’s work, the 
choreography demands that I move simultaneously from and toward both these experiences of 
movement-time while crystallizing neither. Again, there is only flux.  
 In Hay’s choreography, I am engaged and required to move in time with measure, tempo 
and rhythm. In this movement-time experience, time is a flowing linear progression past me and, 
with/through my movement, I phrase and accent its flow. In this experience, time is “going” and 
my movement functions as a kind of intermittent “staying” against that motion. At the same time, 
the choreographic destructuring structure deflects that experience and asks me to practice 
perceiving time passing, to “step up to the moment, and let it go”, as Hay says. As I engage in 
this practice, my movement-time experience shifts. My being as movement at the cellular level 
becomes an on-“going” flux rather than objective actions imposed on time, while time itself 
seems to somehow “stay” in the “now”. No longer flowing in a linear progression past me, time 
becomes an ongoing present within/as me, that includes past and future. In this experience, time 
becomes a buoyant fluctuation and my movement is the movement of time. Hay’s work 
choreographs me into both of these experiences; however, again, I can sustain neither because 
the one simultaneously precludes the other. In attempting to practice this, once again, I 
experience a paradoxical simultaneity: time both goes and stays; movement both stays and goes. 
In an effort to describe this oppositional suspension, I describe it as “thresholding”,127 a term that 




Through these descriptions and discussion, we gain insights into my experience of practicing 
performing Hay’s choreography and the way in which it is a practice of perception – an ongoing 
effort, an impossible practice, to approach the world and lived experience through perceptual 
processes. It becomes apparent that as a performer, I am in a constant process of moving both 
toward and away from specific experiences of self, world, body, space, movement and time: 
between various objective, analytical experiences characterized by stability and definition; and 
other more bodily, perceptual experiences characterized by fluidity and porosity. The point I 
wish to make is that neither type of experience is achieved, realized or “consummated”128 as such. 
I cannot grasp these experiences, allow them to become clear or sustain them in any way, 
because the choreography constantly pulls and pushes me – engagingdeflecting – such that I 
continually shift, which thereby perpetuates the experience of dynamic flux. As I move toward 
one type of experience, the other pulls at its seams, tearing it apart and moving me away.  
Through the complex destructuring structure of the linguistically layered choreography, 
these experiences don’t occur in linear sequence but overlap and embed one within the other 
within the other …. As I have articulated, my bodily experience is of dynamic paradoxical 
simultaneities of absencingpresencing (I-world), of yieldingexpanding (body-space), of 
thresholding (movement-time). These simultaneities precipitate an experience of hovering, like a 
hummingbird in radical movingstillness coming into relation with the flower, itself also in 
radical movingstillness on a vastly different durational scale. I might also describe the experience 
as the folding over of bread dough and the kneading through of folded layers – fold back and 
knead through again and again – such that the foldingoverkneadingthrough occurs 
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simultaneously. To offer yet another image, my experience is that of perpetually being at/within 
the turning point of a transition. I refer again to the illusion of the vase and two faces: in Hay’s 
work, I am dancing the experience of between, of neither faces nor vase nor both nor neither, of 
rather the dynamically unfigured field, before either form takes shape. It becomes impossible to 
distinguish between the “me” and the “not-me”, between inner and outer environment, between 
movement and pause. Who, where, when? What if…?  
In order to describe this experience overall, I have derived the term “somatic anacrusis”, 
to describe the simultaneous and paradoxical bodily feeling of “about to (express something), but 
never quite (realizing it)”. In poetry, an anacrusis is the unstressed syllable at the beginning of a 
line of verse. In music, an anacrusis is an upbeat, a moment (or series of notes) which precedes 
the first beat of the composition, in which there is a quality of in-drawing of breath, and a 
suspension/gathering of intention, attention and action by a single musician or throughout a 
group. The downbeat that is to follow is implied in this upbeat as yet an inherent potential, 
generating an energetic experience of paradoxical simultaneity. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary the etymology of the word goes back to the Greek anakrousis (“anacrusis”, OED). 
This term may refer to the pushing back of a ship in water (“anacrusis”, OED, Harper). The word 
derives from the prefix ana: pushing back or pulling up and krousis: to strike. In these various 
senses, the word includes a paradoxical simultaneity in which there is an inherent simultaneous 
opposition; the pushing back or pulling up is in preparation for and thus includes the potential for 
the strike within it. In the situation of the ship, the counter force of the water is present in the 
process of its pushing back. As the ship pushes back, the water flows forward, these movements 
occur simultaneously. This is the embodied experience of paradoxical simultaneity in Hay’s 
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work.  
It is important to note that while anacrusis seems to suggest a kind of pre-event, the 
paradoxical simultaneity includes the event within the pre-event and vice versa. In Hay’s work, 
we do move, but it is with an engageddeflected intention, attention and action that is always also 
pulling back. And it is from meaningfulness per se that we are suspended, in the what if …? of 
the what if …? through the action and process of perception engendered by Hay’s choreography. 
As I have discussed earlier, in describing the intertwining and reversibility of sense perception, 
Merleau-Ponty writes that the perceptual capacities are “gaping open”, he describes this “lacuna” 
as an anticipation (Visible and Invisible 147), and he notes that a coincident experience of 
sentient/sensible, of the reversibility of the perceptual capacities, can never be fully experienced 
because there is always a shift or spread between them: “the coincidence eclipses at the moment 
of realization and one of two things always occurs: either my right hand really passes over to the 
rank of touched, but then its hold on the world is interrupted; or it retains its hold on the world, 
but then I do not really touch it …” (Visible and Invisible 148). Merleau-Ponty’s description of 
these two possibilities resonates with my own discussion above of the way that Hay’s 
choreography incites contrasting experiences of I-world, body-space and movement-time and it 
also helps me to articulate the lived experience of Hay’s choreography, in which these 
contrasting experiences unravel each other, in which neither of Merleau-Ponty’s two possibilities 
arise. Rather, the choreography propels the performer at least toward, if not into, the anticipatory 
lacuna, the suspension – somatic anacrusis – which resonates with what Merleau-Ponty also 
describes as the hiatus: 
But this hiatus between my right hand touched and my right hand touching, between my 
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voice heard and my voice uttered, between one moment of my tactile life and the 
following one, is not an ontological void, a non-being: it is spanned by the total being of 
my body, and by that of the world; it is the zero of pressure between two solids that 
makes them adhere to one another. My flesh and that of the world therefore involve clear 
zones, clearings …. (Visible and Invisible 148). 
Again here, Merleau-Ponty’s language further refracts my descriptions and helps illuminate the 
experiential concept of somatic anacrusis. 
 How is it that I can arrive at these figures to capture or describe the experience of 
paradoxical simultaneity? Is it not a fundamental contradiction to do so, when with the same 
breath I describe the subversion of processes of meaning making in Hay’s work, in which figures 
and ground are, rather, indistinguishable flux? It is only through reflection and analysis that I can 
attempt to arrive at a way of articulating and describing the experience. While I am practicing 
performing the destructuring structure of Hay’s choreography, these figures are not apparent to 
me as figures. The experience is flux, is dynamic, shifting, simultaneous enfoldingunfolding. It is 
only through the iterative writing process that I arrive at these figures, as an attempt to allow this 
kind of experience to be considered theoretically. It is also why I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s 




As noted in the introduction to this chapter, several dance improvisation, movement and somatics 
scholars have articulated similar somatic experiences in dance. Their discussions relate to my 
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characterization of somatic anacrusis, particularly with respect to similar descriptions of 
experiences of pre-movement and suspension. It is useful now to consider these discussions in 
more depth, because they resonate with my analysis of my experiences in Hay’s work, and also 
enable me to distinguish Hay’s practice from that of improvisation per se, and thereby support 
my argument for the unique poetics of Hay’s work and the implications thereof (which I will 
address in my concluding chapter). 
 
Nancy Stark Smith’s “Gap” and Ann Cooper Albright’s “Dwelling in Possibility” 
In her essay “Dwelling in Possibility”, dancer/improviser and scholar Ann Cooper Albright 
writes about the experience of the “gap”, which she draws from veteran dance improviser Nancy 
Stark Smith, whom she quotes:  
‘Where you are when you don’t know where you are is one of the most precious spots 
offered by improvisation. It is a place from which more directions are possible than 
anywhere else. I call this place the Gap. … Every time I want a cigarette and don’t have 
one I’m creating a gap. Moments that once were easily and automatically filled have 
become uneasily and consciously unfilled. By leaving them unfilled, I’m not only 
breaking a “momentum of being,” a pattern of behaviour, but I’m bringing attention and 
charge to a moment that would have passed without remark. … Being in a gap is like 
being in a fall before you touch bottom. You’re suspended – in time as well as space – 
and you don’t really know how long it’ll take to get “back”’. (Smith qtd. in Albright, 
“Dwelling” 258)  
This description of the “gap” resonates with the experience of somatic anacrusis in Hay’s work; 
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however, in the improvisatory experience described by Smith, the “gap” is a moment through 
which one passes. Though Smith implies that it might last for an indefinite period, the gap is not 
the point of improvisational practice. One moves from the open gap of suspension into a given 
direction, onto the path of forming meaningfulness, of composing. Immediately following this 
long quote, Albright writes: “This ‘gap’ or moment of possibility is an existential state, a 
suspension of reference points in which new experiences become possible” (“Dwelling” 258). 
The implied focus in improvisation, in which one may move into and through a “gap”, is on 
those “new experiences”. Albright acknowledges the rigorous training required to move into this 
gap, which supports my understanding of Hay’s work necessarily as a practice,129 and she also 
notes – as I have similarly described above in my discussion of experiences of I-world in Hay’s 
work – the change in sense of self that occurs in this state:  
In order to embrace those moments of falling, in order to experience that state of 
suspension, however, one needs to train the body (and, by extension, the psyche) away 
from one’s conditioned fear of losing control. Being suspended between up and down, 
stretching one’s awareness to attend to the split-second experience of falling – these are 
all physical moments that point to an existential openness (which includes a suspension 
of the self as we have come to think of the self/ego in contemporary Western society). 
Nancy Stark Smith’s gap constitutes what I think of as a space in which to change our 
habitual responses, thereby expanding the possibility of dwelling in the world. 
(“Dwelling” 258-9, italics mine) 
Here Albright also comments on the way in which this experience might allow shifts in 
established habits and patterns through which we approach the world, a point that echoes Hay’s 
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intent and reflects on my experience in the work. Albright further offers a way to understand 
how this occurs: “This willingness [to cross into the uncomfortable, unknown] is made possible 
by the paradoxically simple and yet quite sophisticated ability to be at once external and internal 
– both open to the world and intensely grounded in an awareness of one’s ongoing experience. 
‘Dwelling in Possibility’ refers to this dual experience of being present “here” in order to be able 
to imagine what could happen out ‘there’” (“Dwelling” 260, italics mine).130  
 I will make two related points drawing on the latter quote. First, in defining her phrase 
“Dwelling in Possibility”, Albright here describes the paradoxical experience of simultaneous 
inner and outer attentionality that can occur in improvisational practice. I have described in the 
previous chapter the way in which Hay’s questions choreograph attention in a similar way. A 
particular emphasis on the practice of attention to both inner experience and outer environment is 
indeed common between Hay’s work and improvisation. However, in the next sentence, Albright 
suggests that in improvisation we are in the process of “imagining what could happen”. In the 
context of her quote and discussion, I understand this to indicate a process of imagining 
something (or somethings), a process that is focused on “bringing into form”, of making 
meaningful. In my reading, this description expresses the process of composing in-the-moment 
that is the intent of improvisation and that the improviser’s actions articulate – and against which, 
as I have discussed, Hay’s choreography works explicitly. Here I am making a connection and 
also a distinction between my experience of somatic anacrusis in Hay’s choreography and the 
related experiences of the “gap” and “dwelling in possibility” in these descriptions of 
improvisational practice. Both experiences are characterized by a sense of suspension, of a 
certain paradoxicality, and of multiplicity, which can be attributed to their arising from similar 
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processes of attention. However, as discussed by Albright and Smith, the “gap” is a moment in 
improvisational experience that one passes through on the way to a particular somewhere or 
something, on the way to form and meaningfulness. Somatic anacrusis, on the contrary, 
describes an attempted perpetuation or sustaining of the experience of the “gap”, of actually 
sustaining the “unconsummatedness”, the “dwelling in possibility”, not passing through it. The 
emphasis on attention, and specifically the paradoxical inner and outer attention, may be 
common to the two experiences; however, the engagingdeflecting of processes of 
intentionality/intention and action that are also involved in somatic anacrusis distinguish it. 
 
Hubert Godard’s Gestural Anacrusis 
In several articles and interviews in the journal Writings on Dance, dance theorist and 
kinesiologist Hubert Godard articulates his notion of gestural anacrusis, which bears some 
resemblance – as a term and as a concept – to the somatic anacrusis I am theorizing here. In an 
interview with dance theorist Laurence Louppe, she and Godard establish the notion, taken from 
philosopher Michel Bernard of the dancer’s body as a “corporeity” (Louppe, “Singular Moving 
Geographies” 13), emphasizing the dancer’s accumulated history in movement as one of 
experiences, intensities, situations, rather than that of a topology (geometric and spatialized 
structural relations). In seeking to identify an existing discourse through which to think this 
conceptualization, they dismiss the bio-medical discourse, and indicate phenomenology as a 
potential, because, as Louppe explains:  
… the problematic of dance brings into play a body of continuous functionality; the 
dancer can only work from a body-vector, which does not define itself in terms of its 
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structure, but in terms of the ways in which it organises intensity and, as we’ll see, 
intentionality. Before all else, the dancing body is a multi-directional geography of 
relations with oneself, and with the world. It’s a matter of keeping it living, open, 
sensitive. (Louppe 13) 
For Godard, “… a dancer operates more like a geographer, accumulating maps, intra-corporeal 
dispositions, geographical situations which subsequently produce a history” (Godard qtd. in 
Louppe “Singular Moving Geographies” 14). Here, Godard’s language resonates with Merleau-
Ponty’s situational ontology and the notion of a body schema that develops an accumulation of 
sedimented structures through situations. We find further parallels to Merleau-Ponty’s thought – 
though no direct reference to its influence on Godard here – when, in thinking through dance as a 
way of organizing intensity and intentionality, Godard’s inquiry leads him to consider how this 
organizing comes about, what comes before the movement, how does intentionality arise: 
One inevitably goes back to the mystery of what happens before movement: what body 
image (connected to what plasticity)? What geography? What history? And above all, 
what intentionality? The pre-movement is an empty zone, with no displacement, no 
segmentary activity. And yet everything is already played out there, the entire poetic 
charge, the tonal colouring of the action. A brief passage, a low pressure trough 
corresponding to this wholly founding moment: the gestural anacrusis. (Godard qtd. in 
Louppe, “Singular Moving Geographies” 15) 
What’s interesting for my purposes here is that Godard identifies this spacetime of pre-
movement, before the gesture as such, as an anacrusis, and describes it, as noted above, as a “low 
pressure trough” and later as “a value … of hesitation, a certain suspension of being, body and 
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thought” (Godard qtd. in Louppe, “Singular Moving Geographies” 17). These descriptions 
resonate with my own articulation of the somatic experience of paradoxical simultaneity I 
encounter in Hay’s work. Further, Godard’s use of the term “gestural anacrusis” suggests the 
way in which this experience precedes and is at once part of the gesture, the communicative 
movement: the anacrusis grounds and underpins the gesture as such.131 In this dialogue, Godard 
and Louppe are interested in understanding the poetic charge of dance, the way in which dance 
organizes intensities and intentionality into communicative meaningfulness. They are interested 
in what precedes the gesture in order to understand the gesture, the gesture being the movement 
as meaningful/communicative action.  
We can distinguish this from my discussion of somatic anacrusis in Hay’s work as 
follows: in her choreography and practicing performing, we are not aiming for meaningfulness; 
we are not aiming for gesture as such, and yet we are in motion. By engagingdeflecting proceses 
of intention, attention and action through its destructuring operation, the choreography 
(impossibly but nonetheless) aims to sustain the experience of the anacrusis itself in movement, 
to continually reiterate the suspension of, as Godard says, “being, body and thought”. In Hay’s 
work we move but this movement, as I’ve argued, is action as fundamental motility and the 
practice of perception. Hay’s choreography insists that we let go and resist the impulse to make 
meaningful movement, gesture. In a comparison of Godard’s gestural anacrusis and my somatic 
anacrusis, the distinction lies in the difference between the terms gestural and somatic. To be in 
anacrusis is to be in suspension “before” expression, gesture – “about to … but never quite …”. 
To be in gestural anacrusis is to be before “gesture”, in fact before motion, “displacement” or 
“segmentary activity” (Godard qtd. in Louppe, “Singular Moving Geographies” 15), and yet to 
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be already in a poetically charged experience or process of movement as meaningful action. To 
be in somatic anacrusis is to be before “bodiliness” if you will, before the differentiation of 
body-subject and world, before the precipitation of subjectivity and objectivity, and yet to be in 
motion – as action, fundamental motility as a practice of perception. Drobnick discusses Hay’s 
“Cellular Consciousness: When an individual is immersed in cellular consciousness, the 
privileging of the singular ego becomes secondary as the body is turned into ‘an infinity of tiny 
organs of perception’ and the significance of one’s ‘identity falls out of focus and is replaced by 
attention’” (Drobnick and Hay qtd. in Drobnick 49). To be in somatic anacrusis then, is to be in 
cellular motion and in suspension, against the tendency for this motion to become meaningful, as 
gesture.  
 
Erin Manning’s Preacceleration and Interval 
In theorist and philosopher Erin Manning’s book Relationscapes: Movement, Art, Philosophy, 
which draws substantially on Albert North Whitehead’s philosophy and the work of, among 
others Deleuze and Guattari, she offers a dense discussion and theorization of the same question 
as Godard’s: “what happens before movement?” Grounded in Manning’s experience of a 
relational dance context – improvisational tango-based partner dance – her discussion is most 
concerned with articulating the character of the relationality itself and the processual experience 
of connectedness that allows the dancers to move fluidly together without deciding, planning and 
knowing in advance what the movement will be, when to extend a leg or arm, where to place a 
foot, how to manage one’s weight and balance. I draw on Manning here because she identifies 
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and articulates qualities of movement/dance experience that support my own descriptions and 
thinking.  
In her introduction, Manning offers this proposal:  
The dynamic form of movement is its incipient potential. Bodies are dynamic expressions 
of movement in its incipiency. They have not yet converged into final form. Throughout 
Relationscapes, I refer to bodies as pure plastic rhythm. I propose that we move toward a 
notion of a becoming-body that is a sensing body in movement, a body that resists 
predefinition in terms of subjectivity or identity, a body that is involved in a reciprocal 
reaching-toward that in-gathers the world even as it worlds. (Manning 6) 
The language of this proposal resonates strongly with the experiences I have described in my 
practicing performing Hay’s choreography. Particularly, Manning’s description of the 
“becoming-body”, “resisting predefinition” and of the “reciprocal reaching-toward that in-
gathers”, provide articulations related to my own experiences in Hay’s work, of paradoxical 
simultaneity in absencingpresencing and in yieldingexpanding. Throughout her introduction and 
first two chapters, Manning works toward articulating the experiential time-slip (“the future 
anterior: the will-not-yet-have-happened” (24) and incipient potential of body-movement-
relation. Manning develops a number of related concepts to get at a nuanced articulation of the 
experience of incipient action. 
For Manning, movement emerges out of the interval created through preacceleration, 
both of which are phases belonging to the cycle of relational movement experience as she 
conceives it:   
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Preacceleration is tapped into by the interval, actualized not in displacement as such but 
in the potential of its actualization. Preacceleration is like the breath that releases speech, 
the gathering-toward that leaps our bodies into a future unknowable. It goes something 
like this: preacceleration–relation–interval–intensification–actualization–extension–
displacement–preacceleration. Simultaneity of experience creates sensing bodies in 
movement creates shifting space-times of experience. (25) 
With this cycle of phases, Manning enables me to get even more specific about the experience of 
somatic anacrusis, which aligns most readily with her conceptualization of preacceleration.  
Her description of preacceleration as “the breath that releases speech” evokes the experience I’ve 
described of somatic anacrusis, a paradoxical simultaneity, like the transitional suspension 
between the inhalation and exhalation (as speech). Manning notes the generative “simultaneity of 
experience” that reinforces the alignment between her concept and my analysis of Hay’s work. 
This transitional suspension that for Manning ultimately releases speech, for Hay, does not. In 
Hay’s work, meaningful expression is continually undermined or subverted. This is what I mean 
when I describe the experience of somatic anacrusis as the “about to … but never quite …”, a 
phrasing that parallels Manning’s future anterior, noted above with respect to movement’s 
incipient potential. 
For Manning, preacceleration enables, or perhaps better, activates the relation through 
which the interval arises. The relation here refers to the relation between the two tango dance 
partners. The interval, which arises through the relation, is the creation of a spacetime of 
between:  
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The time of the interval is incipiency. This is a future-past that is prolonged at the 
interface of the becoming-actual of the virtual. Just because you cannot see the interval 
doesn’t mean it’s not real. The interval’s concreteness is what allows me to feel the 
movement in the before or the even-as of my body’s displacement [actual movement 
from a to b]. I can’t think fast enough to catch the interval in the making. The interval is 
the production of movement before we know it as such. (Manning 18, insertion mine) 
With this description of the interval and Manning’s cycle of preacceleration–relation–interval …, 
I am able to deepen my articulation of somatic anacrusis in Hay’s work. Above I have indicated 
that somatic anacrusis most readily aligns with Manning’s preacceleration, and in its experiential 
quality of active suspension, it is. However, through Manning’s discussion, we can now begin to 
take into account the performance context for Hay’s work, and provisionally consider the 
relation as that between the solo performer and the audience rather than, in Manning’s discussion, 
a relation between co-participants in a social dance. However, in Manning’s situation of the 
tango dancers, the relation is actualizable and actualized: the dancers actually interconnect and 
interact together in meaningful movement.  
By contrast, in Hay’s situation of the solo theatrical performance, the performer and the 
audience do not interconnect or interact together in meaningful movement. The relation, as such, 
is suspended from actualization in Hay’s constructed situation and destructuring structure, in 
contrast to the situation of the tango dancers. Here, Hay’s choreography – and my experience 
and analysis – diverge from Manning’s conceptualization of movement process. Hay’s 
choreography remains suspended in the preacceleration phase, the further phases of relation, 
interval, intensification, actualization, extension and displacement do not occur, per se. Because 
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the relation is not actualized, the interval, articulated by Manning as a spacetime of between [the 
two tango dancers], does not arise through the relation of performer and audience member in the 
solo performance context. Participatory communication as such is not the intent. We don’t dance 
“with” the audience like tango partners dance together. We don’t “move” together with the 
audience in meaningful relational movement. However, nor is non-participatory, or 
“re/presentational”, communication the intent. We don’t dance “for” the audience like in more 
conventional staged dance performance. We don’t move into “meaningful” movement figures, 
enacted or presented for the audience. Indeed, we do move; however, the movement in Hay’s 
work is of a different order than that of relational or re/presentational movement. Movement in 
Hay’s work can be understood to reside within, or be, preacceleration, a paradoxical simultaneity 
of “the gathering-toward that leaps our bodies into a future unknowable” (Manning 25) rather 
than a sequential process that moves into actualization, extension and displacement.  
For Manning as for Godard, meaningful, communicative, relational movement or gesture 
nonetheless remains the primary concern in their conceptualizations. For Godard, a concern with 
the meaningful gesture (its poetic quality) is implied in his discussion of gestural anacrusis. For 
Manning, “bodies capitulate” or “surge into” the interval and into meaningful, relational 
movement. For both, something happens. Dynamic forms emerge and the dancers flow with 
them; these dynamic forms are valued as expression, as dance. However, in Hay’s practice, we 
don’t capitulate or surge. For Hay, “nothing happens, but is happening all the time” (Hay, Open 
Rehearsal, italics mine). We move, yes. And forms may begin to emerge, of course, as an 
inherent result of sedimented structures and tendencies to organize and interpret experience, but 
they are not the concern, and for Hay it is imperative that we release this very germination as 
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soon as, even before, it begins. This is the very destructuring operation that her linguistically 
constructed choreography effects. In a linguistic torque of my own that attempts to use language 
against itself to conceptualize this experience, this nascent “pre-forming” is the “ground” to 
Hay’s “figure”, which I am arguing is the somatic anacrusis, is the preaccelerating, not the 
movement or the gesture that arises therefrom. Hay’s choreography prompts the performer to 
engage in “catastrophic acts of perception” (Hay, At Once 5) that turn the body-world inside-out, 
and reverse the fold, such that we move toward the limit possibility of perceiving the horizon of 
being – the simultaneity of all time, all space – and the stretching away from specificity, 
individuation, and subject-object positioning. For Hay, the goal is “remaining positionless” (Hay, 
Remaining Positionless), through a deliberate and complex linguistic-experiential choreographic 
operation that undermines and subverts fixity and habituated patterning, attempting to enact 
suspension in sustained flux, as such. It is the preacceleration of Manning’s process that Hay’s 
choreography is aiming to sustain, a suspension of incipiency – somatic anacrusis – into which 
she choreographs the performer. In Manning’s words:  
In the preacceleration of a step, anything is possible. But as the step begins to actualize, 
there is no longer much potential for divergence: the foot will land where it lands. 
Incipiency opens up experience to the unknowable, follow-through toward concrescence 
closes experience on itself. Of course, this closing-in is always a reopening toward the 
next incipient action. (7) 
Manning describes the quality of open suspension inherent in preacceleration: 
“Preacceleration does not predict one displacement over another. It holds in abeyance openings, 
out of which shapes emerge, but control is not of the essence” (19). Shortly thereafter she 
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remarks: “If we had to locate creativity, the interval could serve as its nexus” (20). Here 
Manning’s comments recall earlier discussions of the “gap” – the unknown, the possibility, the 
open – which arises in experiences of improvisation and that seems to be a pre-requisite for 
movement invention, composing while performing.132 
 
RETURNING TO INTENTION, ATTENTION AND ACTION 
In the discussion above, of concepts related to somatic anacrusis, we find that Albright, Smith, 
Godard and Manning also conceive of movement process in terms of intentionality/intention, 
attention and action, as have I, though none uses the explicit triumvirate dynamic relation of the 
three that I have conceived in this study. All these mover/thinkers are also concerned with 
conceptualizing experiences of the unknown, the pre-figurative, in dance-movement or 
improvisational processes. Nonetheless, implied in these conceptualizations is the assumption 
that these movement processes ultimately manifest meaningful, re/presentational and/or 
relational movement. It is specifically along this dimension of meaningfulness, that we may 
begin to understand how Hay’s work is distinct from both improvisation and set choreography. 
In his essay “The Cutting Edge of Awareness: Reports from the Inside of Improvisation” 
improviser and researcher Kent De Spain summarizes his dissertation research analyzing first-
person experiential reports on improvisational practice. In this essay, De Spain is interested in 
articulating the dimension of meaningfulness in lived experiences of movement improvisation. 
As I have indicated in the introduction to De Spain at the opening of this chapter, De Spain 
considers improvisation an “attentional practice” (37), by which he means a practice of paying 
attention to experience and using multiple sources drawn therefrom to generate and compose 
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movement. Through his analysis, De Spain derives four major categories by which he classifies 
the fields of experience from which improvisers source and develop, or derive and compose the 
movement content of their improvisations: the world inside, the world outside, memory and 
intentionality (which he does not explicitly define but that seems to relate specifically to the 
mover’s deliberate purpose). Even in his determination of three different approaches to 
intentionality – in which an improviser may direct or pitch himself or herself toward 1) 
movement, 2) the physical body, or 3) elements of artistic form – De Spain’s analysis implies an 
underlying concern in improvisation with meaningful “content”: through one or more of these 
particular approaches to intentionality, the improviser will derive and develop expressive, 
communicative movement material. Clearly, the focus is on making something: movement, 
meaning, sense of some kind.  
By contrast, in Hay’s work, discovering sources for and composing meaningful 
movement – as “figure” – is not the point. Reading De Spain’s experiential analysis of 
improvisation alongside my own experiential analysis of Hay’s work helps me to be more 
precise about the ways in which Hay’s work is not improvisation. Like Albright, discussed above, 
De Spain emphasizes the importance and emphasis on attention in improvisation. In 
improvisation, the process of attention functions toward meaning-making, drawing movement 
figures from fields of experience, which the improviser then develops to compose/choreograph-
in-the-moment. In Hay’s work, rather, the choreography and practice function on the process of 
attention itself, subverting the possibility of drawing figure from ground and thereby constantly 
undermining the possibility to compose-in-the-moment and make meaning. Similarly, for 
Godard and Manning above, processes of intentionality/intention and action are also understood 
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to function toward meaning-making in danced gesture and in tango partnering respectively. By 
contrast, in Hay’s work, her choreography and practice function on processes of 
intentionality/intention and action to subvert meaning-making per se. Below I discuss several 
experiences that will further illuminate this distinction between Hay’s work and improvisation 
and subsequently also distinguish her work from set choreographic work. Hay often says, “there 
is no one way this looks” (Hay, SPCP), a statement that on the one hand focusses on the visual 
aspect of dancing, while also implicitly undermining our conventional impulse to value the 
specific movements per se. In Hay’s work, we might think of the “dance” that results from her 
choreography and practice as a kind of secondary byproduct of the practice of perception; 
whereas, for De Spain – as for the theorists discussed above – the meaningful/relational 
movement, as dance, is the point. 
 
Coagulating and Constellating: Hay’s “infinite moments of indeterminate specificity”  
In my practice of Hay’s work, I not only experience the flashes I have described above as 
nascent “pre-forming” but I am also at times able to experience the micro-process that precedes 
these flashes, which I describe as experiences of coagulation and constellation. The following 
extrapolated description elaborates my experience of this coagulating and constellating process 
in which the language reveals processes of intentionality/intention and attention as well.  
As I move and engage perceiving, travelling the well-worn path of the score and 
practicing the questions and tools, I am able to attend to the moving fluidity that I am and within 
which I move. I continue to experience the figure-ground reversals and deflections that throw me 
into somatic anacrusis. I become aware of poolings and eddyings, concentratings and dilutings, 
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surgings and abatings, centripetal and centrifugal spiralling forces within my experience. These 
dynamics seem to develop in relation to my environment as the world almost seems to draw me 
out, pushing and pulling at me with forces of its own. Gravitational pulls, tidal shifts; warming, 
cooling, brightening, darkening. The forces may seem to be immense and impact my whole 
being; or they may be minute and call to just a local aspect. The viscosity of my fluid self 
increases, non-uniformly, and I sense a kind of variable coagulating that begins to hint at form 
versus flow. [This is not necessarily stillness but may involve stillness or relative stillness. I 
comment on this further when I discuss the “object” experience below.] As I sense this, I notice 
my reflective processes kindling in the background, eager and willing to flame up, cast light and 
reveal; to compare, contrast, evaluate, identify this potentially meaningful coagulation or name 
the nascent constellating form as it comes into relief and specificity in/through my body.133 
In Hay’s practice, the deflecting functions of the score, questions and tools and the 
multidimensional effort of working with their constantly changing, rapid-fire, braided 
multiplicity, douse134 the kindling process when it begins to draw (like a fire draws oxygen to 
feed itself). “Dis-attach” and “Ready-fire-aim” guide me back to the choreography and the 
practice of the score, questions and tools. Dousing the kindling process before recognition, 
identification and interpretation occur engenders an experience of a kind of pre-reflective 
specificity. This is what I understand a note in the score to be referencing in the Mall section: 
“[blue font] Note: I remember to notice that my whole body is producing unimaginably pure 
instances of specificity” (Hay, At Once 9). Because this kindling process is so readily ingrained 
in my general lived experience, it is very challenging to douse the process before recognition 
occurs and herein lies the impossibility of Hay’s practice. I am continuously suspended in the 
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process of the “about to … but never quite…”, a paradoxical simultaneity of movement 
towardaway of glimpsing and glancing the bodily vibrations that reveal the movement of 
meaning-making as coalescences, fleeting coagulations, possible constellations. I play at this 
edge of meaning-making through absencingpresencing, yieldingexpanding and thresholding, 
barely brushing up against it as Hay’s work choreographs me into somatic anacrusis. 
The Mall section of the score is a fruitful one for the explication of these experiences of 
coagulation and constellation because it offers the possibility to discuss both the dousing of 
reflective processes as described above, as well as the fanning of the embers, as it were, which is 
explicitly choreographed uniquely in one section of the dance, and which I will now discuss. 
This coagulating and constellating process can effectively be understood in Merleau-Pontian 
terms as a process of structuring, which Hay’s choreography “douses” through its linguistically 
constructed destructuring operation. 
Within the Mall section,135 the following direction appears:  “A single [purple font] 
object [black font] reveals itself in [purple font] a mall. [black font] I perform several views of 
object for the benefit of the audience. [purple font] A mall [black font] and [purple font] object 
[black font] alternate their appearances”  (Hay, At Once 9). Shortly thereafter, a note clearly 
articulates the process of coagulation and constellation that precedes the experience of 
recognition and identification, or interpretation. Here again, the word “object” appears in purple 
ink, cautioning the performer against creative/interpretive performance impulses: “[blue font] 
Note: I do not create [purple font] object. [blue font] I learn its attributes from my body, and 
actually take pleasure in identifying the object for myself in each performance” (Hay, At Once 9). 
In this particular section of the score, structuring processes come to the foreground. In my 
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experience of the work, in this section I am very definitely playing with the relative “balance” of 
kindling (structuring) versus dousing (destructuring). In the process of performing Mall, I move 
through experiences of relative fluidity and coagulation. As I embody the choreographic 
directions for the Object section, I usually (but not always) come into relative stillness. In this 
case, I allow the process of coagulation to continue and my reflective processes to kindle. 
Through the experience of viscosity and coagulation, I experience my bodily flow continue to 
“solidify” and constellate as more stable form. Fanning the embers and allowing the process of 
reflection, I experience a sudden flash in which I recognize the stable form I experience: it comes 
to light with an identity as a specific object, of which I then “perform several views … for the 
benefit of the audience”. Interestingly, while the identity of the object comes to light in this flash 
of receptive registration, I do not always actively “name” the object for myself in my mind 
during the experience of performing the work. In my practicing, I would generally experience the 
constellation of three different objects in the Mall section of the work. Writing afterward, I 
would always attempt to recall the three objects in my journal. Sometimes I would be able to 
easily and quickly recall and write down the names of the objects. Other times, I would have no 
immediate recollection of them, though I knew I had experienced their constellation within the 
work. Only by tracking back through the score and tracing the residues of their constellation as it 
echoed in my body afterward could I recall these constellated objects and name them in my 
journal.  
I draw out this particular example and experience from the practice of At Once because it 
is a unique occasion in the practice of the score in which the choreography directs reflective 
processes to carry through, to resolve. In conventional dance improvisation and set 
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choreographic work (with predefined movement), resolution of some kind is generally sought. 
The nature of the resolution may or may not be understood by the audience, or even necessarily 
by the performer/s; however, both cases typically work with and/or toward expressive, 
communicative gestures and/or movement statements.136 Other than in this one unique instance, 
Hay’s choreography does not strive for resolution. It is not trying to say or mean anything. By its 
contrast, the resolution occurring in this Object example serves to show the prevailing experience 
throughout the work of somatic anacrusis, in which the destructuring structure of the 
choreography deflects intentionality/intention, attention and action away from meaning-making 
processes, moving the performer away from the intentional object and into the écart, away from 
attention to figures and toward the horizon, away from danced movement and into the action of 
fundamental motility and the practice of perception that opens impossibly toward primordiality. 
 I have above articulated the way in which Hay’s work is distinct from dance 
improvisation and conventional set choreography with respect to the way in which the performer 
experiences processes of reflection and meaning-making. Coagulating and constellating describe 
the nascent process of meaning-making itself, against the edge of which we brush in Hay’s work. 
This edge is the “O”, of which Hay’s work is “the other side” (Hay, “What if now is?”).  
 
Compositional Responsibility 
I will now address the way in which Hay’s work is distinct from both set work and improvisation 
with respect to compositional responsibility. Conventional set choreography and improvisation 
both tend to be concerned with meaning-making and interpretation, wherein someone, either 
choreographer or performer, tends to take primary responsibility for the composition – the 
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reflective handling and shaping of material. In set work, the choreographer generally takes more 
responsibility, in setting the movement material and directing the interpretation, though aspects 
of both may be shared with the performer in the creative and rehearsal process. In improvisation, 
the performer generally takes substantially more, if not full, responsibility, thereby navigating a 
balance between engaging with the developing movement material of the dance experience and 
maintaining reflective awareness and active engagement with the evolving whole. In 
improvisational contexts, this balance is often described as, for example, ten per cent 
compositional awareness to ninety per cent generative experience.  
As noted earlier, Hay is explicit that her work is not improvisation. From my experience 
and analysis of the work, I concur. The work is highly choreographed. As I have discussed in the 
previous chapter, the choreography (score, questions and tools) is significantly complex and 
specific, and constrains the performer to a high degree, allowing the performer to mostly 
relinquish responsibility to actually compose in the moment. The work, as choreography, 
provides a very specific structure, direction and parameters for the performer’s activity. Hay 
holds compositional responsibility – and explicitly claims it in the required credit given to her in 
all performances of her work: “choreography by Deborah Hay”. Hay’s choreography, as such, 
resides in the complex braid of linguistic operations in the score, questions and tools, as I have 
discussed at length in chapter 4. There is very little autonomy granted to the performer in terms 
of compositional responsibility; and yet, there is. 
 In terms of movement material, Hay’s work is not necessarily “choreography” as we 
typically understand it in dance: defined sequences of specific movements composed into a 
meaningful whole. In Hay’s work there is practically no set movement, pre-defined figures or 
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expressive intent. Thus the performer is granted almost full responsibility with respect to the 
movement material of the dance. In this way, as I have indicated in my introductory chapter, 
Hay’s practice can be understood to align with other un-premeditated movement practices, such 
as improvisation generally speaking. In Hay’s work, the performer is indeed expected to generate 
the movement material of the dance, as in improvisation. However, the performer is not at liberty 
to follow, develop and interpret the material – to compose-in-the-moment – as one would in 
improvisational practice. As I have discussed, Hay’s choreographic function deflects the 
performer from this compositional activity, constraining against this improvisational pursuit. Hay 
is explicit in the score: “[blue font]: Note: The movement may change but the choreography 
itself does not change” (Hay, At Once 9). Paradoxically herein, though autonomy is granted with 
respect to the actual movements, the performer once again experiences Hay’s assertion of 
compositional responsibility. 
 Nevertheless, I must address the fact that Hay does grant the performer modest 
compositional responsibility in a very few choreographic cues in the score that ask the performer 
to maintain some reflective awareness of the overall performance manifestation in a given run-
through, of which this example is the most specific: “[blue font]: Note: I strongly maintain the 
role of the choreographer overseeing the particularity of the path I travel – making spatial 
choices without becoming too artistic” (Hay, At Once 7). This would seem to contradict my 
discussion above. However, I account for this somewhat anomalous choreographic cue by 
acknowledging Hay’s own active embrace of the theatrical performance context in which she 
situates her work and in which it circulates. As Christopher House has said, commenting on 
Hay’s work following his own performance of Hay’s solo I’ll Crane For You at Toronto’s 
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Winchester Street Theatre, and I paraphrase: “Deborah is interested in theatrical performance.” 
Passing references in the score to “the audience”, “the theater” and “live performance” within 
cues that provide other specific choreographic directions support this understanding.137 As I have 
noted earlier, the theatrical performance context plays an important role in providing a frame that 
safeguards the performer in entering the choreographic destructuring structure and moving into 
the practice of perception. Entering into this practice without this contextual frame could be quite 
risky: alone, one has the potential to become destabilized; in public, one has the potential to be 
seen this way. Charged with developing an “adaptation” of Hay’s choreography, the performer 
participates in setting the theatrical performance frame, in which the choreography will take 
place. Thus, at this level, the performer is granted a kind of responsibility, though I consider this 
a contextual responsibility, as distinct from a compositional responsibility per se. Despite having 
framed his solo performance of Hay’s I’ll Crane For You with lighting, costume and set, House 
describes the sense of risk and lack of autonomy he experiences in performing the work as being 
like: “entering an arena with no shield and no sword… with an hour of potential failure hanging 
over me” (House qtd. in K. Smith). House’s statement does not convey a sense of compositional 
responsibility and rather expresses a sense of being at the mercy of Hay’s choreography.  
 Because the choreography functions in a sophisticated manner to deflect the performer 
from meaning-making processes overall, explicit choreographic directions like the ones noted 
above, which ostensibly give the performer momentary compositional responsibility, in fact 
participate in the challenging dynamic of the work and contribute to the paradoxical simultaneity 
of the somatic anacrusis experience, in which the performer cannot properly embrace the 
compositional responsibility, nor entirely relinquish it. I consider Hay’s work choreography 
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because of the linguistic complexity and specificity of the score, questions and tools. In the work, 
though the movement is not set, the performer is highly constrained by the choreography, which 
stays the same but is not necessarily graspable as choreography in the conventional sense of 
danced movement. As such, in my view, Hay’s work is at the cutting edge of choreography, a 
claim that has support from similar assessments by others who suggest that Hay is contributing 
to a paradigm shift in contemporary dance training, with respect to her approach to choreography 
and practice. For example, Nicely notes that “ Hay has identified something within training itself 
that she works to reform, thereby confronting the institution of dance and remaking it on her 
terms” (167) and Bauer writes that Hay “is one of the choreographers who has most 
meticulously, thoroughly and idiosyncratically explored, challenged and questioned the notions 
of training, technique, bodily behaviour and memory” (75).138  
 
CONCLUSION: BEYOND IMPROVISATION, AT THE CUTTING EDGE OF 
CHOREOGRAPHY 
In De Spain’s conclusion, entitled “Beyond What We Know”, he remarks on the limits of 
language with respect to articulating improvisational experience and offers a provocation to 
explore further:  
My own experience tells me that where we go, what we know, and how we know it is 
intimately connected to the linguistic stories we tell ourselves in our minds (that might be 
one definition of the word “consciousness”). The verbal reports under scrutiny here, by 
their very linguistic nature, urge those aspects of our awareness to the fore. But verbal 
language has limits. By looking at those limits, at the places where our ability to 
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articulate our experience begins to break down, we see how improvisation can take us 
into realms of awareness that extend beyond literacy, a place of synapses and chaos and 
unvoiced intention […] as students of human experience we must find the discipline to 
feel past these words and into the negative spaces around and beyond. (36) 
De Spain’s description here points to the realm of bodily knowing that Hay’s work engenders 
paradoxically through her distinctly complex linguistic constructions. De Spain’s point about 
feeling past “the negative spaces around and beyond words” echoes Hay’s gestural description of 
“the other side of o”, and based on my research and analysis, I would argue that Hay has indeed 
found a way to move into those negative spaces beyond words and beyond what we know. 
Paradoxically, she has done so specifically through language. In my work here I follow suit, 
feeling my way through Hay’s language into those negative spaces beyond. Then, through 
practicing performing and writing, I wind my way back in an attempted return. My aim is to 
draw these experiences into language and to show how Hay’s words can take us beyond 
improvisation and into realms of experience at the cutting edge of choreography. I re-quote 
Drobnick, who captures this “intertwining and reversibility” of body and language: 
Contrary to totalizing theories that argue that the body is unknowable outside language, 
Hay posits the body as dialectical with language, that is, as an influence upon language as 
much as it is influenced by language. Such an ideosomatic understanding of the 
interrelatedness of the psyche and physique recognizes that the body inherently exceeds 
the capacity of language to describe it, while it simultaneously inspires new forms of 
eloquence. (45) 
Interestingly, in order to get hold of the “beyond”, De Spain defaults to calling it “spiritual”: 
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But in those spaces beyond are some experiences in improvisation that are not easily 
categorized – not inside, nor outside; in fact, somehow dissolving that existential border. 
In these moments, we seem to sense and respond to (“dance” with) something ineffable; 
something, although we tend to avoid the word in this culture, that might be described as 
“spiritual”. (36) 
As I have discussed earlier, Hay herself and others describing her earlier work, have often 
appropriated the language of the spiritual, the mystical, the cosmic to somehow grapple with the 
experiences of her work. She continues to use/refute this, as I have noted in reference to her book 
title and comments within My Body, the Buddhist. Dance theorists Hubert Godard and Laurence 
Louppe, whose thinking I have addressed above, also address the challenges of discussing the 
dance experience outside of received discourses (Louppe “Singular Moving Geographies”). 
De Spain nonetheless attempts a recuperation from this default to the spiritual in his 
subsequent paragraphs, which resonate with Merleau-Ponty’s account of the écart as I’ve 
discussed it, though not directly: 
Our consciousness is like a body interacting with the exterior world. Because our nerves 
cannot extend beyond our skin, we only really sense ourselves in contact with a larger 
world, but separate from it. In the same way, we only “know” what is present within our 
consciousness, yet by touching it, by dancing with it, we can sense the contours and 
textures of an infinite world that exists beyond the boundaries of knowledge. (De Spain 
37) 
In his discussion, De Spain seems to be struggling to articulate this realm of experience “beyond 
what we know”, at “the cutting edge of awareness”. He is coming up against it, feels its presence 
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and is compelled to describe. I too am compelled to articulate it and I can only try. If I am 
remotely successful, perhaps it is because Hay’s work takes me beyond improvisation, to the 
cutting edge of choreography, and through her complex and specific use of language, she offers a 
way. 
Hay’s choreographic proposal is distinct and unique in the way that it uses language 
against itself, and drawsforces movement and language together, challenging their power in 
proximity and the performer’s capacity to practice her complex choreography, which involves 
the commitment to enter into and live through the generated forcefield of the dance. And I mean 
forcefield explicitly, as this term evokes the charged experiential spacetime of the “dance” 
(Godard’s body vectors and intensities that arise through intention, attention and action), and as 
this term also evokes the palpable experience of sustained suspension in somatic anacrusis.  
 In operating on intentionality/intention, attention and action in the ways that I have 
analyzed in the previous chapter, Hay’s complex constructed choreographic situation and 
uniquely linguistic-somatic destructuring structure of score, questions and tools engagesdeflects 
processes of meaning-making: “about to … but never quite …”. As performer, I am thrust into 
motion and caught in the act of perception, suspended within the flux of intertwinings and 
reversals, of paradoxical simultaneities – the absencingpresencing of I-world, the 
yieldingexpanding of body-space and the thresholding of movement-time. In practicing 
performing Hay’s work, I enter into an experience that is beyond improvisation, arising at the 
cutting edge of choreography; an experience through which I might impossibly glance 
primordiality; an experience of somatic anacrusis that has potential implications within and 
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beyond the field of dance with respect to presence and relationality, and which I address in my 
concluding chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Moving Toward Otherness: What if …? 
 
Improvisation does not, therefore, entail a silencing of the mind in order for the body ‘to 
speak’. Rather, improvisation pivots both mind and body into a new apprehension of 
relationalities. (Foster, “Taken by Surprise” 7) 
 
As the above quote implies, discussions of movement improvisation often suggest that such 
experiences offer new approaches to relationality with other, within the world. I use this quote to 
open this chapter because it helpfully connects the ideas I have articulated in the previous 
chapters to the focus of this chapter on relationality; however, I remind the reader once again that 
Hay does not consider her work improvisation, and I have argued in agreement with this in the 
preceding chapter, describing her work as being “beyond improvisation, at the cutting edge of 
choreography”. I arrived at this point via my descriptive and reflective analyses of practicing 
performing Hay’s choreography and practice as a unique function that draws language and the 
moving body into a dynamic, torqueing process – a destructuring structure – that pivots the 
performer through a practice of perception into the paradoxical and simultaneous, non-resolving 
experience of somatic anacrusis.  
In this chapter, I specifically consider the dimension of relationality in Hay’s work 
through a double re-framing. In the following discussion, I reconsider Hay’s practicing 
performing as two distinct but connected activities: “training” in “doing”. The practicing is 
understood firstly as “training” a process or way that does not seek to stabilize meaning and 
therefore secondly as a “pre-disposing”; and the performing, specifically as solo activity nested 
	  260	  
in a theatrical frame is understood firstly as “doing” – praxis – and therefore secondly as “pre-
relational” or “unconsummated” in terms of active engagement for/with another. As such, in the 
first reframing, practicing performing becomes “training in doing”, and in the second reframing, 
this training in doing – somatic anacrusis – becomes “pre-relational pre-disposing”. I undertake 
this reconsideration with reference to certain discussions in performance and dance studies with 
respect to training, performance, presence, repetition and representation. It becomes clear to me 
as I work through these ideas, that Hay’s choreography and practice could be further considered 
in relation to these discussions; however, I do not pursue these lines of thought here. My primary 
effort in this study is to describe and articulate the experiential poetics of Hay’s work through 
emergent choreographic analysis and to consider certain implications thereof. Ultimately, this 
reframing of somatic anacrusis as pre-relational pre-disposing sets up my understanding of the 
unique relationality of Hay’s work and enables me to consider the ethical implications of her 
choreography and practice in light of feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray’s call for a culture of 
perception as a way toward the other. I ask: in cultivating the processual experience of somatic 
anacrusis considered as a pre-relational pre-disposing, can Hay’s choreography and practice be 
understood as a way toward otherness through perception? What if …? 
 
Shifting the Frame of Reference: Rethinking Relationality  
Many writers have commented on Hay’s interest in and concern with relationality, which is also 
explicit in Hay’s own discourse about her work. As I have discussed in Chapter 2, most major 
contributions to the literature on Hay highlight this key concern and, taken together, they address 
various ways this theme has reiterated throughout Hay’s career. Foster’s 1986 analysis of Hay’s 
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choreography established relationality as a foundational principle of Hay’s practice: “From the 
moment she walks into the performing space … she works to create a sense of community 
among everyone present” (Reading Dancing 5). In Nicely’s 2012 dissertation chapter she writes 
that: “A relational engagement with others happens in her work by unfixing who we see and 
instead identifying ourselves in movement as action” (154). Nicely further suggests that Hay’s 
solo work Art and Life can cultivate a sense of responsible action that prepares us to approach 
the challenges of the future (171). 
Hay’s concern with relationality in her work, over and above an interest in content or 
meaningfulness per se, helps to explain her work’s varying and often strong effects on different 
populations: confounding dance spectators, attracting experimental performing artists and artist-
researchers, engaging therapeutic and community practitioners. This relational priority also 
assists in understanding how Hay’s work has caused significant controversy,139 been described as 
spiritual, considered feminist, and been both dismissed and revered as ground-breaking in 
reviews. From an alternative perspective, one might say that through her decades-long 
exploration of relationality, Hay has perhaps only inadvertently established a movement 
aesthetic. In considering her work beyond a theatrical dance context, I suggest that through it she 
proposes an embodied ethic – a way of being/moving toward others and the world, and moreover 
one that she is able to publicly stage and enact through a theatrical performance practice. 
Accompanying this embodied ethic is a verbal discursive practice that enables her to disseminate 
her process to others who can then also enact it – through adaptation, via a global performance 
and presenting network that ultimately perpetuates her work – and her message. 
Considering this persistent concern with relationality in Hay’s work over time, I propose 
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an understanding of Hay’s artistic career arc as an exploration of how to enact relationality, 
following an overarching chronological trajectory from her early work in unison group contexts 
to her more recent interest in individual solo contexts. Hay’s early circle dances focused on 
enacting a kind of relationality in completely participatory group practice. Hay’s SPCP solo 
choreography and practice, which is the subject of this research, enacts a different kind of 
relationality through individual performative solo practice. Hay’s career phases, focussed 
alternately on solo work and large group workshops, have enacted relationality in various ways 
along the participatory/performative spectrum. In the following discussion, I will go further, 
however, and suggest that in Hay’s SPCP solo practice phase she actually comes to question 
relationality per se, enacting a participatory-performative suspension thereof, in the processual 
experience of somatic anacrusis, reframed as pre-relational pre-disposing.  
 
Textual Performances and/of Performing Bodies 
Before I continue with my discussion of Hay’s work, it will be helpful to briefly establish some 
theoretical context with respect to questions of training, performance, presence, repetition and 
representation. These questions are made relevant broadly in the context of performance studies, 
which, while strongly debated as a field or discipline, collects under its auspices a multiplicity of 
theories, methods and events (Madison and Hamera xii) which share some common ground in, as 
performance scholar Tracy C. Davis notes: “acknowledging how individual behavior derives 
from collective, even unconscious, influences and is manifest as observable behaviour, both 
overt and quotidian, individual and collective” (1). Within this conception, as Richard Schechner 
has articulated, almost anything can be considered and studied “as performance”, while we still 
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understand some more typically “theatrical” and culturally defined events to be performances  – 
“is performance”, per Schechner. In the twenty-first century, however, the distinction between 
the two modalities “is vanishing”. (Schechner 38 and 49, all). This is in part due to the 
“performative turn” in cultural analysis (Davis 1), by which even “is performance” can be 
understood “as performance”. And yet as is often cited, the term “performance” itself remains an 
“essentially contested concept” (Strine, Long and Hopkins qtd. in both Carlson 68 and in 
Madison and Hamera xi), the tensions therein valued as fundamental to its meaning/s – and its 
opening/s to alternative articulations. 
Rather than rehearsing one of many possible stories of performance studies, here I will 
draw out several key contributions in order to briefly sketch some important ideas that variously 
mark my subsequent discussion. In his essay “What is Performance?” performance scholar 
Marvin Carlson surveys a range of notions of performance from the public display of technical 
skill; to Richard Schechner’s concept of restored behaviour (discussed further below); to the 
measurement of a specific act against an ideal. In an attempt to establish a more overarching 
definition, he offers the conceptualization attributed to ethnolinguist Richard Bauman, that “all 
performance involves a consciousness of doubleness, through which the actual execution of an 
action is placed in mental comparison with a potential, an ideal, or a remembered original model 
of that action” and that “performance is always performance for someone, some audience that 
recognizes and validates it as performance even when, as is occasionally the case, that audience 
is the self” (Carlson 70-71, all). 
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At the outset of Schechner’s chapter “What is Performance?” in his Performance Studies: 
An Introduction, and before further specifying his notion of performing as “restored behaviour”, 
Schechner defines “to perform” in four basic ways: “being, doing, showing doing and explaining 
showing doing”. He defines “being” as “all that exists” and “doing” as “the activity of all that 
exists”. “Showing doing” is “pointing to, underlining, and displaying doing” and the final phrase, 
he explains, “is performance studies”. “Doing” and “showing doing”, he says, “are actions … are 
always in flux” (28, all). In conceiving of performance more specifically as “restored behaviour”, 
Schechner draws attention to the idea that even quotidian activity can be understood to be 
performed according to a script: “the habits, rituals, and routines of life are restored behaviors” 
(34). Restored behaviour is “symbolic and reflexive” (Schechner 35); its meanings are scripted, 
coded and enacted within cultural contexts. For Schecher, “Performance in the restored 
behaviour sense means never for the first time, always for the second to nth time: twice-behaved 
behavior” (36) and this is so even at the level of the minute, wherein a closer look will reveal a 
process of repetition and recombination even if the individual is unaware of it being so. However, 
Schechner points out that while “[p]erformances can be generalized at the theoretical level of 
restoration of behaviour, […] as embodied practices each and every performance is specific and 
different from every other” (36-37). While this statement gestures in the direction of 
performance conceived alternatively as bodily lived experience or corporeal presence, for 
Schechner, it does not necessarily liberate performance from his rubric of restored behaviour; it 
just tightens the aperture at which the performance and/of the behaviour is considered. We can 
consider Schechner’s “restored behaviour” as a characterization of performance as representation 
and repetition. 
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Schechner is recognized as one of the founders of performance studies. His perspective, 
as Madison and Hamera note: “has inspired scholars to examine the intricate conceptual and 
pragmatic connections between performance, repetition, and representation” (xxi). These 
examinations have been substantially fuelled by Jacques Derrida’s philosophical contributions in 
deconstructing binaries and challenging the western “metaphysics of presence” or “logocentrism” 
(Reynolds “Jacques Derrida”), which problematizes the notion of a “truth” or “origin” or “centre” 
that stabilizes meaning. His influential ideas, particularly iteration, différance and trace, have 
contributed in direct and indirect ways to performance theory. For Derrida, there is always an 
absence within presence (any mark), constituting a “leakage” or “overflow” (Royle 61), which is 
the trace that is fundamental to the movement of signification as différance. In particular, 
Derrida’s notion of iterability – that the meaning of an act said or done relies on its having been 
said or done before and on the specific context in which it occurs, but importantly not on the 
presence of the actor or speaker (thus a deferral, différance) – constitutes a key process in 
thinking about performance as repetition and difference. According to Royle on Derrida’s 
thought: “Iterability thus entails both ‘repetition’ (sameness) and ‘alterity’ (difference)” (68). 
Schechner illuminates the implication of this idea for meaning in performance: “meaning cannot 
‘be’ once and for all. Meaning is always performed: Always in rehearsal, its finality forever 
deferred, its actuality only provisional, played out in specific circumstances” (Schechner 146).  
Through this, we can also understand Derrida’s impact on the question of representation: 
if there is no absolute origin or truth and meaning is always deferred, performing presence in its 
encompassing fullness – or plenitude – is impossible. Derrida’s close reading of Antonin 
Artaud’s writing on the Theatre of Cruelty works through this problem acknowledging the 
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impossibility of Artaud’s proposal: “But if the idea of a theater without representation, the idea 
of the impossible, does not help us to regulate theatrical practice, it does, perhaps, permit us to 
conceive its origin, eve and limit, and the horizon of its death” (Derrida 16). He concludes by 
articulating the closure of representation: “Because it has always already begun, representation 
therefore has no end. But one can conceive of the closure of that which is without end. Closure is 
the circular limit within which the repetition of difference infinitely repeats itself. That is to say, 
closure is its playing space. This movement is the movement of the world as play” (Derrida 17).  
From Derrida’s paradigm shifting interventions, particularly iteration or citationality, a 
notion of performativity evolved, influenced largely by the work of feminist theorist Judith 
Butler who argued that genders (and by extension, all manifestations of identities) are 
performative, repetitions or citations of cultural norms and values, not biologically determined. 
This thinking recalls Schechner’s notion of “restored behaviour” as twice-behaved behaviour, an 
iteration of a previous action. However, as Madison and Hamera usefully point out, this is but 
“one dimension” of performativity, which opens up the alternative possibility for performativity 
as “resisting citationality” (xviii, both). In either case, this notion of performativity – whether 
normative or resistive – largely relies on the effect of repetition and difference on socio-cultural 
constructions of values and norms in the process of citationality. 
As just discussed, Derrida’s provocative ideas have been influential in thinking through 
performance as text, as repetition and as representation. However, they have also been influential 
in thinking through performance as bodily experience. For Derrida, there is always the 
supplement, the trace, or “that which precedes or exceeds language” (Royle 62) and particularly 
his notions of the trace and of différance have been taken up directly and indirectly in dance 
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studies with respect to questions around the “presence” of the “body” in “movement”, all of 
which I place in quotes because these notions have been theorized and problematized – 
repeatedly. What of the visceral, material, living, breathing, experiencing/experienced body in 
motion? Thinking also through repetition and difference, Peggy Phelan developed a 
psychoanalytically inflected feminist approach to understanding performance that considers the 
dynamic presence of live bodies in performance, which cannot be documented or written. As 
such, she proposes an ontology of performance as “representation without reproduction” and 
emphatically claims that “Performance … becomes itself through disappearance” (146). For 
Phelan, performance becomes less about presence per se and more about absence and loss. In 
this work, Phelan is strongly concerned with the lived materiality of the marked and “unmarked” 
body and the performance and politics of representation. 
Writing both “with and against Derrida”, in his essay “Mimique” dance scholar Mark 
Franko thinks through the implications of the Derridean trace for dance and performance studies 
(“Mimique” 209). He forwards the notion of primary mimesis, via Spariosu: “the taking of 
bodily form by bodies, the material occasion for the presentation and transmission of behaviour” 
(“Mimique” 209). He suggests that: “Primary mimesis does not entail an originary metaphysics 
so much as a project of becoming. If one conceives the danced trace as primary mimesis, dance 
need not be identified with an originary metaphysics on the one hand, nor with the reference-less 
reference on the other”. He then proposes primary mimesis as a “doing”, a “physical 
participation” in order to theorize dance as “praxis” (“Mimique” 210, all). As part of his larger 
argument Franko articulates an understanding of dance as action, rather than as presence or 
absence. The notion of dance as action, as praxis, is useful as I develop an understanding of 
	  268	  
Hay’s performing as “doing”. Franko’s essay begins with a question of the relationship between 
writing and dancing, prompted by Derrida.  
Dance and performance scholar André Lepecki also takes up the (un-resolving – and 
productively so, as my study both relies upon and reveals) question of this relation between 
dance and writing in his essay “Inscribing Dance” which examines both the contributions and 
limits of Derridean logic for dance and dance writing. Inside his larger discussion of the co-
relational possibilities among dancing, writing and femininity which I will not elaborate here, 
Lepecki notes several dance scholars – including Franko and also Ann Cooper Albright and 
Peggy Phelan – whose critiques of presence in dance have been influenced by Derrida and, 
importantly, whose thinking, Lepecki suggests, also reveals the “limits of deconstruction for 
dance and performance studies” (“Inscribing” 136). Writes Lepecki in reference to these scholars’ 
critiques: “Configuring the conditions of dance’s embodiment destabilizes the play(fulness) of 
the trace by anchoring the dance in the dancer’s historical, material body. Presence returns … it 
returns with the mark of a history on the edge of its own withdrawal” (“Inscribing” 136). 
Concerned as he is with ontologies of dance, presence and movement (both here and elsewhere, 
for example in his book Exhausting Dance: Presence and the Politics of Movement), Lepecki 
states the importance of acknowledging the always historically contingent and fluid relation 
between writing and dancing via the material moving body on stage. This means, he writes, 
throwing  
the presentness of the verb to be into the space of friction between writing and dance, a 
space mediated by gendered bodies as systems of exchange, as practice of counterfeiting, 
as spaces of troubling restlessness through which dance’s presence becomes undecidable, 
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multiple, lawless, a presence whose present can point simultaneously toward yet 
unthinkable ontological coimpossibilities of pastness, presentness, and futurity. 
(“Inscribing” 137) 
With, against and through Derrida – with, against and through writing – dance’s presence returns 
as “unthinkable” “(co)impossible”, as paradoxical simultaneity: historical, material, undecidable, 
ephemeral, approachingwithdrawing.  
It is always a dance in itself, this act of writing dancing, and one that Laurence Louppe 
performs virtuosically in her book The Poetics of Contemporary Dance. Like the scholars noted 
above, Louppe also addresses questions of “presence” and “body” in her work, in which – as her 
English translator and dance scholar Sally Gardner acknowledges – “she is concerned to avoid 
positivistic, naturalistic and biologistic notions of bodies and their ‘lineages’” (Gardner, 
“Introduction” xi). While positing an “irreducibly social and cultural body-agent”, Louppe 
develops her poetics of dance with great attention to and complex treatment of the body matière 
of dance: “the live unstable ‘body states’ of the dancer which are her/his primary materials” 
(Gardner, “Introduction” xv). Gardner notes that for Louppe the term matière is crucial in 
circumventing oppositions and binaries and is an example of one of Louppe’s own linguistic 
moves in the process of thinking and writing dancing. 
It is to this task that I now return, to consider the specific relationality that Hay’s dance 
practices performing in the context of the above discussion. In my thinking, I’m not positing the 
body as primordial essence or presence, nor am I endlessly repeating a text or routine (in the 
sense of daily repeated behaviour and/or an established, set, phrase of danced steps), in a 
normative citationality. For Hay’s work functionally problematizes these notions. I am, however, 
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playing with language and the possibilities that lie within and beyond words to “write with 
dance” (Lepecki, “Inscribing” 133). I accept that in Hay’s work, I am a socio-cultural body-
subject and that my performing and performed body meets, intertwines with and reiterates Hay’s 
choreography and practice (her destructuring structure) – as praxis. Through Hay’s distinctly 
linguistic choreography and practice a torqueing occurs, a dynamic tension – in-tension, at-
tension – in which dance as action becomes a performance generating system for somatic 
anacrusis – a ravellingunravelling paradoxical simultaneity that opens a spacetime of the 
“prepost”, “pre-relational”, “pre-disposing”. Hay’s work attempts to sustain this spacetime such 
that its possibility can register: like trying to register the paradoxical simultaneity that occurs in 
the process of breathing, precisely as inhaling becomes exhaling or vice versa. 
 
Practicing as “Training” as Pre-disposing 
Thus far, I have focused on Hay’s choreography and practice primarily as “choreography”, as a 
dance work. It is also possible to consider her choreography and practice as “training”, 
particularly with respect to the required three-month daily practice. However, Hay’s practice 
distinguishes itself from a conventional understanding of training in dance, which is typically 
concerned with disciplinary skill development through repetition of figures and forms belonging 
to one or more particular movement aesthetics, cultures and value systems, for example: ballet, 
flamenco, bharatanatyam, folk dance forms, breaking, Limón, contact improvisation, release 
techniques, etc. As noted previously, Susan Foster has registered Hay’s blurring the distinctions 
between training, rehearsal and performance as part of her approach to choreography and dance 
(Reading Dancing 11). Through stipulations to “Dis-attach” from acquired technique, to not 
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rehearse but to always run the piece in full, to not strive for repetition of a previous day’s 
manifestation of the dance, to not compare or evaluate each daily practice against past ones, and 
pertinently, in almost never involving movement demonstration per se in the process of teaching 
the work, Hay’s practice moves against the grain of conventional dance training.  
In a short article on Hay’s practice as training – in which the author considers Hay’s 
approach to training as innovative – Bojana Bauer notes the historical connection, in 
contemporary Western dance, between the development of a choreographic aesthetic and its 
basis in training: “Most of the milestone figures of modern dance history constructed their 
aesthetic discourse and forms on the basis of a specific body training. Creating a body for oneself 
meant creating a dance and choreography” (74). In this way, Hay’s work is perhaps no different: 
there is a connection in Hay’s work too between the training and the choreography; and yet, her 
work is fundamentally different in terms of what constitutes “training” and, as I’ve discussed, 
what constitutes “choreography”. Bauer writes: “To understand how Hay’s repetition differs 
from disciplinary repetition characteristic of conventional training, the process and the result of 
repetition have to be taken out of the representational framework” (77-78). This is not 
Schechner’s “restored behaviour”.  
Bauer develops an understanding of dance training as a tensile negotiation of the 
“history” of the body and the “future” demands of a new choreographic aesthetic or situation and 
suggests that: “In the moment between past and future the movement emerges. As an approach to 
this moment, training can become something more open than the instructed development of 
habits” (Bauer 75). Bauer draws on Hay’s own description of the practice as “training in a 
questioning process” (Hay qtd. in Bauer 76) to acknowledge Hay’s embrace of the notion of 
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training and yet her distinction from the conventional understanding of dance training. Pointing 
out the important tool in Hay’s work to “Dis-attach”, Bauer further elaborates the way in which 
Hay’s practice trains an “ongoing transformative process” (76). She notes: “The dancer is 
expected to relinquish what she knows while at the same time no other specific bodily 
programme is laid out. Hay leaves the dancer in the void. It is a void that is not to be filled but 
should rather act as a generative threshold towards the unknown” (77). This description resonates 
strongly with my discussion and articulation of the experience of somatic anacrusis in Hay’s 
work – in which I too describe it in part using the word threshold(ing). Referencing Bauer’s 
discussion here assists me in acknowledging Hay’s choreography and practice as “training” and 
as repetition, and in significantly distinguishing it from the disciplinary repetition in 
conventional dance training. So, what are we training and repeating in Hay’s practice? 
According to Bauer, via Hay herself as noted above, we are training in a process, an approach or 
way, that opens the “generative threshold”, a phrase that does indeed correspond to the 
experience of somatic anacrusis as a dynamic – engagingdeflecting – suspension of the 
structuring of meaningfulness in my analysis.  
I will now consider this notion of training in the context of Hay’s choreography from a 
different perspective and articulate it as a “pre-disposing”. First taking the definition of the word 
“disposition” as “one’s habitual ways of acting toward others or of thinking about things” 
(“disposition”), I then understand the etymology of the term “dispose” from the Old French dis 
(variously) poser (to place) as referencing the act or process of variously placing, positioning, or 
arranging (“disposition”). Adding to this the prefix “pre–”, meaning “before in place, time, order, 
or rank” (“pre-”), I invoke the term “pre-disposing” to characterize how Hay’s work practices – 
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“trains” – a process or way of being that, in effect, is “before” disposing, “before” habit, “before” 
the act of placing and positioning. According to Melinda Buckwalter, “Hay says ‘practice the 
performance’ rather than ‘rehearse’ to point out that the purpose of an ongoing performance 
practice is to unlearn the habit of learning a piece in one particular way” (39).   
I purposefully place the term “before” in quotes to signal my use of it in the context of 
the paradoxical simultaneity of somatic anacrusis under discussion. Here “before” is not before 
in linear time per se, but a “beforeness” that occurs within the process “disposing” and can only 
be understood in this context. A useful analogy, as I noted earlier, can be found in Julia 
Kristeva’s conceptualization of the semiotic and the symbolic, not, in this case, with respect to 
her articulations of the semiotic and the symbolic specifically (although her theory of poetic 
language could provide another interesting lens through which to reconsider the experience of 
somatic anacrusis). Here, however, I wish only to echo Kristeva’s clarification that the semiotic 
can only be thought from within the symbolic order (24). The “before” of somatic anacrusis that 
I am articulating here – the “pre” – only arises through the process of “disposing”, via the 
distinct function of Hay’s choreography.  
I consider the training or practicing of somatic anacrusis in Hay’s work a “pre-disposing” 
in the sense that this training perpetuates a processual experience of being “before” (i.e. pre-) 
disposition. This is the destructuring that occurs through Hay’s structure. In the experience of 
somatic anacrusis, the performer is perpetually deflected into the écart, the spreading away from 
precipitations of subjectivity and objectivity. Through Hay’s choreographic operation, the 
possibility for structuring and sedimentation that is involved in forming dispositions or habits – 
in conventional dance training or otherwise – is thwarted and with so-called repetition through 
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practice, the performer could be said to be “training” this process of subversion – of somatic 
anacrusis.  
However, simultaneously (and paradoxically), this practicing or training in the process 
and experience of somatic anacrusis may in itself be considered an act of habit-forming, of “pre-
disposing” in the dictionary’s sense of “[having] an inclination or tendency to” or “[putting] into 
a favourable or suitable frame of mind, emotional condition, etc.” (“predispose”). This line of 
thinking recalls Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of the sedimentation of structures of experience in 
the body schema, which aligns conceptually with the formation of dispositions as habits. As 
Mallin characterizes it: “Situations are mastered (though never finally) through a process of 
articulation and patterning which at one and the same time is the formulation of actions and of 
dispositions” (16). 
 In my analysis, I discussed how Hay’s choreography constantly engagesdeflects 
intention, attention and action, simultaneously acknowledging and subverting the tendency 
toward structuring and sedimentation through its function as a destructuring structure. As such, 
the term “pre-disposing” is apt because it reflects the paradoxical simultaneity of the experience 
of somatic anacrusis in both including and suspending the act of disposing, and the paradoxical 
simultaneity of being “before” and also “engaged in” the process of habit-forming. It is the 
practice of Hay’s choreography – as destructuring structure – and the daily repetition of the 





Performing as “Doing” as Pre-Relational 
Not only is Hay’s work practicing, it is also – and always – performing,140 both when dancing in 
the theatrical context and, importantly, even when dancing the solo alone in a studio. In 
articulating the performing aspect of practicing performing in the context of Hay’s work, I begin 
by addressing what it is not. Schechner’s restored behaviour does not adequately account for the 
experience of performing in Hay’s work, not least because Hay’s work functionally 
problematizes the idea of “restored behaviour” per se, in pulling at the seams of previously 
behaved habit, pattern, ritual or routine. Neither does Hay’s performing sit easily within 
Bauman’s definition of performing for as “double consciousness”, in part because the action is 
not placed in mental comparison with an ideal or original. Schechner’s earlier distinction 
between “doing” (the activity of all that exists) and “showing doing” (pointing to, underlining, 
and displaying doing) becomes helpful in beginning to understand Hay’s notion of performing. 
(Here, Schechner’s “showing doing” compares to Bauman’s notion of performing for.)  
Based on my experience, Hay’s performing is a kind of nesting of one within the other 
that, not surprisingly, troubles both. The experience of practicing performing in Hay’s work is 
more akin to Schechner’s “doing” insofar as it is aligned with Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental or 
global motility – the basic movement of bodily change – and insofar as this scope includes “all 
that there is”, as Hay has said. However, framed as theatrical performance, performing Hay’s 
work presumptively becomes a “showing doing” by context, with the potential experience of 
“double consciousness” this entails. However, even in the theatrical context, Hay’s choreography 
actively subverts self-reflexivity of “double consciousness” or of performing for. 
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In the case of working alone in a studio, one is fully engrossed in executing the complex 
task that is the destructuring structure of Hay’s choreography. The emphasis is on the de facto 
commitment to the full activity as prosaic task,141 recalling Hay’s stipulation that one should 
never “rehearse”, take apart, work on, mark,142 gloss over, etc. In practicing performing Hay’s 
work alone in a studio, one should not be refining the choreography, in a manner once removed 
from the theatrical context but nonetheless in advance of and in preparation for performance, as 
for someone. It is not rehearsal. Rather, one should be fully committed to executing the 
choreography as Schechner’s “doing”. Similarly so, in the case of practicing performing in a 
theatrical context versus the studio, though this would suggest a shift into “showing doing” or the 
for. According to Hay’s request for fidelity to her work at all times, in the theatre as in the studio 
one should maintain a de facto commitment to the choreography, as prosaic task. Thus, even 
within the context of the for, Hay’s choreography pulls away from the self-reflexive experience 
of “showing doing”. Performing, for Hay, does not change whether in the studio or in the theatre 
with an audience. The immense perceptual challenge of the destructuring structure of the work 
constantly pulls the performer away from falling into the for. By way of analogy, I think of this 
as similar to the experience of actually jumping/being pushed into deep, icy cold water and 
having to swim to avoid sinking or drowning. I might have greater or lesser skill in the 
movement and I can improve, but the movement is imperative and the situation requires my full 
commitment. In this analogy, there is no “double consciousness” or for. It is helpful here to 
return to Franko’s understanding of dance as praxis, through primary mimesis – “the taking of 
bodily form by bodies” – to understand Hay’s performing as praxis: a “doing” and a “physical 
participation” (Franko, “Mimique” 209-210). Dance as action. 
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In both studio and theatrical contexts then, performing Hay’s choreography involves 
“doing, not “showing doing”. However, in performing Hay’s work in the theatrical context, the 
stakes and the challenge of remaining committed to the task of the choreography – as “not 
showing doing” – increase due to the socio-economic contract of theatrical performance, and the 
attendant expectations and forces of desire to fulfill them – on the part of audience and 
performer. By contrast in the studio context, the stakes and challenge ostensibly decrease in the 
absence of an audience; however, in studio there arises the challenge of mustering a full 
commitment to the “doing” rather than the slightly removed rehearsal and marking, which are 
the common approach, but which would, to carry the analogy through, keep me standing at the 
edge of the water. Paradoxically once again, in the theatrical context, I must sustain the “doing” I 
might achieve in studio that is not for; and in the studio, I must manifest the committed “doing” I 
might achieve in the theatrical situation. The work itself raises my awareness of these 
expectations and forces of desire, of the habits and patterns of my own history and experience 
rehearsing and performing (and also as an audience member), and my interaction with them 
becomes another layer in the engagingdeflecting experience of somatic anacrusis – another of 
Hay’s “catastrophic acts”. I believe this is in part why Hay’s contract stipulates a period of three 
months’ daily practice – in order to be able to maintain fidelity to and consistency in “doing” the 
work, on a daily basis in the studio and in the charged context of theatrical performance.  
If the performing of Hay’s work can be articulated as doing, as praxis, as action, and can 
be “done” both alone in studio and also before an audience without substantially changing, can it 
effectively be considered relational? Further then, why ultimately situate the work in the 
theatrical context, i.e. before an audience? It is this fidelity to the performing as action, as praxis, 
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in both the studio and the theatrical context before an audience that prompts me to further 
question the dimension of relationality in Hay’s work. 
 
Considering Relational Aesthetics 
In the 1990s, art critic and curator Nicolas Bourriaud began to establish the concept of relational 
aesthetics as a way to understand and critique contemporary visual art of the 1990s. Writes 
Bourriaud: “… the role of artworks is no longer to form imaginary and utopian realities, but to 
actually be ways of living and models of action within the existing real …” (13). Relational 
artwork, for Bourriaud, involved a certain open-endedness in both the creation and interpretation 
of what was previously understood as a completed art object. Artists working in what Bourriaud 
identified as relational aesthetics, were concerned with generating situations or scenarios in 
which artists, objects and the public would engage in active intersubjective encounters – what 
might for our purposes here be called object-events. Around this time and after, performing 
artists in dance and theatre also re-engaged with 1960s and 1970s strategies for participatory 
work, in which the audience was invited, prompted or provoked into active relation with either or 
both the performers and the work.  
In her book Social Works, performance scholar Shannon Jackson extends the analysis of 
relational art launched by Bourriaud, addressing the increasingly complex aesthetic and socio-
political strategies in the field of “experimentation in art performance” with respect to the “social 
turn” (Jackson 2, both). Relatively recent examples in the contemporary dance/theatre zeitgeist 
include bluemouth inc.’s Dance Marathon and Punchdrunk’s Sleep No More, both of which 
actively invite the audience to participate in the performance event. Works of this kind have been 
	  279	  
variously critiqued for either their potent or, alternately, limited (to non-existent) self-reflexivity 
and criticality with respect to challenging or reinforcing socio-political contexts and structures 
(Bishop). Nonetheless, the common impulse in these efforts in both visual and performing arts 
was and is to activate the audience, incite interaction and catalyze relationship.143 According to 
Claire Bishop, so-called relational works prioritize function over contemplation – and I have 
characterized Hay’s choreography explicitly as a function, which would thus include it in the 
category of relational artwork. However, I question how to place Hay’s work with respect to this 
dimension of relationality. 
Considering relationality in light of the above, as an active engagement between public 
subjects and object-events or public subjects and performing subjects, presupposes a placing or 
positioning – a disposing – however temporary and contingent, in which each aspect of the 
relation takes meaningful, identifiable form both by and for the other. However, as I have just 
discussed, Hay’s choreography of somatic anacrusis enacts a “pre-disposing”. For the 
performer,144 Hay’s work deflects the precipitation of subjectivity and objectivity, and therefore 
of positioning or disposing. Thus, for the performer, the work deflects the possibility for active 
engagement, or relationality per se. And, if active engagement or relationality is pre-empted by 
the work itself, then this is how practicing performing the work can be understood to remain 
essentially unchanged whether in the studio or in the theatre, or in fact in a public or a private 
space.  
However, at the same time that a theatrical audience is not necessary in maintaining 
fidelity to practicing performing the work, Hay’s choreography is understood as such within the 
frame of theatrical performance convention, involving presentation before a generally seated 
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audience and thus implying a kind of witnessing, though perhaps not an explicit active 
engagement. The context for the work is presumptively relational at this level; Hay embraces this 
and it is important for the way in which, I propose, the work functions ethically. She could 
certainly choose to define a different context for her work that would contain or frame it 
otherwise, for example as an exclusively private practice. As it is, Hay makes a commitment to 
the presumptively relational context of theatrical performance and yet choreographically deflects 
the realization of relationality in the practicing performing of the work itself. Before an audience 
or not, in a theatre or not, the “doing” of the work subverts what might be articulated as a 
“consummated relationality”. 
Here I return to my analysis of somatic anacrusis as an “about to … but never quite …” 
to articulate what I now consider the “pre-relationality” of Hay’s work. This solo work is 
presented in the relational context of theatrical performance but deflects the realization of 
consummated relationality by deflecting the possibility of active engagement. It is always “about 
to [enter] … but never quite [entering into]…”, and therefore always just “before”, relationality. 
As with my discussion of “pre-disposing” above, here, the word “pre-relationality” implies being 
“before” relationality and yet embraces the paradox of the work’s theatrical context by including 
the concept of and possibility for relationality within it. Once again as above, by placing 
“before” in quotes, I signal my non-linear use of the term. 
As I have indicated, it is not possible for me to speak with any scope about the audience 
members’ experiences of the work. However, I have been an audience member for Hay’s work 
on several occasions and based on those few experiences I will only suggest the possibility that, 
in an encounter in which the artwork (specifically Hay’s) constantly strives to deflect a relational 
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disposing (in Hay’s case, as I have argued, via the performance of somatic anacrusis through the 
choreographic operation), audience members might experience something similar in witnessing 
the work. While a fair gauge of audience response to Hay’s solo choreography and practice 
remains a question for future study, reviews of Hay’s solo works hint at this possibility. In a 
review of Hay’s No Time to Fly (2010), Johanna Burton writes: “Watching Hay, I got a sense of 
just what such ‘cellular intelligence’ might be” (355). And of Hay’s The Match Jennifer Dunning 
writes: “Who knows what was going on, seemingly in real time, in the strange and surprisingly 
handsome little world of “The Match”? There was nowhere else to look, however, and that was 
good” (n.p.). For Daly watching Hay perform Voilà in 1995: “The condition of watching, and of 
being, becomes perpetually transformational, without continuity or closure. It’s an experience of 
constant deferment” (“No Exit” 41).145    
To summarize, what I am working toward here is an articulation of the way that 
practicing performing somatic anacrusis in Hay’s work can be understood to be “training” of not 
the stabilizing of figures and forms in a consummated relationality that enables meaningful 
interaction (however potentially fraught with imposition and misunderstanding as it might be 
equally filled with receptivity and understanding), but, rather, a process of 
approachingwithdrawing in a pre-relational pre-disposing that practices a way toward but does 
not yet actually move into relation with the other. Hay’s work cultivates the process and 
experience of somatic anacrusis, the perpetual spreading away from precipitations of subjectivity 
and objectivity and the deflection of processes of structuring and sedimentation, thereby 
engendering a lived suspension of consummated relationality, engagement and meaningful 
interaction. In this sense, it is a radical communication practice. Hay’s work pitches the 
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performer into this pre-relational pre-disposing through a fundamental and necessary process of 
perception in which the performer experiences the reversals and intertwinings of I-world, body-
space and movement-time through the desctructuring structure of Hay’s choreography, catching 
an impossible glance at primordiality. For Merleau-Ponty, this process of perception lies at the 
core of our being-in-the-world. For feminist philosopher of language Luce Irigaray, this process 
of perception lies at the heart of our capacity for an ethical approach to the other. So, I propose 
that somatic anacrusis – as pre-relational pre-disposing arising through the process of perception 
generated through the torqueing dynamic of moving Hay’s language through the body – enacts 
Irigaray’s call for a new way toward the other.  
 
Irigaray and Hay: Staging Encounters between One and the Other 
“Perception represents a possible path for sensing the other, respecting him as subject, and it also 
allows me to remain a subject while perceiving the other” (Irigaray, To Be Two 22). As this 
quote suggests, perception and relationality are among feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray’s 
concerns, like they are Hay’s. Where Hay embodies her politics implicitly through movement, 
Irigaray articulates her politics explicitly through language. Both propose bodily sense 
perception as a way of becoming toward self, world, other – staging provocations to a primarily 
logocentric, rational order. Having articulated somatic anacrusis as a pre-relational pre-disposing 
above, I will now further expand my frame of reference to consider the ethical implications of 
Hay’s practicing performing in light of feminist philosopher of language Luce Irigaray’s thinking 
about relationality and communication. Recalling Hay’s own words, as quoted by Daly: “It is 
precisely ‘the whole person in relation to the rest of the world,’ Hay argues, that is missing from 
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life today. That relationship is what we are longing to see. So the point of performance is not 
self-centeredness, but to embrace the audience, as well as fellow performers” (Hay qtd. in Daly, 
“The Play of Dance” 37). As I have presented above, Hay attempts this by choreographing a 
dynamic approachingwithrawing –  somatic anacrusis – that arguably enacts the widest possible 
embrace. 
 
Irigaray’s Call for a Culture of Perception and a New Way of Speaking Together 
Here I will summarize the aspects of Irigaray’s thought that are directly relevant to my argument. 
Irigaray’s works, specifically To Be Two and Wisdom of Love, develop her thinking about a new 
way of becoming together, of speaking together, in difference via an unpremeditated language 
that arises in the present encounter between one and the other. She is generally critical of 
instrumental-rational hegemony and media technologies and argues for the possibility of a new 
way of being toward the other through sensible perception that at once starts from and returns 
one to oneself, that is simultaneously a being toward the other and a becoming of self. Irigaray’s 
thinking, presented through a distinctly somato-poetic discourse, usefully enables a consideration 
of the ethical implications of Hay’s practicing performing, with respect to how it cultivates the 
pre-relational pre-disposing of somatic anacrusis.  
From her earlier works, which develop her thinking around sexual difference, Irigaray 
extends her theorizing of identity and difference to consider alterity and the possibility for 
relations between one and another in community: “In fact, there is no rupture between 
intersubjectivity in the strict sense and the intersubjectivity of a collectivity, and the desired 
changes in the relations between man and woman, men and women, form part of a 
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transformation which is helpful to all of our social relationships” (To Be Two 23). Irigaray 
questions – in To Be Two – language, technology and other discourses on her way to articulating 
– in The Way of Love – “a philosophy in the feminine, where the values of intersubjectivity, of 
dialogue in difference, of attention to present life, in its concrete and sensible aspects, will be 
recognized and raised to the level of a wisdom. A philosophy which involves the whole of a 
human and not only that mental part of ourselves through which man has believed to succeed in 
differentiating himself from other kingdoms” (Irigaray, Way of Love vii-viii). Here we note 
Irigaray’s critique of logocentrism and the instrumental/rational paradigm that has tended to 
dominate Western culture, and her prioritization of embodiment as a holistic and integrating 
principle. Like Merleau-Ponty, in her thinking Irigaray is concerned with the sensible body and 
foregrounds the role of perception in our encounters with the world and others. However, she 
critiques Merleau-Ponty for “overlooking the role of perception as a means of acceding [the verb 
accede here is likely used in connection with the Latin accedere, meaning to go near] to the other 
as other” (Irigaray, To Be Two 22, insertion mine). She continues: “Perception can establish a 
link between the reception of a fact exterior to me and an intention towards the world, towards 
the other” (To Be Two 22).  
Importantly, by the phrase “other as other” Irigaray emphasizes the need for respect and 
preservation of fundamental otherness, difference – a possibility foreclosed by either subsuming 
difference in same, or by refusing acknowledgement altogether. She implicitly critiques a 
generalized tendency to approach the “other as same” in the interest of efficient communication 
and an instrumental means-ends drive. The urge(ncy) to find common ground and understanding 
is predicated on identity/identification, thus eclipsing respect for otherness per se in 
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communication. For Irigaray, bodily sensible perception – with its qualities of intertwining and 
reciprocity – can specifically enable both a respect for otherness (“reception” in the above quote) 
and an opening toward (“intention” in the above quote) that do not foreclose the possibility to 
respect alterity in encounter and communication. Irigaray argues that this alternative approach – 
a more ethical approach – lies in a practice or process of perception that is generally missing 
from contemporary interactions and communications. 
In fact, several times in this chapter of The Way of Love, Irigaray notes that “we lack a 
culture of perception”, “we lack a culture which is subjective and intersubjective. Such a culture 
would require being faithful to the reciprocity in touching-being touched, itself a matter of 
perceiving or of speaking” (To Be Two 23). (This is one of the quotes with which I began this 
dissertation.) Her book The Way of Love can be understood as a kind of answer to the inherent 
question of how we develop such a culture. In fact, she suggests this in her preface: “The original 
place of the relation between the two parts of the human [mental and sensible, which she 
articulates previously] has to be cultivated in order for humanity to exist as such. This task is still 
to be fulfilled by us, and The Way of Love sketches a possible scenography for it” (Way of Love 
viii). Irigaray’s choice of the word scenography is particularly striking in the context of my study 
in its invocation of the realm of theatrical performance. This invocation returns again with the 
use of the word “staging” in the next paragraph, in which Irigaray discusses the problem of using 
existing descriptive or narrative language for this task. She notes rather that she is attempting to 
“[make] something exist, in the present and even more in the future. It is a matter of staging an 
encounter between the one and the other – which has not yet occurred, or for which we lacked 
words…” (Way of Love viii). From these invocations, we can understand The Way of Love as a 
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kind of performative text that, “proposes ways to approach the other, to prepare a place of 
proximity: with the other in ourselves and between us. The book is in search of gestures, 
including gestures in language, which could help on the way to nearness, and in order to cultivate 
it. This implies another relation with language, a relation which favors the act of speech in the 
present, and not a language already existing and codified” (Irigaray, Way of Love ix). These 
invocations of the performative realm, Irigaray’s explicit effort to “search [for] gestures, 
including gestures in language”, to find “another relation with language”, to “act … in the 
present”, to work through “a language [not] already existing and codified” aptly describe Hay’s 
project, which I argue embraces a similar and yet more fully performative strategy, equally “in 
search of gestures, including gestures in language”, and equally “stag[ing] an encounter between 
the one and the other which has not yet occurred, or for which we lacked words”.146  
On several levels, then, Irigaray’s work helps me to articulate the ethical implications of 
Hay’s choreography and practice. First, the practice aspect of Hay’s practicing performing, in 
which the tools and questions she expects the performer to embrace function to activate 
perceptual processes, aligns with Irigaray’s concern with the sensible body and with developing 
a culture of perception. Second, Irigaray’s thinking around the irreducible difference between 
two and her effort to articulate a way to approach the other while respecting this irreducibility in 
a new ethical relation offers a way to understand the performing aspect of Hay’s practicing 
performing, insofar as it is presumptively relational and “stages an encounter” in the present 
between one and other(s). Thirdly, Hay’s effort to subvert codified meanings and the “already 
choreographed” in her work – as dance, as movement, as gesture, and also through her distinctly 
subversive use of language in the score, question and tools – connects with Irigaray’s attempt to 
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move against, away, around codified language and pre-existing meanings “in search of gestures, 
including gestures in language, which could help on the way to nearness” (Irigaray, Way of Love 
ix). For Irigaray, we must find a new way of speaking together in difference. Hay’s 
choreography and practice performs such a proposal. Finally, at another level, Irigaray’s 
performative/poetic writing as a scenography (throughout The Way of Love and differently but 
particularly in the “Prologue” in To Be Two (Irigaray, To Be Two 1-16) can be thought of as a 
kind of score to be performed or enacted, not unlike Hay’s, while both of Irigaray’s texts also 
serve to illuminate language as gesture (as speaking and as moving) and reveal the intertwining 
weave of words and body, as does Hay’s dance work. 
 
Hay’s Choreography and Practice: Toward Otherness, Toward A Theatre of Love? 
In this concluding chapter, I have expanded the frame of reference for my study of Hay’s 
choreography and practice in order to consider its implications beyond the dance context. I am 
here answering the proverbial “so what?” with respect to my analysis of Hay’s choreography and 
practice. Above, I discussed Hay’s ongoing and prevailing concern with relationality in her work 
and from there, I articulated Hay’s practicing performing as a kind of “training” in “doing” of a 
specific order. This enabled me to develop an understanding of somatic anacrusis as a pre-
relational pre-disposing process – a “way”. In keeping with the paradoxical linguistic strategies I 
have employed throughout, these two terms – pre-relational and pre-disposing – include and yet 
preclude – engagedeflect – disposition (as formed habit or stance) and relationality (as active 
intersubjective engagement, “consummated relationality”). Understanding Hay’s work in this 
manner, as purposefully suspending processes of structuring and forming and thus holding back 
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the consummation of relationality, led me to the texts of Luce Irigaray, whose work shares 
themes and concerns similar to Hay, with respect to relationality, processes of perception and 
bodily being. As noted above, Irigaray has called for a culture of perception in order to find a 
new way to approach the other. My analysis has shown how Hay’s work functions through a 
practice of perception that I now suggest opens up possibilities for new ways of moving toward 
otherness.  
Others too have commented on the potentially ethical dimensions of Hay’s choreography 
and practice. As discussed in chapter 2, Dolan, Drobnick, Goldman and Nicely particularly 
emphasize the ways in which Hay’s work can be understood to resist status quo ways of being 
through the unique relationality it sets up. While Dolan and Drobnick focus on Hay’s large group 
works, Goldman and Nicely focus on Hay’s recent solo practice and group works deriving 
therefrom and both consider the ethical implications of the work in different ways. Goldman 
raises an important question about the ethics of practicing this work outside the safe space of the 
studio where individuals in the room share relative agreement around the nature of the work. She 
is particularly concerned about the vulnerability involved in the visual practices in Hay’s work, 
in both inviting another’s and activating one’s own gaze. Goldman’s concern here is primarily on 
the part of the safety of the performer (“O, O” 161). On the other hand, Daly describes Hay’s 
“public vulnerability” in performance as part of what makes her work so uniquely compelling 
(“No Exit” 40). Daly’s comment offers an important complement to Goldman’s concern because 
it both reinforces that concern and also therefore supports the view that Hay’s work is indeed 
implicitly political: in its performance it is making a proposal against the status quo and 
specifically with respect to relationality. Nicely, for her part, also suggests that the ethical 
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implications of Hay’s work lie largely in Hay’s approaches to visuality, which as Nicely argues, 
disrupt the constitution of subjectivity and dissolve the boundaries of naming that keep us 
separated (162). Nicely suggests that the practice can therefore change the possibilities of 
relationality, offering different ways to move into the future and to respond to the crises of our 
times. My own thinking about the ethics of Hay’s practice resonate with these perspectives; 
however, where these writers emphasize the visual aspect of Hay’s work, I consider the 
choreography and practice as a whole. 
Hay writes that she “aspires toward a bodily speechlessness” (At Once 6), and she 
discusses the importance of “playing” as a way of suspending or sustaining attention to the flux 
of the body (“Playing Awake” 75). In her book The Way of Love Irigaray characterizes a “silent 
constituting pause” (Way of Love 21) in which the world arises, a pause which is a withdrawal 
that reveals the non-universal character of the speaking and, in the pause, energy is awakened 
that is not named and fixed with words – that is left indeterminate – and, in this pause, the parts 
of the world come into proximity: “There is then neither a single round dance [Hay’s circle 
dances?] nor a single play of the world [Hay’s more conventional solo and group dances?] but a 
constitution of subjectivities [Hay’s solo choreography and practice?] that try to dance or to play 
together through – and despite – different unfoldings and refoldings” (Irigaray, Way of Love 21, 
italics and insertions, mine). Irigaray writes: “A silence, an impossible to say, moves each one 
toward an unappropriable signification. Too quickly occupying this silence – or the between-two 
– by a gesture, gestures, risks veiling the meaning of it: between the two something exists that 
belongs neither to the one nor to the other, nor moreover to any word” (Way of Love 23). 
Irigaray’s descriptions here unmistakably resonate with my foregoing discussion of the 
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experience of somatic anacrusis in Hay’s work: of suspension, of absencingpresencing, of 
yieldingexpanding, and of thresholding, of a process that subverts formed meaningfulness in a 
pre-relational pre-disposing wherein the engagingdeflecting of intentionality/intention, attention 
and action dissolves figure and ground to emphasize the écart or spreading away, of subjectivity 
and otherness, and opens toward an impossible glance at primordiality.  
Thus, in aspiring to bodily speechlessness, Hay’s choreography and practice enacts or 
performs Irigaray’s silent constituting pause. In engagingdeflecting intention, attention and 
action, Hay’s work foregrounds “the non-universal character of the speaking” through its un-
premeditated and thus individual and idiosyncratic movement and sound; it does not “[name] and 
[fix] with words” or gestures, instead it actively subverts processes of structuring; and it 
generates an indeterminate energy through an emphasis on bodily flux and the practice of 
perception. In engendering somatic anacrusis then, as a sustained suspension in a bodily process 
of perception, Hay’s work engagesdeflects pre-established modes, habits, patterns and structures 
of relationality and precipitates an experience of hovering, or …approachingwithdrawing…. 
Hay’s choreography and practice shifts experience into pre-relationality and thereby 
performs/reveals the generative dynamic, or pre-disposing, at the inception of relationality, 
proposing possibilities for a more ethical relation with the other, one that does not seek to 
possess or master, a new way of moving toward the other through perception that respects 
subjectivities (othernesses) and irreducible difference.  
In effect, through the engagingdeflecting processes engendered in the experience of 
somatic anacrusis, which moves towardaway from meaningfulness, Hay’s work, paradoxically 
once again, opens up possibilities for drawing together, into proximity. Practicing performing the 
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dynamic lived experience of moving Hay’s linguistic torques and semantic/syntactic strategies 
through the body opens a spacetime of difference and a new way to approach otherness. It is an 
ethical practice; Hay’s work enacts it, and disseminates it globally through others’ committed 
practice and performance of her work. Insofar as practicing performing Hay’s work engenders 
the experience of somatic anacrusis, could its iteration, perhaps even beyond the theatrical stage 
– as a radical communication practice of pre-relational pre-disposing – actually affect an 
individual’s approach to the world and to others over time? I suggest that Hay’s choreography 
and practice is a kind of performative answer to Irigaray’s call for a culture of perception, her 
search for a “way of love”. Could Hay’s choreography and practice therefore be considered to be 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
A “theatre of love”. What if? Certainly, this question opens up the positive, utopic potentiality of 
Hay’s embodied ethic. However, the opposite must be considered. As Deidre Sklar has noted in 
her essay “Unearthing Kinaesthesia”, in which she considers performances that shift between 
and engage different sensory modes: “I am making a large claim for somatic awareness, nothing 
less than declaring its potential for interrupting automatic responses. A performance that does 
this can be an act of generosity”. However, in short order she follows up with this: “I cannot help 
but consider the opposite possibility – the potential for danger as well as generosity inherent in 
interrupting somato-sensory habits … There is certainly evidence that one can call an audience to 
somatic attention and fill the opening with propaganda or worse (“Unearthing Kinaesthesia” 46 
and 46n12, both).  
As discussed earlier, Goldman has noted the possible dangers in practicing Hay’s work 
beyond the safe space of the studio where everyone is complicit in the work, and Daly has noted 
Hay’s vulnerability in performance, which could be compared to Sklar’s description of 
generosity. In my experience practicing performing Hay’s work in a field near my home – 
outside the theatrical context – I was definitely aware of the vulnerability (which, as I have 
noted, performer Christopher House has also remarked upon (K. Smith)) inherent in the practice 
and experience of somatic anacrusis as passersby turned their attention my way. In some 
instances, I immediately registered my instinct to “close up” into a stable experience of identity 
and meaningfulness, to dispose myself and come into a known pedestrian-in-the-park relation in 
order to feel safe and “normal”. But this experience reinforces the productive potential of Hay’s 
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work as a radical communication practice that moves toward otherness. I would argue that the 
inherent risks are worth taking in an effort to enact change – to move into new, more ethical 
(more loving?) relationalities. 
 
Summary of the Research 
Deborah Hay is a contemporary choreographer of international repute with a distinct and 
enigmatic choreographic practice that has garnered her critical acclaim, a network of 
accomplished performers engaged in her work, and a moderately-sized literature demonstrating 
scholarly interest in her distinct approach to dance practice through the course of her over forty-
year career. In this research project, I engaged in and studied Hay’s work from the “inside” as a 
performer and via close descriptive writing through my devised method of emergent 
choreographic analysis. A phenomenological framework of intentionality/intention, attention and 
action evolved from and supports my theoretical analysis, drawing significantly on Merleau-
Ponty’s ontology of situations and his theory of embodiment and perception. My emergent 
choreographic analysis of Hay’s work, as I experienced it through the solo At Once, comprises 
two parts. The first considers Hay’s choreography as a constructed situation of score, questions 
and tools that, through her distinct use of language, functions as a destructuring structure. 
Through description and analysis, I articulate how Hay’s braided choreographic function 
engagesdeflects the performer’s intentionality/intention, attention and action, operating as a 
destructuring structure that subverts tendencies toward organizing and interpreting experience 
such that the performer is thrown into a fundamental practice of perception. The second part of 
the analysis involves experiential descriptions of distinct and contrasting experiences of I-world, 
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body-space and movement-time within the work that reveal how Hay’s practice of perception 
actively pulls at the seams of patterns and habits of sense-making.  
Drawing together three key phenomena at play in my performing experience – 
absencingpresencing, yieldingexpanding and thresholding – which are characterized by a shared 
felt-sense of paradoxical simultaneity, I establish the experiential concept of somatic anacrusis. 
Comparing this concept to similar concepts from within the somatic and improvisational dance 
literature, I distinguish this non-resolving suspended experience of somatic anacrusis from my 
experience in both set choreography and improvisation, which both tend toward resolution, 
broadly speaking. Having articulated this distinction, I argue that through a highly specified 
dance work that is nonetheless realized through un-premeditated movement, Hay’s work takes us 
both beyond improvisation and to the cutting edge of choreography, where, through linguistic 
torques and semantic/syntactic strategies, we move beyond meaningfulness toward an impossible 
glance at primordiality.  
In rethinking the dimension of relationality in Hay’s work, I bring it into contact with 
Irigaray’s thought. First, through the lens of certain discussions around training, performance, 
presence, repetition and representation, Hay’s practicing performing is reframed as “training” in 
a process of “doing” – as praxis. Then, through this reframing, somatic anacrusis in Hay’s work 
is understood as a pre-relational pre-disposing that occurs in the process of perception, one that 
suspends pre-established habits and patterns of encounter and sense-making. As such, practicing 
performing somatic anacrusis becomes a possible answer to Irigaray’s call for a new and more 
ethical way toward others and difference through perception. In bringing Hay’s work into contact 
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with Irigaray’s, we arrive at an understanding of the implicit critique of an instrumental/rational 
paradigm and the embodied ethic enacted through Hay’s choreography and practice. 
My emergent choreographic analysis of Hay’s work, presented in the preceding chapters, 
resonates with many of the ideas developed in the literature on Hay’s work. Like others, my 
work recognizes the specific quality of attention – what some, including Daly, call presence – 
that occurs in Hay’s work, which derives from somatic awareness of bodily experience. Writes 
Daly: “The work is about what is traditionally called ‘presence’ … It has, I think, to do with a 
saturated quality and intensity of focus, with the simultaneous, connected attention between the 
performer’s inner and outer life” (“The Play of Dance” 37). In her early analysis of Hay’s 
creative activity, Foster focuses particularly on Hay’s practice of cellular consciousness with 
respect to the qualities of presence and attention in her work (Reading Dancing). I address the 
dissociation of movement and meaning in Hay’s work, which has also been noted in the 
literature, specifically by Leslie Satin and Rosalind Krauss. The emphasis on flux and change 
that appears in my discussion has also been treated by others, often in considering Hay’s work 
through a feminist lens as a process of becoming, as do Daly, Satin and Burns. I also articulate 
shifting experiences of self and subjectivity that occur in Hay’s work, which have been noted by 
others including Daly, Drobnick and Nicely. I examine Hay’s distinct use of language in her 
work, which has been noted by Dolan and treated more systematically by Drobnick; and I 
consider the destabilizing forces at play in Hay’s work as they subvert and disrupt habits and 
patterns of thought and action, as have Nicely and Goldman. Finally I consider the relational and 
ethical dimensions of Hay’s work, which have been touched on – differently – by others 
including Dolan and Nicely.  
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My study in part resonates with similar points from the above literature and yet offers a 
new perspective on Hay’s work. Specifically, my work digs deeper, asking not “what” are the 
characteristics of Hay’s work but more specifically, “how” are these characteristics engendered. 
A commitment to articulating complex, dynamic, processual experience lies at the heart of my 
study. Both Goldman’s and Nicely’s work tends in this direction as well; however, a major 
distinction between my research and the discussions referred to above is also in how I 
approached my key question, generated in itself through an overarching practice-as-research 
approach. This approach facilitated my devised method of emergent choreographic analysis, 
which provides significant new insights into Hay’s choreography and practice, specifically in 
terms of how it functions as processual experience and how it enacts an embodied ethic. The 
work I have undertaken in this study realizes my aims from the outset: to bring my dancing 
experience of Hay’s work into language and present it as a way of knowing, to articulate a 
poetics of Hay’s dance practice in terms of how it functions experientially, and to expand the 
context in which Hay’s work is considered.  
 
Contributions 
My work contributes generally to practice-as-research methods for the experiential study of 
dance practice and choreography through my devised method of emergent choreographic 
analysis involving iterative phases of moving and writing. This method goes hand-in-hand with 
the theoretical framework I have derived for this research, based on the triumvirate dynamic 
relation of intentionality/intention, attention and action, which provides a lens through which to 
differently illuminate other experimental contemporary dance and performance practices that are 
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similarly working with choreographic functions and through perceptive practices. I intend to 
continue developing the processes and procedures I have articulated in this study and hope that 
others will join me in exploring both their value and their limits in revealing the workings of 
experimental choreography and performance from within the performer’s experience, as well as 
their potential applicability in other kinds of research involving close study of complex, 
processual lived experiences. In my reconsideration of the relationship between movement and 
language through the intermediary of the (dancing) body, this work adds to and inflects the 
existing discourse on the relationship between writing and dancing in the dance studies literature. 
Finally, the experiential concept of somatic anacrusis that I have articulated allows a reflection – 
through dance – on the relation between language and the body, and the role of processes of 




This work is a poetics: it presents the internal experiential processes by which Hay’s work 
arguably enacts an implicit critique and an embodied ethic. In taking a practice-as-research 
approach to a case study analysis, it remains necessarily tightly focussed. It answers the question: 
how does Hay’s work function from a performer’s perspective? Many other questions extend 
from this work – not least of which is how other performers’ experiences of Hay’s work might 
corroborate and complicate my analysis. Using my eleven interviews with other performers from 
my same SPCP workshop/residency, a preliminary study could begin. Further, my research does 
not yet address the question of how Hay’s work “appears” to an audience? This would require, 
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according to Beshty, an “aesthetics of ethics”: “a new set of tools for the evaluation of art’s 
‘agency’” (15). Another next step would be such an ethical analysis of the aesthetics of Hay’s 
work from the standpoint of reception. Earlier I suggested that from an alternative perspective, 
one might consider that Hay has perhaps only inadvertently established a movement aesthetic 
through her decades-long exploration of relationality. This fits with Beshty’s proposal: “The 
central concern of an ethical analysis is not whether the work can be evaluated positively or 
negatively in ethical terms, but instead resides in the more complex question of the aesthetic 
manifestation of the ethical dimension of the work of art” (20). This kind of evaluation that is 
concerned with “how ethical relations create aesthetic form” (Beshty 19) presents an alternative 
and perhaps more appropriate method of evaluation for work like Hay’s and other contemporary 
dance artists practicing in similar ways.148  
 
Thinking (through) Dancing 
As a result of my research and analysis, I consider Hay’s work a radical communication practice 
with implications beyond the field of dance. Though this particular work is a solo practice and 
I’ve articulated it as “pre-relational”, it is nonetheless “social work”, aligned with the range of 
performances discussed by Shannon Jackson: “Whereas for many the word “social” signifies an 
interest in explicit forms of political change, for other contemporary artists it refers more 
autonomously to the aesthetic exploration of time, collectivity, and embodiment as medium and 
material” (14). Hay’s work moves along this continuum. And it is dance; therefore, in 
embodying Lepecki’s five main constitutive qualities (ephemerality, corporeality, precariousness, 
scoring and performativity), it is a practice of contemporaneity: in its “inescapable corporeality 
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constantly demonstrat[ing] to dancers and audiences alike concrete possibilities for embodying-
otherwise – since a dancer’s labour is nothing else than to embody, disembody and re-embody, 
thus refiguring corporeality and proposing improbable subjectivities” and in its “essential 
performativity […] [t]his insistence on returning with a difference” (“Dance as a Practice” 14). 
Choreography, dancing, is contemporary “thinking in process”. 
 
Practicing, Performing, Writing: Iteration, Adaptation, Perpetuation 
And we need new processes of thinking. In contrast to taking an established scholarly argument 
or idea and destabilizing it through critique, my research has taken a lived and changing practice 
– and one that, as I have discussed, actively seeks to destabilize – and sought to stabilize and 
restabilize it, through critical-creative adaptation. This is only ever provisional. As performance 
scholar Della Pollock writes: “Performance won’t stand still long enough for theory to wrap it up 
nicely. It moves in time and space through restless bodies. To track its contingencies, to plumb 
its affective depths, and to discover the power and pleasures of its rough currents, thinking about 
performance must move as well” (1). In this characterization of my work, I refer back to my 
introduction in which I articulated Linda Hutcheon’s sense of the term adaptation as: “An 
acknowledged transposition of a recognizable other work or works; A creative and interpretive 
act of appropriating/salvaging; An extended intertextual engagement with the adapted work. 
Therefore, an adaptation is a derivation that is not derivative – a work that is second without 
being secondary. It is its own palimpsestic thing” (8). My effort here is grounded in the fact that 
knowledges develop in many forms – movement performance being one – and yet to consider 
them in a scholarly context requires a type of reflective – and linguistic – engagement. In this 
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dissertation – thus understood as a critical-creative adaptation of Hay’s solo At Once – I have 
endeavoured to remain intimate with the lived dancing experience through writing strategies that 
strive to respect the lived form of the knowledge (in movement performance) while translating 
and interpreting this knowledge into a discursive form that enables its interaction with an 
interdisciplinary field of ideas. 
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Notes 	  
1. To clarify and orient the reader with respect to my use of this phrase throughout, what I 
mean by a radical communication practice here is distinct from the more conventional 
understanding of communication as a semiotic, representational system of signs and meanings – 
through which dance and movement have been considered. In my work here, I use this phrase in 
the broad context of performance praxis, placing emphasis on the embodied, affective, energetic 
aspects of enactment and intersubjective exchange. 
2. I first encountered many of Hay’s distinct turns of phrase, questions and tools during the 
2009 Solo Performance Commissioning Project residency in Scotland. Henceforth in this 
document, all quotations cited in this manner refer to statements Hay made during the course of 
that workshop. 
3. Interestingly, in his essay “Mimique”, Mark Franko also refers to Kristeva’s theory as one 
that “dodges metaphysical fixity because its ‘originary metaphysics’ is motility itself, without 
spatial coordinates” (Franko, “Mimique” 215 n23). 
4. I use this phrase “think through (the) dancing” in two senses. To “think through” 
something commonly connotes a reflective analytic engagement with the experience. However, 
the phrase also suggests using dancing as a kind of method or tool for thinking. This second 
meaning is pertinent to understanding my approach to this research.  
5. French feminism is by no means a unified school of thought, as Kelly Oliver points out in 
her preface to the French Feminism Reader (Oliver vii-x). In fact, theorists considered to belong 
to this heterogeneous group, including Hélène Cixous, have refused the categorization altogether 
(Oliver 254). 
6. In my Chapter 2 discussion of the surrounding literature on Hay and her work, I address 
relevant aspects of her career and influences more fully. 
7. Baryshnikov conceived of this project for his White Oak Dance Project as a way to 
honour and reconnect to the artists of the 1960s avant-garde in dance. He commissioned 
remounts or new works from a handful of key figures from the period including David Gordon 
(co-organizer of PASTForward), Trisha Brown, Lucinda Childs, Simone Forti, Hay, Steve 
Paxton and Yvonne Rainer. Hay created the group work Whizz (2001) for White Oak and also a 
new duet for she and Baryshnikov entitled Single Duet (2001). (See Perron, Judson Dance 
Theater). 
8. I first encountered this phrase “performance generating system” in reference to dance 
through the work of performance dramaturg and scholar Pil Hansen who, in 2014, published an 
essay entitled “Dancing Performance Generating Systems”. In Hansen’s terms, “Performance 
generating systems add precise rules, parameters, and sources to task-based creation that focus 
the dancers’ attention on specific aspects of the work and limit their possible responses. The 
resulting coordinates are not typically used to create material that then is set as choreography, but 
they and the movements they attract become the very dramaturgy of a composition.” Hansen 
briefly cites Deborah Hay’s work as an example of a performance generating system: “Her 
[Hay’s] performance generating ‘scores’ indicate a series of paired tasks, emotions, directions in 
space, perceptual orientations, rules, challenges, and memories that the dancer is moved through 
and responding within over time (for example, No Time to Fly)” (Hansen 256-257, both). 
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9. It would be interesting to consider this perspective with respect to psychoanalyst Donald 
Winnicott’s thinking in Playing and Reality. I do not take up this direction here. 
10. Deborah Hay’s Solo Performance Commissioning Project: In 1998, after a period 
focussed primarily on making solo dances for herself, Hay launched the Solo Performance 
Commissioning Project (SPCP), in which a group of participants commissioned the same solo 
from Hay. The annual ten-day residency ran from 1998 through 2012 in various locations 
internationally. During the SPCP, participants studied Hay’s specific performance practice and 
received individual coaching from her over the course of the residency.  For participants, the 
SPCP provided the opportunity to acquire a solo work from Hay that then became part of the 
individual performer’s repertoire. The SPCP invited experienced performers from dance, 
performance art and theatre to participate in the program. In August 2009, when I attended, 
international participants came from countries including Canada, the United States, Australia, 
Portugal, Venezuela, the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. Most participants came 
with a strong dance background and many had quite highly developed technical training in 
western contemporary dance modalities. A handful had less technical movement training, 
coming to performance via physical and dramatic theatre.  
The SPCP was partly a way for Hay to explore and develop her choreographic method and 
performance practice, and to engage in questions around the documentation and transmission of 
choreography as much as it was a choreographic commission structure. Interested individuals 
applied to the program and were required to raise the commissioning fee from their community 
via individual, corporate and/or government sources. Over the course of its existence, the 
program inevitably evolved, forming a cyclical and iterative part of Hay’s annual choreographic 
and performance practice. Solo scores commissioned by participants through the SPCP 
developed from Hay’s prior work and also evolved into subsequent solos or group works by Hay, 
for herself or others. For example the solo At Once commissioned through the SPCP 2009, which 
I attended, was informed by the previous solo Market (2009) and linked forward to Hay’s 
subsequent solo work No Time to Fly (2010). 
11. For each subsequent performance run, the contract stipulates that the performer must 
complete a three-week process to engage with the tools of the practice and to bring the work 
back to performance readiness. 
12. I am concerned here with dance practices that prioritize process over product, and 
experience over form. In the latter category, we might include classical dance forms such as 
ballet, bharatanatyam and Graham, in which a strong aesthetic and technical specificity underlie 
the practice, compositions are most frequently set in advance and draw on an established 
movement vocabulary. Though improvisation can be understood to be at play in all live dance 
performance (Albright and Gere xv), it is not the primary modality in these cases. In the former 
category, we might include contemporary practices such as contact improvisation, structured and 
open improvisation, along with conceptual and task-based performance that may be informed by 
or appear in performance art contexts. In these practices, we find a low degree of specificity in 
aesthetic and technique, composition often occurs during performance or is derived from 
parameters set in advance that do not prescribe the movement vocabulary for the performance. 
13. An interesting study that seeks to understand the dancer’s artistic process in a particular 
choreography was conducted by Cecilia Roos and Anna Petronella Foultier and documented in 
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an anthology that includes theoretical and practice-based research and writing in which the 
moving body is very present in the text. 
14. Hay makes a distinction between a score and a libretto: “The scores of the ’60s were 
simply from the point of view of the dancer who was dancing it, whereas with the libretto, which 
I also think of as a score, you get the view of how the observer sees it. You have more than one 
perspective into the dancing of the dance” (Daly, “Horse Rider” 51). This passage in Daly’s 
interview with Hay provides some useful insight from the time into Hay’s thinking about, 
writing and use of scores or libretti in her work. In my work here, I use the term score, but allow 
for the fact that the score for At Once is more like a libretto, as defined by Hay here. 
15. For example, beyond performing Hay’s solos, various practitioners have begun to share 
her approach to practice. Australian solo dance artist Ros Warby has worked extensively with 
Hay and has begun to teach in a workshop-based structure sharing her own approach to practice, 
which draws on what she has learned from Hay (Gardner and Dempster 1). Toronto-based 
Christopher House, who has also developed an extended working relationship with Hay, taught a 
workshop in January 2013 through the Toronto Dance Community Love-In that was described to 
be focussed on sharing his understanding of Hay’s practice. 
16. In chapter 5, I discuss the level of choreographic responsibility that the performer holds 
in Hay’s work and make a distinction between choreographic responsibility and contextual 
responsibility. Here, I use the term choreographer with direct reference to its usage in Hay’s 
quote above. Below I use the term contextual responsibility to refer to the framing the 
performance of the work. I thus distinguish this from choreographic responsibility, which I use to 
refer to dealing with the actual material of the work itself. 
17. I address this understanding of daily practice as performing more specifically in my final 
chapter. 
18. Considering that there are approximately twenty people involved in each SPCP (though 
some people return year over year), and considering the fact that at least a good portion of this 
group enters into the requisite three months of practice immediately following the SPCP 
residency, we can begin to visualize network of iterating processes, extended across space and 
time: Hay’s work in multiplicity, pulsing through bodies around the world. 
19. Sally Banes, eminent scholar of the Judson-era and post-modern turn in dance, provides 
a distilled summary and examples of work from this period in her essay “Earthly Bodies: Judson 
Dance Theatre” included in the Bennington College Judson Project book (Banes “Earthly 
Bodies”). Other books by Banes examine the context, concerns and artists of this period in more 
detail. 
20. Most recently, I’m thinking here of American dance artist Sara Wookey’s engagement 
with Yvonne Rainer and the transmission of Rainer’s Trio A, for example, an incarnation of 
which took place at the Art Gallery of Ontario in spring 2015 (“Transmitting Trio A”), and the 
July 2014 symposium entitled “The Live Legacy Project: Correspondences between German 
Contemporary Dance and Judson Dance Theater Movement” mounted by Tanzfonds Erbe 
(Guerreiro). Some of the interest and connection between new generation and the 1960s avant-
garde artists relates to questions and concerns on the part of both groups around legacy and 
transmission of live performance practice. Such concerns have also been a motivating factor for 
Hay (Daly, “Horse Rider” 53). 
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21. Perron herself notes this connection (“Through the Eyes” 157). 
22. In 1980, Hay also established her own dance company, Deborah Hay Dance Company 
(DHDC), which has since functioned as a non-profit umbrella to support her own work. 
23. Hay’s 1991 large-group workshop was the first to be named in this way (Hay Lamb xi). 
24. Banes’ collected work provides an excellent contextual analysis and ethnographic 
document of the period, laying out the cultural and artistic foment among disciplines and 
articulating the specific history of JDT itself. 
25. Satin notes that she draws this phrase from James Olney’s book Metaphors of Self: The 
Meaning of Autobiography (205, n2). 
26. Satin calls upon the work of Adrienne Rich and Laura Mulvey, among others. 
27. Satin also looks back at some of Hay’s work over time and draws out salient details 
including Hay’s early use of objects as another strategy to deflect the spectactorial gaze from 
herself. 
28. Drobnick participated in Cheap Thrills, which took place in Austin, Texas, in 1988, three 
years prior to the Playing Awake workshop that gave rise to Lamb, Lamb, Lamb, Lamb, Lamb, 
Lamb….  
29. Drobnick’s 27 chosen terms: Ah-Ha, Artist, Attention, Awakeness, Body, Cellular 
Consciousness, Change, Choreography, Community, Cultivation, Dance, Innocence, Listening, 
Movement, Performance, Performance Consciousness, Performance Meditation, Play, 
Positionlessness, Practice, Resourcefulness, Returning, Seeing, Simplicity, Tricks, Willingness 
to be Seen, The Work.  
30. In the ethics agreement Hay signed with me with respect to this research project, she 
requested the addition of a special term in which I agreed to never describe her work as 
improvisational. 
31. In her book Lamb at the Altar, Hay includes the scores/libretti for both the group and 
solo choreographies. 
32. This term comes from Hay herself  (“How do I recognize my choreography?”). 
33. “Practicing performing” was the language Hay used in the SPCP in which I participated. 
“Meditation” was not generally used as a descriptor of the work – or any aspect of it – in my 
experience.  
34. Indeed, one might argue that through processes of mimicry and appropriation, Hay’s 
work functions as a (feminist) challenge to and critique of both Eastern and Western notions of 
spirituality, offering a secularization of spiritualism that could be read in critical dialogue with 
contemporary debates about spirituality and atheism, such as those forwarded by philosopher 
Alain de Botton (Botton, “Atheism 2.0”). A more robust consideration of Hay’s complex 
relationship to and extension of spiritual ideas/practices and discourse in her artistic practice is 
well beyond the scope of this project. 
35. Later, I consider Kent de Spain’s research on improvisation in which he also reverts to a 
certain spiritually inflected language to articulate the experiences thereof. 
36. In My Body, the Buddhist, Hay provides a short reflection on sacred dancing and dancing 
as inherently sacred. Her comment highlights the semantic/linguistic issue that I articulate here 
with respect to the use of spiritual discourse around her work: “I was never drawn to participate 
in sacred dance classes. I feared my irreverence, cynicism, and snobbery. Little did I realize that 
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my problem was linguistic. Sacred dancing is redundant” (My Body, the Buddhist 53). 
37. In addition to the performative hierarchy and segregation, according to Wasik one group 
of performers was paid significantly less than the other, and during one performance a blue black 
“intentionally shoved” (Wasik) a member of the blue white group. This incident is described 
differently in Goldman “Judson Now”. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to parse the 
perspectives and implications of this particular performance and ensuing discussion. I raise the 
situation here in order to provide an alternative perspective on the debate about the political 
dimensions (or lack thereof) in Hay’s work. 
38. This issue was made topical in 2012 with an article on theglobeandmail.com by John 
Barber, which took stock of the fact that though female writers dominate in terms of the number 
of novels sold, male writers still dominate as both reviewers and reviewed in the media. 
Anecdotally, this situation could very likely be transposed directly onto dance, a field of 
prevalently female practitioners. 
39. Later in the text, Hay reveals the title’s allusion to a dog, proposing that her cultivated 
relationship to her body as teacher is not unlike the relationship of a good dog to its master, 
attuned and responsive to the slightest movements and energies and following its lead. 
40. Yvonne Rainer’s No Manifesto stands as a major articulation of these concerns (Rainer). 
41. In her thinking through the possibility for research via embodiment, dance ethnologist 
Deidre Sklar also references Thomas Csordas’ earlier work on somatic modes of attention as a 
proposed method for conducting embodied anthropological research (Sklar “Reprise”). 
42. This question is productively engaged and explored with respect to dance in Susan 
Foster’s anthology Choreographing History (1995).  
43. I use this term descriptively, and also in reference to feminist arguments about 
knowledge and embodiment significantly articulated in Donna Haraway’s important 1988 essay 
“Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective”.  
44. Ann Cooper Albright’s essay “Situated Dancing: Notes from Three Decades in Contact 
with Phenomenology” first appeared in this journal issue and was subsequently published in her 
2013 book Engaging Bodies. I reference the version of the essay from Engaging Bodies. 
45. For my discussion, I rely primarily on personal experience and certification as a CMA –
Certified Movement Analyst – through the Laban/Bartenieff Institute of Movement Studies in 
New York. Several published texts on the system include Bartenieff, Bradley, Brennan, Daly, 
Hackney, Maletic, and Newlove and Dalby.  
46. Mary Alice Brennan discusses LMA as a research method and addresses questions of 
reliability and validity in her essay “Every Little Movement Has a Meaning All Its Own: 
Movement Analysis in Dance Research”. While inter-reader reliability has been established via 
several studies, reliability evaluation could stand to be further examined, particularly for more 
scientifically inclined studies using the method. 
47. See for example Daly “Movement Analysis” and Desmond. In discussing her own 
scholarly trajectory, Ann Cooper Albright also notes the limitations of LMA as an analytic tool 
when used in neutral analysis of dance movement with a focus on description versus 
interpretation and cultural meaningfulness (“Situated Dancing” 6). 
48. Recent research in cognitive neuroscience on proprioception and kinaesthesia has 
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identified the existence and activity of mirror neurons, which are involved in our perception of 
movement in ourselves and others. Providing a scientific and physiological grounding for the 
notion of kinaesthetic empathy or what I have above called embodied “listening”, research has 
shown that these neurons, located within the cerebral cortex, activate not only when a subject 
performs an action herself, but also when a subject witnesses an action. In her book-length 
analysis of concepts and relationships between choreography, kinaesthesia and empathy, dance 
scholar Susan Foster has elaborated this research in a dance-related context (Choreographing 
Empathy). 
49. Vera Maletic has conducted an extensive comparative analysis of LMA and three 
different phenomenological philosophies, including Merleau-Ponty’s in an appendix to her 
detailed text Body, Space, Expression: The Development of Rudolf Laban's Movement and 
Dance Concepts.   
50. Below, I address one method developed by dancer/researcher Kent De Spain for 
soliciting descriptive reports of movement experience during the experience itself and I explain 
why that method would not have functioned in my inquiry here. 
51. By thematized, I mean a description that develops or imposes a theme on the 
phenomenon in order to organize and make sense of it according to a particular concept, 
reference or framework. The goal is a description that is as free as possible from pre-selected or 
pre-defined organizing or interpreting principles. 
52. A brief summary of the residency experience: On the first day, we immediately began 
learning the score, an eleven-page text document with some simple hand-drawn figures, each 
person around the circle reading aloud a paragraph at a time. Hay would then answer questions 
and elaborate with further verbal instruction, though minimally, and very shortly we were up and 
moving through the score in the space. As At Once is a solo work, each person practiced 
individually within the context of the full group. During the first few days, the twenty of us 
almost always moved concurrently, or in one or two smaller groups. Within two days, we had 
learned the score’s basic structure and sequence. The balance of our ten days continued in a 
similar manner. Generally we began with open group practice of Hay’s specific tools for 
practicing performing, usually with a specific focus or direction proposed by Hay, who would 
often provide additional verbal proposals while we were moving. Then we would practice the 
score, as a group at first and then individually. Over the course of the intensive, each participant 
had two opportunities to perform the full score as a solo, witnessed by the entire group. 
Immediately following each solo performance, Hay provided feedback and engaged in direct 
dialogue with the performer, before inviting other participants’ feedback and a group discussion. 
Cycling through the entire group allowed us to observe other performers’ approaches and 
embodiments of the score, as well as to learn from Hay’s responses to each performer. The score 
took approximately twenty minutes to perform, on average depending on the performer and the 
specific instance. As such, including feedback and discussion, it was possible to complete two 
solo performances per hour. With open group practice, discussions and breaks, it took about two-
and-a-half to three days to cycle through the group once; thus, the workshop period allowed for 
two solo performances per participant. 
53. Video recordings of the performances and digital audio recordings of the post-show 
discussions remain as documents of these events. 
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54. While my keyword analysis method in ways resembles that of Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis as developed by Jonathan Smith (Smith 1999), I did not proceed 
from that basis or approach, which is used more commonly in psychological research.  
55. In science, and in alcohol production, a secondary distillation process is sometimes used 
to further purify a liquid. For example double distilled water, produced via a second boiling of 
the previously boiled and condensed vapour, was often used in laboratory experiments. 
56. I use these terms in relation to the above quote in which Cazemajou explains 
Vermersch’s usage. “Reflective” is taken to mean making something conscious, which I 
understand to mean bringing it to language, to light. “Reflexive” is taken to mean 
conceptualizing something, which I understand to mean organizing and interpreting it. 
57. From early work in dance and movement rehabilitation by Dr. Lulu Sweigard to Irene 
Dowd’s expansion of the term Ideokinesis to more recent approaches including Eric Franklin’s 
Conditioning With Imagery and Donna Krasnow’s CI Training, the productive resonance 
between somatic awareness and verbal description is recognized and valued. 
58. Here I am concerned with articulating the repetition of this practice from the perspective 
of method. In chapter 6, I offer a more critical discussion of the question of repetition in Hay’s 
work in the context of dance training. 
59. While I have not formally studied Mallin’s Body Hermeneutic Method, I have come into 
contact with aspects of it through the work of my colleagues Drs. Angela Joosse and Izabella 
Pruska-Oldenhof. As I study my experience of Hay’s practice through Merleau-Ponty via 
Mallin’s interpretation, I am aware of Body Hermeneutics and begin to see possible resonances 
between the way I’m working and aspects of Mallin’s method, particularly with respect to my 
approach to descriptive writing. I wish to acknowledge this indirect influence while also noting 
that I do not take it up explicitly in this study. 
60. Choosing not to read the Hay literature prior to my research process helped me avoid 
this to the degree possible, while of course I acknowledge that I studied Hay’s practice directly 
with her and discussed it with others on the SPCP residency program. 
61. De Spain also uses the word “echo” to describe the relationship between bodily 
experience and language that describes it (29). 
62. Ann Cooper Albright draws on Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of tracing the body in writing 
in her own reflections on researching and writing through bodily experience as a “connected 
knowing” (“Situated Dancing” 13). 
63. To make a connection, Authentic Movement – developed by Mary Starks Whitehouse – 
is a practice in which a witness observes a mover freely following movement impulses arising in 
the body in a non-judgmental way and non-selective way. The movement may but need not bear 
any resemblance to recognizable or codified form, either pedestrian or practiced (sport, dance, 
etc.) The intent is spontaneous and personal-exploratory. The witness and the mover both 
respond to the experience afterward and then often switch positions to repeat the process. The 
literature surrounding this practice situates it within a therapeutic context, though the practice is 
sometimes drawn upon in dance creation contexts. There are similar principles underpinning 
Authentic Movement, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “authentic speech” and my writing practice in 
this research project (Whitehouse et al). 
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64. In the senses articulated by Hutcheon in Theory of Adaptation and Freeman in “Making 
the Obscene Seen”, both of which I have discussed earlier. 
65. Many of Hay’s own articles on her practice have appeared in the alternative movement 
journal Contact Quarterly, which focuses extensively on improvisational dance and somatic 
movement practices, including contact improvisation, hence its title. 
66. In the ethics agreement she and I signed with respect to my research, she stipulated the 
additional specification that I would not refer to her work as improvisation. 
67. In Hay’s score for the solo At Once, there are only a few explicit movement directions. 
The balance of the score is more abstract and enigmatic. See chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of 
this. 
68. See for example Novack, Albright and Gere, Goldman’s I Want to be Ready, Buckwalter, 
De Spain and the movement journal Contact Quarterly. 
69. This is also very likely why her work is often considered improvisation and why she 
takes pains to distinguish it, which I hope to explain in the following chapters. 
70. This term/concept has been repeatedly taken up and taken apart in dance, theatre, 
performance studies and philosophical contexts. I use it here in a general and vernacular usage.   
71. I understand and employ aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s thought in my work through 
engagement with primary texts and via their interpretation by Samuel B. Mallin in his book 
Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy. 
72. Situations will be discussed below; for now, a situation can be understood to be any 
specific instance of lived experience. 
73. Merleau-Ponty distinguishes two types of intentionality: operative (or motor) 
intentionality and thetic intentionality. Per Mallin, the perceptual, affective and motor-practical 
given capacities are characterized by operative intentionality; whereas, “thetic intentionality, that 
which makes a definite claim or judgment about its object, is uniquely characteristic of the 
cognitive realm” (Mallin 38). I understand this, generally, to articulate a basic distinction 
between pre-reflective and reflective experience. Thetic intentionality builds upon operative 
intentionality. 
74. This conceptualization would be very interesting to explore in dialogue with Laban’s 
movement theory, with respect to Laban’s concept of the freeing and binding of flow. Maletic’s 
analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s intentionality as related to Laban’s Effort theory provides a 
beginning for this, which is well beyond the scope of this study. 
75. This is discussed by Mallin on pages 14-15 wherein he notes the difficulty in describing 
these ideas in language which “forces us to speak of them in one of these two ways [subjective 
and objective]” (14) when they inherently and fundamentally belong to one another. 
76. Mallin points out that Merleau-Ponty uses the term “polymorphic matrix” in The Visible 
and the Invisible to describe this system of structures (Mallin 35n16). 
77. As discussed in my Introductory chapter, throughout this document, I yoke terms in 
neologisms, as in this example, in order to convey a quality of dynamic simultaneity and attempt 
to address, or at least remind the reader of, the ineffectiveness of given English language to 
effectively articulate such lived experiences. 
78. I see how this is risky. What if the other doesn’t approach in this way? What if the other 
is violent and encumbered? What if I am violent and encumbered but unaware? This is why, as I 
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will discuss in my concluding chapter, this practicing performing is located in a theatrical, 
performance context. It is a (relatively) safe space to propose, enact, practice, suggest, imply, 
show, share. Hay’s practice is radical and not practical for daily life – but in its radical proposal, 
it provokes a reconsideration of the accumulated sediment and lets us know there are ways to 
excavate, and possibly open new pathways, channels. I think even of my responsibility to my 
daughter. My ethical responsibility to her is to provide some structures and to approach her 
through some structures, but not all of them are ethical because not all of them allow for her 
freedom and subjectivity. It is this dynamic that I understand Irigaray to be after and why, as I 
will also discuss in my conclusion, I think Hay’s work is pre-relational, not relational. It is a 
proposal, a practice. In relationality, structures must come into play, but it is a question of how 
we allow these structures to form between us that is at issue I think. Who decides how? Is it 
possible to respect alterity and develop structures of relationality that are more ethical?  
79. Take, for example, the establishment in 2009 of the new Journal of Dance and Somatic 
Practices.  
80. Hay almost never physically demonstrates movement, though in open group practice, 
she often moves with the group. She herself notes this on her website, and it has been remarked 
upon by others including Ann Daly and Megan Nicely. 
81. On various occasions, dance scholar Sally Banes has critiqued the use of the term post-
modern with respect to dance, arguing that the values and concerns associated with post-modern 
dance actually align more readily with the values and concerns of modernism in the visual arts, 
as set out by art critic Clement Greenberg (Banes, “Terpsichore in Sneakers, High Heels …” 
303). 
82. See Daly’s “Horse Rider” for a discussion of Hay’s intentional exploration of writing as 
a method for transmitting her dances to other performers. 
83. In addition to Daly’s discussion with Hay about the communicative import of language 
for Hay in sharing her practice with others (see note 81 above), Drobnick also remarks several 
times on Hay’s need for a shared language in order to work across difference with both trained 
and non-trained dancers (43 and 45). 
84. I have made reference to this distinction between improvisation and choreography in the 
introduction and I have used discussions of improvisation to contextualize and support my 
thinking in chapter 3. In the conclusion of chapter 5, I more thoroughly distinguish choreography 
and improvisation with respect to Hay’s work, which as I’ve noted, she maintains is emphatically 
not improvisation. 
85. While not made explicit in our discussion or ethics process, I feel my commitment to 
Hay precludes my including the full score as an appendix to this document as it is rightly her 
creative work and is not generally available for public use at this time. Another of her scores, No 
Time to Fly, is available to the public via William Forsythe’s Motion Bank website project, of 
which Hay’s work was a part. 
86. I have noted elsewhere Hay’s choreographic genealogy in the 1960s avant-garde, with 
choreographers’ pre-occupation and experimentation with tasks and games as compositional 
strategies to challenge the emphasis on technical virtuosity, emotional expression and narrative 
structure in modern dance prior to that time. 
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87. For a productive study on the experiential dimensions of solo improvisational dance 
practice, see de Spain. 
88. I have commented earlier in the chapter on this distinction in relation to Drobnick’s work 
on the topic. 
89. Certainly, according to the contract all SPCP participants sign, I also have a professional 
responsibility to Hay to respect her choreography and uphold its integrity. 
90. In the SCPC residency, Hay verbally offered this image of the way affect or emotion 
might ripple across one’s face like wind on the surface of water. 
91. Rosalind Krauss has also similarly commented on the dissociation of movement and 
meaning in Hay’s work, describing “the nature of Hay’s physical performance” as a “message 
without a code” and “a message disengaged from the codes of dance” (211). 
92. Hay references this in the score itself (Hay, At Once 1) and other writers have 
commented on it, as I have discussed in chapter 2. Susan Foster addresses it in depth as I have 
noted on page 37. 
93. In my adaptation of the score, I changed market/mall to city about halfway through my 
three months of practice. I found that in order to perform market/mall, I was strongly drawn into 
an active reflective thought process in which I found myself locked into “creating a mall” in my 
imagination and then projecting it into the space around me so that I could then “notice it”. This 
reflective process continually halted my practice of the score, running counter to Hay’s direction 
and what I understand the practice to entail. In making the change, I was not trying to remove the 
effort required “to refrain from creating”, which Hay addresses in her note; rather, I was 
attempting to remove a major block to my performance of the score. Once I made the change 
from market/mall to city, it became possible to simply “notice it” rather than having to actively 
conjure and project an image. 
94. With this phrase in quotes I explicitly reference J.L. Austin’s seminal text “How to Do 
Things with Words”. 
95. Drobnick defines Hay’s term “Performance Meditation” as “a specific phrase or 
affirmation that focuses the mind of the performer during a performance” (53). 
96. In her foreword to Hay’s book My Body, The Buddhist, dance scholar Susan Foster 
writes of Hay’s “postulation of body as the ever-changing cumulative performance of seventy-
five trillion semi-independent cells” (Foster, Foreword xii). 
97. For anyone familiar with Contact Improvisation, this relates to what the form’s founder 
Steve Paxton has called “the small dance”.  
98. As noted elsewhere, see the back matter of Hay’s My Body, the Buddhist for a 
chronological list. 
99. In fact, following one of my practices of the solo during the residency in Scotland, Hay 
suggested to me that I “lighten up” and I understand this now to be essential in the practice of the 
work, for in focusing and trying too hard, I move toward specification and stabilization, against 
which the performance practice works. 
100. Certainly one could examine Hay’s practicing performing through the literatures on 
creativity and play, in which I would expect some common ground with the work I’ve done here. 
Taking up those literatures is beyond the scope of this study.  
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101. Both Drobnick and Foster, among others, have remarked on the koan-like phrasing of 
Hay’s statements. 
102. “Falling in” is a phrase I have come to use that describes an experience of becoming 
engaged by, going with/following and developing a movement theme, image or idea. In the 
previous section of this chapter, I have included a journal entry that describes the experience and 
the necessity of navigating “the precarious edge”.  
103. As a Laban Movement Analyst, I recognize the strong correlation between these 
descriptions and dynamic bodily processes as described in the LMA framework of Body, Effort, 
Shape, Space (BESS). As discussed earlier, I don’t use the LMA framework or vocabulary in this 
study. This point of connection, however, prompts a further exploration of the relations between 
Merleau-Ponty’s work and LMA, building on the foundation established by Vera Maletic. 
104. These disambiguating definitions of comprehend and apprehend are offered in the entry 
for comprehend under Usage. 
105. The difference in this example is that it relies on a pre-structured experience of “alarm-
clock-waking-bedside table-arm-hand-button” whereas, in Hay’s work there isn’t this object-
oriented pre-structured experience to rely upon, per se. 
106. The visual perceptual dimension of Hay’s practice has been given significant emphasis 
by several scholars including Nicely and Satin. The perceptual dimensions of touch and hearing 
have not been as substantially considered.  
107. All these qualities can be tangibly measured by devices that one would find in a lab. 
Hay’s tool “I need the lab” suggests this connection, and I have included it as a secondary tool in 
combination with “be a barometer of space”. 
108. In a footnote on the score for No Time To Fly (2010), Hay writes: “My use of the word 
‘dis-attach’ instead of ‘detach’: to detach has become a generalized concept that, at this time, 
often loses the experience of the personal. To dis-attach requires more action on my part as a 
practitioner. I need to recognize where I am before I can choose to dis-attach from where I am.” 
(No Time to Fly 30). 
109. In conventional dance practice grounded in a technique, I definitely aim before I fire; I 
aim toward the movement form or figure I am to execute. In improvisational dance practice, I 
still aim before I fire; in this case, I aim toward a possible movement form or figure that I 
discover in the process of moving and my intent is still toward this “something”, this evolving 
figure or form. In Hay’s “ready, fire, aim”, the “movement arises without looking for it” (Hay, At 
Once 1) and my focus is decidedly not on the movement form or figure but on sustaining the 
practice of attention. Aim, coming after fire, does not point me back to the movement that arose, 
in a reflective return, but rather draws me continually toward the practice itself, demanding my 
attention and inhibiting the possibility to lose focus and instead begin to follow or “fall in” to the 
ripple effect of the movement impulse of the “fire” experience. This cue prompts the mover to 
subvert his/her own habits and patterns, “removing my sequencing from the sequence” (which is 
another of Hay’s verbal cues related to this one). The experience is one of surprise, an entry into 
the realm of the unfamiliar, the not-known, the not-already-known. This experience is not, 
however, of randomness or flailing or chaos because there remains in the verbal cue the intention 
and action of aiming. 
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110. In an interview with Hay as part of her essay “Deborah Hay’s O, O”, Danielle Goldman 
raises a question about the necessity for a kind of trust in relation to Hay’s work: “I guess I was 
wondering whether a kind of trust is necessary to allow that kind of invitation in the first place. 
In the workshop, we built a shared vocabulary in the safety of the studio. What does it mean to 
generously invite being seen in situations that are far less certain, or comfortable?”. For 
approximately the first month of my three-month practice period, I worked outside in a park and 
experienced a related dilemma. I encountered the difficulty of remaining committed to the 
practice and particularly to “inviting being seen” in the presence of passersby. These moments 
raised the question of how they would understand (or not) what I was doing and what 
interpretation and meaning they might develop, without the explicit theatrical performance frame 
to situate them. My concern with this at times is revealed in my journaling in which I discuss my 
self-conscious awareness of being seen in this potentially very odd-looking activity in a public 
park and the ways in which I purposefully shifted my performance of the practice into a more 
“readable” modality, pushing my performance toward potentially graspable meaningfulness by 
emphasizing interpretive structure toward “tai chi” or “physical workout”, while also “closing” 
my attention (and therefore invitational performance openness) in a way so that I articulated 
myself as a figure of action in order to communicate my wish to not be disturbed. Within the 
theatrical dance performance situation, the intentionality/intention of such a context allows more 
freedom for the practice, without the risks I faced in public space in being without framing or 
contextual cues. 
111. I experienced this possibility as well in my studio practice when I worked alone. At 
times I struggled to maintain fidelity to the practice as performance and would “fall in” to my 
inner experience, it drawing my intentionality/intention in such a way that the situation shifted 
from theatrical dance performance to personal meditation or therapy, in which my personal 
process become a kind of figure of attention. In these instances, the constructed situation of 
theatrical dance performance and some temporarily forgotten aspect of the score, questions or 
tools would draw me back to “the edge” of the practice. “Inviting being seen” was often a strong 
and helpful tool in these cases. 
112. Drobnick’s definition of Hay’s term Ah-Ha has some potential resonance here. 
Drobnick writes that an ah-ha is: “a lucid moment of revelation. An epiphany-like moment that 
engenders a ‘spontaneously inclusive cosmic shift in perception’ (Drobnick and Hay qtd. in 
Drobnick 47).  
113. In an article about Hay’s work, dance scholar Selma Odom quotes internationally 
renowned choreographic innovator William Forsythe describing his experience of Hay’s work: 
“You brought me to a level of attention that I love. And you kept me there” (Forsythe qtd. in 
Odom 28). 
114. I adapt this two-part phrase from Kent de Spain. 
115. Throughout this chapter, I will continue to use neologisms to remind the reader of the 
lived experiences of flux and paradoxical simultaneity that I am describing and discussing. 
116. De Spain uses this term independently from any reference to Merleau-Ponty. 
117. I have addressed this in reviewing the literature on Hay in chapter two, noting the way 
Hay herself has appropriated this language at times to reference her work. 
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118. In descriptive italic sections throughout this chapter, anything in quotes is either 
directly from the choreography – score, questions or tools or is Hay’s voice, echoing from the 
residency experience. 
119. Again, I use these neologisms to imply the holistic and simultaneous experience of 
these “world” imprints in my body. 
120. This is a metaphorical reference to the dance form of contact improvisation in which 
two dancers move together in close proximity and non-prescribed movement, sharing weight and 
rolling around, over, under and with each other through sustained touch and following a 
travelling point of contact between the two bodies: arm to arm, arm to leg, torso to back, head to 
hand, foot to hip, etc. For an ethnographic study of the form see Novack. 
121. Here I do not address the various and complex notions of subjectivity and identity in 
cultural debates per se. 
122. It is worth noting that my experiences of space are generally associated with touch, 
whereas, as will be discussed, my experiences of time are generally associated with hearing. 
Further analysis might reveal another layer of connection between perception of the various 
phenomena and specific senses, which also begins to appear in my earlier analysis of the 
experience of the tools in Hay’s choreography. This could be the focus of another study. 
123. In developing my theoretical framework earlier in this document, I distinguished the 
terms movement and action. I defined action, with respect to Merleau-Ponty’s term motility, as 
all actualized voluntary and involuntary body activity. Action thus forms the third aspect of the 
triumvirate dynamic relation (intentionality/intention, attention, action) that organizes my 
analysis of Hay’s choreography, specifically in chapter 4. Here I use the term movement for two 
reasons: 1) it is the word I used in my first-order journal entries and extrapolated descriptions 
and therefore its use in this section maintains a clear relationship for the reader between the 
descriptions (from which I quote here) and my analysis in this chapter; and 2) when I use the 
term action, I use it as part of the triumvirate dynamic relation and I have specified that this 
includes the action of perception; whereas here, in using the word movement, I am more 
generally referring to my experience of dynamic bodily change and flux in the dance. There is 
also a nuance here with respect to the two terms in that “action” derives through theoretical 
reflection, whereas “movement” arises through experiential description. I acknowledge the 
relation between the two terms and use movement in this specific discussion. 
124. In Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of temporality, he works through a long discussion of 
time through the metaphor of a flowing river or stream, a metaphor that he notes has been with 
us since Heraclitus. In his discussion, Merleau-Ponty critiques this metaphor and moves past it in 
his articulation of the phenomenon of time (Phenomenology of Perception 477-479). 
125. Of course sometimes this flux opens to me in daily life, such as when I encounter a 
very old object, for example, and I fleetingly perceive its enduring materiality, the pastness in its 
present. This brief perception is rapidly obscured by the layers of meaning and context – my 
grandmother’s ring, my grandmother, my mother, passing down of heirlooms, weddings, pearls, 
oysters, shells, sand, ocean – that slide in over top and shift the perceptual relation and 
experience of time to the background of experience. Yes, within the layers of meaning and 
context, we can also still understand the signs of experiential time; however, they are signs 
comprehended logical/rational (cognitively) and not perceptions apprehended somatically. 
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126. This description of my experience of time as linear progression recalls Laban’s analysis 
of the dimension of time in movement in which movement can reveal an attitude of either 
fighting/quickening (strong resistance to time) or indulging/sustaining (going with the flow). 
Though I am describing a lived experience in this particular extrapolation, time is still here 
conceptualized as a force outside of myself.  
127. I would like to remark here that the three dimensions I discuss here: I-world, body-
space and movement-time seem to align with the triumvirate dynamic relation of 
intentionality/intention, attention and action via Laban Movement Analysis. In LMA, the vertical 
dimension activates a sense of weight, having thus to do with a sense of self or “I” and the 
capacity for intention. The horizontal dimension activates an awareness of environment, having 
to do with a sense of space and the capacity for attention. The sagittal dimension activates an 
awareness of goingness, having to do with flow through time and the capacity for progression or 
action. This could be a fruitful overlap to explore in a separate study. 
128. This term becomes important in chapter 6 where I discuss what I consider to be the 
unconsummated, pre-relationality precipitated in Hay’s work. 
129. I will further address this point about Hay’s work as practice versus training in my 
conclusion. 
130. Here in her text Albright references her invocation of Heidegger’s notion of dwelling 
from his Poetry, Language, Thought in the chapter “Building Dwelling Thinking”. 
131. Note that Godard links the gestural anacrusis to his concept of the tonic dialogue which 
could be examined with respect to Merleau-Ponty’s global motility and primordial contact and 
also with respect to LMA’s discussions of Weight Sensing with respect to developmental 
reflexes and patterning. Interestingly, Godard uses Trisha Brown as an example of a 
choreographer who is working through an understanding of and inquiry into what he calls the 
“tonic dialogue”, though Brown’s work is invoked to illustrate the way in which dance organizes 
intensities and releases of the gravitational system to express poetic quality. Hay’s project is 
different in its resistance to poeisis of that kind. However, it’s worth remarking on the fact that 
these choreographers are contemporaries, with roots in the 1960s avant-garde, and have each 
been working, exploring, practicing dance, movement, choreography, relatively consistently for 
over fifty years. It’s not surprising that this longevity and commitment could reveal substantial 
somatic knowledge. Nicely also completes a case study on Trisha Brown that could possibly be 
brought into contact with Godard’s thinking. 
132. This discussion could be considerably expanded through the literature on creativity; 
however, this is beyond the scope of my project. Considering Hay’s work in the context of 
creativity, generally, also implies an interest in the purpose, outcome or result of this experience 
of the “unknown open”. This is not Hay’s interest, nor mine at this juncture. I am aiming to 
describe and articulate the experience and how Hay choreographs it.  In the following chapter, I 
will consider some possible “thens” to Hay’s “What if…?”. For now, on the topic of creativity as 
raised by Manning, I will point out that her interval – where she locates the nexus of creativity – 
comes after both preacceleration and relation, in her dynamic process. I align somatic anacrusis 
with Manning’s preacceleration and as such, somatic anacrusis would come before creativity per 
se. Briefly thinking this through, I would point out that I have articulated somatic anacrusis as 
arising from a destructuring process and that creativity is arguably a structuring or restructuring 
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process. Creativity might benefit from or even require a destructuring process in advance but this 
destructuring is distinct from creativity as I’m thinking about it here. Somatic anacrusis pulls 
away from meaning-making; creativity pushes toward it. This short digression is relevant to the 
following section in which I distinguish Hay’s choreography from improvisation and set 
choreographic work because both improvisation and set dance work value and work toward 
meaningfulness, or what Hay has identified as “resolution”. 
133. As I wrote this description, working from bodily sensing to find descriptive language, 
the word “kindling” jumped forward as the apt word to describe this experience and only as I 
worked through the description did I find in that word the connotations of fire and light, which 
align so well, culturally speaking, with cognition and thinking. This in itself is a kind of example 
of the process I’m trying to describe in which I had a “felt experience” of the form or action of 
cognition and allowed the experience to register sufficiently that cognition could jump in and 
name it “for me”, thus drawing out meaningfulness. 
134. Douse is the right word here too, with respect to the fluidity of experiencing as I am 
describing it. 
135. I have indicated earlier, in chapter 4, that I adapted this section as City, not Mall. 
Nonetheless, I maintained fidelity to the score’s cues in this section. 
136. Of course there is a great range of approaches to both improvisation and set work, 
across a spectrum of genres and practices. Much more nuance and gradations of resolution could 
be revealed through individual experiences than I can address here. I recognize the generalization 
I’m making, which serves its purpose in this discussion. For a survey of approaches to 
improvisation in dance see Buckwalter. Further, my triumvirate dynamic relation of 
intentionality/intention, attention and action would be interesting to apply in emergent 
choreographic analyses of other task-based, pedestrian and performance art-type events. Such 
analyses would no doubt refract the distinctness of Hay’s work and develop further specificity 
with respect to improvisational practices in dance. 
137. Considering the performance context, the theatre and the audience, opens up the 
possibility to discuss the particular relationality engendered by Hay’s work, which I will address 
in my final chapter. 
138. I address Bauer’s writing on Hay more fully in chapter 6. 
139. See my earlier discussion of the presentation of Hay’s work Blues at the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York City in 2012. 
140. Or perhaps, in another play on words in keeping with the above, pre-forming, but I will 
leave this play for another time. 
141. As I have quoted earlier: Hay writes in her 1988 article “Remaining Positionless”: “In 
The Man Who Grew Common In Wisdom (1987), I return to choreography but remove all 
movement that could not be created by a traffic cop from Duluth. It is deliberately prosaic. The 
choreography is similarly reduced, stripped of everything unusual” (“Remaining Positionless” 
22-23). 
142. In dance, this term is used to describe the process of quickly running through a 
movement sequence or choreography without actually dancing it fully. Marking involves 
gesturing through the material, abbreviating various elements in order to generally map the order, 
spacing and timing of the sequence. 
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143. Of course this impulse is not new. The history of theatre broadly speaking, as Jacques 
Rancière points out in his essay “The Emancipated Spectator”, has always been concerned with 
the role of the audience, the spectator, and “activation” strategies have run the gamut: Rancière 
makes reference to the Brechtian and Artaudian paradigms.  
144. Because in this study, I am working from the experience of the performer, I am not able 
to directly address audience members’ experiences of the work – which in any event cannot be 
subsumed into a generalizable experience. 
145. Here, I note the unmistakable echo of Derrida’s trace in Daly’s reception, which could 
be further explored in relation to my experiential analysis of Hay’s work here. 
146. In both Irigaray’s text and in my understanding of Hay’s dance, the emphasis on the 
present, and even on the future, in a kind of inciting act, recalls Erin Manning’s use of the future 
anterior tense to characterize movement’s incipiency (Manning 24). Here, I want to point out 
how Irigaray’s and Hay’s projects have a political edge because of the way that their work 
performs the potential of incipiency. Nicely also makes this connection with Manning’s thought 
(171) and characterizes Hay’s choreography as a kind of future writing, her main thesis and the 
connecting thread among the choreographic case studies she analyses in her dissertation.  
147. For a related provocation, see Patrick Finn’s Critical Condition, in which through an 
invigorating discussion of the history of critical thinking and a critique thereof, he calls for its 
replacement by what he calls “loving thinking” based on practices of creativity, found in their 
most fully realized form in the performing arts. 
148. In considering the ‘agency’ of the artwork, it might also be interesting, in combination 
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